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TikTok and China's Digital Platforms: Issues for Congress

Congress and U.S. policymakers at the federal and state levels have taken steps to address their national security-related concerns about the extent to which the People's Republic of China's (PRC, or China) influences digital platforms that are directly or indirectly tied to the PRC and operating in the United States ([Table 1](#)). Most U.S. actions to date have focused on TikTok, owned by ByteDance, a company with ties to the PRC government. Other expressed concerns include PRC platforms' large user bases, access to U.S. data, and company data and content policies. As of 2026, TikTok has a reported 82 million daily active U.S. users. TikTok's CEO testified to Congress in 2023 that the PRC parent, ByteDance, retained in the PRC at least seven years of U.S. users' data. Enacted in 2024, P.L. 118-50 (Div. H and Div. I) requires ByteDance to execute a ["qualified divestiture" from TikTok](#), allows the President to address other PRC-tied digital platforms, and directs the Federal Trade Commission to enforce provisions that prohibit data brokers from transferring U.S. personally identifiable sensitive data to foreign adversaries, including the PRC.

PRC digital firms are able to serve both the U.S. and PRC markets, while PRC investment and technology policies restrict U.S. firms from operating in China. This asymmetry raises issues for Congress about market access reciprocity, fair competition, and U.S. regulation of PRC firms. PRC digital platforms have expanded in the U.S. market over the past 10 years. Many firms have entered regulated or restricted parts of the U.S. economy—broadcasting, media, health, and finance—via mobile applications (apps).

Digital platforms are internet-connected and software-based digital spaces that facilitate the exchange of goods, services, and information through online interactions. For this report, **PRC digital platforms or platforms that have PRC ties** refer to digital platforms that are headquartered in China, subsidiaries, or firms otherwise tied to a company headquartered in China, or whose relevant technology and core business functions (e.g., algorithms, software and technology development, and intellectual property) are based in China, owned by a PRC parent or subsidiary, and/or subject to PRC jurisdiction. In some cases, PRC digital platforms might be incorporated or headquartered outside China. The PRC digital platforms discussed in this report are not exhaustive.

China's Digital Platform Development

PRC policies prioritize the role digital platforms play in China's economic competitiveness, the development of emerging technologies, and PRC global projects in sectors such as communications, smart cities, financial, and logistics services. China's digital platforms emerged in the late 1990s with the help of PRC government policies that restricted U.S. and other foreign internet services firms from operating in China while promoting alternative PRC competitors. Alibaba began in 1999 as a competitor to

Amazon and formed Alipay in 2003 to compete with PayPal. Baidu started as a Google competitor in mapping and search engines. Sina Weibo began as a competitor to Twitter. Tencent's WeChat competed with WhatsApp. In 2016, ByteDance refined the algorithm from its news aggregator business (Toutiao) to launch Douyin (a predecessor-turned-companion PRC application to TikTok), a service that competed with Facebook and YouTube. The PRC universe of digital firms has expanded as industry has adopted digital services and now includes other firms, such as BGI (biotech) and DJI (drones).

As PRC digital firms became viable in China, some moved into global markets. The PRC government allowed some PRC firms to list and expand overseas. In 2014, Alibaba raised \$21.8 billion in its offering on the New York Stock Exchange. U.S. investors in TikTok's PRC parent ByteDance include Sequoia Capital, Susquehanna Group, and KKR. Some PRC firms focused on app offerings to enter foreign markets. They used existing foreign operating systems on mobile phones (e.g., Apple's iOS and Google's Android) to avoid up-front technology infrastructure costs and expand quickly. Once established, some PRC firms developed their own infrastructure, such as cloud services, data storage, and semiconductor design. PRC firm Huawei has launched its own operating system (Harmony OS).

Some PRC firms inherited foreign user bases and licenses through acquisitions. This approach gave some firms, such as TikTok's parent ByteDance, a significant initial U.S. market position and accelerated these firms' expansion. In 2017, ByteDance acquired musical.ly, a short-form video app firm. The deal gave ByteDance 80 million monthly U.S. users—a base almost half of TikTok's current user base. ByteDance then used that U.S. user base in launching TikTok. In another example, Tencent invested in Snap and Epic Games (owner of the gaming platform *Fortnite*).

Table 1. Selected Examples of Digital Platforms in the U.S. Market That Have PRC Ties

PRC Business	U.S. Business	Sector
ByteDance/Douyin	TikTok	Social media
Tencent	WeChat	Super app
	Snap/Snapchat	Social media
	Blizzard, Riot, Epic	Gaming
Alibaba	Alibaba, Alipay	E-commerce/payments
Baidu	Apollo	Mapping, autonomy
Yidian Yixun	Newsbreak	News, media
PDD	Temu	E-commerce, clothing
Shein	Shein	E-commerce, clothing
Zoom subsidiaries	Zoom, Zoom.gov	Business software
Shiji Tech	Shiji Technology	Business software/hotel
Binance	Binance.US	Crypto

Source: CRS, with information from media and corporate reports.

Some PRC digital platforms, such as TikTok, are incorporated and/or headquartered in the U.S. and third

markets and have core engineering and technology functions in China and other PRC ties. Temu, founded in Boston, is controlled by a PRC firm. Zoom Video Communications, Inc., founded in California, incorporated in Delaware, and headquartered in the United States, [reports in its FY2024 annual report](#) that “a significant portion of our research and development organization resides in China” and that “we have a significant number of employees, primarily engineers, in China, where personnel costs are less expensive than in many other geographies.”

PRC Influence and Control

Since 2014, the PRC government and the Communist Party of China (CPC) have adopted interrelated laws, economic security measures, and data restrictions that enhance control over data and commercial activity, within and outside of China. They have expanded data localization requirements and placed controls on the export of data and algorithms. In 2021, they introduced security review requirements for PRC firms listing or operating overseas. These provisions require firms to adhere to PRC rules when they conflict with U.S. laws. PRC measures seem to be more extensive than other countries' approaches to data security. Such measures have affected U.S. firms' operations in China, raising questions about the extent to which PRC firms operating offshore are independent of the PRC government. Examples of PRC authorities include the following:

- [China's National Security Law \(2015\)](#) requires information systems in China to be “secure and controllable.” The law underpins requirements that U.S. firms store data and cryptographic keys in China.
- The [PRC's National Cybersecurity Law \(2017\)](#) requires firms to store personal information and data within China. The law builds on related requirements to place PRC data and related infrastructure in China.
- [China's Data Security Law \(2021\)](#) requires PRC government approval for the transfer of data stored in China and calls for classifying data according to the data's importance to economic and security interests.
- In [August 2020](#), the PRC government placed export controls on algorithms used in social media platforms. Some experts saw this as an effort to influence TikTok and other PRC digital firms' offshore operations.

The CPC requires all firms to house a Party committee that is empowered to attend board meetings and be part of decisionmaking. The PRC government is also an indirect shareholder in some firms. For example, it holds a board seat in Douyin Information Services Co., Ltd (the owner of TikTok's core technology) via a 1% shareholding by a firm backed by China's internet regulator. Other PRC tools to influence PRC digital platform firms include the following:

- **PRC official content guidelines and censorship rules** restrict and promote content on PRC digital platforms.
- **China's anti-espionage, cybersecurity, and data security laws** compel firms to support PRC state security authorities.
- **The core business (e.g., software and technology development) and intellectual property** is based in China, owned by a PRC parent or subsidiary, and

subject to PRC jurisdiction. Offshore structures can obfuscate such ties.

Key U.S. Government Actions to Restrict Certain PRC Digital Firms

2019: [Executive Order \(EO\) 13873](#) declared a national emergency to secure U.S. information and communications technology and services supply chains. The EO has been renewed annually since 2019.

2020-present: Some federal agencies and state governments banned the TikTok app on government devices. In 2026, the Trump Administration argued that the bans should no longer apply after the President approved a “qualified divestiture.”

2020: [Presidential orders](#) under Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) authorities required PRC firm Shiji Technology to divest Stayntouch, a U.S. software firm, and required PRC ByteDance to divest musical.ly/TikTok. [EO 13942](#) and [EO 13943](#) (later rescinded) restricted the U.S. operations of TikTok and WeChat. Court injunctions blocked implementation of the EOs.

2021: [EO 13971](#) provided for scrutiny of apps and software developed/controlled by PRC firms. [EO 14034](#) replaced EO 13942 and EO 13943 and created a program to address risks of foreign adversary-owned, internet-tied and software firms.

2025: The Commerce Department banned the import/sale of some PRC-tied connected vehicle hardware and software.

Issues Before Congress

The executive branch has restricted some PRC digital firms' operations (**text box**). P.L. 118-50 focuses on national security issues and platform conduct and allows the President to restrict foreign adversary-controlled apps. The law designates TikTok as a “foreign adversary controlled application” and required ByteDance to sell TikTok to a non-PRC owner by January 19, 2025, or face a ban on app stores and internet hosting services supporting the app. In 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court [upheld the law](#) in a legal challenge by TikTok.

P.L. 118-50 allows the President to authorize a “qualified divestiture” of TikTok and impose terms, which President Trump did in 2025. Under the divestiture terms, TikTok's U.S. operations are run by a joint venture (JV) that is majority-owned and controlled by U.S. persons in which ByteDance and its affiliates have a 19.9% stake. TikTok is to license a copy of TikTok's algorithm from ByteDance, which still owns the underlying intellectual property. Some Members of Congress [have raised questions](#) about ongoing PRC ties and influence over TikTok given ByteDance's role in the JV. Congress may exercise oversight over the deal and examine the potential risks from continued software, data, and technology ties to China.

Congress also may act with respect to other PRC platforms, including conducting its own inquiries into potential risks presented by these platforms and overseeing any executive branch actions. In March 2026, the [Trump Administration reportedly was deliberating](#) whether to allow PRC firm Tencent to retain its holdings in several U.S. and foreign gaming companies, such as Epic Games (*Fortnite*), Riot Games (*League of Legends*), and Supercell (*Clash of Clans*).

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