On August 7, 2026, right-wing political outsider and former criminal defense lawyer Abelardo de la Espriella was inaugurated to a four-year presidential term, succeeding Gustavo Petro of the Historic Pact (PH), Colombia's first left-wing president. De la Espriella narrowly defeated PH senator Iván Cepeda, 49.7% to 48.7%, in a June runoff. President Trump endorsed de la Espriella, who has vowed to restore a "close relationship" with the United States after some strains under Petro.
Since the late 1990s, Congress has sought to foster closer security and economic ties with Colombia, including by appropriating extensive U.S. foreign assistance for the country. The 119th Congress reduced foreign assistance to Colombia and placed additional conditions on the remaining assistance, however, due to concerns about the Petro government's security policies. De la Espriella supports a military-led security policy and has joined U.S.-backed regional security efforts. Some Members of Congress have pledged to strengthen ties and offered "full support" to de la Espriella. Others support continued cooperation while urging the new government to adopt a more holistic approach to security by implementing the 2016 peace accord intended to end Colombia's internal armed conflict.
President Petro's legacy influenced Colombia's 2026 elections. Supporters praised Petro's focus on reducing inequality through labor reform and minimum wage increases. Critics noted that the Petro administration's de-emphasis of coca eradication coincided with record cocaine production. The government's "total peace" negotiations involving ceasefires with illegally armed groups arguably bolstered such groups' power as their use of drones and involvement in illegal mining proliferated. Crime and corruption were among voters' top concerns in the election, which was marred by political violence, including the assassination of a presidential hopeful.
Colombia's March 8 legislative election results illustrated a left-right division among voters amid continued fragmentation in the party system. PH captured the most Senate (25 of 103) and House of Representatives (43 of 183) seats, and the conservative Democratic Center (CD) garnered the second-largest number of seats in both chambers (17 and 28, respectively). Parties that collectively control 61% of the Senate and 67% of the House joined President de la Espriella's governing coalition, but maintaining their support may prove challenging.
Colombia began its presidential contest with hundreds of candidates, but the field narrowed to three major candidates. Cepeda led the polls from January until the first-round election on May 31. De la Espriella used social media, rallies, and support from evangelical churches to consolidate conservative support and surpass Paloma Valencia of the CD. He won 44% of the first-round vote, finishing ahead of Cepeda (41%) and Valencia (6%), and then defeated Cepeda in the runoff. After a recount, Cepeda conceded while Petro claimed fraud occurred, contradicting international observers. De la Espriella's narrow margin of victory reflected Colombia's political polarization.
Analysts have variously described President de la Espriella as a "maverick" who lacks strong ideological leanings but wants to concentrate power in the executive and as a pragmatist who will only implement right-wing policies if they are popular. De la Espriella vowed to establish a country that is safe and prosperous, investor-friendly but fiscally austere, and protective of conservative social values. He has ended Petro's dialogues with armed groups, expanded extraditions, and deployed the military to combat illegally armed groups. His government reopened the hydrocarbons sector to private investment and increased the 2027 budget proposal to support recovery from an August 10 earthquake, which may cost some $10 billion.
The government inherited growing debt and a deteriorating security situation, and several factors may hinder its ability to respond to those challenges. In July, de la Espriella suspended the presidential transition process after Petro refused to recognize his victory. Consequently, his Cabinet may not have received full information from outgoing officials. In July, the PH and CD united to defeat de la Espriella's preferred candidate for Senate president, foreshadowing possible legislative pushback despite de la Espriella's working majorities. In September, a court paused a pilot project to restart aerial coca fumigation.
President de la Espriella, who also holds U.S. and Italian citizenship, has vowed to revitalize U.S.-Colombia relations. He has joined President Trump's Americas Counter Cartel Coalition and Shield of the Americas regional security and diplomatic initiatives and offered to host joint operations targeting illegally armed groups. Some analysts argue his policy toward Venezuela is likely to be influenced by the Trump Administration's approach.
On August 7, the Trump Administration announced it would work with Congress to provide $1 billion in support to help the de la Espriella administration combat narco-terrorism and advance economic opportunity. The State Department has provided some $26.5 million in earthquake assistance and reportedly reprogrammed a portion of $52 million in foreign military financing from other countries to Colombia. The Administration requested at least $87 million for Colombia in its FY2027 budget proposal; the Administration has not publicly released foreign aid allocations for Colombia since FY2024.
On September 8, Secretary Marco Rubio visited Colombia and said he hoped to start a "new cooperation stage" in bilateral relations. Secretary Rubio signed memorandums of understanding with the Colombian government on civilian nuclear cooperation and critical minerals development. He did not announce any new security assistance for Colombia or a reduction in U.S. tariffs on Colombian goods. Secretary Rubio said the United States is "willing to do everything necessary" in compliance with Colombian law to carry out joint military operations. Such operations could require Colombian Senate approval. On September 16, President Trump maintained Colombia on the list of countries that "failed demonstrably" to meet their international counternarcotics obligations but found that the continued provision of U.S. assistance to Colombia is in the U.S. national interest.
Congress may track developments in U.S.-Colombia relations as it considers appropriations and other legislation. Congress could adjust the level, type, or conditions on foreign assistance for Colombia in FY2027 National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations legislation. Congress could also authorize, prohibit, or condition U.S. military involvement in Colombia. Additionally, Congress could assess how U.S. tariffs have affected bilateral trade and consider measures to codify, terminate, or adjust the tariffs.