Colombia: The Problem of Illegal Narcotics and U.S. - Colombian Relations

Colombia: The Problem of Illegal Narcotics and U.S. - Colombian Relations

98-152 F
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Colombia: The Problem of Illegal Narcotics
and U.S. - Colombian Relations
Updated May 11, 1998
Nina M. Serafino
Specialist in International Security Affairs
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Colombia: The Problem of Illegal Narcotics
and U.S. - Colombian Relations
Summary
The United States has long been concerned with Colombia as a major producer
and trafficker of the illegal narcotics entering this country: first marijuana, then
cocaine, and now also heroin. Colombia's drug trafficking business has been
dominated by two cartels during the two decades in which cocaine trafficking became
a major activity: first the Medellin cartel, which dominated during the 1980s and
then the Cali cartel, which dominated during the early 1990s. With the arrests of the
major Cali cartel leaders in the mid-1990s, independent traffickers have filled the
void.
The rise of the cartels had significant social, political, and economic effects in
Colombia. During the 1990s, U.S. officials became highly troubled by the degree
to which leaders of the drug-trafficking organizations had become accepted into the
mainstream of Colombian life and allegedly influenced the political system through
funds passed to politicians. Bilateral relations deteriorated significantly with the
inauguration to a four year term in August 1994 of President Ernesto Samper, whose
campaign received funds from drug lords.
In March 1996 and March 1997, the Clinton Administration “decertified”
Colombia in the annual review of cooperation on counternarcotics efforts, faulting
the administration of President Samper for insufficient efforts to control traffickers.
Decertification led to the required cut-off of certain categories of aid which Colombia
was receiving. These included Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International
Military Education and Training (IMET) funds, investment guarantees for U.S.
businesses through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and trade
financing for U.S. business through the EXIM Bank.
Decertification also required U.S. representatives to international financial
institutions to vote against funding for Colombia; funding to Colombia continues
through the World Bank and through the normal (i.e., nearly market-rate) lending
accounts of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), but the threat of the U.S.
veto has blocked funding to Colombia through the IDB's concessionary rate, local
currency fund. The Administration has not invoked discretionary sanctions, which
would curtail trade tariff preferences.
Nevertheless, bilateral counternarcotics efforts continue. Substantial funding
has continued through the State Department's counternarcotics program, as permitted
by the decertification. In mid 1997, the Clinton Administration authorized resumed
FMF and IMET funding to Colombia's security forces, and now provides assistance
to the Colombian National Police, the air force and the navy. Assistance to the
Colombian army may be provided once the State Department scrutinizes information
from the Colombian army on the human rights records of units which would receive
the aid.

Contents
Colombian Drug-trafficking Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Links with the Guerrilla Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Problems of Violence And Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Influence on the Political System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Effects on the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
U.S.-Colombian Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Effects of Decertification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Colombian Government Action in 1996 and the Clinton Administration’s 1997
Decertification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Colombian Government Action in 1997 and the Clinton Administration’s 1998
Certification on National Interest Grounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Scope of U.S. Assistance to Colombian Counter-Drug Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Congressional Concerns and Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Colombia: The Problem of Illegal Narcotics
and U.S. - Colombian Relations
Colombian Drug-trafficking Organizations1
With most of their leaders dead or jailed, the powerful cocaine cartels of the
1980s are declining and apparently being replaced by independent traffickers, who
increasingly deal in heroin. The Medellin cartel became prominent in the early
1980s, as cocaine replaced marijuana as Colombia’s primary illegal export and
Colombia became the source of most of the world’s supply. (Colombia has also
become an increasingly important producer of coca leaf, the raw material from which
cocaine is produced. It still ranks behind Peru and Bolivia in coca leaf production,
but in 1997 it surpassed both countries in the amount of land dedicated to coca
cultivation.) Since its former leader, Pablo Escobar, was killed by security forces
after escaping from jail in December 1993, the Medellin cartel has also appeared
quiescent, even though in 1996, Escobar’s No. 2 man, Jorge Luis Ochoa, and
Ochoa’s two brothers, Juan David and Fabio, were released after serving less than six
years in jail.
Despite the incarceration or death of its principal leaders over the last few years
and its apparent decline, the Cali cartel remains the primary Colombian trafficking
organization, although independent traffickers (see below) are increasingly moving
into the market. Much more sophisticated than its predecessors, the Cali cartel
“fashioned itself after the Sicilian Mafia and the La Cosa Nostra.” It “pioneere
2
d
large-scale shipment to the United States and sophisticated money-laundering
schemes, and shared these innovations with others....”3 At the height of its power
earlier in the 1990s, the Cali cartel earned annual revenues of $7 billion, according
to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The cartel’s activity reportedly
began to decline with the arrest of several leaders in 1995, but drug proceeds remain
high. According to DEA testimony in February 1996, by the estimate of Colombian
economists, the Cali cartel was then repatriating $4.5 billion per year to Colombia.
1 Sources for this section include DEA testimony to Congress. Where cited, the testimony
is referred to by date. Thomas A. Constantine, DEA Administrator, testified to the House
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, House International Relations Committee, on
September 12, 1996, and June 6, 1996; to the House Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs and Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight, on September 19, 1996; and to the House Banking and Financial Committee,
February 28, 1996.
2 DEA Congressional testimony, op.cit. June 6, 1996.
3 Washington Post, Drug Lords Feuding in Colombia, June 10, 1996.

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The Colombian National Police first arrested a Cali cartel leader, Gilberto
Rodriguez Orjeuela, in June 1995. By September 1996, police had arrested the
remaining top Cali leaders, including Rodriguez’ brother, Miguel. Both brothers
pleaded guilty to trafficking in June 1996, and were sentenced in January 1997,
Miguel to 9 years and Gilberto to 10. In mid-1997, the DEA testified that the
incarcerated Rodriguez Orejuela brothers continue to operate, but "they are unable
to control their vast empire from jail" to the extent that they previously did when
their empire "reached into the cities and towns of the United States either through
their U.S.-based infrastructure or their surrogates who sold crack cocaine on the
streets..." Now others, principally Mexican organized crime families, have become
the dominant figures in the cocaine trade and the U.S. wholesale market.
Nevertheless, according to DEA, "the remnants of the Cali group still directed by the
Orejeulas [sic], as well as Cali splinter groups such as the Grajales-Urdinolas,
[remain or] have become powerful forces in their own right."4
Several groups of Colombian “independent” traffickers from the northern
Cauca Valley have become prominent in cocaine trafficking and have expanded their
activities through the sale of cheap, high quality heroin that is 80 to 90 percent pure.
Heroin became a significant export from Colombia after 1990, when substantial
opium poppy cultivation in Colombia was first reported. The DEA predicted in early
1997 that, if the current trend continued, Colombia’s independent traffickers would
dominate the heroin market in North America by 2000. (The Colombian export of
heroin to the United States in 1997 was only slightly higher than that of 1996,
however.) These groups market heroin throughout the Northeast and East Coast,
using groups from the Dominican Republic "to handle, and to some degree, control
wholesale and street level distribution of cocaine and heroin."5
Links with the Guerrilla Organizations
Colombia’s illegal narcotics industry also receives support from leftist guerrilla
groups, and provides financing for those groups. The Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) are paid by traffickers
to protect crops, laboratories, storage facilities, and airfields from government anti-
narcotics efforts.6
The Problems of Violence And Corruption7
4 Testimony of Donnie Marshall, DEA Chief of Operations, before the Subcommittee on
National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice, July 9, 1997. Available at
www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct970709.htm.
5 Ibid.
6 National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee. The NNICC Report 1995: The
Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States. August 1996. DEA-96024. p. 15.

7 This section is based largely on news reports from the Miami Herald, the Washington Post
(continued...)

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Colombia has long been troubled by violence and corruption associated with
drug trafficking. The Medellin cartel had attempted to force the government to desist
from efforts to curb trafficking largely through assassinations and bombings. In the
1980s and early 1990s, hundreds of policemen, judges, and journalists, as well as
four presidential candidates were killed, and the Medellin cartel was believed
responsible for many of the killings. The Cali cartel has been seen to operate
differently, trying to insinuate itself into elite social and political circles and
depending largely on corruption rather than violence to achieve its ends.
Analysts point to the corrosive effects of the illegal narcotics industry on
Colombia. A noted Colombian analyst states that the country’s weak and elite-based
institutions provided an opportunity for the rise of the drug cartels in the 1980s,
which in turn weakened the state further through “pervasive” detrimental effects on
Colombian society. “The industry’s illegal nature coupled with its substantial profits
have exacerbated the problems of violence and have contributed substantially to the
growth of the underground economy and corruption in society and state institutions,”
writes Francisco Thoumi. The illegal narcotics industry “took advantage of and
enhanced the weaknesses of the state, accelerating its decline as a provider of a
framework in which society operates.” The pervasive corruption has led som
8
e
critics to label Colombia a “narcodemocracy,” but others find the label unfair because
many government officials and other Colombians reject drug trafficking.
Influence on the Political System
Revelations of connections between members of Colombia’s political elite and
prominent drug traffickers first surfaced after President Ernesto Samper Pizano’s
August 1994 inauguration. Soon after President Samper’s election in May, reports
were published that he had accepted Cali cartel funds. As investigations into
Samper’s campaign finances took place in 1994 and 1995, reports began to circulate
of longstanding ties between drug traffickers and several prominent members of the
Colombian elite. In August 1995, at a time when 12 members of the Colombian
Congress were under investigation for drug-related corruption, Colombian legislators
publicly acknowledged drug traffickers’ influence in the country’s political system.
One member of the Colombian Congress stated that most political campaigns had
received money from drug traffickers over the previous 15 years.9 Although
President Samper was eventually cleared by the Congress of charges brought against
him by the country’s prosecutor general, several members of Colombia’s legislature
10
7(...continued)
and the New York Times.
8 Francisco Thoumi. Political Economy and Illegal Drugs in Colombia. Boulder: Lynn
Rienner Publishers, 1995. p. 5. Thoumi is an economist and one of Colombia’s foremost
experts on narcotics trafficking.

9 Drug Investigation in Colombia Puts Focus on Ruling Class. Washington Post, August 23,
1995.
1 0 In February 1996, Prosecutor General Alfonso Valdivieso formally accused President
(continued...)

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were eventually arrested and jailed for “illegal enrichment” because of their
acceptance of drug money.
Effects on the Economy
Although conventional wisdom among Colombians apparently has held, at least
until recently, that the drug trafficking industry benefits Colombia’s economy, some
11
analysts have concluded that the overall economic effects are negative. Thoumi
describes the illegal narcotics trafficking industry as “an expression of primitive and
raw capitalism that contradicts the spirit of change....the industry concentrates
income, weakens the legitimacy of property rights, discourages growth in the
economy’s formal sector, makes it harder for the government to collect taxes, [and]
necessitates increased expenditures...”12
Drug traffickers use many individuals and businesses to launder money abroad.
As of its latest posting, the U.S. Treasury has placed some 482 individuals and
companies (with Colombian addresses) on the Specially Designated Narcotics
Traffickers (SDNT) list, developed under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA) of October 1995. This is a list of individuals and companies
believed to be operating on behalf of, or owned or controlled by drug traffickers. The
U.S. assets of these businesses and individuals are frozen and Americans are
prohibited from doing business with them. Among the businesses are several large
poultry farms and processing plants, investment and import/export firms, and real
estate developers.
13
U.S.-Colombian Relations14
10(...continued)
Samper of four crimes stemming from the alleged receipt of cartel monies. Evidence against
Samper included testimony by his campaign treasurer that the campaign had received $5.9
million in such funds. Samper insisted that he was unaware of the contribution. After a
congressional committee investigated the accusations, Colombia’s House of Representatives
cleared the President, 111-43, of the four charges in June 1996.
1 1 The World Bank estimates that drug trafficking produces an amount equivalent to seven
percent of Colombia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). See: Colombia: Country
Overview, on theWorld Bank website, http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/lac/
colombia.html.
12 Thoumi, op.cit., pp. 5-6.

13 The list, dated September 9, 1997, is available at:www.fedworld.gov/pub/tel/t11drugs.pdf,
or through the U.S. Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control home page at
www.ustreas.gov/treasury/services/fac/fac.html. Types of businesses described in a Reuters
dispatch. January 15, 1997.
1 4 Sources include: Guy Gugliotta and Jeff Leen. Kings of Cocaine: Inside the Medellin
(continued...)

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Traditionally close bilateral relations began to deteriorate in the 1980s as the
United States and Colombia differed sharply over approaches to curb illegal cocaine
trafficking. Counternarcotics cooperation on marijuana control had been close in the
1970s, and in 1979, the two countries signed a bilateral extradition treaty, just as
cocaine was growing into a multibillion dollar export. The U.S. and Colombian
perspectives on counternarcotics strategy began to diverge in the mid-1980s,
however, as the Medellin cartel retaliated against the government when then-
President Belisario Betancour decided to extradite several cartel leaders after the May
1984 murder of Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla. Since then, Colombia’s
priority has been to reduce the violence, while the U.S. priority has been to eliminate
the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics.
Former President Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994) broke with his predecessor’s policy
of extraditing drug traffickers to the United States. In September 1990, he offered
drug traffickers the option of trial in Colombia if they turned themselves in and
confessed to a crime. This brought relative peace to Colombia as drug violenc
15
e
abated, but provoked strains in bilateral relations, particularly because plea-bargain
deals with major traffickers gave them sentences as short as three years. Another
cause of friction was Colombia’s adoption in 1991 of a new constitution forbidding
extradition.
After President Ernesto Samper of the Liberal Party took office in August 1994,
relations deteriorated still further. Clinton Administration officials stated that
Samper had disregarded U.S. warnings of cartel contributions to his campaign,
incurring their distrust. Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration certified Colombia
on national interest grounds in the annual narcotics cooperations review of March
1995, even though President Clinton found that Colombia was not cooperating fully
on counternarcotics efforts. In March 1996, however, the President “decertified”
Colombia, althought the Administration acknowledged successes in 1995, including
drug seizures, the destruction of clandestine airfields, and the arrest of several top
Cali cartel leaders.
Effects of Decertification.
The decertifications led to the required cut-off of certain categories of aid which
Colombia was receiving. These included Foreign Military Financing (FMF),
International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds, investment guarantees
14(...continued)
Cartel. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989; and Dennia M. Hanratty and Sandra W.
Meditz, eds., Colombia: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army,
1990.
1 5 Extradition has never been well-regarded by Colombian citizens. According to polls
conducted by the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the 11% of Colombians who favored
extradition in July 1991 had grown to 31% in December 1996, when most Colombians,
66%, still opposed extradition even though opponents had shrunk from 86% in 1991. From:
“Colombian Views on Illegal Narcotics,” January 28, 1997, by the USIA Office of Research
and Media Reaction.

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for U.S. businesses through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and
trade financing for U.S. business through the EXIM Bank. The decertification also
required U.S. representatives at international financial institutions to vote against
funding for Colombia; funding to Colombia continues through the World Bank and
through the normal (i.e., nearly market-rate) lending accounts of the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB), but the threat of the U.S. veto has blocked funding to
Colombia through the IDB's concessionary rate, local currency fund. The
Administration has not invoked discretionary sanctions, which would curtail trade
tariff preferences. Substantial funding has continued through the State Department's
counternarcotics program, as permitted by the decertification. In mid 1997, the
Clinton Administration took the steps necessary to resume funding to Colombia's
security forces, and now provides assistance to the Colombian National Police, the
air force and the navy. (See the section on the Scope of U.S. Assistance to
Colombian Counterdrug Efforts, below, for more information on the resumption of
military funding.)
Colombian Government Action in 1996 and the Clinton
Administration’s 1997 Decertification
The Colombian government billed 1996 as “a year of significant progress” in
its war on drugs, and claims that “Colombia has done more than any other single
country to combat drug trafficking.”16 It states that it spent $1.3 billion on
counternarcotics efforts during 1996, up from $900 million the previous year. It also:
carried out eradication spraying over 73,581 acres of coca and poppy; confiscated
1.35 million pounds of coca leaf, 124,575 pounds of pure cocaine and base, and more
than $400 million in assets; and destroyed “more narcotics processing labs,
clandestine airstrips, and transportation infrastructure than ever before”. In addition,
the Colombian government enacted new asset forfeiture laws “intended to bankrupt
narcotics traffickers,” implemented new laws on money laundering, and concluded
a new maritime understanding and eradication verification protocols with the United
States.
The Clinton Administration, on the other hand, cited limited cooperation by the
presidency and Congress and “pervasive corruption” during 1996 in its March 1997
decertification. In the report accompanying the decertification, the Administration
pointed to the short sentences given the Rodriguez Orjeuela brothers as evidence of
corruption in the legal system. It faulted Colombia for opposing the testing of
herbicides to combat coca cultivation. It stated that coca cultivation had increased
by about 30 percent during 1996, and that drug seizures were lower than the previous
year.
On the positive side, the Administration praised the “serious work” of
Colombia’s National Police and of “select elements” of the military in confronting
traffickers. It noted “signs that newly appointed members of the cabinet are
committed to advance important counternarcotics objectives.”
16 Embassy of Colombia, Colombia’s War on Drugs, Jan. 30, 1997.

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The Administration also noted that the Colombian Congress passed in
December 1996, “after hesitating,” an asset forfeiture law, and, in a February 1997
extraordinary session, legislation to increase sentences for narcotrafficking and
money laundering. Nevertheless, the Administration stated that the asset forfeiture
law “will have to clear a constitutional challenge in court before we can evaluate its
effectiveness,” and that Colombia’s Congress will have to pass an international asset
forfeiture cooperation provision in order to meet standards of the 1988 UN
Convention. The Administration faulted the Samper Administration for failing to
participate in congressional debate on extradition and to respond to the U.S. request
for the extradition of four Cali cartel leaders in 1996.
The Colombian government reacted quickly to defy the United States after the
1997 decertification, but then reversed itself. Within days, the Colombian
government suspended aerial spraying of coca crops, announced that it was reviewing
cooperation with the United States, and questioned the United States’ eradication
estimates. The government resumed aerial spraying shortly, however, and in early
April, President Samper urged the legislature to revoke the constitutional prohibition
on extradition in the debate that was then beginning in Congress.
Colombian Government Action in 1997 and the Clinton
Administration’s 1998 Certification on National Interest Grounds
In mid 1997, the Clinton Administration listed five steps it wanted Colombia
to take to in counternarcotics control during the year, which became the standard
against which Colombia was judged for the 1998 certification decision. These were:
(1) the extradition of Colombian nationals, including the Cali kingpins; (2) the full
implementation of laws on asset forfeiture, money laundering and sentencing, as well
as the U.S.-Colombian bilateral agreement on maritime enforcement; (3) tightened
prison security to prevent traffickers from carrying out their operations from prison;
(4) the use of a more effective herbicide in eradication operations; and (5) efforts to
bring corrupt officials to justice.17 Debate within the Administration apparently
centered around whether Colombia had made sufficient progress on these points.
In its explanation of the President's February 1998 decision to certify Colombia
on vital national interests grounds, the Administration found that although the
Colombian government had made "important progress in some areas this year," there
were also serious problems with its performance. "Poor government performance in
the extradition debate, lack of a concerted effort to combat official narcotics-related
corruption and still lagging enforcement of strong counternarcotics laws all argue
against certification," according to the Administration.
Detailing the Colombian government's performance, the Administration stated
that the Colombian Congress' December 1997 vote to amend the 1991 constitution
by reinstating extradition "represents significant progress." Nevertheless, the
1 7 Testimony of Jeffrey Davidow, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs,
before the National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice Subcommittee of
the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, July 9, 1997. Available at
www.state.gov/www/regions/ara/070997_davidow.html.

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Administration criticized the vote as falling short of U.S. expectations because it
specifically banned extradition for crimes committed before the reinstatement. The
Administration noted that the Colombian government subsequently appealed the
retroactivity provision, but cautioned "if the ban is upheld by Colombia's
Constitutional Court, then the Cali kingpins would be placed beyond the reach of
U.S. justice for crimes committed before December 1997."
The Administration praised the passage in early 1997 of "excellent legislation
which stiffened sentences for narcotics laundering, strengthened regulations affecting
money-laundering and permitted forfeiture of the assets of narcotics traffickers," but
faulted the implementation of these laws as "disappointingly slow" and criticized the
Colombian government because it "has yet to apply them aggressively." It also cited
the government's steps to improve prison security, stating that the U.S. Embassy had
heard "few reports of traffickers carrying out their illicit business activities with
impunity from their cells..." Again, however, there was a caveat. The Administration
found there were "still indications that the drug kingpins maintain some ability to
operate their criminal enterprises and exert some influence from prison." In addition,
the Administration judged that the Colombian government had "demonstrated little
inclination to root out official corruption and to strengthen democratic institutions
from the corrupting influence of narcotraffickers." It lauded the Colombian National
Police and units of the military involved in the counternarcotics efforts for the
"impressive results" in increasing eradication and seizures.
The Administration explanation did not refer to another action of the Colombian
Congress in 1997 that had proved troublesome for U.S. policymakers, i.e., the
passage of legislation, ostensibly to relieve prison overcrowding, which would
allow prisoners early release and other privileges. For instance, those who have been
convicted of crimes related to narcotrafficking are permitted furloughs of up to 15
days after they have served 80% of their sentences. The Samper Administration
18
,
however, issued a directive soon after the law was passed which stated that it could
not be applied to prisoners convicted of narcotics trafficking or illicit enrichment.
Scope of U.S. Assistance to Colombian Counter-Drug
Efforts
Counternarcotics cooperation continues despite the exacerbation of already
difficult relations after President Samper took office in August 1994, and after the
1996 and 1997 decertifications. U.S. funding for counternarcotics efforts in
Colombia is provided primarily through the State Department. Other U.S. agencies
involved in assisting Colombia include the DEA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense. (See
table below for the amount of U.S. aid to Colombia.) U.S. agencies work with
Colombia’s judicial system to improve law enforcement capabilities, criminal justice
procedures, and the accessibility and fairness of the justice system. They assist
Colombia’s eradication and interdiction efforts, providing training, equipment, and

18 See: Colombia's Jailbirds to Get 'Vacations'. Christian Science Monitor. Dec. 22, 1997,
and Law Would Give Jailed Drug Lords Furlough. Miami Herald. Dec. 18, 1997.

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spare parts. For instance, in 1997, the United States turned over to Colombia 18 UH-
1H “Huey” helicopters.
Despite the provision of counternarcotics assistance through the State
Department, the mandatory cutoff in 1996 of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and
International Education and Training (IMET) funding was perceived as problematic
by some analysts and policymakers, including Members of Congress. This cutoff
was viewed as punishing the Colombian security forces, particularly the police, for
the corruption of high-level civilians officials. On August 16, 1997 the
Administration authorized under Section 614 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
(FAA) the provision of up to $30 million in FMF and up to $600,000 in IMET to
Colombia. Using the FMF funds, the Administration subsequently provided
assistance to the Colombian police, air force and navy, and requested information
from the Colombian army concerning the observance of human rights by the units
which will receive the aid.
Information on six army units was received in mid-January 1998, and the State
Department subsequently cleared one unit to receive aid. As of mid-May, State
Department officials were anticipating that a second unit would be cleared in June,
and had requested the Colombian government to provide additional clarifying
information on a third. The three remaining units are considered more problematic,
according to a State Department official, and there may be no possibility that they
will be cleared.
U.S. Counternarcotics Assistance to Colombia
FY1994-FY1997
($ Millions)

FY1994
FY1995
FY1996
FY1997
Actually spent
28.7
16.4
16.3
37.8

Authorized
(10.0)
40.00
30.0
but not necessarily spent
during the fiscal year*
Value of indirect support
NA
2.5
6.6
14.0
provided by the State
Department Air Wing
Source: Compiled from information provided by the State Department in February 1998.
* The $10 million in FY1995 is FMF that was authorized but not spent before decertification. This
figure is in parentheses because it was in effect reauthorized as part of the $30 million authorized for
expenditure under the August 16, 1997 waiver. The $40 million in FY1996 is support in the form of
defense articles provided under the authority of Section 506 of the FAA which permits the President
to provide immediate military assistance in the event of an unforeseen emergency. This support is
still being delivered.

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Congressional Concerns and Action
Congressional opinion on Colombia is sharply divided. On the one hand, some
argue that the Clinton Administration should increase aid to military and police
forces because the Colombian government's stability is threatened by the violence
perpetuated by narcotraffickers and guerrilla forces allied to them. Because of these
concerns, in 1997 Congress approved funding for counternarcotics support to the
Colombian security forces that had not been requested by the Administration. This
included, in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1998 (P.L. 105-85),
authority for the Secretary of Defense to transfer to Colombia, through 2002, several
categories of aid to be used for counternarcotics activities. In the Foreig
19
n
Operations Appropriations Act for FY1998 (P.L. 105-118), Congress also provided
funding for equipment for narcotics interdiction. The conference report on the bill
(Report 105-401) states that the funds were meant for the procurement of Black
Hawk helicopters, at a cost of $36 million, and for the upgrade of UH-1H Hue
20
y
helicopters, at $14 million, for the Colombian National Police.
Those who oppose increased aid to the Colombian military and security forces,
or who are wary of its potential effects, cite several concerns. Foremost, they argue
that by providing such assistance, which can also be used for the army's
counterinsurgency efforts, the United States is becoming more deeply involved with
security forces that are guilty of gross violations of human rights. As a result of these
concerns, the FY1998 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act also included the so-
called "Leahy Amendment" (Section 570) which prohibits the use of funds
appropriated by the act for assistance to any unit of foreign security forces "if the
Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations
of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to the Committees on
Appropriations that the government of such country is taking effective measures to
bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice..." (This put into
law the practice that the Administration had previously adopted, described above.)
Further, they argue, the United States undermines efforts to strengthen democracy
by centering U.S. policy around a counternarcotics agenda. Rather than providing
military assistance which Colombia will also use in its counterinsurgency war, they
argue, the United States should broaden its assistance efforts to include support for
peace negotiations underway with the Colombian guerrillas and undertake other
actions to promote democracy and end the violence.
1 9 These include: non-lethal protective and utility personnel equipment; non-lethal navigation,
communications, photo and radar equipment; night visions systems; non-lethal components,
accessories, attachments, parts, firmware and software for aircraft or patrol boats; riverine patrol
boats. The legislation also granted the authority to provide for the maintenance and repair for all
equipment used in counterdrug activities. This legislation also provided authority to transfer the same
items to Peru, and established a limit of $9 million available for both countries in FY1998 and $20
million annually after than through 2002.
2 0 The U.S. Army reportedly has objected to the transfer of the Black Hawk helicopters,
stating that it would compromise military readiness. See: Army, Key Senator Oppose
Transfer of Four Black Hawks to Colombia. Inside the Army. Feb. 9, 1998.

CRS-11
In early 1998, the debate on military assistance appeared to intensify. Recent
activities of the Colombian guerrillas heightened concerns about the country's
stability. The Administration reportedly was weighing a decision to increase military
aid, including the provision of 12 modified, armored Cobra helicopters requested by
the Colombian government. The helicopters reportedly would have a Cobra frame,
but not the anti-tank armaments that make Cobras an "attack" helicopter.
21

21 Philip Finnegan. Colombia Wants U.S. Attack Copter. Defense News. March 9-15, 1998.