Conventional Arms Transfers to Latin America: U.S. Policy

Conventional Arms Transfers to Latin America: U.S. Policy

97-512 F
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Conventional Arms Transfers to Latin America:
U.S. Policy
Updated August 5, 1997
(name redacted)
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

ABSTRACT
This report provides background on United States policy regarding conventional arms
transfers to Latin America. It focuses on the development of U.S. policy toward arms sales
and transfers to Latin America, and the debate over modifying existing policy and practices
regarding such sales and transfers to countries in this region. It will only be updated if there
is a significant change in U.S. policy or practices regarding arms transfers to this region.

Conventional Arms Transfers to Latin America: U.S. Policy
Summary
This report provides background on United States policy regarding conventional
arms transfers to Latin America. It focuses on the development of U.S. policy toward
arms sales and transfers to Latin America, and the debate over modifying existing
policy and practices regarding such sales and transfers to countries in this region.
United States policy on arms transfers to Latin America, as implemented, has gone
through various modifications over the last forty years. However, there has always
been some reluctance to provide large quantities of arms to this region. And, there
has been a fundamental interest in not making sales or transfers of highly advanced
weapons systems, such as combat fighter aircraft, that could undermine regional
military balances or stimulate an arms race.
While there has been no generic "ban" on arms transfers to Latin American
nations, there have been specific legislative controls and executive branch practices
applied to this region that have restricted the flow of American weaponry into it.
Recently, United States arms transfer practices regarding Latin America were
clarified by the Clinton Administration, although they remain the subject of a debate
over what approach the United States should follow. A review of the development
of U.S. policy and practices toward arms transfers to this region follows to provide
a context for understanding recent actions.
Some in Congress have expressed concern that the United States might
stimulate an avoidable arms race in Latin America should it permit American defense
firms to sell highly advanced weapons systems to this region. They have expressed
particular concern with the prospect that the United States might sell very
sophisticated combat fighter aircraft and the prospect that this would divert scarce
financial resources that could be better spent in other ways. Others argue that it is
appropriate for the United States to assist in the modernization of Latin American
military forces, especially in light of the growth of democratic institutions there, and
the practical need some nations have to replace obsolescent military equipment.
Chile is the most likely candidate for a sale that would give tangible effect to the
Clinton Administration's approach to U.S. arms sales to Latin America. Chile is
considering the purchase of a modern combat fighter to upgrade its Air Force. In late
March 1997, the Clinton Administration gave the U.S. companies who build the F-16
and F-18 fighters permission to provide technical data regarding these aircraft to the
Chilean government, while noting that just because it has permitted U.S. defense
companies to compete for the Chilean aircraft sale does not necessarily mean that it
would approve a sale request from Chile's government. If and when Chile should
choose to request the sale of an American fighter aircraft, the Clinton Administration
would, at that point, have to agree to make such a sale or issue an export license for
a commercial sale, and then justify that sale to Congress in accordance with the terms
of the Arms Export Control Act. Congress, in turn, would have the opportunity to
disapprove that sale by enactment of a joint resolution, should it choose to do so.

Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Congressional Restrictions on Arms Transfers to Latin America . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S. Arms Sales Policy Toward Latin America Before 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
President Carter's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and Latin America . . 4
President Reagan's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and Latin America . 5
President Clinton's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and Latin America 6
Current Debate Over U.S. Arms Sales Policy and Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Conventional Arms Transfers to Latin America:
U.S. Policy
Background
United States policy on arms transfers to Latin America, as implemented, has
gone through various modifications over the last forty years. However, there has
always been some reluctance to provide large quantities of arms to this region. And,
there has been a fundamental interest in not making sales or transfers of highly
advanced weapons systems, such as combat fighter aircraft, that could undermine
regional military balances or stimulate an arms race. While there has been no generic
"ban" on arms transfers to Latin American nations, there have been specific
legislative controls and executive branch practices applied to this region that have
restricted the flow of American weaponry into it. Currently, United States arms
transfer practices regarding Latin America are again under review, and have become
the subject of a debate over what course the United States should follow in the future.
A review of the development of U.S. policy and practices toward arms transfers to
this region follows to provide a context for understanding these most recent
deliberations.
Congressional Restrictions on Arms Transfers to Latin America
In the 1960s, Congress determined that arms sales and military assistance to
Latin America should be constrained generally during a period when emphasis was
being placed on U.S. aid to that region for economic and social development
purposes. This was also a period when Congress was concerned about providing
advanced weaponry to underdeveloped nations globally, not just to Latin America.
These concerns led Congress in 1967 to pass an amendment by Representative Conte
to FY1968 foreign assistance funding bill that specifically forbade U.S. financing of
the "purchase or acquisition of sophisticated weapons systems, such as missile
systems and jet aircraft for military purposes, by or for any underdeveloped country
... unless the President determines that such purchase or acquisition of weapons

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systems are vital to the national security of the United States and reports within 30
days each such determination to the Congress."1
In 1968, Congress enacted into permanent law a modified version of the Conte
amendment as a proviso in section 4 of the Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA). In
this act Congress prohibited U.S. financing or guarantees of sales of "sophisticated
weapons systems, such as missile systems and jet aircraft for military purposes to any
underdeveloped country," not specifically exempted from this ban, unless the
President determined that financing of such sales was "important" to the U.S.
national security, and reported this finding to Congress within thirty days. Section
4 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the successor statute to the FMSA,
currently contains the same restrictions on credit or guarantee sales of "sophisticated
weapons systems" to "underdeveloped" countries as did the 1968 Foreign Military
Sales Act.2
Section 33 of the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 also placed an overall
ceiling of $75 million on the amount of cash, credit or guaranteed arms sales that
could be made to "Latin American" countries in FY1969. The President was
permitted to waive these limitations should he determine that doing so is "important
to the security of the United States," and "promptly" report this to the Speaker of the
House and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. This overall dollar ceiling
on Latin American arms sales was raised to $150 million by 1973. In 1974 it was
repealed in its entirety by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974.3
Although the overall dollar ceilings on arms sales levels to Latin America were
eliminated in 1974, Congress did enact prohibitions on the sale or transfer of military
equipment to specific Latin American nations -- notably Chile and Argentina -- due
to concerns over actions taken by their governments, in particular human rights abuse
of their citizens. The ban on military aid and arms sales to Chile was first enacted
in 1974, while the one for Argentina was enacted in 1978.4
1 This amendment explicitly excluded from its restrictions Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel,
the Republic of China, the Philippines, and [South] Korea. See Title I, Military Assistance,
of the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1968, P.L. 90-249.
2 See Section 4 of P.L. 90-629. The 1968 Foreign Military Sales Act exempted Greece,
Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China, the Philippines and [South] Korea from this
restriction as does the current Arms Export Control Act.
3 See P.L. 93-559.
4 Section 25 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, P.L. 93-559, forbade the provision
of any military assistance, cash or credit arms sales, loan guarantees, or excess defense
articles transfers to Chile in FY1975. Section 404 of the International Security Assistance
and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, P.L. 94-329, continued limitations on military
assistance, arms sales and sales credits for Chile. Section 620B of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as added in 1978 by P.L. 95-92 and amended by P.L. 95-384 prohibited, among
other things, the furnishing to Argentina of grant military assistance, and the extension of
credits, sales, or export licenses under the Arms Export Control Act after September 30,
1978. The prohibitions on U.S. assistance and sales to Argentina were repealed by Congress
in 1989. The limitations on military assistance and arms sales to Chile were repealed in 1990
(continued...)

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During the 1960s and 1970s, the United States was a key supplier of arms to
Latin American countries. Nonetheless, other major arms exporters, including the
Soviet Union, and major West European nations also sold notable amounts of
weapons to this region. During the period from 1966-1975, the value of all arms
deliveries to all Latin American nations was $2.768 billion, or an average of $277
million a year, according to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The
principal suppliers of arms to Latin America from 1973-1977 the period before
President Jimmy Carter's arms transfer policy fully took effect were: the Soviet
Union (delivering $1.03 billion in weaponry to two nations Cuba and Peru), the
United States ($653 million), the United Kingdom ($565 million), and France ($475
million).5
U.S. Arms Sales Policy Toward Latin America Before 1977
The U. S. limitations on the sale or transfer of advanced military equipment to
Latin America, especially on combat aircraft, noted above, led to friction with
prospective Latin American customers and resulted in other suppliers making sales
that the United States refused to make on policy grounds. In the mid-to-late 1960s,
the United States refused to sell combat aircraft more advanced than the A-4B light
attack aircraft, and the Korean War era F-86 fighter. Some Latin American nations
sought the F-5 light jet fighter, but the United States was not prepared to sell it until
1969. Peru responded to a U.S. rejection of its request to buy F-5s by purchasing
Mirage 5 fighters from France, thereby becoming in 1969 the first Latin American
nation to acquire supersonic fighter aircraft. Subsequently, Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia, and Venezuela also obtained Mirage III and Mirage 5 fighters from
France. In the early 1970s the U.S. F-5 fighter became available for sale to Latin
America on a cash basis. In 1973, President Nixon waived the restrictions on credit
sales to the region to enable Latin American states to purchase the F-5. Brazil
purchased 42 F-5Es on credit terms. Chile bought 18 F-5Es for cash. Peru in 1976
chose not to seek U.S. F-5 aircraft. Instead Peru purchased Su-22 supersonic fighter
bombers from the Soviet Union, thereby introducing a new level of military
capability into the region.6
4(...continued)
by P.L. 101-513, conditioned on a Presidential certification specifying certain things. The
requisite certification was made on September 30, 1990, in Public Notice 1333 by the
Secretary of State on behalf of the President.
5 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers, 1966-1975, 1977, p. 80. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1968-1977, October 1979, p. 115.
6 Details regarding arms sales and transfers to Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s
are found in Luigi, Einaudi, et. Al. Arms Transfers to Latin America: Toward a Policy of
Mutual Respect. Rand Corporation, Report R-1173-DOS, June 1973, pp. 1-21; Ronfeldt,
David and Caesar Sereseres, U.S. Arms Transfers, Diplomacy, and Security in Latin
America and Beyond. Rand Corporation, Rand Paper P-6005, October 1977, pp. 5-12. Also
see Sorley, Lewis, Arms Transfers under Nixon: A Policy Analysis. The University of
Kentucky Press, 1983, pp. 152-160 and Foreign Military Markets. Latin America &
Caribbean. 1996/1997 Forecast International/DMS. Newtown, Connecticut.

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U.S. missile systems were considered to be too advanced to be available for sale
to Latin America in the 1960s and early 1970s, so West Europe, Israel and Australia
became primary sources for these weapons. Because the United States, during this
period, did not have cost competitive surplus ground and naval equipment to sell to
Latin America, European nations became the leading source of these types of
weapons in the region. Great Britain, Italy and West Germany supplied new
destroyers, guided-missile frigates, submarines and tanks. In 1973, Peru purchased
T-55 medium tanks from the Soviet Union, as well as radar-controlled anti-aircraft
guns and long-range artillery.
President Carter's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and Latin
America
By the time of President Carter's election in 1976, Congress had already passed
legislation that placed restrictions on sales or transfers of weapons to countries
determined to be engaged in systematic violations of human rights. The Carter
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy directive (PDD-13), publicly announced on May
19, 1977, noted that it would seek to advance respect for human rights in countries
that received U.S. military aid, and would assess the economic impact of arms
transfers to less developed nations receiving U.S. economic assistance. The Carter
policy directive reflected the view that conventional arms transfers in general, except
for those to major allies, needed to be restrained. The Carter policy stated that arms
transfers would be viewed as "an exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used
only where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national
security interests." It also noted that "the burden of persuasion will be on those who
favor a particular arms sale, rather than those who oppose it." It stated that the United
States would not be the "first supplier to introduce into a region newly-developed,
advanced weapons systems which could create a new or significantly higher combat
capability." Further, the policy directive set in motion a revision of U.S. arms sales
regulations that required authorization by the State Department before agents of the
U.S. or private manufacturers could take actions to promote the sale of U.S.
armaments abroad. And, U.S. embassies and military representatives abroad were
forbidden from promoting the sale of U.S. weapons.7
It is the language of the Carter arms transfer policy directive on conventional
arms transfers that has given the impression that strong restrictions on U.S. transfers
to Latin America originated with his Administration. Yet, as noted above, Congress
had already taken direct legislative action to limit U.S. sales to this region for at least
a decade. Once in office, Carter did follow through with the key elements of his
policy directive by refusing to sell any combat fighter aircraft to Latin America more
advanced than the A-4 and the F-5. He also denied permission for Israel to sell its
Kfir fighter aircraft to Ecuador in July 1977, an action he was able to take because
7 Statement on Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, issued by President Jimmy Carter,
May 19, 1977.

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the Kfir was powered by the U.S.-origin General Electric J-79 engine.8 The Carter
Administration's human rights policy had an important effect on overall levels of
Latin American arms purchases from the United States. Some nations such as Brazil
and Argentina, indicated that they did not appreciate U.S. criticism of their human
rights records, or the linking of such records to levels of military assistance or credits
for purchasing arms. U.S. government arms sales figures for the Carter years reflect
a general decline in the total value of weapons purchased by all of Latin America
from the United States during FY1977-FY1980.9
President Reagan's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and Latin
America
President Ronald Reagan's Administration took a different position from
President Carter on arms transfer policy generally as well as on arms transfers to
Latin America. On July 9, 1981, President Reagan publicly announced his
Presidential directive on Conventional Arms Transfer policy, which explicitly
superseded the May 1977 Carter policy directive on the subject.10 The Reagan
policy directive stated that the transfer of conventional arms and defense articles was
"an essential element of its global defense posture and an indispensable component
of its foreign policy." It noted that the United States would evaluate arms transfer
requests "primarily in terms of their net contribution to enhanced deterrence and
defense." In making decisions to transfer arms a "broad range of factors" would be
taken into account, including: "whether the transfer is consistent with United States
interests in maintaining stability within regions where friends of the United States
may have differing objectives; ... whether the proposed equipment transfer can be
absorbed by the recipient without overburdening its military support system or
financial resources; and whether any detrimental effects of the transfer are more than
counterbalanced by positive contributions to United States interests and objectives."
The Reagan directive stipulated that all arms transfer requests would be
considered "on a case-by-case basis," and that those involving "coproduction, or the
transfer of sensitive or advanced technology" would receive "special scrutiny." At the
same time, the Reagan directive removed the Carter prohibition on U.S. government
representatives overseas providing assistance to U.S. firms that had obtained licenses
to market U.S. defense items abroad.
During the Reagan Administration the United States made its first sale to Latin
America of a highly advanced, supersonic combat fighter aircraft. This sale of 24 F-
16 fighters to Venezuela was proposed on January 13, 1982 and cleared
8 Under U.S. law, all third-country retransfers of U.S.-origin military equipment and
components much receive the prior approval of the United States before they can be made.
9 Total U.S. arms sales agreements with Latin America fell each year from a high of
$83.3 million in FY1977 to a low of $24.9 million in FY1980. U.S. Department of Defense.
Defense Security Assistance Agency. Fiscal Year series.
10 Announcement Concerning a Presidential Directive on United States Conventional
Arms Transfer Policy released by the White House on July 9, 1981. This announcement
stated that President Reagan signed the new Presidential Directive on July 8, 1981.

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congressional review a month later. The principal justifications for the sale cited by
Administration witnesses were the Cuban military buildup, including acquisition of
MiG-23 fighters, Venezuela's measured decision to update its air force, Venezuela's
important role as a force for stability in the region, and the fact that its oil revenues
gave it the requisite funds to pay for the F-16 fighters.11 The F-16 sale to Venezuela
was the single largest sale of any major U.S. weapons system to Latin America
during the Reagan Administration, and was larger than any single arms sale to that
region made subsequently by the Bush Administration. From FY1981 through
FY1992, the total of U.S. government arms sales to Latin American was $3.32 billion
or an average of about $276.8 million a year. Most of the weapons sold in the region
were of a less advanced character, and the largest sales totals were to nations such as
El Salvador, considered a strong anti-Communist ally facing an internal insurgency.
The highest arms sales total for any year to the region was in FY1982 -- $523.9
million. Of this FY1982 total, $456 million were for sales to Venezuela, the largest
part of this figure was for the F-16 aircraft.12
President Clinton's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy and Latin
America
The Reagan Conventional Arms Transfer Policy directive was not modified
during the Administration of President George Bush. Thus, the July 1981 Reagan
directive was the basis for U.S. policy until it was replaced on February 17, 1995,
when, after months of internal debate, President Clinton released details of his
directive on Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (PDD-34). As outlined, the Clinton
directive codified an approach toward arms transfers that had guided the Clinton
Administration's decisions since the President took office. Under the Clinton policy
directive, the United States continues to view transfers of conventional arms as a
legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy when they enable the United States to
help friends and allies deter aggression, promote regional security and increase
interoperability of U.S. forces and allied forces.13
President Clinton's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy represents a public
articulation of a policy approach that has governed United States arms transfers at
least since the Reagan Administration. Given what the Administration believes are
the multiple U.S. interests involved in each arms transfer determination, decisions
will continue to be made on a "case-by-case" basis. The guidelines set out in the
policy are sufficiently broad so as to permit most U.S. sales on the grounds of
advancing the national interest. The policy guidelines do not reflect more tightly
drawn criteria for U.S. arms transfers such as a strict "code of conduct" test that
potential arms recipients would have to meet under a proposal by some congressional
11 See U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Proposed Sale of F-16's
to Venezuela. Hearing. 97th Cong., 2nd. Sess., February 5, 1982, pp. 3-12.
12 U.S. Department of Defense. Defense Security Assistance Agency. Fiscal Year
Series.
13 For a detailed analysis and text of key documents related to President Clinton's
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy see CRS Report 95-639, Conventional Arms Transfers:
President Clinton's Policy Directive, by (name redacted), May 17, 1995.

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arms control advocates. Nor do they explicitly single out any region of the world for
special policy treatment.
Although the Administration has emphasized that its decisions on arms transfers
will not be driven by commercial considerations but primarily by national security,
the Clinton Conventional Arms Transfer Policy holds that supporting a strong,
sustainable American defense-industrial base is a key national security concern,
rather than simply a commercial matter. In so doing, the Clinton policy directive has
publicly elevated the significance of domestic economic considerations in the arms
transfer decision-making process to a higher degree than has been formally the case
in previous Administrations.
Current Debate Over U.S. Arms Sales Policy and Latin
America
Although media accounts suggest otherwise, there has been no explicit statutory
or policy "ban" on arms sales to Latin American nations, with the exception of Cuba.
From FY1993 through FY1996, the United States government sold a total of $789.8
million in arms to Latin America, averaging about $197 million in sales a year. It is
true, as outlined above, that since the 1960s, there has been reluctance on the part of
the U.S. government to make sales of highly sophisticated combat weapons systems
to Latin American countries. And it has been a general practice by the United States
government not to seek to sell highly advanced weapons, particularly advanced
combat aircraft, to this region.14
The current debate over prospective Latin American arms sales is a debate over
whether or not the United States (or U.S. companies) should sell specific
sophisticated weapons to specific nations in Latin America. It is a debate over
whether or not the United States should, for example, be willing to sell advanced
combat fighter aircraft to nations in the region for the first time since 1982, when the
U.S. sold F-16 fighters to Venezuela. The practice of the executive branch, since the
Venezuelan sale, has been either to discourage or turn down requests to sell highly
advanced combat weapons systems to Latin American nations, especially fighter
aircraft. It is this practice, in the implementation of U.S. arms transfer policy
guidelines, that has been challenged by U.S. defense industry representatives. It is
this practice that was under review by the Clinton Administration for about two
years.15
On August 1, 1997, President Clinton made public his decision to place U.S.
arms transfer policy toward Latin America explicitly "on a par with our policy toward
14 U.S. Department of Defense. Defense Security Assistance Agency. Fiscal Year
Series.
15 Jane's Defense Weekly, December 4, 1996, p.16; Jane's Defense Weekly, January
15, 1997, p.6; New York Times, January 16, 1997, p.A14; Reuters, January 16, 1997.;
Washington Post, January 17, 1997, p. A22; Washington Times, February 12, 1997, p.A1,
A8.

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other regions of the world," through a process of "case-by-case" review of requests
for "advanced arms transfers" by nations in that region. The White House statement
announcing this approach regarding arms transactions with Latin America is
consistent, in its focus and emphasis, with President Clinton's Conventional Arms
Transfer Policy Directive of 1995. The President's August announcement, while
clarifying the policy approach the Administration will follow in evaluating Latin
American arms transfers, has not resolved the debate between proponents and
opponents of advanced weapons transfers to this region by the United States.16

Many U.S. exporters of weapons systems argue that past restrictions on sale of
advanced weapons sales to Latin America are no longer appropriate considering
among other things: the positive changes in the nature of governments in Latin
America toward greater democracy in the last decade, their better ability to pay for
more costly weapons, and their practical requirement to upgrade key weapons that
are at or near obsolescence. These exporters also argue that past history has
demonstrated the likelihood that once a Latin American nation has decided to
purchase a particular type of weapon, it will do so, whether the United States is
willing to sell it to them. The sales in late 1996 of MiG-29 and Su-25 fighter aircraft
to Peru by Belarus, has increased the interest of some Latin American countries in
obtaining new combat fighter aircraft for themselves, and prompted calls by U.S.
defense companies for the Administration to permit U.S. combat fighter sales to such
countries.17
Conventional arms control advocates argue that the United States would foster
an expensive and destabilizing arms race in Latin America if it sold comparable or
better fighter aircraft than the Peruvian Mig-29s to other nations in the region. They
argue that the Peruvian aircraft do not in themselves upset a military balance in the
region. It is not certain the planes can be operated effectively or maintained, and thus
there is no point in encouraging unnecessary new purchases of expensive fighters by
other nations in Latin America merely because of Peru's acquisition. Instead, the
United States could attempt to secure the support of all major states in the region to
engage in collective self-restraint in the purchases of costly advanced weapons, and
place more emphasis on confidence-building measures that could avert wasteful
military expenditures. These arms control advocates believe the restraint the United
States has displayed in arms sales to the region has served the interests of all nations
in the region, and should not be changed just because new market opportunities for
American contractors might exist.
Chile is the most likely candidate for a sale that would give tangible effect to the
Clinton approach to U.S. arms sales to Latin America. Chile is considering the
purchase of a modern combat fighter to upgrade its Air Force. In late March 1997,
the Clinton Administration gave the U.S. companies who build the F-16 and F-18
16 White House Statement. Office of the Press Secretary. "U.S. Policy of Arms
Transfers to Latin American," August 1, 1997; New York Times, August 2, 1997, p. A1;
Washington Post, August 2, 1997, p. A15. For text of White House Statement of August 1,
1997 see Appendix 1.
17 Jane's Defense Weekly, November 27, 1996, p.3; Jane's Defense Weekly, December
18, 1996, p. 9.

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fighters permission to provide technical data regarding these aircraft to the Chilean
government. Similar information is being provided by foreign aircraft exporters as
part of an effort to convince Chile's government that their aircraft would best serve
Chile's military requirements.18 The Clinton Administration has noted that just
because it has permitted U.S. defense companies to compete for the Chilean aircraft
sale does not necessarily mean that it would approve a sale request from Chile's
government. If and when Chile should choose to request the sale of an American
fighter aircraft, the Clinton Administration would, at that point, have to agree to
make such a sale or issue an export license for a commercial sale, and then justify
that sale to Congress in accordance with the terms of the Arms Export Control Act.
Congress, in turn, would have the opportunity to disapprove that sale by enactment
of a joint resolution, should it choose to do so. The same process would apply to any
other sale of advanced military equipment to a Latin American nation.19
18 New York Times, April 4, 1997, p.7; Reuters, April 3, 1997; Jane's Defense Weekly,
April 16, 1997, p. 8;
19 For details regarding the congressional arms sales review process see CRS Report
96-971, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by (name redacted), December 2,
1996.

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Appendix
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
August 1, 1997
Statement by The Press Secretary
U.S. POLICY ON ARMS TRANSFERS TO LATIN AMERICA
Following a review of Administration security policy in Latin America, the
President has decided to establish a process for case-by-case consideration of
requests for advanced arms transfers to countries of that region. This decision puts
U.S. arms transfer policy toward Latin America on a par with our policy toward other
regions of the world and will be implemented in a way that serves our objective of
promoting stability, restraint, and cooperation in the region.
In the last decade, Latin America has changed dramatically from a region
dominated by coups and military governments to one of democracy and civilian
control. Our partnership with countries in the region has reached a new level of
maturity, cooperation and dialogue. As their democracies strengthen and their
economies grow, the governments of some Latin American countries are now
addressing the need to modernize their militaries. They are doing so in the context
of greatly improved regional political cooperation and economic integration, and of
increased defense cooperation, transparency and confidence-building.
It is in America's national security interest to promote stability and security
among our neighbors in the hemisphere by engaging with them as equal partners as
they modernize and restructure their defense establishments. In considering requests
from appropriate civilian authorities for advanced conventional arms, we will take
into account our guiding goals of strengthening democracy, including civilian control
of the military; focusing resources on needed social and economic development;
preventing an arms race; supporting transparency and confidence-building; and
ensuring that defense modernization occurs responsibly and with restraint.
An interagency group has been formed under the Chairmanship of the Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs to address and
coordinate our efforts to achieve our security goals for the region, including
enhancing regional cooperation and stability, and considering requests for advanced
conventional arms transfers.

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