{ "id": "98-136", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "number": "98-136", "active": false, "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "versions": [ { "source": "EveryCRSReport.com", "id": 101229, "date": "1999-12-21", "retrieved": "2016-05-24T20:40:05.008941", "title": "Superfund Act Reauthorization: Liability Provisions of Leading Congressional Proposals", "summary": "Congress is currently seeking to reauthorize and amend the Superfund Act (Comprehensive\nEnvironmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, or \"CERCLA\"). This report targets the\nliability issues addressed in the two House committee-reported bills, H.R. 1300 and\n H.R. 2580 , and the House Committee on Commerce's minority substitute offered by\nRepresentative Towns. Senate bills are not covered at this time because the Senate has decided to\nwait until the House acts.\n CERCLA creates a stringent liability scheme so that persons associated with sites contaminated\nby hazardous substances bear their share of cleanup and associated costs. Whenever a hazardous\nsubstance is released (or threatened to be released) from a facility, potentially responsible parties\n(PRPs) include the generators of the substance, transporters who selected the disposal/treatment\nfacility, and the owners or operators of the facility both now and when the hazardous substance was\ndisposed of. Several exemptions from liability are provided -- e.g., for innocent purchasers who\nmade due diligence inspection of the site. PRPs are liable for \"response\" (cleanup) costs, natural\nresource damages, and costs of federal health assessments. The liability standard is strict, joint and\nseveral, and retroactive.\n This liability scheme flowed from two policy choices made by the Congress that enacted it --\nadoption of the \"polluter pays\" principle and a correlative decision that, in light of the many\ncontaminated sites, disbursements from the newly created Superfund at each site should be as low\nas possible. These choices dictated an expansive liability scheme that maximized the chance of\nfinding PRPs able to fund cleanup at most sites. With the passing of time, however, issues have\narisen as to this scheme's high transaction costs (for litigation, studies, oversight) and its inclusion\nof PRPs who, in the view of some, should not be held liable.\n None of the bills would repeal the existing liability scheme outright, but all contain a\nnonbinding, nonlitigation alternative through which a PRP can avoid the scheme. At sites with\nmultiple PRPs (which is most), a neutral \"allocator\" would assign each PRP a percentage of the\noverall liability, which the PRP can accept or reject. Acceptance has certain advantages, such as\navoidance of possibly large transaction costs and protection from further liability.\n In addition, all the bills would add to or clarify the current categories of liability-exempt parties\n-- addressing de minimis and de micromis contributors to a site, small businesses, municipalities and\nmunicipal waste, codisposal landfills, and nonprofit institutions, among others. Importantly, the\nbills all would expand upon EPA's longstanding initiative to encourage brownfields development --\ne.g., by exempting from liability the innocent purchaser who wants to improve the site.", "type": "CRS Report", "typeId": "REPORTS", "active": false, "formats": [ { "format": "PDF", "encoding": null, "url": "http://www.crs.gov/Reports/pdf/98-136", "sha1": "4b168726ca836323d040aafdf82194ce67037bb1", "filename": "files/19991221_98-136_4b168726ca836323d040aafdf82194ce67037bb1.pdf", "images": null }, { "format": "HTML", "filename": "files/19991221_98-136_4b168726ca836323d040aafdf82194ce67037bb1.html" } ], "topics": [] } ], "topics": [ "American Law" ] }