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U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine Since 2022

The United States has cooperated with European governments, the European Union (EU), NATO, and others to provide increased security assistance to Ukraine in response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine starting in 2022. From February 2022 through June 2026, the United States *committed* more than \$68.2 billion in defense articles and services to Ukraine, according to the Special Inspector General for Operation Atlantic Resolve (SIG-OAR), which is statutorily required (5 U.S.C. §419 note) to submit a quarterly report to Congress on U.S.-funded programs and operations for Ukraine. The total value of security assistance that has been *delivered* to Ukraine to date may be lower and is not publicly available.

According to SIG-OAR, "Congress has not made significant new funding available for ... the Ukraine response since April 2024." The 119th Congress authorized \$400 million a year for FY2026 and FY2027 in security assistance for Ukraine (P.L. 119-60, §1243) and appropriated \$400 million for FY2026 in European capacity building, including Ukraine (P.L. 119-75, Division A).

Assistance Since FY2022

The Department of Defense (DOD) has not publicly tallied total security assistance commitments to Ukraine by program and initiative (DOD is "using a secondary Department of War designation" under Executive Order 14347, dated September 5, 2025). Since FY2022, U.S. security assistance for Ukraine has relied mainly on drawdown authorizations of up to \$31.7 billion worth of defense articles from existing DOD stocks, via Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA; 22 U.S.C. §2318); \$33.5 billion in appropriated funding for defense equipment procured through DOD's Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI; P.L. 114-92, §1250); and \$3.7 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF; 22 U.S.C. §2763), as of June 30, 2026. Congress expanded PDA and provided most USAI and FMF funding for Ukraine through a series of supplemental appropriations acts from FY2022 to FY2024.

Ukraine-related supplemental appropriations included other DOD funding: \$45.8 billion to replenish equipment stocks sent to Ukraine and (including regular appropriations, through June 30, 2026) \$51.1 billion in U.S. military support, mainly for U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) in support of OAR, through which the United States "seeks to demonstrate its commitment to [NATO] collective defense, strengthen NATO's deterrence capabilities against Russian aggression, and provide security assistance to Ukraine."

DOD has reorganized its management of security assistance by distributing responsibilities of Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U, based in Wiesbaden, Germany, and established in 2022) to NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU). U.S. Military Group-Ukraine (USMILGRP-Ukraine, based at U.S. Embassy in Kyiv) helps coordinate security assistance and cooperation. The Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (JMTG-U)

provides training and mentoring to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF), including on specific weapon systems.

In addition to U.S. support, EU and non-U.S. NATO members and others have committed about \$130 billion in security assistance to Ukraine from 2022 (through March 2026). The United States, the EU, and others also have provided non-security assistance to Ukraine, including direct financial support.

Security Assistance During the Second Trump Administration

The Trump Administration has announced some new security assistance for Ukraine, at levels lower than from FY2022 to FY2024, while continuing to provide certain previously committed assistance. In 2025, DOD twice briefly paused and resumed the provision of assistance to Ukraine. Some NATO and European officials reportedly have expressed concern that U.S. military operations against Iran could lead to procurement shortages and delays that may affect assistance to Ukraine.

PDA. DOD has not publicly reported the total value of drawdowns delivered to Ukraine to date. As of June 30, 2026, \$4.96 billion in authorized PDA remained available for assistance to Ukraine, according to SIG-OAR (for more, see "Presidential Drawdown Authority," below).

USAI. As of August 2026, DOD estimated that "the cost of defense articles and services funded with USAI appropriations and delivered to Ukraine equaled 57.3 percent of the total USAI appropriations" since FY2022. As noted above, in Section 1243 of P.L. 119-60, Congress authorized \$400 million a year for USAI for FY2026 and FY2027. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75, Division A), did not specify funding for USAI. The accompanying explanatory statement included a \$400 million security cooperation program increase for "European capacity building." This funding was allocated for Ukraine, according to SIG-OAR.

FMF. Between May 2025 and May 2026, the U.S. Department of State approved a series of possible Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Ukraine potentially valued at more than \$3 billion in total, partially funded by FMF. According to SIG-OAR, about \$2.4 billion in FMF assistance allocated for Ukraine since February 2022 had been disbursed as of June 2026.

PURL. In 2025, the United States and NATO allies launched the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, whereby NATO allies fund procurement of U.S. defense articles for Ukraine. As of June 2026, NATO allies and partners had announced about \$6.3 billion in PURL-related assistance, of which about \$4.8 billion had been received by the U.S. Treasury (\$2.3 billion to replenish DOD stocks and \$2.5 billion for new procurement).

JUMPSTART. In 2022, DOD established the Joint Ukrainian Multinational Program—Services, Training and

Articles Rapid Timeline (JUMPSTART) fund to enable foreign contributions to finance FMS for Ukraine. As of June 2026, six allies had contributed about \$2.8 billion in assistance through JUMPSTART.

URIF. In 2025, the United States and Ukraine established the United States-Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund (URIF), which seeks to “mobilize U.S. and aligned capital ... to generate private-sector investment into Ukraine.” In March 2026, URIF announced its first investment to support the development of radio communication control systems for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Presidential Drawdown Authority

Since FY2022, the United States has provided defense articles to Ukraine in part via PDA, by which the President may authorize the immediate transfer of defense articles from U.S. stocks, up to a funding cap established in law, in response to an “unforeseen emergency” (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)). After Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine, Congress increased the annual PDA funding cap from \$100 million to up to \$11 billion for FY2022 (P.L. 117-128), \$14.5 billion for FY2023 (P.L. 117-328), and \$7.8 billion for FY2024 (P.L. 118-50). The PDA funding cap returned to \$100 million for FY2025 and FY2026. From August 2021 to January 2025, the Biden Administration announced 74 PDA drawdowns for Ukraine. Additional PDA remained available, according to SIG-OAR, consisting of “extended authority, recovered authority, and residuals that result from final pricing adjustments on PDA packages.” A DOD review of PDA overvaluations led, in 2023, to the availability of about \$6.2 billion in recovered FY2022 and FY2023 authority (a portion of which was utilized). Separately, President Joe Biden authorized the drawdown (with no expiration) of up to \$5.55 billion in remaining FY2024 PDA in September 2024. PDA announcements through the end of the Biden presidency committed \$4.5 billion of this extended FY2024 authority.

Provision of Defense Equipment

According to State Department and DOD fact sheets (last updated in early 2025), the United States has provided Ukraine with progressively more advanced capabilities since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion: from Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and Javelin anti-armor systems to, for example, Patriot air defense batteries, National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), HAWK air defense systems, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS, including Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, or GMLRS, munitions), Abrams tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, Stryker armored personnel carriers, 155mm howitzers and artillery (including precision guided rounds), UAV and counter-UAV systems, high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMS), and F-16 support.

Beyond PDA, USAI, FMF, PURL, and JUMPSTART, the United States has approved third-party transfers (TPTs) of U.S.-origin defense articles from several NATO and EU members to Ukraine. The United States separately has transferred surplus U.S. equipment to Ukraine through Excess Defense Articles. U.S. firms also export defense articles to Ukraine through Direct Commercial Sales.

Section 1208 of P.L. 118-159 authorized the Secretary of Defense to accept and expend foreign-government contributions to carry out security cooperation under USAI. Section 8106 of P.L. 119-75 made such contributions available for Ukraine assistance, weapons replacement, and equipment recovery or disposal. Section 1245 of P.L. 119-

60 extended and expanded DOD reporting requirements related to allied and partner support to Ukraine; the accompanying explanatory statement directed additional reporting elements specific to JUMPSTART.

End-Use Monitoring

In addition to statutory end-use monitoring (EUM) requirements (22 U.S.C. §2785), Congress has imposed Ukraine-specific EUM and Enhanced EUM (EEUM) reporting through P.L. 117-103 and successor bills P.L. 117-128, P.L. 117-328, and P.L. 118-50. These appropriations requirements were attached to funds with a period of availability ending September 30, 2025. Some congressional concerns have focused on (1) the risk that sensitive U.S. equipment could be diverted to unauthorized end users; (2) gaps between DOD’s accountability assurances and DOD Inspector General (IG) findings; and (3) the adequacy of existing EUM mechanisms in a wartime environment. Some Members have emphasized that no substantiated cases of illicit diversion of U.S.-provided weapons have been identified.

IG reports have documented accountability and tracking gaps without identifying evidence of diversion, while noting limits on the ability to detect diversion. Documented gaps have included delayed inventory checks due to limited U.S. personnel and restricted travel, ad hoc battlefield-loss reporting, and incomplete TPT documentation. As of June 2026, according to SIG-OAR, “USEUCOM reported that [DOD] has not identified any credible evidence indicating the illicit diversion or misuse of the defense articles that the United States has provided to Ukraine.”

Discussion on Future Assistance

U.S. policy increasingly has recognized the UAF’s ability to employ and operate advanced weaponry. Much of U.S. assistance has been focused on providing capabilities that Ukraine’s domestic defense industry cannot produce. The UAF continues to request advanced air defense systems (in particular, Patriot systems to counter Russian ballistic missiles) and artillery and artillery ammunition, as well as medium- and long-range strike capabilities.

Ukraine has become less reliant on security assistance as its defense industry has developed, especially in its capacity to produce UAV and counter-UAV systems. In January 2026, Ukrainian officials stated Ukraine was producing more than 50% of its weapon systems and estimated its defense production capacity at \$55 billion for 2026. Ukraine has concluded some, and is seeking more, joint production and defense agreements and has removed barriers to exporting surplus defense production. Some reports indicate U.S. and Ukrainian officials are exploring ways to improve defense industry cooperation. In July 2026, President Trump indicated that the United States was considering options to allow Ukraine to coproduce Patriot missiles but subsequently noted that this would be a “big step” and “we have to be very careful.” In the 119th Congress, some Members have advanced legislation to provide additional assistance to Ukraine (e.g., H.R. 2913, S. 2592). The House passed H.R. 2913 on June 4, 2026, by a vote of 226-195, following a discharge process on a special rule that provided for the bill’s consideration.

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