Senate Consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty and Subsequent Accessions: Historical Overview

Senate Consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty and Subsequent Accessions: Historical Overview

97-1041 F
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Senate Consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty
and Subsequent Accessions:
Historical Overview
December 8, 1997
(name redacted)
Senior Specialist in International Security Policy
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Note
This report is based on a memorandum originally prepared at the
request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and released with
the Committee's permission. Research assistance for the report was
provided by Sarah Cambridge and Louis Golino.

Senate Consideration of the North Atlantic Treaty and
Subsequent Accessions: Historical Overview
Summary
The Senate debate over the original North Atlantic Treaty and three
subsequent accessions (Greece and Turkey in 1952, Germany in 1955, and Spain in
1982) took place under very different circumstances than the current debate over the
proposed accessions of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The historical
setting, of course, has fundamentally changed. Then there was a broad consensus in
the United States that the Soviet Union posed a threat to U.S. interests in Europe.
Today, there is an equally broad consensus that there is no such threat. Some issues
raised in the earlier debates by skeptics and opponents, for example concerning the
cost and risks of the commitments entailed, however, may be echoed in the current
accession discussions. Equally, some arguments offered by today's NATO
enlargement supporters are similar to rationales advanced on behalf of the original
treaty and subsequent enlargements, including support for common values and the
benefits of cooperation with like-minded states. In all four cases, the resolutions of
ratification were approved without reservations or conditions.
In the debate on the North Atlantic Treaty, Senators focused on several issues,
including: (1) whether or not the Treaty undermined congressional war powers; (2)
the meaning of the article V collective defense provision in the treaty; and (3) the
link between the Treaty and the Military Assistance Program (MAP) that the
administration planned to seek in support of West European self defense capabilities.
When the resolution of ratification came to the Senate floor, three reservations were
proposed and defeated. The role call vote gave the Senate's consent to treaty
ratification by a margin of 82-13.
Senate consideration of the membership of Greece and Turkey in NATO ended
with a February 7, 1952 roll-call vote of 73-2 favoring their admission. Debate on
the Senate floor centered primarily on the question of the war-making powers of the
Congress.
The Senate's consideration of the protocol concerning Germany's membership
in NATO came after several years of debate and senatorial involvement in decisions
related to the future of European security arrangements. When the Senate considered
the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, many Senators had then wanted to bring
Germany's potential to bear as part of Western defenses. On April 1, 1955, by a roll
call vote of 76-2, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the end of occupation and
the accession of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty.
On March 16, 1982, Senate action on the Spanish protocol moved swiftly and
without opposition. No Senator spoke in opposition and, on a division vote, two-
thirds of the Senate present and voting stood for the affirmative, and the resolution
of ratification was agreed to.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
North Atlantic Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Process/Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Accessions to the North Atlantic Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Accession of Greece and Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Process/Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Accession of Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Process/Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Accession of Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Process/Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Resolutions of Ratification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
North Atlantic Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Accession of Greece and Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Accession of Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Accession of Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Resource Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
North Atlantic Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Accession of Greece and Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Accession of Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Accession of Spain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Senate Consideration of the North Atlantic
Treaty and Subsequent Accessions:
Historical Overview
Introduction
The Senate debate over the original North Atlantic Treaty and three subsequent
accessions (Greece and Turkey in 1952, Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982) took
place under very different circumstances than the current debate over the proposed
accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. The historical setting, of
course, has fundamentally changed. Then there was a broad consensus in the United
States that the Soviet Union posed a threat to U.S. interests in Europe. Today, there
is an equally broad consensus that there is no such threat. Some issues raised in the
earlier debates, however, may be echoed in the current accession discussions. In
1949, several Senators were particularly concerned about the affect of U.S. accession
to the North Atlantic Treaty on congressional war powers. Others focused on how
much the treaty might cost the United States, and whether it would require additional
U.S. military efforts. Similar issues were raised when Greece and Turkey entered the
alliance in 1952 and when Germany was admitted in 1955. There was very little
debate about Spain's proposed membership in NATO in 1982, in part because there
had been a longstanding interest in bringing Spain into the alliance but resistance to
doing so as long as democracy had not been established there. Many of the
arguments offered by today's NATO enlargement supporters are reminiscent of the
rationales offered on behalf of the original treaty and subsequent enlargements,
including support for common values and the benefits of cooperation with like-
minded states. The following paragraphs summarize the debate in the U.S. Senate
on all of these earlier decisions.

North Atlantic Treaty
Background
Three formative actions originally shaped the North Atlantic Alliance in 1948-
49: the Brussels Treaty (1948), the Vandenberg Resolution (1948), and the North
Atlantic Treaty (1949). These events outlined the objectives of the "transatlantic
bargain," identified the partners in the deal, and suggested some of the reciprocal
obligations to be borne by the participants. The Congress, the Senate in particular,
played an important part in this process.
In the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and
Collective Self-Defense, of March 17, 1948, the governments of France, the United

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Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg provided the initial
framework for postwar West European cooperation. More important, these five
countries signaled to the United States their intent to structure postwar intra-
European relations to encourage internal stability and to defend against external
threats. The treaty stated the basic European commitment to the bargain. To make
sure that the signal would be heard loudly and clearly in the halls of the U.S.
Congress, President Harry Truman told a special joint session of Congress that he
was "sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves
will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them protect
themselves."
Congressional acceptance of this bargain was given political impetus in the so-
called Vandenberg Resolution. Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-Michigan), the
sponsor and chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, had been
known as an "isolationist" during World War II, and the Truman administration went
to great lengths to encourage Vandenberg's postwar conversion to a more
"internationalist" inclination. Following signature of the Brussels Treaty, the State
Department asked Vandenberg to prepare a resolution which would express
congressional support for the Administration's desire to affiliate the United States
with the European self-help project. Vandenberg crafted a resolution which, in part,
suggested the United States should support "the progressive development of regional
and other collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and
provisions of the [United Nations] Charter...." The resolution was approved by the
Senate on June 11, 1948 with overwhelming bipartisan support. Almost immediately
thereafter, in late June 1948, the Soviet Union imposed a blockade of Berlin, and
officials from the United States and its transatlantic partners (Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and the
United Kingdom) intensified work on the North Atlantic Treaty.
The document signed on April 4, 1949 was a compromise between the European
desire for explicit U.S. commitments to provide military assistance to prospective
NATO allies and the American desire -- strongly expressed in Congress -- for more
general, less specific assistance provisions. The end product reflected close
cooperation between administration officials and key Senate leaders in their attempt
to produce a treaty that could win Senate advice and consent.
Process/Issues
On April 12, 1949, President Truman delivered the protocol, in the form of
Executive Document L, to the Senate. The protocol was referred to the Committee
on Foreign Relations. The Committee convened on April 21 to consider the Treaty's
relationship to the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, which the Administration
had proposed as a military assistance program to support the Treaty's goals.
The Foreign Relations Committee, led by Chairman Tom Connally (D-Texas),
began a series of public hearings on April 27 and, over the next two months, recorded
hearings on 16 days producing 1263 pages of printed testimony. Two Senators not
on the Committee, Forrest C. Donnell (R-Missouri) and Arthur V. Watkins (R-Utah),
participated actively in the hearings. These two self-proclaimed skeptics were among
the leading opponents of the Treaty when it came to the floor of the Senate. From

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the beginning, there was a tension between these Treaty skeptics and Chairman
Connally.
The hearings opened with testimony from Secretary of State Dean Acheson.
Secretary Acheson began by making note of the fact that the Committee on Foreign
Relations and its members had been deeply involved in development of the Treaty.
Acheson said "Without the vision and assistance of your chairman [Connally], of
your former chairman [Vandenberg], and the members of this committee, this Treaty
could never have been concluded. The text embodies many constructive suggestions
from members of the committee."
Acheson argued that the Treaty was in the interest of peace ("If we want peace,
we must be prepared to wage peace, with all our thought, energy, and courage.") and
deterrence ("Security today and henceforward can only be assured, in the President's
words, by stopping war before it can start.") He said the Treaty was perfectly
consistent with the United Nations Charter and noted the importance of the Brussels
Treaty. Acheson drew attention to the system of common values underlying the
Treaty ("The principles which draw these nations into natural affinity and which they
seek to defend -- freedom of the individual, tolerance and restraint, and the rule of
law -- are the principles which unite free peoples throughout the world.")
He also emphasized that the Article V mutual defense provision in the Treaty
was not an "automatic" commitment and would be in accord with constitutional
requirements. ("This naturally does not mean that the United States would
automatically be at war if one of the other signatory nations were the victim of an
armed attack. Under our Constitution, the Congress alone has the power to declare
war. The obligation of this Government under article V would be to take promptly
the action it deemed necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic area. That decision would, of course, be taken in accordance with our
constitutional procedures.")
In response to questioning by Chairman Connally, Acheson confirmed that the
Treaty was not aimed at any country, but rather was designed to prevent armed
aggression. Acheson stated that "...any nation which claims that this Treaty is
directed against it should be reminded of the Biblical admonition that `The guilty flee
when no man pursueth.' "
Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-Iowa) asked whether or not the United
States would be "...expected to send substantial numbers of troops over there as a
more or less permanent contribution to the development of those countries' capacity
to resist?" Secretary Acheson replied "The answer to that question, Senator, is a clear
and absolute `No.'"
Acheson was questioned on various issues by a number of Committee members,
all of whom were favorably inclined toward the Treaty. Chairman Connally then
gave the floor to Senator Donnell, who, along with Senator Watkins, had asked to
join the Committee in its work. Senators Donnell and Watkins made initial
statements, and then Senator Donnell pursued a critical line of questioning. Donnell
focused in particular on the meaning of the article V "guarantee," and whether or not
the provision undermined Congress's constitutional war-making power.

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Secretary of State Acheson was followed by a parade of administration
witnesses speaking in favor of the Treaty, including Ambassador to the United
Nations Warren Austin, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, Ambassador W.
Averell Harriman, and Army Chief of Staff Omar N. Bradley. In addition, testimony
in favor of the Treaty was offered by a large group of private witnesses, and a similar
group of witnesses and organizations testified in opposition. Opponents questioned
the effect of the Treaty on congressional war-making powers, the link between the
Treaty and military assistance to European countries, and whether such an agreement
was warranted by the perceived threat to Europe.
In retrospect, the two major issues on which Senators focused in the hearings
were: (1) the meaning of the article V commitment; and (2) the link between the
Treaty and the Military Assistance Program (MAP) that the administration planned
to seek in support of West European self defense capabilities.
With regard to article V, because this provision had been developed in close
cooperation with members of the Committee, the entire Committee membership
accepted the final outcome and Acheson's explanation of the nature of the
commitment. This was not true, of course, for Senators Donnell and Watkins, who
had not been involved in developing the U.S. position and remained wary of
Secretary Acheson's explanations.
With regard to the Military Assistance Program, Secretary Acheson asked
Committee members to treat the issues separately, even though he acknowledged that
MAP was directly related to the Treaty's article III, calling for self-help and mutual
aid. The basic link between article III and MAP was the question of how much the
Treaty would cost the United States, at least in the near term. Because article V had
been watered down to satisfy concerns expressed by the Senate, some European
governments saw the provision of military assistance as an important aspect of the
U.S. commitment as well as essential to their ability to build credible defense
capabilities.
On both questions -- commitment and costs -- the administration tried to walk
a fine line between the desire of the Europeans for guarantees and aid and the
Senate's desire to protect congressional war-making prerogatives and limit costs to
the American taxpayer.
On June 6, the Committee reported the Treaty, recommending, by a unanimous
13-0 vote, that the Senate give its advice and consent. Senators Donnell and
Watkins, who throughout the hearings had vigorously advanced their skeptical views,
were left to pursue their opposition in the floor debate. In its report on the Treaty, the
Committee made five main points: (1) approval would not commit the Senate to
approving the military assistance program; (2) the Treaty would not abridge the
Constitutional powers of the Congress to declare war; (3) Treaty approval would not
imply the Senate's "support, approval or disapproval of other pact nations' colonial
policies; (4) Spain's admission to NATO depended on the approval of all pact
nations; and, (5) Germany was protected by the Treaty only to the degree that the pact
covered attack on U.S. armed forces stationed there.

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As the floor debate opened on July 5, Senator Donnell and Senator William
Jenner (R-Indiana) led opposition to the Treaty. The bipartisan pro-Treaty forces
were led by Senators Connally, Vandenberg, Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Massachusetts)
and Brien McMahon (D-Connecticut).
Senator Robert A. Taft (R-Ohio), before and during the floor debate,
concentrated on the link between the Treaty and the military assistance program. He
announced on the floor that he could not vote in favor of the North Atlantic Treaty
because "...I think it carries with it an obligation to assist in arming at our expense
the nations of Western Europe...." A few additional Senators joined in Taft's
concern, and others remained skeptical about the wisdom of the Article V provision
and its potential impact on the Constitutional prerogatives of the Congress.
Following lengthy and detailed debate which concluded on July 20, the Senate
on July 21 heard Senator Connally read a letter from Secretary Acheson urging
adoption and opposing any reservations or conditions. The Senate then voted on
three proposed reservations and finally on the Treaty itself.
The first reservation, proposed by Senators Kenneth Wherry (R-Nebraska), Taft,
and Watkins, addressed the issue of the link between Treaty ratification and military
assistance. It would have provided that the Treaty was ratified with the
understanding that Article III commits none of the parties to supply arms to other
parties to the Treaty. This reservation was defeated by a vote of 21-74. The second
reservation, offered by Senator Watkins, would have specified that the United States
assumed no obligation to assist another party to the Treaty unless such assistance
were authorized by a joint resolution of Congress. This reservation was defeated by
a vote of 11-84. The third reservation, also offered by Senator Watkins, would have
declared the Senate's understanding that Article V, in the case of an attack on a party
to the Treaty, does not obligate the Congress to declare war or authorize employment
of U.S. military forces. This reservation was defeated 8-87.
When the resolution of ratification was brought to a vote, Senator Wherry and
others asked for the "yeas and nays." At the end of the day, the Administration and
Treaty supporters in the Senate overcame the objections concerning cost and
commitments. The result of the roll call vote produced 82 yeas and 13 nays, and the
Senate, having provided much advice over many months of negotiations and debate,
also then gave its consent to ratification.

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Accessions to the North Atlantic Treaty
Accession of Greece and Turkey
Background. As noted earlier, during hearings on the North Atlantic Treaty
in 1949, Secretary of State Acheson told Senators that it would not be necessary to
send major formations of U.S. troops to Europe. In a few years, much had changed.
The North Korean attack on the Republic of Korea in June 1950 led President
Truman to send substantial numbers of U.S. forces to Europe less than 18 months
after Secretary Acheson had pledged that no major U.S. deployments would be
required. U.S. forces would become key assets within an “integrated command
structure” led by an American Supreme Allied Commander. This change led to a
“great debate” in the Senate and eventual passage of Senate Resolution 99, by a vote
of 69-21 on April 4, 1951. Resolution 99 supported Truman’s decisions, but
cautioned against making additional troop commitments without Senate approval.
The resolution, issuing the first clear call for effective “burdensharing,” called on the
Administration to ensure that the European nations, including Germany, Italy and
Spain, were making realistic efforts on behalf of European defense.
The 1952 accession of Greece and Turkey came in the historical wake of the
Senate’s consideration of Resolution 99. In a sense, adding these two southern
European nations to the alliance was a logical sequel to the decisions represented by
Resolution 99. The two nations, it was argued, would add important military forces
and geography to NATO’s southern flank. At the time, the sense of the Senate was
that any available European military potential should be used to help deal with the
Soviet threat, and the addition of these countries was responsive to this concern.
Process/Issues. Senate consideration of the membership of Greece and Turkey
in NATO ended with a February 7, 1952 roll-call vote of 73-2 favoring their
admission. The process leading up to the vote included advance consultations and
formal hearings with Secretary of State Acheson and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff General Omar Bradley. The Committee members discussed a variety of
topics among themselves and with Administration witnesses, but debate on the
Senate floor centered primarily on the question of the war-making powers of the
Congress.
In September 1951, while the Protocol to the Treaty of Washington on bringing
Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was still being
negotiated, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held two formal discussions of
the issue. On September 17, 1951, the Committee was convened by Senator
Connally and heard a report from Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Arkansas)
concerning a meeting that he and Senator Guy M. Gillette (D-Iowa) had recently held
with State Department representatives. The NATO allies, meeting in Ottawa,
Canada, were discussing possible membership invitations to Greece and Turkey.
The State Department reportedly wanted to know whether or not SFRC members
thought that Greek and Turkish membership in NATO "was a good idea." During
the Committee's discussion, Senator Gillette observed "I think the vast majority of
the Senate would be glad to see Turkey and Greece in, on the theory that you are

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containing Russia." Chairman Connally asked if it would be acceptable to
communicate this sense informally to the Department of State and, hearing no
objections, ordered Committee staff to do so.
On September 26, 1951, Secretary of State Acheson came before a joint meeting
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs to discuss the decision taken by the NATO allies at Ottawa to amend the
North Atlantic Treaty to admit the two nations. The brief discussion focused almost
exclusively on the dangers to U.S. interests in the region and command structure
issues that has been debated in Ottawa.
The Protocol providing for the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North
Atlantic Treaty was signed on October 17, 1951. President Truman transmitted the
Protocol to the Senate on January 10, 1952. On January 14, Secretary Acheson
appeared before the Committee to give a survey of international conditions. He
returned on January 15, along with General Bradley, to testify on behalf of the
Senate's approval of the adherence of Greece and Turkey to the Treaty. Discussion
in the Committee that day focused on how addition of the two nations and amending
the Treaty might affect U.S. commitments in the Middle East region. The Committee
sent the resolution of ratification to the floor with no reservations or conditions
attached.
The proposition came quickly to the Senate floor where a voice vote was taken
on January 29, 1952. Only six Senators were present and all voted to give the
Senate's advice and consent to the protocol, which was then sent to the President.
But on January 31, Senator Gillette observed to the Senate that it had been a mistake
to approve the protocol by voice vote with only six Senators in the chamber.
Majority Leader Ernest W. McFarland (D-Arizona) agreed, and declared that future
action on major treaties should be taken on roll-call vote after all Senators had been
formally notified. The President was requested to return the amendment to the
Senate, which he did on February 6.
In floor debate, Senator Gillette suggested that the Senate consider the effect of
the amendment to the Treaty on U.S. commitments. Senator Spessard L. Holland (D-
Florida) replied that, even though coverage would be extended to cover two
additional states, the United States and other parties to the Treaty retained the right
to decide what they were willing to do in the case of hostilities. Senator Arthur V.
Watkins (R-Utah) asked whether the Congress or the President had the power to send
U.S. forces into a "shooting war." Senator Fulbright replied that, in a "real
emergency," the President would likely act without consulting the Congress, but in
a "normal and reasonable situation" would seek congressional advice and consent.
Senator Watkins and Senator James P. Kem (R-Missouri) observed that the President
had not done so in the case of the Korean war.
Senator Watkins offered an amendment to the resolution of ratification
expressing the sense of the Senate that the Constitution gives Congress sole power
to declare war and that U.S. forces committed to NATO should not be used "in a
manner which would necessarily involve the United States in war, unless the
Congress by act or joint resolution so provides." The Watkins proposal was
supported by Senator Robert A. Taft (R-Ohio), but Senators Walter F. George (D-

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Geogia) and Senator Connally argued that all provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty
must be implemented by the Congress in any case. Senator Watkins then withdrew
his proposed reservation, and the amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty was voted
for the second time, on this occasion by a 73-2 roll-call vote on February 7, 1952.
The two votes against came from Senators Langer (R-North Dakota) and Case (R-
South Dakota).

Accession of Germany
Background. The Senate's consideration of the protocol concerning Germany's
membership in NATO came after several years of debate and senatorial involvement
in decisions related to the future of European security arrangements. When the
Senate considered the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, many Senators wanted to bring
Germany's potential to bear as part of Western defenses. Similarly, in the debate on
Resolution 99, most Senators supported using German military potential against the
Soviet threat. France, however, so soon after World War II, was very reluctant to
accept a rearmed Germany unless the process was carefully monitored and
controlled.
The original plan was to develop European defense efforts, including Germany,
through creation of a European Defense Community. When that project failed to win
approval in the French National Assembly, it was agreed to strengthen the 1948
Brussels Treaty, setting up the Western European Union (WEU) organization,
establish arms control provisions to govern German rearmament, end the occupation
of Germany and admit it to NATO. The entire period from 1948 through 1955 was
therefore one of almost continuous consultation between the Administration and the
Senate. The Senate gave its approval to the protocol admitting Germany to NATO
by a roll call vote of 76-2 on April 1, 1955.
Process/Issues. President Truman delivered the Treaty ending occupation of
the Federal Republic of Germany (Executive"L") and the protocol on admission of
Germany to NATO (Executive "M", a product of the London and Paris conferences
of September-October 1954) to the Senate on November 15, 1954. Formal
consideration of the protocol was delayed until ratification by France and Germany
was assured. Consideration of Germany's membership by the SFRC began with
hearings on March 29 and 30, 1955. On March 29, Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles testified that the arrangements being considered would give Western Europe
"its last chance to survive as a place of human welfare." On March 30, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Robert B. Anderson said the agreements promoted peace and
the alternative would be "chaos." Supporting statements were also received from
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and General
Orville R. Cook, deputy U.S. commander-in-chief in Europe. Later that same day,
the Committee heard opposition views from a variety of private groups who argued
that ratification of the arrangements would promote neo-Fascism and possibly lead
to another world war. On March 30, the Committee voted to report the two treaties
favorably (without reservations or conditions) to the Senate. The vote was 14-1, with
Senator William Langer (R-North Dakota) casting the sole negative vote.
When the Senate debated the German treaties on April 1, 1955, Senator Walter
F. George (D-Georgia), Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, argued

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that approving the treaties would increase the chances of German unification and
improve the chances of settling other East-West issues in Europe. Senator Langer
drew a parallel to the Treaty of Versailles, arguing that the treaties could bring on
another world war the way Versailles led to World War II. Senator George W.
Malone (R-Nevada), who cast the other vote against the treaties, argued that the
United States was compromising its right and ability to make sovereign decisions
about its national security. Senator Alexander Wiley (R-Wisconsin), speaking in
favor, maintained that ending the occupation and admitting Germany to NATO "will
return Western Germany to the place where she rightfully belongs, to a place of
equality and partnership with other nations of the Western World." By a single roll
call vote of 76-2, recorded separately for the two treaties, the Senate gave its advice
and consent to the end of occupation and the accession of Germany to the North
Atlantic Treaty.
Accession of Spain
Background. The Senate voted in favor of Spain's accession to the North
Atlantic Treaty on March 16, 1982, but the process that produced that result can be
seen as starting much earlier. In 1976, the United States and Spain completed
negotiation of the "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the
United States of America." The agreement was intended primarily as a political
framework for U.S.-Spanish military cooperation. Generalissimo Francisco Franco
had passed away in 1975, and then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wanted to
bring post-Franco Spain into the Western alliance system. But European allies
objected to bringing a Spain that was still ruled by an authoritarian regime into
NATO.
When the Senate gave its advice and consent to the U.S.-Spain Treaty on June
21, 1976, it made its resolution of ratification subject to a declaration. That
declaration said, in part, that the United States hopes that the Treaty will "support and
foster" Spain's progress toward democracy and consequent participation in "the
institutions of Western European political and economic cooperation." It added that
the United States "looks forward to the development of such an expanded
relationship between Western Europe and a democratic Spain as would be conducive
to Spain's full cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its activities
and mutual defense obligations."
Process/Issues. After Spain had thrown off the last vestiges of authoritarian
rule, all NATO members were prepared to offer it membership in NATO. There was
substantial political opposition in Spain to joining NATO, in part because of the
perception that Spain's defense relationship with the United States had helped sustain
Franco and his successors. But, on November 26, 1981, Spain's Senate, following
the lead of the House, voted to authorize the Government of Spain to seek an
invitation. NATO foreign ministers signed the protocol of Spanish accession to the
North Atlantic Treaty in Brussels on December 10, 1981. President Reagan
transmitted the protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent on January 25, 1982.
Senate action on the Spanish protocol moved swiftly and without opposition.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator Charles Percy (R-
Illinois), considered the protocol and reported it to the full Senate favorably and

CRS-10
without reservation on March 9, 1982. On March 16, Senator Ted Stevens (R-
Alaska), assistant Majority Leader, asked unanimous consent that the Senate go into
executive session to consider the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on accession
of Spain "and that no reservations, amendments, declarations, or understandings be
in order." Senator Percy took the floor first to speak on behalf of the protocol. He
was supported in statements by Senator Claiborne Pell (D-Rhode Island), ranking
minority member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator John Tower (R-
Texas), chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, and Senator Harry F. Byrd,
Jr.(R-Virginia). No Senator spoke in opposition and, on a division vote, two-thirds
of the Senate present and voting stood for the affirmative, and the resolution of
ratification was agreed to.

CRS-11
Appendix 1
Resolutions of Ratification
North Atlantic Treaty
Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),
That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of Executive L,
Eighty-first Congress, first session, the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at
Washington on April 4, 1949.
Accession of Greece and Turkey
Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),
That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of Executive E,
Eighty-second Congress, second session, a protocol to the North Atlantic
Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey, which was opened for
signature at London on October 17, 1951, and has been signed on behalf
of the United States of America and the other parties to the North Atlantic
Treaty.
Accession of Germany
Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),
That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of Executive M, 83d
Congress, 2d session, a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the
accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Paris on October
23, 1954.
Accession of Spain
Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein),
That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the Protocol to the
North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain, signed in Brussels on
December 10, 1981, on behalf of the United States and the other parties to
the North Atlantic Treaty.

CRS-12
Appendix 2
Resource Note
The following sources were used in preparation of this memorandum:
North Atlantic Treaty
Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1949. Foreign Affairs. "North Atlantic Treaty,"
pp. 343-350, 429-430.
Ireland, Timothy P., Creating the Entangling Alliance, The Origins of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut. 1981.
Kaplan, Lawrence S., The United States and NATO, The Formative Years, The
University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky. 1984.
Sloan, Stanley R., NATO's Future, Toward a New Transatlantic Bargain, National
Defense University Press, Washington, D.C. 1985.
United States Congress. Congressional Record. Senate. 1949. July 5, p. 8812-
8820; July 6, p. 8891-8904; July 7, p. 9011-9033; July 8, 9090-9120, 9122-
9123, 9127; July 11, p. 9190-9214; July 12, p. 9254-9288; July 13, p. 9334,
9352-9381; July 14, p. 9426-9446, 9447-9464, 9466-9470; July 15, p. 9534-
9537, 9552-9575, 9575-9604; July 18, p. 9623-9650; July 20, p. 9762-9838;
July 21, p. 9879-9916. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1949.
United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. North Atlantic
Treaty. Message from the President of the United States transmitting a copy of
the North Atlantic Treaty signed at Washington on April 4, 1949, April 12,
1949; Questions Relating to the North Atlantic Treaty; Documents Relating to
the North Atlantic Treaty; Report, June 6, 1949; Hearings, 81st Congress, 1st
session. Part 1, April 27, 28, 29, May 2, and 3, 1949; Part 2, May 4, 5, 6, 9, 10
and 11, 1949; Part 3, May 12, 13, 16, 17 and 18, 1949.U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1949. 1263 p.
Accession of Greece and Turkey
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1952. Foreign Affairs. "Greece, Turkey in
NATO." p. 172, 182.
United States Congress. Congressional Record. Senate. 1952. January 29, p. 586-
588; January 30, p. 714-715; January 31, p. 720-721; February 6, p. 846-847,
861-869, 870-885; February 7, p. 903, 915-930. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1952

United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Executive
Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1951, vol. 3.2. Admission

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of Greece and Turkey to NATO; Genocide Convention. Washington, U.S.
Govt. Print. Off., p. 377-380. (82nd Congress 1st session).
United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Executive
Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1951, vol. 3.2. Report by
the Secretary of State on European Problems. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., p. 449-456.
(82nd Congress 1st session).
United States Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Executive
Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1952, vol. 4. Greek-
Turkish Protocol. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., p. 37-43. (82nd Congress
2nd session).
Accession of Germany
Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1955. Foreign Affairs. "German Treaties." p.
121, 283-284.
United States Congress. Congressional Record. Senate. 1955. p. 4201-4234.
Accession of Spain
United States Congress. Congressional Record. Senate. 1982. March 16, p. 4299-
4301.
United States Congress. Senate. United States Treaties and Other International
Agreements. vol.27, part 3, 1976. Spain, Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.
TIAS 8360. p. 2279-3310.

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