Foreign Policy Agency Reorganization in the 105th Congress

Foreign Policy Agency Reorganization in the 105th Congress

97-538 F
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Foreign Policy Agency Reorganization in the
105th Congress
Updated November 6, 1998
(name redacted), Larry Q. Nowels, and (name redacted)
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

ABSTRACT
Reorganization of the foreign policy agencies has been debated by both the 104th and 105th
Congresses. As enacted in P.L. 105-277, the reorganization authority, among other things,
would require consolidating the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the
U.S. Information Agency (USIA) into the Department of State. It would require that the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) be reorganized and would come under the
authority of the Secretary of State. This report provides background on the foreign policy
agency consolidation issue, discusses foreign policy implications, and tracks legislation. It
will be updated as related activities occur.

Foreign Policy Agency Reorganization in the 105 Congress
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Summary
On April 18, 1997, the Clinton Administration announced a plan to reorganize
the foreign policy agencies. The two-year plan would require significant internal
restructuring of the State Department, and eliminate two other agencies—the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA)
whose functions and personnel would be absorbed by State. It would integrate
ACDA into State within the first year, and USIA into State by the end of 1999. The
implementation process would begin after a 120-day planning period. The U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) would remain a separate agency with
its own appropriation, but would be brought under the direct authority of the
Secretary of State.
Administration interagency task forces reviewed and analyzed the possible
options for consolidating and restructuring the potentially affected agencies.
Reportedly, a draft reorganization plan, including some major unresolved issues, was
submitted to the Office of the Secretary in mid-1997. Selected elements of the
proposal have been implemented in the period since, although a complete
consolidation had to await enactment of explicit authorization.
Congress debated reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies in the context of
foreign relations authorizing legislation for FY1998/99, consideration that spanned
most of the 105 Congress. Although the House and Senate approved bills in June
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1997 (H.R. 1757 and S. 903), conference negotiations continued for over nine
months. During this time, the reorganization issue, which conferees had resolved in
November, became entwined with other foreign policy controversies in dispute
between Congress and the President, including international family planning policy
and abortion restrictions, U.N. reform and arrears payment authorization, and U.S.
contributions to the International Monetary Fund. As approved by the House (March
26, 1998; voice vote) and by the Senate (April 28; 51-49), the conference report on
H.R. 1757 directed the President to 1) abolish ACDA and USIA and merge them into
the State Department, 2) establish the Broadcasting Board of Governors as an
independent agency, and 3) maintain USAID as a separate agency but require the
Administrator to report directly to the Secretary of State.
After President Clinton said he would veto the bill primarily because of the
abortion provision, congressional leaders held H.R. 1757 until the end of the 105th
Congress. On the eve of adjournment, Congress lifted the foreign affairs agency
consolidation authorization from H.R. 1757 and attached a slightly revised version to
the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999.
President Clinton signed the omnibus measure on October 21, 1998 (P.L. 105-277).
Congress also sent to the White House H.R. 1757, legislation that the President
vetoed on October 21.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background and Political Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Context for Debate in the 105th Congress on Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Shaping the President’s 1997 Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Role of Congress in Agency Consolidation: Procedural Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Congressional Consideration under Presidential Reorganization Authority . 5
Implementation through Normal Legislative Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Legislative Status of Reorganization Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Mandatory Elements of Congressional Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Administration’s Proposal and Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Implications for Agencies and their Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
State Department and Foreign Policy Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
USIA and Public Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
ACDA and International Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
USAID and U.S. Development Assistance Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Reorganization Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Foreign Policy Agency Reorganization in the
105th Congress
Introduction
On April 18, 1997, the Clinton Administration announced a plan to reorganize
the foreign policy agencies. The two-year plan would require significant internal
restructuring of the State Department, and eliminate two other agencies — the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA)
whose functions and personnel would be absorbed by State. It would integrate
ACDA into State within the first year, and USIA into State by the end of 1999. The
implementation process would begin after a 120-day planning period. The U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID) would remain a separate agency with
its own appropriation, but would be brought under the direct authority of the
Secretary of State.
The House passed its version of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (H.R.
1757, introduced June 3, 1997) on June 11. Division A of H.R. 1757 consisted of
provisions for the consolidation of the foreign affairs agencies. As reported, the
legislation included a somewhat different reorganization plan, crafted largely by
House International Relations Committee Chairman Gilman, than proposed by the
President. During floor debate, the House rejected an amendment by Congressman
Hamilton that would have provided fewer requirements and greater presidential
flexibility than the Gilman plan. Prior to final passage and in the face of a possible
veto, the House approved compromise reorganization language, worked out between
Congressmen Gilman and Hamilton, that was acceptable to the Administration.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee marked up and ordered reported its
version of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (S. 903) on June 13, producing
a consolidation plan that also diverged in several key ways from the President’s
initiative. Provisions that would move more of USAID into the State Department and
require the budget for development assistance programs to pass through the Secretary
of State were elements especially opposed by the Administration. Senate floor debate
on S. 903 produced no significant changes to the Committee-endorsed consolidation
plan.
House and Senate conferees met in late July to work out differences between the
bills, but did not come to final agreement, mainly because of a contentions
disagreement over an international family planning provision in the House version of
the bill. Without further movement on H.R. 1757, efforts were made near the end of
the first session to attach a modified agency consolidation authority to other
legislation, including the District of Columbia appropriations bill (H.R. 2607) which
passed the Senate on November 9. The revised text reflected resolution of
House/Senate disagreements between the two reorganization proposals worked out

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during conference meetings on H.R. 1757. In particular, the modified language
accommodated, to some extent, Administration concerns regarding Senate provisions
moving USAID closer to the State Department. Nevertheless, a final legislative
attempt collapsed on November 13 when House leaders proposed to combine three
top Administration priorities — foreign affairs agency consolidation, International
Monetary Fund appropriations, and U.N. arrearage payments — in a new legislative
package with international family planning abortion-related restrictions. The White
House said it would veto any legislation containing the family planning conditions,
and House leaders abandoned plans to vote on the measure during the final two days
of the session.
On March 10, 1998, a conference report for H.R. 1757 was filed. In addition
to the reorganization provisions that were agreed to in November 1997, the
conference report included (among other provisions) authorization of appropriations
for the State Department and related agencies, U.N. reform and payment of U.S.
arrears to the United Nations, and international population funding restrictions. The
legislation passed by voice vote in the House on March 26. The Senate passed the
legislation on April 28, 1998 with a vote of 51 to 49. The President stated he would
veto the bill primarily because of the abortion funding language. Because of the
threatened veto, Congress held the legislation until the end of the 105 Congress, at
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which time it was sent to the White House and vetoed by President Clinton on
October 21, 1998.
Expecting the President's veto, however, Congress lifted major portions from
H.R. 1757, including slightly revised foreign affairs agency consolidation
authorization, and attached it to the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 (H.R. 4328). Under the terms of the
omnibus measure, which the President signed on October 21, 1998 (P.L. 105-277),
ACDA will merge into the State Department by April 1, 1999 and USIA by October
1, 1999. USAID must be reorganized, and its press office and some administrative
offices merged into State by April 1, 1999
Background and Political Context
Context for Debate in the 105th Congress on Reorganization
Following a contentious debate in the 104th Congress, capped by President
Clinton’s veto of legislation requiring the termination of one of three foreign policy
agencies, the context surrounding congressional consideration of the Executive’s most
recent reorganization proposal has changed significantly. Not only is the current plan
a Presidential initiative, rather than one imposed by Congress, but it has also been a
key element in a complex, inter-related set of broader foreign policy issues — the
Chemical Weapons Convention, U.N. reform and arrearage payments, and
international affairs budget levels — discussed by Congress and the Executive branch
during 1997.

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Shaping the President’s 1997 Initiative
Since late 1996, many close foreign policy observers had anticipated a White
House initiative to consolidate U.S. foreign affairs agencies. Although the
Administration rejected congressional proposals in 1995 to reorganize these
bureaucracies, key Executive officials, primarily in the State Department, continued
to believe that the merger of ACDA, USIA, and USAID with the Department would
make for more coherent U.S. foreign policy decision-making and make better use of
scarce resources. Moreover, many believed that in the absence of a White House
plan, Congress would once again target the foreign policy agencies for reorganization,
possibly in ways that even consolidation proponents within the Administration would
oppose. Some argued that in order to protect Presidential prerogatives to structure
the executive branch, the White House should construct a plan in advance of
proposals that might emerge early in the 105th Congress.
Indication that agency consolidation issues were under consideration came
during the January 8, 1997, confirmation hearing of Secretary of State-nominee
Madeleine Albright. In response to several questions, she told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee how “important [it is] for us to have an effective and efficient
foreign policy mechanism.” The Secretary-designate stated that she had an “open
mind” on the question of consolidation and pledged to discuss the issue further with
the Committee.
In the ensuing weeks, however, the reorganization issue reportedly became
embedded in a broader agenda of State Department and White House national
security priorities that required congressional attention in early 1997. At the top of
the Administration’s list was gaining quick Senate approval of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) before the pact went into force, with or without U.S. ratification,
on April 29, 1997. The CWC was strongly opposed by Chairman Helms, and had
been bottled up in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for months. The State
Department had also begun a vigorous campaign in late 1996 to raise concerns about
the adequacy of U.S. foreign policy and diplomatic funding resources, a strategy
setting the stage for an FY1998 $19.45 billion (up 6.3%) International Affairs budget
request submitted on February 6. A third high-priority item on the White House’s
early 1997 foreign policy agenda was congressional approval of about $1 billion to
clear U.S. arrears at the United Nations and for peacekeeping contributions, an
initiative many in Congress wanted tied to U.N. management, organizational, and
financial reforms.
Although none of these issues were explicitly linked with one another, it was the
view of many close congressional and White House observers that if the President
expected Congress to consider his priority proposals, especially CWC, the
Administration must be prepared to work with lawmakers on advancing key
congressional issues, such as U.N. reform, submission of certain arms control treaties
to the Senate, and foreign affairs agency consolidation. Labeled as a coincidence,
movement on the CWC and reorganization issues began almost simultaneously. On
April 17, while the Senate leadership announced that it would schedule debate on
CWC for the following week, the White House was preparing its statement, made the
next day, that it would merge USIA and ACDA into the State Department, and bring
USAID directly under the guidance of the Secretary of State.

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Agency Consolidation Debate in the 104th Congress
Throughout 1995 and into 1996, both the Administration and Congress
considered options to reorganize the structure of U.S. government foreign policy
agencies. At issue was how best to tighten the foreign policy budget while
maximizing the effectiveness of inter-agency coordination in working toward
common foreign policy goals in an ever-changing post-Cold War world. Critics of
U.S. foreign policy management practices charged that these agencies at times
maintained conflicting agendas, housed duplicative functions and bureaus, and often
did not give proper emphasis to national priorities, such as promoting U.S. economic
trade and economic interests abroad.
After the White House rejected the outlines of a State Department plan to
consolidate the agencies — a proposal strongly opposed by USAID, ACDA, and
USIA — Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Helms announced his own
initiative on March 15, 1995. The original Helms plan would have eliminated all
three agencies, and created what Senator Helms characterized as a “new,” more
effective State Department with some of the functions of the eliminated agencies
merged into it. An “America Desk” would have been established in the State
Department to ensure that all U.S. foreign policy contributed to American national
interests.
With continued White House opposition, Senate democrats successfully
blocked debate on Foreign Relations Committee-reported legislation (S. 908) that
followed Chairman Helms’ plan. Following several months of negotiations, Senate
leaders reached agreement (which was adopted by the full Senate on December 14,
1995) on a compromise proposal to consolidate U.S. foreign affairs agencies. The
agreement, however, did not require the Administration to abolish agencies, but
mandated $1.7 billion budget savings in program and operating expenses.
A House reorganization bill (H.R. 1561) that like the initial Helms proposal,
also abolished USAID, USIA, and ACDA, folding their functions into State with
newly-created Under Secretary positions, had already passed on June 8, 1995.
Ultimately, House and Senate negotiators agreed on a plan to abolish one agency, to
be selected by the President, but widely assumed to be ACDA. The President also
had to certify: 1) that his own foreign policy consolidation plans would save $1.7
billion over four years, and 2) that the preservation of the remaining two agencies
was important to U.S. national interests. President Clinton, however, vetoed the bill
(H.R. 1561) in early April 1996, for a number of reasons, including agency
consolidation requirements that he said jeopardized the President’s ability to manage
his own executive agencies. The House could not override the veto, and the issue did
not resurface in the 104th Congress.
Role of Congress in Agency Consolidation: Procedural
Issues
At the outset of the White House initiative to consolidate the agencies, it was
clear that Congress would have some degree of influence over the shape of the plan,
as well as the power to approve or reject it. With several options available to

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Congress and the executive branch in the approval and implementation procedure for
agency reorganizations, it was unclear exactly how the process would unfold.
Because the plan included the creation of new State Department positions, such as
Under Secretaries for Arms Control and International Security and for Public
Diplomacy, at a minimum, Congress must amend the State Department Basic
Authorities Act (P.L. 84-885, as amended) to enact these and other organizational
changes. For the broader details of reorganization, several scenarios and options were
available to the President and lawmakers.
Congressional Consideration under Presidential Reorganization
Authority
An early option preferred by the White House was the reinstatement of a
currently dormant presidential authority to reorganize the executive branch. Although
such authority ultimately requires Congress to approve the President’s plan, it
provides for far less direct congressional involvement than through the normal
legislative process. With the objective of achieving greater efficiency in government,
Congress, since the 1930s has granted the Chief Executive authority to issue
executive orders and, since 1939, plans proposing reorganizations within the
executive branch. This authority has been issued for temporary periods of time, and
renewed by Congress periodically. The most recent reorganization authority expired
in 1984, and Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton did not ask for its reinstatement.
At the time of its expiration in 1984, the reorganization authority (see 5 U.S.C.
901-912) provided that, once the President submitted his plan, Congress must adopt
a joint resolution within 90 calendar days of continuous session for it to become
effective. Although the President could modify his own proposal within the first 60
calendar days of continuous session after its submission, Congress could not amend
the Chief Executive’s plan — lawmakers could only vote up or down on the
recommendation. One potential problem with this approach was that it largely took
the issue out of the hands of the most active proponents for consolidation in the 104th
Congress. Under the statute that expired in 1984, such reorganization plans were not
referred to the committees of policy jurisdiction — in this case, the House
International Relations and Senate Foreign Relations Committees — but to the House
Government Reform and Oversight and Senate Governmental Affairs panels.
Implementation through Normal Legislative Process. Without reorganization
authority, the proposed foreign affairs agency consolidation would proceed through
normal legislative process. In recent years, the Departments of Energy, Education,
and Veterans Affairs were created in this fashion. Under one possible scenario that
appeared plausible in May 1997, following the Administration’s 120-day review process,
the President would draft the necessary legislation to implement the reorganization
and submit it to Congress for consideration, probably in September or October 1997.
Congress could then choose to deal with the legislative proposal as either a separate
bill or incorporate it into omnibus foreign policy legislation as it did in the 104th
Congress (H.R. 1561). Timing for the latter option, however, was awkward since the
House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees were about to act on omnibus foreign
affairs authorization bills, action that would come well in advance of the anticipated
submission by the President of his formal plan.

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Legislative Status of Reorganization Authority. Legislative authority enacted
on October 21, 1998, in the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 1999 (P.L. 105-277) combines elements of both approaches
outlined above. The statute grants the President authority to draft and submit to
Congress by December 20, 1998 a foreign affairs reorganization plan. At the same
time, P.L. 105-277 legislates certain mandatory elements that must be contained in a
presidential plan, including the abolishment of ACDA, USIA, and IDCA, and th
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streamlining of USAID. Once submitted, the President may amend his plan at any time
prior to its effective date. For ACDA, IDCA, and USAID, the required steps must
take place by April 1, 1999, while USIA must be abolished and consolidated by October
1, 1999. The authority does not require Congress to vote on the proposal prior to its
implementation, but should lawmakers attempt to reject or make significant
modifications to the President's plan through regular legislation, they would most likely
have to overcome a veto.
Mandatory Elements of Congressional Plans
Although legislation approved by both the House and Senate permitted the
President to shape much of the reorganization proposal according to plans developed
by Executive branch working groups, lawmakers established a series of items that must
be included in any consolidation scheme drafted and submitted to Congress by the
President. Several of the Senate-passed mandatory reorganization elements closely
followed the House plan, but with the addition of a few key directives, especially those
affecting U.S. international broadcasting activities and USAID. The revised
reorganization act passed by Congress on October 20, 1998 and signed into law (P.L.
105-277) by the President on October 21, 1998 requires the President to submit a final
report by January 1, 2001 providing a final accounting of the finances and operations
of the agencies abolished by the Act. Other details follow:
! ACDA. The House and Senate plans passed in H.R. 1757 and S. 903 would
have required that ACDA be abolished by October 1, 1998, that its functions
be transferred to the Secretary of State, and that the Department of State create
an Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. P.L. 105-277
adopts this same approach, but sets April 1, 1999 as the date for abolishing
ACDA.
! USIA. H.R. 1757 passed by the House would have required that USIA be
abolished by October 1, 1999, its functions transferred to the Secretary of State,
that the International Broadcasting Bureau maintain a degree of independence,
and that the Department of State create an Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy. The Senate measure also would have required that USIA be
abolished by October 1, 1999, its functions transferred to the Secretary of State,
and the Department of State create an Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy.
The
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International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) was created in 1979 to be the
overall coordinator of U.S. development assistance policy. Although the agency continues to
exist, it has functioned in an extremely minimal capacity for the past 18 years and has
frequently been a target for elimination.

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The Senate differed from the House, however, by establishing the Broadcasting
Board of Governors as an independent entity by October 1, 1999. As enacted
in P.L. 105-277, USIA must be consolidated into the Department of State by
October 1, 1999. International broadcasting functions are not transferred to
the Secretary of State, but are maintained as a separate entity in the executive
branch. The statute further includes the Zorinsky Amendment and Smith-Mundt
language prohibiting public diplomacy programs unique to the USIA from
operating domestically.
! IDCA. The House proposal would have required that IDCA be abolished by
October 1, 1998, and its functions transferred to another agency or agencies.
The Senate version would have required that IDCA be abolished by October
1, 1998, and its functions, including the allocation of economic assistance funds
to USAID, be transferred to the Secretary of State. IDCA functions regarding
OPIC were to be transferred to USAID. Other IDCA functions, and those of
USAID, would be transferred to another agency or agencies as specified by the
President’s reorganization plan. The enacted legislation sets the deadline at
April 1, 1999, but otherwise generally follows provisions of the Senate-passed
bill.
! USAID. The House would have required that USAID be reorganized by
October 1, 1999, that it report to and be under the direct authority and foreign
policy guidance of the Secretary of State, and, at a minimum, the functions of
its press office and certain administrative functions be transferred to the
Department of State. The Senate would have required that USAID be
reorganized by October 1, 1998, the USAID Administrator serve under the direct
authority of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State assume responsibility
for coordinating (including the design of overall aid and economic cooperation
strategy) all U.S. economic assistance programs, and, at a minimum, the
functions of USAID’s offices of legislative affairs, and press and public affairs
be transferred to the Department of State.
2 P.L. 105-277 mandates USAID
reorganization by April 1, 1999; requires the USAID Administrator to report
to and be under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary
of State; establishes the Secretary of State as the coordinator of all U.S.
economic aid programs, including “approving” (but not “designing,” as in the
Senate bill) overall aid strategy; and transfers USAID’s press office and certain
administrative functions to State, as proposed by the House.
The Administration’s Proposal and Actions
While Congress debated legislation concerning certain aspects of a consolidation
of U.S. foreign affairs agencies, the Clinton Administration was in the process of
developing details of a comprehensive plan to what it considers will “adapt Cold War
policy structures to the post-Cold War policy agenda.”
The
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Senate bill further includes a non-binding sense of the Senate that OMB should apportion
all funds for U.S. foreign assistance programs, including those administered by USAID,
directly to the Secretary of State instead of to the head of other Federal agencies.

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Description
The Administration states that sustainable development, nonproliferation and public
diplomacy are more central than ever to American foreign policy. The foreign policy
apparatus should reflect that, pulling the best people and practices from each agency
to carry out U.S. foreign policy through the coming era. After a 120-day planning
period, which concluded in late August 1997, the Administration proposed to phase
in over a two-year time period the integration of ACDA and USIA, and partial
integration of USAID into State. The Administration proposed completion of its reform
plan by the end of 1999, with the promise of a streamlined and more effective foreign
policy structure before the 21st century.
Within the first year, ACDA would be fully integrated into the State Department’s
Political-Military Bureau (PM). The new Under Secretary for this bureau would also
carry the title of Senior Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State for Arms
Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament. This official would attend and participate
in all relevant meetings of the National Security Council and the Principals Committee
or its equivalent. The new Under Secretary would communicate with the President
and members of the NSC on issues of arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament
through the Secretary of State. This official would lead the interagency process on
nonproliferation issues, and work closely with the NSC staff in managing the arms
control policy process.
Also within the first year, USIA’s Legislative and Public Affairs offices would
be fully merged into State. Until the completion of the reorganization, the Administrator
of USIA would also function as the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy.
USAID would be placed under direct authority of the Secretary of State; its
appropriations, however, would remain separate.
During the second year of implementation of the Administration proposal, USIA’s
Administrative functions, the Information Bureau (Broadcasting) and Educational and
Cultural exchanges would become integrated into the State Department. USAID’s
press office would be integrated into State. Later in the process, the two agencies would
seek to improve coordination of the regional bureaus. Beyond that, the USAID
Administrator and Secretary of State would attempt to further reform both agencies
to eliminate duplication between USAID’s and State’s functional bureaus.
Actions
In mid-1997, the Administration formed a number of committees to evaluate
various options for implementation of the reorganization plan. Overseeing the entire
operation was the Reorganization Steering Committee. It consisted of the Deputy
Secretary of State, Mr. Strobe Talbott, Administrator of USAID, Mr. Brian J. Brian
Atwood, Director of USIA, Dr. Joseph D. Duffey, and ACDA Director, Mr. John D.
Holum, and was chaired by the Secretary of State.
The main work was carried out by a Core Team and specialized task forces. The
Core Team included senior level representatives from the affected agencies, and was
chaired by Patrick Kennedy, Acting Under Secretary of State for Management. This

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committee reported to the Steering committee, synthesizing options and making policy
recommendations.
Eight specialized task forces were formed which included representatives from
each of the agencies involved, as well as labor union representatives. The eight task
forces were: 1) arms control and nonproliferation; 2) public diplomacy; 3) press
operations; 4) legal operations; 5) legislative operations; 6) development coordination;
7) management and administrative functions; 8) State Department reinvention. The
Task Forces analyzed the issues and built a plan with options. A full time planning
committee was established to focus and bring together the work done by eight task
forces. The planning committee relayed the information to the Core Team.
Reportedly, the task forces transmitted their conclusions to the planning team in
mid-August 1997. A draft of the Administration’s official reorganization plan was
reviewed by the core team and the heads of all the organizations involved. By October
1997, a detailed, but unreleased implementing plan was at the Secretary’s desk.
The Administration stated they were seeking ways to keep up the reorganization
momentum, in view of the fact that the 105 Congress di
th
d not provide reorganization
authority during the first session. On December 19, 1997, Secretary Albright announced
that ACDA Director John Holum would be “double-hatted” as Acting Under Secretary
of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs.
Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy
One of the primary goals of reorganizing the foreign policy agencies is to eliminate
duplication, a frequent source of criticism from Congress. Currently each agency
maintains parallel, duplicative operations, such as legislative affairs, administrative
bureaus, and press offices. Additionally, some agencies have similarly structured
regional or functional bureaus. By eliminating the duplication, it is argued, a more
effective, streamlined U.S. foreign policy mechanism would result. Eliminating
duplication and merging similar functions into one agency also would likely improve
the coordination among foreign policy regional and functional bureaus, thereby
improving the efficiency in U.S. decision making and response to world events.
Budget savings was a primary force driving foreign policy agency consolidation
during the 104th Congress. The Congressional Budget Office had estimated that $3
billion could be saved over a five-year period with the congressional reorganizing
proposal; the Administration asserted that the Vice President’s National Performance
Review (NPR) initiative would save as much while keeping the agencies independent.
While budget savings are expected to eventually result from a reorganization of
agencies, the Clinton Administration did not expect savings to be significant in the early
years of plan implementation. Some in the executive branch claimed that budget savings
were not viewed as the top priority in implementing the White House plan; reorganizing
to achieve a more effective foreign policy apparatus was the key objective, they stated.
Merging most foreign policy activities under the State Department was expected
to give the Secretary access to a wider array of foreign policy tools, such as international
broadcasting, economic assistance, international exchanges, and international speakers
programs. The needs and costs of U. S. overseas posts and embassies were likely to

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be more transparent after a reorganization. The Secretary would be able to respond
more quickly to moving resources and skilled staff to posts where most needed. Further,
consolidating agencies would reduce the number of voices (simplify the message)
advising the President on any given issue, allowing the President to determine and better
execute a foreign policy that is in America’s best interest.
Some foreign policy experts, however, were concerned that the reorganization
of the foreign policy agencies into the Department of State would further encumber
an agency already burdened with too many layers of management and where too many
decisions end up on the Secretary’s desk. Integrating the ACDA and USIA would
further hamper the conduct of foreign policy, they argued, because the Secretary of
State would have too many issues to manage. Also, many who follow specific foreign
policy activities, such as international broadcasting, international exchange programs,
and foreign aid, were concerned that those functions would become less efficiently and
effectively managed because political-military-focused managers would be making
decisions about priorities, resource distribution, and program funding. To some, this
raised the question of whether the programs would be able to maintain the level of
credibility they currently enjoy. They wondered whether the State Department could
be reformed adequately and quickly enough to administer the many new programs
merged into it.3
A few issues were not addressed in the Administration’s reorganization plan. For
example, the State Department’s role in coordination of U.S. government agencies
that administer trade and economic issues, international exchange programs that are
managed by U.S. government agencies outside of the foreign policy agencies, and
refugee issues were not raised.
Implications for Agencies and their Functions
Arguments for reorganizing the foreign policy bureaucracy suffer from a seeming
contradiction. On the one hand, the State Department is heavily criticized for
management weaknesses. On the other hand, reorganization proposals would likely
require the Department and the Secretary to deal with a wide span of control and
additional responsibilities. Nevertheless, many believe that State Department reform
would only occur when driven by the integration of other agencies and their functions
into State.
3On August 8, 1997, Secretary of State Albright sent a memorandum to all employees of
ACDA, State, USIA, and USAID stating that, as a first step in the reorganization process,
Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries would take on greater responsibility in an effort
to decentralize the demands of the Secretary of State.

CRS-11
State Department and Foreign
The State Department, established
Policy Management. Proponents of foreign
in 1789, has a mission to advance and
policy agency reorganization, including
protect the worldwide interests of the
Senator Helms, former Secretary of State
United States and its citizens. Currently
Eagleburger, former National Security
the State Department represents
Advisor Scowcroft, and others have
American interests on behalf of 50 U.S.
raised a long list of perceived
government agencies and organizations
shortcomings in the Department of State
operating 249 posts in over 180 countries
and the foreign policy organizational
around the world. The Department
structure. Criticisms of the State
employs an estimated 18,869 full time
Department include: 1) poor
staff, down from 19,110 in FY1996. The
management structures with too many
FY1999 budget for State is about $4.4
layers that impede efficient policymaking;
billion, up from $4 billion enacted for
2) too many disputes funneling directly to
FY1998..
the Secretary of State, creating decision
making overload at the top; 3) too much
energy devoted to diplomatic reporting; 4) an elitist attitude among many staff
(particularly in the foreign service); 5) an archaic information system that is not
compatible with those at ACDA, USIA, or USAID; and 6) a lack of coordination in
regional and functional bureaus that undermines consistent policy direction.
Many on both sides of the consolidation issue agree that the Department has
suffered from weak management and has been unable to divest itself of Cold War
operational standards and adopt a revised set of mission priorities. While the State
Department has made some foreign policy downsizing efforts in response to recent
budgetary pressures, the changes have been mostly quantitative with little noticeable
change in State’s policy or management structure, and, according to the General
Accounting Office (GAO), it has no strategy for future downsizing efforts.4
On their face, many of these views of State Department management deficiencies
appear to weigh against merging other agencies with the Department. Critics of merging
other agencies into the Department have argue that well-functioning organizations
should not be moved into what they view as a dysfunctional agency; that only after
the State Department fully implements reforms and integrates new policy priorities
should the idea of a “super” State Department be given serious consideration.
Proponents of consolidation, however, countered that the goals of reducing the
duplication of functions and achieving better policy coordination can only be achieved
by merging currently independent agencies with the State Department and bringing
their missions more directly under the authority of the Secretary of State. They asserted
that the continuing independence of key foreign affairs agencies contributes to the
fractured decision making process and weakens the position of the Secretary of State
and ambassadors around the world. Supporters also contended that management
reforms within the State Department would be pursued in conjunction with the agency
consolidation and would be integral to the success of the effort. Moreover, they stated
that the consolidation of external agency responsibilities into the Department will force
State
4
Department: Options for Addressing Possible Budget Reductions, General Accounting
Office, August 1996.

CRS-12
State to incorporate “non-traditional” yet important foreign policy initiatives into its
priorities.
Clinton Administration officials acknowledge that the Department’s restructuring
is critical to the broader reorganization process. At a White House briefing, the National
Performance Review Senior Policy Advisor stated that “reinvention at the State
Department is an a priori qualification for doing any other consolidations of other
agencies...we’ve got a reinvigorated State Department that will, hopefully, start dealing
with its core problems.”
5
Officials maintain that State’s reform effort will be phased in simultaneously as
agencies are integrated into State. It is believed that State Department reform will
continue to evolve long after the implementation period of the overall reorganization
plan. While details of the Administration’s proposal are lacking, integrating ACDA
and USIA into State will expand the agency horizontally, increasing the number of
bureaus and under secretaries. A new bureau for arms control and international security
(covering ACDA’s activities) and a new bureau for Public Diplomacy (covering USIA’s
operations) would be established. State’s regional and functional bureaus would remain,
but would need better mechanisms for coordinating their activities within State and
with USAID. Thus, the Secretary of State, it is argued, would acquire the ability to
coordinate, to establish accountability, and to have direct access to officials working
on all aspects of foreign policy. Although consolidating agencies is expected to result
in some positions being eliminated, reductions in force (RIFs) at the Department are
not being discussed at this time.
On August 8, 1997, Secretary Albright outlined in a memo to staff in all four
agencies the “first step” in the reorganization process—to diffuse demands placed at
the top in the Department of State by increasing the responsibilities of the Under
Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries at State. According to the August 8th memo and
followup explanatory memo, the Under Secretaries will serve as the main policy advisers
to the Secretary and will function as a “corporate board” on long-term resource and
strategic planning matters. Assistant Secretaries are to be the main policy makers,
implementers, and issue leaders.
The reorganization law (P.L. 105-277), as passed by Congress and signed by the
President on October 21, 1998, creates a new Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security and a new Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy. It requires the Secretary of State to submit a report with its congressional
presentation document of the budget for FY2000 and FY2001 describing estimated
and achieved costs related to the consolidation effort.
5White House briefing on Foreign Policy reorganization by Dr. Elaine Kamarck, National
Performance Review Senior Policy Advisor, and Mr. Michael McCurry, White House Press
Secretary, April 18, 1997.

CRS-13
USIA and Public Diplomacy.
The U.S. Information Agency was
Most public diplomacy experts agree that
established in 1953 to help present the
broadcasting and international exchange
American culture and U.S. government
programs are comparatively inexpensive
policy to foreign publics. In 1978
and safe ways to promote U.S. interests
Congress merged the State
and democratic values around the world.
Department’s Bureau of Education and
Supporters of the reorganization
Cultural Affairs into the USIA which
proposal believe that putting international
primarily focused on international
broadcasting in the State Department
broadcasting. Its current estimated
would strengthen the link between these
staff size is 6,828—3,336 domestic
activities and U.S. foreign policy
positions, 739 Americans overseas and
objectives.
2,753 foreign nationals. Its FY1999
appropriation is $1.1 billion,
A number of concerns were raised
comparable to the enacted FY1998
regarding proposals to integrate the U.S.
level.
Information Agency into the Department
of State. One issue addressed was
USIA’s mandate required by the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 and Zorinsky Amendment
that bar the USIA from operating domestically and propagandizing U.S. audiences,
on grounds that such activities might influence local politics. About 80 percent of
USIA’s employees come under this law. This restriction is in conflict with many
Department of State activities; State’s activities currently involve providing domestic
press and audiences with foreign policy information, as well as sponsoring forums and
town meetings on behalf of the State Department.
P.L. 105-277 addressed this issue by establishing a new Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy. Furthermore, the Act includes language which would continue to apply
Smith-Mundt and Zorinsky laws to USIA programs after consolidated into State.
Another concern was whether international broadcasting’s credibility with foreign
publics in promoting democracy and the U.S. perspective would be weakened if it were
administered by the State Department. Some question whether the selection of news
stories to be aired and editing of reports would be affected by ongoing State Department
activities, such as the Secretary’s travel plans to a particular region, imminent trade
agreements, or U.S. government actions to gain cooperation from a foreign government.
Some observers believe State Department management of U.S. international
broadcasting could invite foreign governments to blame the Secretary of State for airing
broadcasts viewed by them to be unfavorable.
The Act addressed broadcasting credibility by establishing the Broadcasting Broad
of Governors as an independent entity within the Executive Branch, effective October
1, 1999. The BBG is required to report to Congress by March 1 each year on Radio
st
Free Europe/Radio Liberty privatization efforts, as required by December 31, 1999
by the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of FY1994/95 (P.L. 103-236), as well as
assess continued government funding of RFE/RL in FY2000.
Similarly, some had questioned whether international exchange programs, such
as the Fulbright Program, would continue to emphasize cross-cultural understanding
or whether they would be diverted to promote political-military goals of U.S. foreign
policy. Some have contended that particularly the long-term nature of international

CRS-14
exchanges in building relationships could be compromised if resources that might have
been devoted to exchanges get diverted to shorter-term crises. Furthermore, many
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) support international exchange activities of
the U.S. government. NGOs may not have the trust or be as welcome at State as they
were by USIA, some fear. P.L. 105-277 did not specifically address this concern.
Another issue that needed to be addressed was the differing communication systems
and operations of each agency. Since USIA’s mission is to provide information, it
maintains an “open” information system, available to foreign publics. The State
Department, on the other hand, keeps a secure communication system. Some experts
claimed that keeping both public and secure aspects within one computer system would
weaken the secure part. Two separate computer systems may be necessary if the
agencies are fully integrated.
Responding to the view that consolidation would reduce expensive duplication,
USIA had already agreed that consolidating travel offices, security systems, personnel
support and overseas warehouses with State would make sense. However, USIA
asserted it has already undergone, more than any other foreign policy agency, a massive
restructuring and streamlining effort. Beginning in 1994 USIA consolidated the
international broadcasting activities, generating a savings of $400 million since 1994.
During those same years, USIA dismantled its Bureau of Policy and Programs and
created the Bureau of Information, 30 percent smaller and more customer-oriented.
Additionally, USIA has restructured the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs,
delayering it and consolidating offices that manage international exchange programs.
ACDA and International
ACDA was established as a small
Security. For the past thirty-five years,
agency in 1961 to be an independent
ACDA’s mandate was to serve as “the
advocate for arms control with direct
central organization charged by statute
access to the President. Over the past
with primary responsibility” for arms
several years, ACDA and State have
control under the direction of the
worked closely to eliminate
President and Secretary of State (P.L.
unnecessary duplication. ACDA
87-297; 75 STAT 631). ACDA was
employs about 250 people; this number
envisioned as a quasi-independent
has been declining for several years. Its
advocate for arms control, and its
FY 1999 appropriation is $41.5 million,
Director designated the principal adviser
comparable to the level enacted in FY
to the President, the Secretary of State,
1998.
and the National Security Council (NSC)
on arms control issues.
ACDA’s role has now been modified. Although the implications of these changes
are not likely to be profound, the primacy of arms control will no longer be codified
in law to the degree it has been in the past.
ACDA’s supporters credited the small agency with key arms control victories
and contributions to U.S. national security since its creation. Since 1961, ACDA was
charged with carrying out the following primary functions:

CRS-15
“the conduct, support, and coordination of research for arms control and
disarmament policy formulation;
the preparation for and management of U.S. participation in international
negotiations in the arms control and disarmament field;
the dissemination and coordination of public information concerning arms control
and disarmament; and
the preparation for, operation of, or as appropriate, direction of U.S. participation
in such control systems [on-site and remote monitoring activities] as may become
part of U.S. arms control and disarmament activities.” (P.L. 87-297. Arms Control
and Disarmament Act, September 26, 1961, as amended.)
ACDA pursued these goals with mixed success under Democratic and Republican
Administrations. A small agency, ACDA contended with much the larger bureaucracies
and priorities of the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, Energy, and the
intelligence community. Nonetheless, the agency credited itself with such arms control
victories as continued reductions of strategic nuclear arms, negotiating an end to
producing fissile material for nuclear weapons, strengthening the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and its safeguards, ratifying and implementing the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, enhancing
compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, and negotiating a global ban on
antipersonnel land mines.
6
Many of the concerns raised over ACDA’s integration into the Department of
State likely have been mitigated, however. First, the current head of ACDA also serves
as the Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
Affairs. Closer integration of arms control objectives with other foreign policy and
national security priorities has been underway for some time. In addition, the transition
likely will be relatively smooth. Second, the Administration remains committed to
retaining ACDA’s technical and policy expertise, as well as its verification, compliance,
and legal functions. Reorganization critics were alarmed at the prospect of losing such
capabilities, widely seen as indispensable to effective arms control, to a larger State
Department culture that did not favor such expertise.
6Statement of the Hon. John D. Holum, Director, ACDA, Subcommittee on International
Operations and Human Rights, Committee on International Relations, March 5, 1997.

CRS-16
USAID and U.S. Development
Established in 1961, the mission of
Assistance Policy. With USAID remaining
USAID is to promote long-term,
an independent agency but placed under
sustainable development abroad,
the direct authority of the Secretary of
helping countries grow economically,
State, it is anticipated that initially there
strengthen democratic institutions,
will be very little change in the way the
protect the environment, stabilize
agency operates and how it implements
population growth, and deal with
U.S. development assistance policy. At
disasters and other humanitarian
present, only USAID’s press office is
requirements. Currently, USAID has
slated to be consolidated with State,
programs in about 100 countries,
although the White House says that State
although the Agency has announced
and USAID will explore further options
plans to reduce that number to 75 by
for coordinating or merging other
the year 2000. Agency staff totals
administrative and program services.
about 7,800, down from over 10,700 in
1993. The current level includes
USAID currently exists under the
roughly 2,240 American direct hires,
authority of Executive Order 12163,
about 750 of which work overseas. In
Administration of Foreign Assistance and
addition, USAID has about 5,500
Related Functions, and through
American and foreign national
International Development Cooperation
contractors.
Agency (IDCA) Delegation of Authority
No. 1 of October 1, 1979. IDCA was
created in 1979 as a small agency intended to serve as the overall coordinator of U.S.
development aid policies and programs. USAID, which had been established in 1961
within the State Department, continued in existence after 1979 within IDCA. In
practical terms, however, IDCA functioned to a very limited extent. After the IDCA
Director appointed by President Carter left in 1981, no one has been named to fill the
position. Instead, USAID Administrators have served in dual capacities as agency head
and acting IDCA Director. The President’s consolidation plan called for abolishing
IDCA, but reconstituting USAID as an independent agency.
Although USAID has remained independent of the State Department since 1979,
the two have maintained a somewhat ambiguous association with the USAID
Administrator always operating under the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of
State. In practice, it appears that USAID’s relationship with the State Department,
both in Washington and in the field, has rested less on organizational lines of authority
than on informal personal relationships between the Secretary and the Administrator,
their chief deputies in charge of regional and functional bureaus, and U.S. ambassadors
and USAID mission directors posted around the world. Most observers believe that
having USAID fall under the direct authority of the Secretary of State will have little
or no effect on how the agencies interact, and that coordination will continue to be
driven more by the personal relationships of senior officials. What remains to be seen
is whether the White House proposes to continue USAID as an independent agency
through law, as USAID anticipates, or through a delegation of authority by way of
the Secretary of State.
During 1995-96, USAID and its Administrator, Brian Atwood, vigorously opposed
merging the agency into the State Department, based largely on two grounds: the unique
nature of USAID’s mission as a development agency and the achievements of agency
management reforms since 1994 that have not been matched by State Department

CRS-17
administrative improvements. In defending their position, USAID officials have
emphasized the different nature of missions and problems dealt with by the State
Department and USAID: State more often focuses on resolving short-term crises
through diplomacy and political government-to-government relations while USAID,
in pursuing its development strategies, requires a long-term, sustained effort to achieve
results that might be compromised by State Department needs to divert resources for
crisis management. USAID officials have further noted that for nearly three years the
agency has been heavily engaged in organizational reforms and participating as an
“experimental laboratory” in the Vice President’s National Performance Review.
USAID has closed 26 overseas aid missions, terminated relations with governments
that were uncooperative development partners, and attempted to create a results-
oriented accountability system against which the agency and Congress can measure
results.
While still defending USAID’s position as an independent agency, during the more
recent round of interagency negotiations over consolidation plans, Administrator
Atwood reportedly argued that whatever the outcome on the merger question, three
elements of USAID operations must be protected: 1) USAID must continue to receive
its development assistance funding directly and control its own budget rather than having
the appropriations passed through the State Department; 2) USAID procurement and
other administrative systems must continue for aid projects instead of using State’s
processes; and 3) the stature of the senior official heading U.S. aid programs and the
development aid mission itself — whether it be within or outside the State Department
— must not be downgraded. Based on the consolidation outlines released thus far by
the White House, it appears that not only will USAID remain independent, but that
Administrator Atwood’s three requirements have been accommodated. Nevertheless,
the outcome of the Administration’s final plan and the requirement enacted in P.L. 105-
277 for development aid funding to be allocated to the Secretary of State could alter
the preliminary arrangements reached in early 1997 regarding USAID’s relationship
with the State Department.
According to current plans, there will be only one minor change for USAID during
the initial stage of the consolidation proposal: some portions of its small press office
of about 10 staff, with an annual budget of roughly $670,000, will merge with State’s
press bureau. But in subsequent phases of the reorganization, the White House says
that other issues will be considered that could possibly have more significant impact
on USAID programs and operations.
Among the most important issues for future consideration would be efforts to
better coordinate USAID and State Department regional and functional bureaus. The
creation in 1993 of State’s Global Affairs Bureau, a unit that oversees the Department’s
policy formulation of, among other things, international environment, population, and
democracy building issues, established a parallel and somewhat overlapping office with
USAID’s Global Bureau. The USAID global unit sets aid policy on these same issues
and administers large amounts development assistance resources. Reportedly, there
have been continuing disagreements between State and USAID on policy prioritization
and aid funding allocations, especially in the areas of the environment and population.
Whether to consolidate and where to locate State Department’s refugee and USAID’s

CRS-18
disaster offices has also been an issue in the past. On regional issues, USAI
7
D
administers U.S. aid programs in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but
a special advisor to the Secretary of State plays the lead role in policy formulation and
exercises extensive guidance for implementing aid programs in the region. These are
some of the most likely areas Administration officials may examine over the next year
in search of further ways to eliminate duplication between the two agencies.
The reorganization text in H.R. 1757, as passed by the House, was generally in
line with the White House’s April proposal for USAID. The bill abolished IDCA
immediately and permitted the President to determine how IDCA responsibilities would
be redelegated. Consistent with White House intentions, the legislation required USAID
to transfer its press office and certain unspecified administrative functions to the State
Department, and come under the direct authority and foreign policy guidance of the
Secretary of State. Bipartisan agreement on the final reorganization provision in H.R.
1757 came after an earlier contentious debate over text that appeared to move USAID
more closely under control of the State Department. As introduced, H.R. 1757
transferred IDCA functions directly to the Secretary of State and moved several other
USAID functions, including non-specialized procurement, travel and transportation,
facilities management, and security operations, to the State Department. The House
early in the debate of H.R. 1757 had defeated (202-224) an amendment by
Representative Hamilton to remove these and other reorganization provisions opposed
by the Administration. Later in the debate, however, the House, under a
Gilman/Hamilton bipartisan agreement, revised the USAID provisions accommodating
Administration concerns.
Unlike the House provision and the White House plan, legislation passed by the
Senate placed the State Department in much more direct control of USAID policy
making, funding allocation decisions, and personnel management. Specifically, the
bill:
! Transferred IDCA functions to the Secretary of State, except for those relating
to the Overseas Private Investment Corporation which remained with USAID.
! Allocated aid funds previously apportioned to IDCA to the Secretary of State.
! Required the reorganization of USAID to occur no later than October 1, 1998,
one year earlier than planned by the Administration.
! Transfered to the State Department press affairs functions, as proposed by the
White House, as well those of public affairs and legislative affairs.
! Granted the Secretary of State direct authority to coordinate all U.S. economic
aid programs, projects, and activities, including the design of broad assistance
USAID
7
contends that a transfer of refugee programs from State to its own Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance would result in a staff reduction of 25 and a savings of about $20 million.
Similar arguments could be made for shifting USAID’s disaster office to State’s refugee
bureau.

CRS-19
strategy and the arbiter for resolving policy, program, and funding disputes
among U.S. government agencies.
! Required USAID to detail its personnel, upon request, on a nonreimbursable
basis to the Department of State.
The revised reorganization legislation that passed Congress on October 21, 1998,
generally follows the Senate proposal regarding USAID, but accommodates a few key
Administration concerns. Only the press office and certain administrative functions,
as proposed by the White House, would transfer to the State Department. While the
Secretary of State would still coordinate U.S. economic assistance policy, as the Senate
recommended, the Secretary would “approve,” but not “design,” overall aid and
cooperation strategy. Nevertheless, the enacted bill directs that aid funds currently
allocated directly to USAID by way of IDCA, be apportioned to the Secretary of State.

CRS-20
Reorganization Chronology
04/12/96 —
President Clinton vetoed H.R. 1561, legislation authorizing U.S. foreign
policy programs for FY1996/97. Among reasons for rejecting the bill,
the President cited the requirement to abolish one foreign affairs agency
and to submit a reorganization plan saving $1.7 billion over four years.
04/18/97 —
The White House announced plans to reorganize U.S. foreign policy
agencies, affecting the State Department, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the United States Information Agency
(USIA), and the Agency for International Development (USAID).
05/01/97 —
A 120-day Executive branch review period began during which working
groups would draft specific elements of a consolidation proposal.
06/03/97 —
Representative Gilman introduced H.R. 1757, the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, FYs 1998/1999. Division A of H.R. 1757 outlined
foreign affairs agency reorganization authority. (Previously, the House
International Relations Committee had marked up and reported similar
legislation (H.R. 1486, H.Rept. 105-94); H.R. 1757 included the
reorganization elements of H.R. 1486.)
06/04/97 —
During floor debate on H.R. 1757, the House rejected (202-224) an
amendment by Representative Hamilton to give the President more
discretion over developing a reorganization plan.
06/11/97 —
The House agreed (voice vote) to an amendment to H.R. 1757 by
Representatives Gilman and Hamilton revising portions of agency
consolidation to accommodate Executive branch concerns. The House
passed H.R. 1757 (voice).
06/13/97 —
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported S. 903, the Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1997 (S.Rept. 105-28).
Division A included provisions reorganizing foreign affairs agencies.
06/17/97 —
The Senate incorporated the amended text of S. 903 into H.R. 1757,
and approved H.R. 1757 (90-5).
07/29-30/97 —House/Senate conferees met on H.R. 1757, but did not finalize.
11/09/97 —
The Senate passed H.R. 2607, after amending it to include modified
text reflecting preliminary House/Senate conference agreements on
foreign affairs agency consolidation. The House subsequently deleted
the reorganization issue from H.R. 2607.
11/13/97 —
Efforts by House leaders to introduce new legislation combining foreign
affairs consolidation with IMF funding, U.N. arrears authorization, and
international family planning restrictions related to abortion, collapsed
in the face of a Presidential veto threat.

CRS-21
12/19/97 —
Secretary of State Albright announces that ACDA Director John Holum
will also be Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Affairs.
03/10/98 —
Conference Report on H.R. 1757 is filed.
03/26/98 —
Measure passes in House by voice vote.
04/28/98 —
Measure passes Senate by a vote of 51 to 49.
10/19/98 —
Conference report on the Omnibus Consolidation and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 (H.R. 4328) is filed in the
House. Division G of H.R. 4328 includes slightly revised foreign affairs
agency consolidation authority.
10/21/98 —
Congress clears H.R. 4328 and the President signs the bill, including
agency reorganization, into law (P.L. 105-277). Separately, President
Clinton vetoes H.R. 1757 because of international family planning policy
and abortion restrictions.

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