Contents

• Issues for Congress
• The Iran Conflict and Challenges for Bahrain's Security
• Damage to the U.S. Defense Presence in Bahrain
• U.S.-Bahraini Defense Cooperation Agreements
• U.S. Arms Sales to Bahrain
• Military Construction
• Human Rights
• Trafficking in Persons
• Bahrain's Normalization of Ties to Israel and the Abraham Accords
• Country Background
• Historical Background
• Domestic Politics
• The Al Khalifa Dynasty

Summary

The Kingdom of Bahrain is a small island nation connected by a causeway to Saudi Arabia (15.5 miles away) and once claimed by Iran (124 miles away). Wedged between these two larger regional powers, Bahrain has hosted a U.S. naval command headquarters since 1948. For decades, Bahrain has permitted U.S. access to its facilities and has hosted U.S. Naval Central Command (NAVCENT) and the U.S. Fifth Fleet at a base called "Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain." NSA Bahrain has long served as the logistical hub for U.S. maritime operations in NAVCENT's area of responsibility and has hosted thousands of American soldiers, civilians, and their families.

Since the ongoing conflict between the United States and Iran began in February 2026, Bahrain's security and economy have faced unprecedented challenges from Iranian retaliatory attacks against the island kingdom. To date, Iran's drone and missile strikes have struck both Bahrain's critical infrastructure and U.S. military facilities. As of fall 2026, numerous reports indicate that NSA Bahrain sustained serious damage in the opening days of the conflict. With NSA Bahrain damaged, U.S. Naval logistics operations have faced an array of challenges.

Congress routinely reviews proposed U.S. arms sales to Bahrain, and Bahraini procurement of additional advanced protection systems to counter incoming missiles and drones from Iran may accelerate in the months and years ahead. Congress also annually authorizes military construction funding for NSA Bahrain, which may require substantial repair in the near future. Preliminary reports indicate that damage to NSA Bahrain from Iran attacks is estimated to be at least $400 million. P.L. 119-60, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2026 authorized $42 million in military construction for maintenance and facility upgrades at NSA Bahrain. For FY2027, draft NDAA bills would authorize $5.9 million in energy programs for NSA Bahrain.

Bahrain is ruled by a hereditary monarchy and is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC; Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman); its politics have been restive, though the monarchy's control has not been durably threatened. With a population of 1.5 million people, a little over half of whom are Bahraini citizens, Bahrain has a history of sectarian tensions between the Sunni Muslim ruling class and the Shia Muslim majority: Bahrain is the only GCC state to have a Shia majority population. Bahrain's politics were unsettled during a 2011 uprising by a mostly Shia opposition to Bahrain's Al Khalifa ruling family; a Saudi military intervention helped Bahrain's government repress protests. Since 2014, the unrest has been relatively low-level. Several senior opposition leaders remain imprisoned.

Bahrain closely aligns with de facto GCC leader Saudi Arabia, which provides Bahrain with substantial financial support. Bahrain, like some other GCC states, has been building ties to Israel and, in September 2020, Bahrain signed agreements at the White House to fully normalize its relations with Israel as part of the "Abraham Accords." During the war between Israel and Hamas, Bahrain and Israel did not sever relations, though some Bahrainis have protested bilateral ties.

Members of Congress have traveled with some frequency to Bahrain to visit U.S. armed services personnel and provide oversight over the U.S. bilateral relationship and defense presence in the kingdom.

---

Issues for Congress

The Iran Conflict and Challenges for Bahrain's Security

Since the conflict between the United States and Iran began in February 2026, Bahrain's security and economy have faced unprecedented challenges from Iranian retaliatory attacks against the island kingdom. To date, Iran's drone and missile strikes against Bahrain have struck both the country's critical infrastructure (e.g., oil refinery, aluminum smelter,¹ desalination plant, and an Amazon-owned data center²) and U.S. military facilities. Through August 2026, after the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain has been the fourth-most-targeted country by Iran since hostilities began.³ Some strikes may have been intended to cause substantial physical damage; others may have been intended to psychologically demonstrate that should hostilities continue, Iran has both the willingness and capability to inflict damage upon a key U.S. Gulf partner. Iran's targeting of U.S. military facilities in Bahrain, as in other parts of the Arabian Gulf, appears to have been designed at least in part to force the United States and Bahrain to reconsider their longstanding defense ties, as both assess the benefits and risks of having a high-profile U.S. facility in such relative proximity to Iran.⁴

As a limited energy producer⁵ with high government debt,⁶ and a small population, Bahrain is particularly vulnerable to external shocks, such as those stemming from the Iran conflict and the disruption to maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Preliminary indicators suggest that the economy has contracted nearly 5% in 2026,⁷ and the cost of insuring Bahrain's sovereign debt has risen sharply, with credit default swap prices up almost 40% in 2026.⁸ As conflict and strikes against Bahrain continue,⁹ Bahrain may continue to look to its wealthier Gulf Arab neighbors to prop up its economy. Bahrain and the UAE have already signed a $5.4 billion currency-swap agreement.¹⁰ As a sign of how the war has impacted tourism, the country's most prestigious annual sporting event, the Bahrain Grand Prix, was moved to Malaysia.

As the kingdom faces Iranian attacks and an economic downturn, authorities have taken several steps to curb any potential unrest; Bahrain experienced a popular uprising in 2011 as part of the wave of regional unrest that swept across the Middle East. Unlike its other Gulf neighbors, Bahrain has a Shia majority population (but a Sunni royal family), and international human rights groups and Bahraini expatriate organizations routinely accuse Bahrain's internal security apparatus of abuse.¹¹ At the same time, Iranian hardliners periodically challenge Bahraini sovereignty.¹² Bahraini officials have also accused Iran of backing violent Shia groups in Bahrain.¹³ Bahrain experienced some protests in majority Shia neighborhoods in late February-early March 2026.¹⁴

Figure 1. Map of Bahrain

Source: Map created by CRS using State Department and Esri data.

Since February 2026, courts have convicted several citizens of various crimes, such as supporting Iran, filming in prohibited locations, disseminating banned statements, and sabotage.¹⁵ Under its legal system, Bahrain has revoked the citizenship of dozens of individuals charged with posting online pro-Iranian sentiment.¹⁶ Bahrain's parliament then expelled three members who opposed a royal decree removing judicial oversight in matters of citizenship.¹⁷ One known Bahraini dissident, who had served over a decade in prison for his role in the 2011 uprising, died in custody after having been rearrested during the early days of the war; according to human rights organizations, his body showed evidence of having been tortured.¹⁸ Perhaps as a sign that authorities have grown more sensitive to public backlash against violent state repression and international opinion, Bahrain investigated and charged an intelligence officer with beating the detainee to death—the prosecution was a rare occurrence in the monarchy.¹⁹ In September 2026, Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) warned that tensions between the government and Shiite opposition groups over detained clerics risked instability.²⁰

Figure 2. CENTCOM Commander meets with King Hamad April 2026 in Bahrain

Source: "CENTCOM commander visits Middle East," U.S. Central Command Public Affairs

In 2026, U.S. Navy Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), has traveled to Bahrain on several occasions for regional meetings and bilateral dialogues with King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (see Figure 2). In summer 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio addressed a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) meeting hosted by Bahrain, in which he thanked Bahrain and other GCC states for their help, friendship, cooperation, and alliance.²¹

Damage to the U.S. Defense Presence in Bahrain

For decades, Bahrain has permitted U.S. access to its facilities and has hosted U.S. Naval Central Command (NAVCENT) and the U.S. Fifth Fleet at a base called "Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain." NSA Bahrain has long served as the logistical hub for U.S. maritime operations in NAVCENT's area of responsibility and has hosted thousands of American military personnel, civilians, and their families.

As of fall 2026, numerous reports indicate that NSA Bahrain sustained serious damage in the opening days of the ongoing conflict. Though Bahraini and U.S. forces had used Patriot missile defense systems,²² F-16 Block 70 fighters,²³ and U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to intercept projectiles and uncrewed aircraft systems, Iranian missile and drone attacks penetrated Bahraini airspace, damaging the command headquarters, two AN/GSC-52B satellite communications terminals, warehouses, and a dozen other buildings.²⁴ Depending on the launch location and type of system, some Iranian assets fired at Bahrain may take anywhere from one to two hours to reach their targets, while others may arrive within minutes.

In the immediate opening of Operation Epic Fury, the Administration issued an Authorized Departure and then an Ordered Departure for military forces, diplomats, other non-emergency personnel, and their respective dependents.²⁵ In many cases, evacuees left their belongings behind and remained in a state of uncertainty as to their potential date of return. According to one unnamed U.S. official, NSA Bahrain "was nearly destroyed," and U.S. sailors were evacuated to Florida.²⁶

It remains uncertain when, if at all, NSA Bahrain will return to its pre-war operating level. In August 2026, the Department of Defense (DOD; now using "Department of War" as a secondary designation)²⁷ issued a "Termination of Ordered Departure—Bahrain," providing a possible pathway for U.S. personnel to transition from temporary evacuation status to more permanent reassignment.²⁸ In September 2026, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Daryl Caudle said that "We're not getting back in [Bahrain at full operating status] anytime soon.… I just want to be completely honest with that."²⁹ Acting U.S. Navy secretary Hung Cao said that Iran "blew the hell out of Bahrain," and that he has commissioned a task force to investigate whether to repair NSA Bahrain.³⁰

With NSA Bahrain damaged ($400 million in estimated repair costs³¹), U.S. Naval logistics operations have faced an array of challenges. According to multiple reports, the Navy has been using Naval Support Facility (NSF) Diego Garcia as a logistics hub to supply vessels that have been in theater for months supporting operations against Iran, such as aircraft carriers.³² In order to avoid the Iranian coastline, the logistics network spans an estimated 2,200-mile distance.³³

U.S.-Bahraini Defense Cooperation Agreements

After the first Gulf War, Bahrain and the United States institutionalized their defense relationship by signing a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) on October 28, 1991. It was renewed in 2017 for 15 years.³⁴ Under the DCA, Bahrain provides access, basing, and overflight privileges to facilitate U.S. regional military operations.³⁵ Since 1971, the United States and Bahrain have maintained a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which grants the U.S. government criminal jurisdiction over U.S. Armed Forces members stationed in Bahrain; the SOFA grants the Bahraini government civil jurisdiction over U.S. forces, "except for those matters arising in the course of the performance of their official duties."³⁶

In September 2023, the United States and Bahrain signed a new bilateral agreement called the "Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement" (C-SIPA). C-SIPA, which is an executive agreement requiring congressional notification but not approval, addresses defense, trade, and scientific-technical cooperation. The agreement commits the United States and Bahrain to regard external aggression or threats of external aggression against either of them as a matter of grave concern and "to develop and implement appropriate defense and deterrent responses" consistent with their respective constitutions and laws. The United Kingdom signed an agreement to join C-SIPA in December 2024.³⁷ In the 119^th Congress, P.L. 119-60, the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act, included Section 1229, which requires the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on the strategic importance of C-SIPA, its effect on fostering regional cooperation following attacks in the Red Sea, how C-SIPA leverages the United States Fifth Fleet to address regional threats, and how C-SIPA may be expanded, among other things.

While C-SIPA reaffirms robust and ongoing U.S.-Bahraini defense and trade cooperation, for the first time, it formally commits both sides, subject to further agreement, to share digital network security standards in order to prevent inappropriate access to sensitive information on a party's digital information and communications network. According to one assessment, C-SIPA "codifies a U.S. commitment to support the growth of Bahrain's technology sector … intended from a US perspective to limit Chinese involvement in the region's technology architecture."³⁸

Following the launch of Operation Epic Fury against Iran in February 2026, representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Bahrain convened a C-SIPA defense working group meeting to discuss "the current regional security environment and the Iranian regime's deliberate aggression and attacks on innocent civilians across the Middle East."³⁹

U.S. Arms Sales to Bahrain

Congress routinely reviews proposed U.S. arms sales to Bahrain and appropriates modest security assistance sums to Bahrain⁴⁰ to supplement the kingdom's use of national funds for defense procurement and personnel training. Over the past five years, successive administrations have notified Congress of nearly $6.5 billion worth of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Bahrain (see Table 1).

Bahrain uses national funds to purchase major U.S. defense equipment through FMS (direct from the U.S. government) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS—an export license to purchase directly from U.S. contractors) programs. The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) has an estimated 11,000 personnel and is responsible for addressing external threats, while the several-thousand-member Bahrain National Guard handles internal security; as of May 2026, the defense budget is estimated at $2.7 billion per year, though that figure may increase as Bahrain procures additional advanced protection systems to counter incoming missiles and drones from Iran.⁴¹

Military Construction

Congress annually authorizes military construction funding for NSA Bahrain. For FY2026, the U.S. Department of Defense estimated that it would spend $768.3 million on personnel, operations, maintenance, and family housing costs for U.S. personnel stationed in Bahrain.⁴² P.L. 119-60, the FY2026 NDAA, authorized $42 million in military construction funding for maintenance and facility upgrades at NSA Bahrain. For FY2027, draft NDAA bills would authorize $5.9 million in energy programs for NSA Bahrain. As stated previously, reports indicate that damage to NSA Bahrain from Iran attacks is estimated to be at least $400 million.

Human Rights

U.S. and global criticism of Bahrain's human rights practices has focused in the past on the government response to political opposition, including lack of accountability for security forces, suppression of free expression, and treatment of prisoners. According to the 2024 U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices (the most recent available), significant human rights issues included, among other things

credible reports of: cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; arbitrary arrest or detention; and serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media freedom, including unjustified arrests or prosecutions of journalists, and censorship.⁴³

The State Department assessment also stated that the Bahraini government took "credible steps to identify and punish officials who committed human rights abuses" and noted the release of 3,400 prisoners during the reporting period.⁴⁴

In April and June 2024, perhaps in an effort to deflect global criticism of Bahrain's human rights record and respond to prisoner unrest inside the Bahraini penal system, King Hamad bin Isa bin Salman al Khalifa issued two mass pardons, freeing several thousand prisoners, including many political prisoners who had been detained since the 2011 uprising. Combined, the pardons released over half the political prisoner population; some Bahraini dissidents welcomed the moves, and others called for additional pardons of key opposition figures still imprisoned.⁴⁵

Trafficking in Persons

Bahrain is the only country in the Near East region that the U.S. State Department categorizes as a Tier 1 country (best) for its anti-human trafficking efforts. According to the U.S. State Department's 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report, Bahrain has "continued to demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting period, therefore, Bahrain remained on Tier 1."⁴⁶ The kingdom not only has multiple government agencies and law enforcement units committed to combating trafficking, but it also maintains an Expatriate Protection Center (EPC), which can shelter and protect trafficking victims and exploited foreign laborers. In 2025, the Chargé d'Affaires at the U.S. Embassy Manama Elizabeth Litchfield said: "We commend Bahrain for once again earning Tier 1 status in the U.S. Department of State's 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report—its eighth consecutive year at the highest ranking. This accomplishment highlights Bahrain's sustained dedication and leadership in the effort to end human trafficking."⁴⁷

Bahrain's Normalization of Ties to Israel and the Abraham Accords

In September 2020, Bahrain signed agreements to normalize its relations with Israel as part of the Abraham Accords. Unlike other signatories, the United States apparently did not take any immediate visible action to benefit Bahrain.⁴⁸ For the next three years (2020-2023), Israel and Bahrain slowly advanced bilateral relations. In February 2022, Bahrain signed a security cooperation agreement with Israel.⁴⁹ In September 2023, Israel inaugurated a new embassy in the capital, Manama, and foreign ministers from both countries agreed to cooperate to increase the number of direct flights, tourism, trade volume, and investments.⁵⁰

Throughout the 2023-2025 Israel-Hamas war, Bahrain retained ties to Israel, albeit at a distance, perhaps reflecting public opposition to Israel's war in Gaza. In 2023, Crown Prince and Prime Minister Salman bin Hamad al Khalifa became the first Arab leader to publicly condemn Hamas' October 7 attacks.⁵¹ Though the conflict hindered a deepening of ties, Israel and Bahrain have not severed relations. Bahrain has not engaged in as much bilateral trade and investment with Israel as fellow Abraham Accords signatory the UAE.

With momentum to bring Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords having stalled, and with Iran actively targeting Bahrain in its conflict with the United States and Israel, Bahraini-Israeli relations are not expected to advance in a significant way in the near term. Since February 2026, Bahrain has focused both on national defense and internal cohesion, as Bahraini authorities have cracked down against dissent, including support for Iran and opposition to Bahrain's diplomatic relations with the United States and Israel.⁵²

Country Background

Historical Background

The Al Khalifa family has ruled Bahrain since 1783, when it left the Arabian Peninsula and captured a Persian garrison controlling the main island of Bahrain (the Persian Safavid dynasty had an intermittent presence in Bahrain from 1602-1782). During the 19^th century, Bahrain's Al Khalifa rulers signed various treaties with the United Kingdom, which was then the dominant foreign naval power in the Gulf. In the late 19^th century, the British Empire entered into additional treaties with Bahrain, making the island a British protectorate. For over a century, the British exercised control over Bahrain's foreign and defense policies in exchange for recognizing the Al Khalifa dynasty as the rulers of Bahrain.

Prior to the discovery of oil, Bahrain's economy centered on trade and pearl diving. Oil exploration began in the 1920s and production followed a decade later. In the 1930s, Iran unsuccessfully sought to deny Bahrain the right to grant oil concessions to the United States and Britain.

By 1968, as Britain reduced its military presence in the Gulf, Bahrain and the other smaller Persian Gulf emirates (principalities) sought a permanent status. At the time, Iran also claimed sovereignty over Bahrain and refused at first to recognize its independence.⁵³ A 1970 UN survey ("referendum") determined that Bahrain's inhabitants wanted independence, a finding that was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 278 and recognized by Iran's then-parliament. Bahrain negotiated with eight other Persian Gulf emirates during 1970-1971 on federating with them, but Bahrain and Qatar each became independent (Bahrain on August 15, 1971), and the other seven emirates federated into the United Arab Emirates.

In its more than fifty years as an independent nation, Bahrain has become a high-income country as defined by the World Bank. The kingdom's rulers have used the nation's limited oil wealth, with aid from its larger GCC neighbors, to construct a financial services and tourism-centered economy in which Bahraini per capita income is comparable to that of some Western European nations. Nevertheless, structural inequalities and sectarian tensions persist, as many Shia citizens contend that the state suppresses Shia political identity and denies Shia citizens access to high positions of governmental authority. A 2011 uprising by a mostly Shia opposition against the Sunni monarchy is the most recent episode of unrest in the kingdom; since then, the government has suppressed organized opposition political activities, releasing some opposition activists in 2024.

Domestic Politics

The Al Khalifa Dynasty

King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (born 1950) is the 14^th ruling Al Khalifa monarch and the second ruler since the island kingdom's independence in 1971 (until 2002, Bahrain's heads of state were first referred to as "Hakims" then "Emirs"). Educated at Sandhurst Military Academy in Britain, King Hamad (see Figure 3) was previously commander of the Bahraini Defense Forces (BDF) and has ruled Bahrain since 1999. The constitution gives the king broad powers, including appointing all ministers and judges and amending the constitution. Nevertheless, during his first two decades of rule, King Hamad's late uncle, the longtime Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa, exercised widespread executive authority over the government, particularly its internal security services. According to one account, though King Hamad had early in his reign attempted to liberalize Bahrain's political system, "Khalifa frustrated that process."⁵⁴ At the time of his death in November 2020, Khalifa bin Salman had been the longest serving prime minister in the world.

Since his uncle's death, King Hamad has appeared to focus on consolidating power among his direct descendants, accelerating Bahrain's economic diversification, and incorporating younger Bahrainis into the political system.⁵⁵ His eldest son, 56-year-old Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa,⁵⁶ is the prime minister and the de facto face of the country's attempt to modernize its institutions. Another of the king's sons, 39-year-old Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al Khalifa, serves as national security advisor (appointed in October 2019) and royal guard commander. Sheikh Nasser also holds the title of major general and routinely meets with U.S. and other foreign defense officials.

Bahrain's bicameral legislature (the National Assembly) consists of the directly elected, 40-seat Council of Representatives (COR or Majlis al Nuwab in Arabic) and the royal-appointed, 40-seat Consultative Council (Majlis al Shura in Arabic). Enactment of any legislation requires concurrence by the king, but a veto can be overridden by a two-thirds majority vote of both chambers. In implementation of an agreement with the Shia opposition in 2012, King Hamad amended the constitution to designate the COR as the presiding chamber and give it the power to remove individual ministers by two-thirds majority. Still, the Shura Council's concurrence is needed to enact legislation, and King Hamad has tended to appoint only government supporters, including former high-ranking government officials, to that body. King Hamad also has typically appointed to the Shura Council several women (in the current COR, women hold eight seats) and members of minority communities (Jewish and Christian) that have difficulty winning seats in the COR.

In the aftermath of Bahrain's 2011 uprising, the government has banned political parties and dissolved various political societies that were legally able to operate before 2011. In 2016, Bahraini courts approved government requests to dissolve Al Wifaq (Accord National Islamic Society, alt. sp. Wefaq), the most prominent Shia political society. Its officials had engaged with the government in and outside of formal "national dialogues" after the 2011 uprising. The next COR election is scheduled for November 2026.

Footnotes

1.	With aluminum production in Bahrain slowed, Aluminum Bahrain (Alba) purchased the European Union's largest smelter in a $2.2 billion deal in June 2026. See "Alba to Buy French Aluminum Smelter in $2.2 Billion Deal," Reuters, June 2, 2026. In September 2026, Alba's corporate leadership noted that repairs had restored production to 80% of its prewar level and that production will be restored to 100% once the European smelter acquisition is complete. See, "Bahrain's Alba Says Producing Aluminum at 80% of Pre-Iran War Level," Reuters, September 16, 2026.
2.	Amazon Web Services cannot restore access to its cloud-computing data centers in Bahrain. See, "Amazon's AWS is Unable to Restore Access to Bahrain, One UAE Cloud Data Zone After War Damage," Reuters, September 15, 2026.
3.	The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Dashboard—Iran, updated September 2, 2026.
4.	Kristian Alexander, "The Future of US Basing in the Gulf After the 2026 Iran War," Stimson, September 2, 2026.
5.	U.S. Energy Information Administration, Total energy production 2024. Available at https://www.eia.gov/international/rankings/country/BHR?pa=12&u=0&f=A&v=none&y=01%2F01%2F2024.
6.	International Monetary Fund, Data Mapper—Bahrain. Available at https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/profile/BHR. Prior to the start of the Iran war, agencies had downgraded Bahrain's credit rating. See, "Bahrain Hit by Another Downgrade," Semafor, February 25, 2026.
7.	Economist Intelligence Unit, "One-Click Report: Bahrain—Briefing Sheet," August 31, 2026.
8.	"Six Months of War: How the Middle East Conflict Has Shaped Financial Markets," Reuters, August 27, 2026.
9.	"US-Iran Strikes Raise Fears of Renewed War Across the Middle East," Reuters, September 1, 2026.
10.	"Gulf States Fear Irreversible Fallout from the Iran Crisis," The Economist, May 11, 2026.
11.	"Human Rights First Seeks Sanctions for Torture in Bahrain Prisons," Human Rights First, December 18, 2025.
12.	Michael Segall, "Iran Revives Its Claim to Bahrain After the War," Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, June 23, 2026. Bahrain was a part of various political entities, including Oman and the Persian and Portuguese Empires, before becoming a British protectorate in the early 19th century. In 1957, the Shah of Iran designated Bahrain as the country's fourteenth province, a claim officially renounced in 1970 (when Iran recognized Bahrain's independence) but periodically raised by some Iranian officials, including under the Islamic Republic.
13.	On March 12, 2024, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), in coordination with the Kingdom of Bahrain, sanctioned Iran-based operatives for the U.S. designated terrorist group Al Ashtar Brigades. The United States designated the Al Ashtar Brigades as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2018.
14.	Nandu Krishnan, "Iran Conflict 2026: Increase in Protest Activity and Unrest in Bahrain Unlikely to Pose a High Threat to Domestic Stability in the Immediate Term," Jane's Intelligence Review, March 6, 2026.
15.	"Bahrain Sentences Three to Life on Charges of Collaborating with Iran," Agence France Presse, May 12, 2026.
16.	"US Middle East Ally Strips Citizenship from 69 in Crackdown on Pro-Iran Support," Fox News, April 28, 2026.
17.	"Bahrain Expels Three Lawmakers in Parliament in Row over Royal Decree," Al Arabiya English, May 7, 2026.
18.	"Bahrain: Sayed Mohamed Almosawi Dies in Custody," Human Rights Watch, April 12, 2026.
19.	"Bahrain Charges Officer After Prisoner Dies in Custody," Agence France Presse, April 16, 2026.
20.	ACLED, "Why Are Bahrain's Shiites Taking to the Streets in Growing Numbers?" September 17, 2026.
21.	U.S. Embassy Bahrain, "Secretary of State Marco Rubio And Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif bin Rashid Al Zayani at a Meeting with the Gulf Cooperation Council Member States," June 25, 2026.
22.	U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Security Cooperation with Bahrain," January 20, 2025.
23.	Gareth Jennings, "Iran Conflict 2026: Bahrain Scores First Air-to-Air Kill for F-16 Block 70," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 10, 2026.
24.	Anika Arora Seth, Shelby Holliday, Denise Blostein and Milàn Czerny, "How Iran Devastated an American Naval Base—and Caused a U.S. Recalculation," Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2026.
25.	See U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, "Authorized Departure (Voluntary/Optional) FAQ Sheet," and U.S. Embassy in Bahrain, "Travel Advisory: Bahrain March 2026," March 3, 2026.
26.	Vivian Nereim, "Gulf Arab States Explore New Options as U.S. Bases Fail to Deter Iran," New York Times, September 15, 2026.
27.	"Restoring the United States Department of War," Executive Order 14347 of September 5, 2025.
28.	Brandi Vincent, "Memo Outlines New Policies for Military Families Affected by War-Triggered Evacuation from Bahrain," DefenseScoop.com, September 1, 2026.
29.	Katie Bo Lillis and Zachary Cohen, "Military and Intelligence Officials Discuss Smaller Presence in the Middle East as US Looks for Another Post-9/11 Strategy," CNN, September 8, 2026.
30.	"Acting Navy Secretary Says Iran 'Blew the Hell out of' US Base in Bahrain," The Hill, September 10, 2026.
31.	"How Iran Devastated an American Naval Base," Wall Street Journal.
32.	John Ismay, "Navy Carrier's Problems Are Tied to Attacks on U.S. Base Early in War," New York Times, August 14, 2026.
33.	Emma Bussey, "Iran War Thrusts Diego Garcia into Spotlight as Official Calls US Military Base 'Integral,'" Fox News, August 16, 2026.
34.	"US, Bahrain Extend Defense Cooperation for 15 Years," Al Defaiya, April 12, 2017.
35.	U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Security Cooperation with Bahrain," fact sheet, June 14, 2021.
36.	See, 1971: Agreement for the Deployment in Bahrain of the United States Middle East Force (22 U.S.T. 2184)—modified by 1975 agreement for the Deployment in Bahrain of the United States Middle East Force (26 U.S.T. 3027) and 1977 agreement on the Status of Administrative Support Unit Personnel (28 U.S.T. 5312) 1991: Agreement concerning the deployment of United States forces (T.I.A.S. 12236).
37.	UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office, "UK Joins US-Bahrain Agreement to Build Security Across the Middle East," December 8, 2024.
38.	Economist Intelligence Unit, "Bahrain and US Sign Symbolic Security Pact," September 19, 2023.
39.	U.S. Central Command, "Bahrain, UK, U.S. Hold Virtual C-SIPA Defence Working Group Meeting," March 6, 2026.
40.	The Joint Explanatory Statement for Defense (Division A) accompanying the FY2026 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 119-75) provides $10 million to Bahrain for security assistance administered by the Department of Defense. Typically, Bahrain receives $1-$2 million annually in State Department-administered, Foreign Operations/National Security, and Related Programs appropriations for International Training and Military Education (IMET).
41.	Jane's Defence Budget, "Bahrain—Defence Budget Overview," May 27, 2026.
42.	U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Defense Operation & Maintenance Overview Book, Fiscal Year 2026 Budget Request, July 2025. Overseas costs are funded by the following appropriations: Military Personnel; Operation and Maintenance; Family Housing Operation and Maintenance; Family Housing Construction; and Military Construction to support all DOD activities located outside the United States that are being performed on a permanent basis at U.S. military bases and other locations (U.S. Embassy, U.S. Consulates, U.S. Mission, etc.). Overseas costs also include the cost of transporting personnel, material, and equipment to and from overseas locations. The overseas amounts do not include incremental costs associated with contingency operations.
43.	U.S. Department of State, 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bahrain, August 12, 2025.
44.	U.S. Department of State, 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, August 12, 2025.
45.	Nazeeha Saeed and Vivian Nereim, "Hundreds of Bahraini Political Prisoners Freed in 'Bittersweet' Royal Pardon," New York Times, May 5, 2024.
46.	U.S. Department of State, 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report: Bahrain.
47.	U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy in Bahrain, "Statement from Chargé d'Affaires Elizabeth Litchfield."
48.	David Makovsky, "Resilience and Roadblocks: The Abraham Accords at Five Years," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Notes, No. 161, September 2025.
49.	Rina Bassist, "Israel Signs Security Cooperation Agreement with Bahrain," Al Monitor, February 3, 2022.
50.	"Israel Opens Embassy in Bahrain Three Years After Historic Abraham Accords," Reuters, September 4, 2023.
51.	"Bahrain Leader Condemns Hamas Oct. 7 Onslaught, Calls for Release of Hostages," Times of Israel, November 20, 2023.
52.	"US Middle East Ally Strips Citizenship from 69 in Crackdown on Pro-Iran Support," Fox News, April 28, 2026.
53.	Ahisha Ghafoor and Paul Mitchell, "Secret Deals Ending Britain's Control in Gulf Revealed," BBC, August 30, 2022.
54.	"Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa," The Times, December 16, 2020.
55.	Kristin Smith Diwan, "Death of Bahrain's Prime Minister Promotes Reformer, but Perhaps not Reforms," The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, November 18, 2020.
56.	According to Bahrain's constitution, royal succession is determined by agnatic (male only) primogeniture among the descendants of King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. The constitution does grant the king the power to appoint any of his other sons as his successor.
57.	According to an older, but still relevant study from 1955, Bahrain's Shia population is "the oldest group among the present inhabitants of the shaykhdom and have been subjected through the centuries to successive conquests, so that although at present they equal or exceed the Sunnis in number—as the 1941 census indicates—they constitute the poorer and lower classes of society and manifest all the markings of a minority group." See, Fahim I. Qubain, "Social Classes and Tensions in Bahrain," Middle East Journal, Vol. 9, No. 3, Summer, 1955, pp. 269-280.
58.	Louay Bahry, "The Opposition in Bahrain: A Bellwether for the Gulf?" Middle East Policy, Vol. 5, Issue 2, May 1997.
59.	"Can Bahrain's Division Between Sunnis and Shias Be Healed?" The Economist, November 24, 2022.
60.	Thérèse Postel, "Here's One Way to Stop the Brutal Repression in Bahrain," The Atlantic, March 13, 2013.