Global Climate Change: Adequacy of Commitments Under the U.N. Framework Convention and the Berlin Mandate

Global Climate Change: Adequacy of Commitments Under the U.N. Framework Convention and the Berlin Mandate

96-699 SPR
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Global Climate Change: Adequacy of
Commitments Under the U.N. Framework
Convention and the Berlin Mandate
October 25, 1996
Wayne A. Morrissey
Science and Technology Information Analyst
Science, Technology, and Medicine Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Global Climate Change: Adequacy of Commitments Under
the U.N. Framework Convention and the Berlin Mandate
Summary
The second session of the Conference of Parties (COP-2) to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) convened July 8-19, 1996, in
Geneva, Switzerland. On July 18, 1996, the Ministers and other heads of delegations
present at COP-2 crafted and released a Ministerial Declaration, also called The
Geneva Declaration. It was based on a U.S. policy statement delivered July 17th at
COP-2 which: 1) recognized and endorsed the Second Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) as currently the most
comprehensive and authoritative assessment of the science of climate change, 2)
called for parties to set “legally binding, medium-term targets” for limitations and
significant overall reductions of their emissions of greenhouse gases, and 3) rejected
commitments for developed country parties regarding “common or harmonized”
policies and measures in favor of flexibility in applying policies and measures to
achieve emissions limitations and reductions. The Chairman of COP-2 called for
FCCC parties to “take note” of the Ministerial Declaration, and to agree as a body to
consider a “future decision [containing these elements] which would be legally binding
on all parties under the FCCC.”
Some in the U.S. Congress have voiced concerns about the principles of
common but differentiated commitments and responsibilities, as well as respective
capabilities, under FCCC for developed versus developing countries. Specifically,
questions have been raised about whether continued adherence to these principles in
any protocol or other legal instrument negotiated for the post-2000 period could
disadvantage the United States economically and competitively in world markets.
Among some Members and the committees of relevant jurisdiction in the House and
Senate, a need has been expressed to be better informed about what exactly the
United States potentially may be agreeing to during the current Analysis and
Assessment Phase called for in the Framework Convention’s 1995 Berlin Mandate,
as well as what the economic impact would be of future decisions the United States
might make vis a vis other FCCC parties in future climate protection negotiations.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A U.S. Response to the Ministerial Declaration and Future Directions . . . . 1
Continuation of Assessment and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Joint Implementation (Activities Implemented Jointly) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Congressional Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Differential Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
U.S. Analysis and Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Next Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Appendix I: Review of the Implementation of the Convention and of Decisions of the
First Session of the Conference of Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix II: The Berlin Mandate: Review of the adequacy of Article 4, paragraph
2 (a) and (b), of the Convention, including proposals related to a protocol and
decisions on follow-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
I. Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix III: Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change . 13

Global Climate Change: Adequacy of
Commitments Under the U.N. Framework
Convention and the Berlin Mandate
Introduction
The Ministerial Declaration of the Second Conference of Parties (COP-2) to the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), adopted July 18, 1995,1
arose out of consideration of two draft decision options for future negotiations to
protect Earth’s climate. One was presented by the United States2 and the other by the
European Union (EU). The Declaration is predominantly influenced by the U.S.
position which 1) accepts the science of climate change proffered by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2) rejects uniform “harmonized
policies” in favor of flexibility and, 3) calls for “legally-binding medium-term targets,”
which many COP-2 parties claim symbolizes an earnest commitment to protect
“dangerous anthropogenic interference with Earth’s climate system,” in the post-year
2000 period.
In essence, the Declaration represents a request by the Chairman of COP-2,
Chen Chimutengwende of Zimbabwe, for FCCC parties to “take note” of these
proposals and, as such, by agreeing to it expresses the sense of ministerial participants
at COP-2 that, as a body, they do not object to a “future decision which would be
binding on all parties under the FCCC,” even though some parties expressed their
reservations which were included for the record. The details of that “decision,”
however, have yet to be determined, and will be the subject of negotiations over the
coming months to culminate at the Third Meeting of COP, scheduled for December
1997, in Kyoto, Japan.
A U.S. Response to the Ministerial Declaration and Future Directions
Some have described the U.S. position which, in large part, forms the basis for
the Ministerial Declaration, as being evident of its taking a leadership role in the post-
year 2000 period. State Department officials have also commented that U.S.
leadership has encouraged future movement toward a concerted international policy
1 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Conference of Parties, Second
session, Geneva, 8-19 July 1996 (agenda item 5) [see appendix I]. Review of the
implementation of the convention and of Decisions of the First session of the Conference of
Parties: Ministerial Declaration (FCCC/CP/1996/L.17, July 19, 1996).
2 The Honorable Timothy E. Wirth, Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs on behalf
of the United States of America. Presentation to the Second Conference of Parties,
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Geneva, Switzerland, July 17, 1996.

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to protect climate. However Russia, and the OPEC bloc of countries objected to the
3
Declaration outright, while Australia and New Zealand, noting the Declaration, voiced
concern that the term “legally-binding” in the Ministerial Declaration is not adequately
defined. U.S. State Department representatives characterized the Declaration’s
movement toward medium-term legally binding targets as getting away from
rhetorical, empty pledges which have been the hallmark, so far, of negotiations toward
climate change protection. They believe that legally binding targets force FCCC
parties to gain a realistic sense of what needs to be done, which in the long run can
help to equalize the differential interest and involvement among Annex I and other
FCCC parties.
4 (See Appendix III)
An official U.S. response to the Geneva Declaration was issued on July 19, 1996,
to clarify how a legally binding medium range target might be achieved. Flexibility
in how one attains emissions-reduction targets, which is a key concept of the
Declaration, assumes a menu of policy options which U.S. negotiators believe would
make potential solutions affordable. This would be accomplished through
implementation of measures, including global emissions trading schemes, joint
implementation projects (see Joint Implementation below) and U.S. bilateral efforts,
such as the U.S. Country Studies program and environmental technology trade
initiatives sponsored by the Environmental Protection Agency jointly with the
Department of Energy. In this respect U.S. negotiators believe that such an approach
would not put OECD countries at an economic disadvantage, b
5
ut perhaps allow them
to implement climate protection measures that may eventually pay for themselves or
provide a return on investment. A flexible approach, they claim, could also allow for
either rolling or cumulative targets based on periodic assessments of progress and the
state of climate science. They emphasized that any medium- or long-term goals that
the U.S. is likely to support would require the participation of all developed and
developing countries.
State Department officials also described the adoption of a standardized basis for
reporting of international sources and sinks of greenhouse gas emissions, which was
3 The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is made up of the
following members: Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.
4 Under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), Annex I Countries
include economically developed countries and “other parties” which are former centrally-
planned economies now in transition to market-based economies. Annex II Countries are
economically developed countries which have added responsibilities under FCCC such as
fiscal and technological assistance to economically developing countries which would to help
the latter meet Commitments incumbent upon all FCCC parties. All Annex II Countries are
also Annex I Countries. All remaining parties under the FCCC, not classified as either Annex
I or Annex II, are considered to be economically Developing Countries.
5 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) includes
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany. Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States, and currently represent
about three-fourths of total global emissions of greenhouse gases.

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agreed to by all parties at COP-2, an indication of further progress in bringing more
developing countries into and contributing to the FCCC process.
Continuation of Assessment and Analysis
U.S. negotiators believe that an analysis and assessment phase called for in the
April 1995 Berlin Mandate, at the First COP, has not yet yielded sufficient
information whereby they could confidently prescribe emissions levels or a staged
decrease in emissions to reach a near term emissions reduction target (by 2005).
Instead they call for a focus on medium-term goals, where medium-term is described
as occurring between 2010-2020. The levels of reduction would be negotiable. Such
goals, they believe, would better synchronize with developed countries’ economic and
environmental interests, and are sensitive to the life cycle/turnover rate of existing
capital stock and equipment in developed countries and with investment cycles that
govern replacement of that stock and equipment.
Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs Tim Wirth has noted that it is
unreasonable, at this time, to consider long-term goals before COP-3, when taking
into account the current partitioning of global emissions, the largest proportion of
which are currently produced by OECD countries. However, a State Department
spokesman has indicated that U.S. negotiators would probably concede the necessity
of including an acknowledgment of long-term goals and binding commitments as part
of any legally binding text (instrument) that might be opened for signature at COP-3.
Long-term goals look toward the next 50-100 years and are also sensitive to
corporate time tables for investment. State Department officials believe this will send
a positive signal to companies to invest in the future. Also, Undersecretary Wirth, in
his statement asserted that the U.S. would reject any rapid transition strategies
suggested in the European Union (EU) and Association of Small Island States
(AOSIS) proposals,6, which, he affirmed, would interrupt economic growth in th
7
e
United States or compromise economic interests of energy producing industries.
Wirth’s statement goes further to reject the imposition of “harmonized” policies
and measures on developed countries, such as uniform Corporate Average Fuel
Efficiency (CAFE) standards and energy taxes, but rather would consider
implementing more flexible, market based approaches, such as an emissions trading
scheme similar to that found in the U.S. Clean Air Act.
Joint Implementation (Activities Implemented Jointly)
Joint Implementation (JI) is a keystone of what Undersecretary Wirth has called
a flexible approach to climate protection in the post-year 2000 period. The United
States, and some other nations have advocated an unrestricted policy of joint
implementation (JI), whereby any country, by merit of their ability to provide
6 The EU Proposal (German Proposal at COP-1) seeks to reduce emissions of Annex I
parties 10% below 1990 levels by 2005 and 15% to 20% below 1990 levels by 2010.
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resources to any other country for the purposes of helping them to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions, could concomitantly earn some credit toward their own
domestic greenhouse gas reduction goals. Joint Implementation (JI) was a leading
topic for debate at COP-1, in April 1995, and activities which occurred prior to and
at COP-1 were described by the U.S. delegation as being very fruitful. However, the
scope and nature of an international joint implementation initiative (activities
implemented jointly) under FCCC, i.e., has been contentiously debated, especially the
issue of assigning credits for emissions reductions.
The U.S. position on JI has been criticized by the “Group of 77” (actually about
130 developing countries) as a tactic by which rich, industrialized countries could
shirk their commitments to reduce emissions at home. Other FCCC parties, most
notably the European Union, claim that such a use of joint implementation runs
contrary to the original spirit of the terms of the climate convention. Many
developing countries have argued that it is more important for the industrialized
countries to pursue actions that would help to reduce their currently larger share of
global greenhouse gas emissions, at their source. However, not all developing
countries were on record as being opposed to JI; some anticipated its implementation
as a sole means for them to comply with their obligations under FCCC, to inventory
their sources and sinks of greenhouse gases and prepare national communications.
The United States is currently engaging both developing countries and those in
economic transition (in Central Europe) in its US Initiative on JI (USIJI) pilot
programs. However, at COP-1, a majority of parties agreed that emissions credits
would not be allotted during the international pilot phase. The German government,
however, suggested a possible ending date of 1999, for all pilot projects, and stated
that, companies investing in successful joint implementation projects will likely be able
to take credit thereafter. In March 1995, in Santiago Chile, U.S. negotiators,
developed new JI agreements with some Latin American countries. Consequently,
they were also somewhat satisfied that preliminary agreements on international JI,
forged at COP-1, provided for all FCCC parties to participate. Unlike, the provision
of the FCCC, the United States had considered offering business and industries
involved in activities under the U.S. Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) credits
which they would be able to count towards domestic emissions reductions. The
United States has also been holding a series of outreach programs to involve the
business community, non-governmental organizations, and other private stakeholders
directly in future international climate negotiations to the extent that they occur.
Furthermore, the Clinton Administration is supporting development of an international
“Climate Technology Initiative,” which would help industrialized countries to
facilitate transfer and dissemination of environmental technologies to the developing
world.
Congressional Interest
Many Members in the U.S. Congress have expressed concerns about how
commitments under FCCC for developed and developing countries have been and
would continue to be applied differently. They also want to be better informed about
what the United States potentially may be agreeing to during the current Analysis and

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Assessment Phase called for in the Berlin Mandate. Furthermore, many are concerned
about what future direction the United States may take vis a vis other FCCC parties
in future climate protection negotiations, and what the potential implication for U.S.
economy of both possible medium-term and long-term actions may be.
Differential Commitments
Many have contended that the Berlin Mandate, issued in April 1995, at COP-1 ,
8
was flawed because it perpetuated different commitments for countries which are
economically developed, in economic transition, or developing countries. The Geneva
Declaration reaffirms and extends, after the year 2000, those commitments now
incumbent upon all FCCC parties. State Department officials have commented that
this differential approach has been consistent from the very beginning, as set forth in
Article 4 of the Framework Convention (Commitments), and has been recognized by
FCCC parties as a way Annex I countries could draw developing countries into the
system for inventory, reporting and complying with their express commitments under
FCCC. Many have pointed out that, to a certain extent, Annex I countries rely on
commitments currently incumbent upon developing countries, in order that the former
may be able to more realistically assess what their emission reduction goals might
need to be in the near term. This can only be accomplished with the help of an
accurate assessment of global sources and sinks of greenhouse gases.

However, others have noted that the Declaration makes no provision for a
“transitioning” of developing countries into Annex I status, which would more
realistically reflect the latters’ changing economic developments and their potential
for growth of emissions. Nevertheless, U.S. representatives at COP-2 were
particularly encouraged that plans to compensate or provide exemptions for certain
developing countries were rejected. Undersecretary Wirth is on record as supporting
what he believes should be a developing nation’s “graduation to compliance,” which
is made possible through “implementing polices and measures,” such as those
mentioned above which justify developing country participation in the FCCC process.
U.S. Analysis and Assessment
Eileen Claussen, Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs at the State Department stressed that any future legally binding
agreement to which the United States would consider becoming a party would be
open to a wide spectrum of national interests for peer review, and all comments
would be taken into consideration. Toward this end, Undersecretary of Commerce,
Everett Ehrlich, is heading up a U.S. Government team of experts who will attempt
to analyze what constitutes reasonably achievable emissions-reduction targets and
over what time frame. This team will also assess for the business and industry
8 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Conference of the Parties, First
session, Berlin, 28 March - April 7 1995 (Agenda item 6 (c)). Conclusion of outstanding
issues and adoption of decisions: Proposal on Agenda item 5 (a) (iii), submitted by the
President of the Conference: Review of the adequacy of article 4, paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of
the Convention, including proposals related to a protocol and decisions on follow-up (see
Appendix II)

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communities, and the Nation as a whole, the economic implications for the United
States of an agreement which would include legally binding emissions reductions
targets. A number of possible scenarios were presented in economic papers prepared
for a June 1996, Climate Change Analysis Workshop, hosted by the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Energy, and State, and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). EPA issued a notice of the beginning of a 90-day comment period on these
proceedings, which closed October 28, 1996.9
Next Steps
Still to be worked out, but not specifically addressed at COP-2, are possible
compliance enforcement measures, whether they would be “hard or soft,” and by
whom compliance would be enforced. Next steps after COP-2 will be pursued at two
upcoming meetings, one December 8-18, 1996, in Geneva, and one February 24-
March 7, 1997, in Bonn, Germany. During these meetings, U.S. representatives will
set out to:
! Establish specific greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets (“medium-term”
emissions and a long-term concentration goal);
! Set timetables for achieving targets;
! Craft rules for bringing developing countries into the climate treaty; and
! Define rules for an international emissions trading regime.10
At the February 1997 meeting, FCCC parties hope to have the final text of a
legally-binding agreement ready for international review which would then be opened
for signature at COP-3.
9 Notice of 90-Day Comment Period on the Proceedings of the Climate Change Analysis
Workshop. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Notice. Federal Register, v. 61, no.
146, July 29, 1996: 39453.
10 Personal Communication, The Business Council for Sustainable Energy. Washington,
DC, August 1, 1996.

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Appendix I : Review of the Implementation of the
11
Convention and of Decisions of the First Session of the
Conference of Parties
Distr. LIMITED
FCCC/CP/1996/L.17
18 July 1996
Original: ENGLISH
CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
Second session
Geneva, 8 - 19 July 1996
Agenda item 5
Ministerial Declaration
The Ministers and other heads of delegations present at the second session of the
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change,
Noting that this, our meeting at Ministerial level under the Convention, is a
demonstration of our intention to continue to take an active and constructive role in
addressing the threat of climate change,
1.
Recall Article 2 of the Convention; the principles of equity and of common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities in Article 3.1 of the
Convention; and the provisions of Article 3.3 concerning precautionary
measures; as well as the specific national and regional development priorities,
objectives and circumstances of the Parties to the Convention;
2.
Recognize and endorse the Second Assessment Report of the IPCC as currently
the most comprehensive and authoritative assessment of the science of climate
change, its impacts and response options now available. Ministers believe that
the Second Assessment Report should provide a scientific basis for urgently
strengthening action at the global, regional and national levels, particularly action
by Annex I Parties to limit and reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, and for all
Parties to support the development of a Protocol or another legal instrument;
and note the findings of the IPCC, in particular the following:
-
The balance of evidence suggests a discernible human influence
on global climate. Without specific policies to mitigate climate
change, the global average surface temperature relative to 1990
is projected to increase by about 2C (between 1C and 3.5C) by
2100; average sea level is projected to rise by about
11 This text was introduced by the President at the 6th plenary meeting, on July 18, 1996.

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50 centimetres (between 15 and 95 centimetres) above present
levels by 2100. Stabilization of atmospheric concentrations at
twice pre-industrial levels will eventually require global emissions
to be less than 50 per cent of current levels;
-
The projected changes in climate will result in significant, often
adverse, impacts on many ecological systems and
socio-economic sectors, including food supply and water
resources, and on human health. In some cases, the impacts are
potentially irreversible; developing countries and small island
countries are typically more vulnerable to climate change;
-
Significant reductions in net greenhouse gas emissions are
technically possible and economically feasible by utilizing an
array of technology policy measures that accelerate technology
development, diffusion and transfer; and significant no regrets
opportunities are available in most countries to reduce net
greenhouse gas emissions;
3.
Believe that the findings of the Second Assessment Report indicate that the
continued rise of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere will lead to
dangerous interference with the climate system, given the serious risk of an
increase in temperature and particularly the very high rate of temperature
change;
4.
Recognize also the need for continuing work by the IPCC to further reduce
scientific uncertainties, in particular regarding socio-economic and environmental
impacts on developing countries, including those vulnerable to drought,
decertification or sea-level rise;
5.
Reaffirm the existing commitments under the Convention, including those
intended to demonstrate that Annex I Parties are taking the lead in modifying
longer-term trends in emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse
gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, and agree to strengthen the
process under the Convention for the regular review of the implementation of
present and future commitments;
6.
Take note that Annex I Parties are fulfilling their commitments to implement
national policies and measures on the mitigation of climate change. Also take
note that this is not the only commitment that Annex I Parties have made and
that many of these Parties need to make additional efforts to overcome
difficulties that they face in achieving the aim of returning their emissions of
greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by 2000;
7.
Acknowledge the considerable work done by the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin
Mandate (AGBM) since the first session of the Conference of the Parties,
including the substantive proposals presented by a number of Parties, and call
on all Parties to come forward with proposals to facilitate substantive
negotiations beginning at the fifth session of AGBM in December 1996;

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8.
Instruct their representatives to accelerate negotiations on the text of a
legally-binding protocol or another legal instrument to be completed in due time
for adoption at the third session of the Conference of the Parties. The outcome
should fully encompass the remit of the Berlin Mandate, in particular:
-
commitments for Annex I Parties regarding:
*
policies and measures including, as appropriate, regarding energy,
transport, industry, agriculture, forestry, waste management, economic
instruments, institutions and mechanisms;
*
quantified legally-binding objectives for emission limitations and significant
overall reductions within specified time frames, such as 2005, 2010, 2020, with
respect to their anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol;
-
commitments for all Parties on continuing to advance the implementation of
existing commitments in Article 4.1;
-
a mechanism to allow the regular review and strengthening of the commitments
embodied in a Protocol or other legal instrument;
-
commitments to a global effort to speed up the development, application,
diffusion and transfer of climate-friendly technologies, practices and processes;
in this regard, further concrete action should be taken;
9.
Welcome the efforts of developing country Parties to implement the Convention
and thus to address climate change and its adverse impacts and, to this end, to
make their initial national communications in accordance with guidelines adopted
by the Conference of the Parties at its second session; and call on the GEF to
provide expeditious and timely support to these Parties and initiate work
towards a full replenishment in 1997;
10. Recognize that the continuing advancement of existing commitments by
developing country Parties, in the context of their national priorities for
sustainable development, requires determined and timely action, in particular by
Annex II Parties. Access to financial resources and to environmentally-sound
technologies consistent with Articles 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.7 will be most critical;
11. Thank the Government of the Swiss Confederation for its contribution to the
work of the second session of the Conference of the Parties in Geneva and look
forward to meeting again at the third session in Kyoto, in 1997, thanks to the
generous offer of the Government of Japan.

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Appendix II: the Berlin Mandate: Review of the
Adequacy of Article 4, Paragraph 2 (A) and (B), of the
Convention, Including Proposals Related to a Protocol
and Decisions on Follow-up
I. Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties
Decision 1/CP.1
The Conference of the Parties, at its first session, Having reviewed Article 4,
paragraph 2(a) and (b), of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, and Having concluded that these subparagraphs are not adequate, Agrees to
begin a process to enable it to take appropriate action for the period beyond 2000,
including the strengthening of the commitments of the Parties included in Annex I to
the Convention (Annex I Parties) in Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), through the
adoption of a protocol or another legal instrument:
I
The process shall be guided, inter alia, by the following:
a.
The provisions of the Convention, including Article 3, in particular the
principles in Article 3.1, which reads as follows: “The Parties should
protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations
of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly,
the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate
change and the adverse effects thereof;”
b.
The specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties referred
to in Article 4.8; the specific needs and special situations of least developed
countries referred to in Article 4.9; and the situation of Parties, particularly
developing country Parties, referred to in Article 4.10 of the Convention;
c.
The legitimate needs of the developing countries for the achievement
of sustained economic growth and the eradication of poverty, recognizing
also that all Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable
development;
d.
The fact that the largest share of historical and current global
emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that
the per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and
that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will
grow to meet their social and development needs;
e.
The fact that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest
possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective

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and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social
and economic conditions;
f.
Coverage of all greenhouse gases, their emissions by sources and
removals by sinks and all relevant sectors;
g.
The need for all Parties to cooperate in good faith and to participate
in this process.
II
2.
The process will, inter alia:
h.
Aim, as the priority in the process of strengthening the commitments
in Article 4.2(a) and (b) of the Convention, for developed country/other
Parties included in Annex I, both
(1) to elaborate policies and measures, as well as
(2) to set quantified limitation and reduction objectives within
specified time-frames, such as 2005, 2010 and 2020, for their
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol,
taking into account the differences in starting points and
approaches, economic structures and resource bases, the need to
maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, available
technologies and other individual circumstances, as well as the
need for equitable and appropriate contributions by each of these
Parties to the global effort, and also the process of analysis and
assessment referred to in section III, paragraph 4, below;
i.
Not introduce any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex
I, but reaffirm existing commitments in Article 4.1 and continue to advance
the implementation of these commitments in order to achieve sustainable
development, taking into account Article 4.3, 4.5 and 4.7;
j.
Take into account any result from the review referred to in Article
4.2(f), if available, and any notification referred to in Article 4.2(g);
k.
Consider, as provided in Article 4.2(e), the coordination among Annex
I Parties, as appropriate, of relevant economic and administrative
instruments, taking into account Article 3.5;
l.
Provide for the exchange of experience on national activities in areas
of interest, particularly those identified in the review and synthesis of
available national communications; and
m.
Provide for a review mechanism.

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III
3.
The process will be carried out in the light of the best available scientific
information and assessment on climate change and its impacts, as well as relevant
technical, social and economic information, including, inter alia, reports of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. It will also make use of other available
expertise.
4.
The process will include in its early stages an analysis and assessment, to
identify possible policies and measures for Annex I Parties which could contribute to
limiting and reducing emissions by sources and protecting and enhancing sinks and
reservoirs of greenhouse gases. This process could identify environmental and
economic impacts and the results that could be achieved with regard to time horizons
such as 2005, 2010, and 2020.
5.
The protocol proposal of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS),
which contains specific reduction targets and was formally submitted in accordance
with Article 17 of the Convention, along with other proposals and pertinent
documents, should be included for consideration in the process.
6.
The process should begin without delay and be conducted as a matter of
urgency, in an open-ended ad hoc group of Parties hereby established, which will
report to the second session of the Conference of the Parties on the status of this
process. The sessions of this group should be scheduled to ensure completion of the
work as early as possible in 1997, with a view to adopting the results at the third
session of the Conference of the Parties.
9th plenary meeting April 1995.

CRS-13
Appendix III: Parties to the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change
Annex I Countries and Countries in
Annex II Countries
Economic Transition
Australia
Australia
Austria
Austria
Belarusa
Belgium
Belgium
Canada
Bulgariaa
Denmark
Canada
European Economic Community
Czechoslovakiaa
Finland
Denmark
France
European Economic Community
Germany
Estoniaa
Greece
Finland
Iceland
France
Ireland
Germany
Italy
Greece
Japan
Hungarya
Luxembourg
Iceland
New Zealand
Ireland
Norway
Italy
Portugal
Japan
Spain
Latviaa
Sweden
Lithuaniaa
Switzerland
Luxembourg
Turkey
Netherlands
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
New Zealand
Northern Ireland
Norway
United States of America
Polanda
Portugal
Developing Countries
Romaniaa
Russian Federationa
Include all remaining FCCC parties
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Ukrainea
United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland
United States of America
Countries that are undergoing the
a
process of transition to a market
economy.