

China's Diplomacy: Selected Issues for Congress

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The People's Republic of China (PRC or China) uses diplomacy to influence governments, publics, international organizations, and international affairs across the world. Under Communist Party of China (CPC) General Secretary Xi Jinping (2012-present), the PRC has adopted a more dynamic, expansive foreign policy vision than that which the PRC had articulated since the 1990s. This more dynamic vision has led the PRC to launch multiple large-scale global initiatives that aim to influence development, security, and values internationally. Increasingly, PRC efforts to shape the landscape in these areas, and others, have implications for U.S. foreign policy and interests.

A socialist state under the leadership of the CPC, the PRC appears to be pursuing several goals by diplomatic means, according to scholars and analysts. These goals include safeguarding a broadly defined conception of national security; blunting U.S. power and influence relative to the PRC's own, such as by promoting multipolarity; using diplomacy to isolate Taiwan, to unify the PRC with the self-ruling island; reforming international institutions; and fostering economic growth and technological development, which may in turn enhance the PRC's diplomatic capabilities. Policymakers, scholars, and analysts hold divergent views with regard to the PRC's ultimate foreign policy goals. Some argue that the PRC seeks global hegemony and to usher in an "antidemocratic order" with itself at the center. Others contend that the PRC wants "status and authority without responsibility" and is "more inwardly focused than externally oriented." Others yet suggest that the PRC seeks regional primacy in the Indo-Pacific, but has more modest ambitions globally. In his address at the CPC's 20th National Congress in 2022, Xi articulated the goal of building the PRC "into a great modern socialist country that leads the world in terms of composite national strength and international influence by the middle of the century."

Although the PRC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts most of the party-state's diplomacy, ultimate authority over foreign policy rests in the CPC Central Committee and, in particular, its Central Foreign Affairs Commission. Numerous other entities, including CPC bodies, government ministries, state-owned and private enterprises, state-affiliated organizations, state media, and local governments all play roles in China's foreign affairs. PRC foreign policy has exhibited several distinctive characteristics over the past five decades including an explicit emphasis on state sovereignty; the eschewing of mutual defense agreements and formal alliances, and the development of semi-hierarchical "strategic partnerships"; and the prioritization of the United Nations (UN) and broader UN system, which the PRC maintains is at the "core" of the international system.

Today, the PRC engages with other countries and international institutions in many traditional areas of international affairs, including international development and international security. The PRC has engaged in what it calls "international development cooperation" to varying degrees for decades, which reflects, in part, the PRC government's efforts to leverage export promotion to fuel economic growth and advance China-centered and China-controlled global infrastructure, transportation, trade, production networks, and standards. China's increasing efforts to position itself as a third-party mediator in international conflicts and use its veto power as a permanent member of the UN Security Council also illustrate growing PRC influence over and interest in matters related to international peace and security. PRC ambitions to isolate Taiwan have at times shaped its bilateral and multilateral engagements.

Since the 115th Congress, some Members of Congress have placed PRC diplomatic activity within the context of competition between the United States and the PRC. In the 119th Congress, Members have introduced legislation with provisions related to U.S. competition with the PRC, such as monitoring the PRC's diplomatic posture, countering its purported foreign malign influence, and leveraging U.S. foreign assistance to gain the upper hand in "strategic competition" with the PRC. Other pieces of legislation seek to address PRC activity in, or cooperation with, third countries and international institutions. During the 118th Congress, the House passed H.Res. 11, which established the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (SCOC) "to investigate and submit policy recommendations on the status of the [CPC's] economic, technological, and security progress and its competition with the United States." The House retained (via H.Res. 5) the SCOC during the 119th Congress, broadening the committee's jurisdiction to include policy recommendations to counter the "ideological threats" posed by the CPC to the United States and U.S. allies and partners.

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Background¹

The Department of Defense's 2026 *National Defense Strategy* asserts that "by any measure," the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) "is already the second most powerful country in the world—behind only the United States—and the most powerful state relative to us since the 19th century."² However one ranks the PRC's power globally, part of PRC's power derives from diplomacy, which supports Beijing's efforts to influence governments, publics, international organizations, and international affairs. Increasingly, PRC efforts to shape the landscape in areas including international development and international security have implications for U.S. foreign policy and interests.

The PRC has portrayed itself internationally as a responsible state actor for several decades.³ More recently, it also has projected itself as a contributor to global stability and purveyor of international public goods.⁴ Some international analysts have suggested that since the first Trump Administration, PRC leaders and diplomats have been more active in claiming some forms of global leadership—a trend that is appreciable in the PRC's broader external messaging, according to some scholarly research.⁵ Other specialists have argued, for example, that "despite the conventional perception that China is actively exploiting the perceived missteps by the Trump administration and filling the void that Washington has left in the world, the actual picture is more complicated," further asserting that China has been unable to sway the world in its favor.⁶

Since the 115th Congress, Members have introduced a growing body of legislation that addresses China, reflecting increased congressional interest in issues including the PRC's relations with third countries, foreign lending and investment, and international initiatives. Some Members of Congress have expressed support for the Trump Administration's "America First Foreign Policy"⁷

¹ In this report, "diplomacy" is used to refer to the conduct of government-to-government relations, including at the national and subnational level. "Foreign affairs" is used more broadly to reference international exchanges in fields such as commerce, finance, and media, as well as diplomacy. "Foreign policy" is a central government's foreign affairs orientation. See Edward Marks, "Defining Diplomacy: Speaking Out," American Foreign Service Association, January-February 2015, <https://afsa.org/defining-diplomacy>.

² U.S. Department of Defense, *2026 National Defense Strategy*, January 2026, p. 9. The Department of Defense (DOD) is "using a secondary Department of War designation," under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025. See Executive Order 14347 of September 5, 2025, "Restoring the United States Department of War," 90 Federal Register 43893, September 5, 2025, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/10/2025-17508/restoring-the-united-states-department-of-war>.

³ See, for example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, "Speech by H.E. Mr. Wen Jiabao Vice-Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China at World Food Summit: Five Years Later," August 20, 2003, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyjh/202405/t20240530_11339680.html.

⁴ See, for example, State Council Information Office of the PRC, "'Xiplomacy: How to Read China's Diplomatic Surge in 2026?," February 11, 2026, http://english.scio.gov.cn/m/topnews/2026-02/11/content_118328213.html; Embassy of the PRC in the Republic of Namibia, *Concept Paper on the Global Governance Initiative*, September 2, 2025, https://na.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/sgxw/202509/t20250902_11700840.htm.

⁵ Melanie Hart and Blaine Johnson, "Mapping China's Global Governance Ambitions: Democracies Still Have Leverage to Shape Beijing's Reform Agenda, Center for American Progress, p.4, <https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/02/China-Global-Governance-2.pdf>; and Sun Haobo, "China's Image in Sino-US Trade War Reporting from the Perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis: Comparative Study on the Report of China Daily in 2018 and 2025," *International Journal of Linguistics, Literature and Translation*, vol. 8, no. 11, 2025, pp.49-68.

⁶ Yun Sun, "Trump 2.0: Is China Filling the Void?," China Leadership Monitor, June 2026, <https://www.prcleader.org/post/trump-2-0-is-china-filling-the-void>.

⁷ White House, "America First Policy Directive to the Secretary of State," January 20, 2025, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/america-first-policy-directive-to-the-secretary-of-state>.

and credited the Administration for having “acted decisively on confronting China’s malign influence.”⁸ Other Members have expressed concern that the Administration’s approach may have negatively impacted the United States’ “competitive advantage,” including its diplomatic statecraft and global influence.⁹

According to the 2026 *National Defense Strategy*, “President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China.”¹⁰ The Administration has also at various times referred to the PRC as a “rival”¹¹ and “strategic competitor.”¹² Some of the Administration’s actions, particularly within the Western Hemisphere, appear to be intended to circumscribe the PRC’s presence and influence abroad.¹³

China’s Foreign Policy

The PRC is a socialist state under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the country’s dominant political institution.¹⁴ Although the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducts most of the party-state’s diplomacy, ultimate authority over foreign policy rests in the CPC Central Committee, and in particular, its Central Foreign Affairs Commission (see “**Diplomatic Entities**,” below).

The PRC’s foreign policy appears to exhibit several distinct characteristics, including:

- An explicit emphasis on state sovereignty, as conveyed in the PRC’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.¹⁵ The principles are (1) mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence.

⁸ U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (SCOC), “New Select Committee Investigation Uncovers China’s Space Operations in Latin America,” February 26, 2026, <https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/media/press-releases/new-select-committee-investigation-uncovers-china-s-space-operations-in-latin-america>.

⁹ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Price of Retreat 2.0: Undermining Americas Economic Edge and Alliance Advantage*, March 2026, p. 3, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/china_report_20.pdf.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Defense, *2026 National Defense Strategy*, p. 3.

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs FY2026*, May 2025, p. 125.

¹² U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification FY2026*, p. 153.

¹³ For examples of these actions in the Western Hemisphere, see Didi Tang, “Trump Takes Forceful Steps To Pressure Latin American Leaders To Reduce China Ties,” Associated Press, March 5, 2026, <https://apnews.com/article/china-trump-latin-america-peru-chile-panama-4ffccc6a6ab67cb82e038fda664ec759>.

¹⁴ State Council of the PRC, “Constitution of the PRC,” November 20, 2019, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/201911/20/content_WS5ed8856ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html.

For more on China’s political system, see CRS In Focus IF12505, *China Primer: China’s Political System*.

¹⁵ Premier Zhou Enlai first articulated the principles during talks with India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, culminating in the *1954 Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between Tibet Region and India*. The principles were subsequently built up during the Asian-African Conference of 1955, also known as the Bandung Conference, which laid the foundation for the non-aligned movement during the Cold War. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “China’s Initiation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence,” https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/wjls/3604_665547/202405/t20240531_11367542.html, Ministry of External Affairs of India, External Publicity Division, *Panchsheel*, June 2004, https://www.mea.gov.in/uploads/publicationdocs/191_panchsheel.pdf, and U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, “Bandung Conference (Asian-African Conference), 1955,” <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf>.

- The eschewing of formal treaty alliances in favor of developing semi-hierarchical “strategic partnerships” with countries around the world.¹⁶ North Korea is the only country with which the PRC maintains a military alliance.¹⁷
- The apparent grouping of countries by categories and a foreign policy approach adapted to each category. In addition to geographic categories, three types of countries frequently referenced in PRC foreign policy documents are major powers, neighboring countries, and developing countries.¹⁸ The PRC typically has considered the United States, Russia, the European Union, and Japan as major powers. In 2025, the China Institute of International Studies did not include Japan among the major powers surveyed in its annual *International Situation and China's Foreign Affairs Blue Book*, suggesting China no longer views Japan as a major power.¹⁹ The PRC's approaches to individual countries within a category often share certain features (e.g., region-specific engagement platforms, see **Table 1**) or are informed by similar considerations (e.g., border security, in the case of neighboring countries).
- The prioritization of the United Nations (UN) and broader UN system, which the PRC maintains is at the “core” of the international system (see “**United Nations**”).²⁰ The PRC's permanent seat on the UN Security Council gives it veto power over most of the UN's most important decisions.
- A tendency toward forming multilateral organizations and groups (e.g., the Eurasia-based, security-focused Shanghai Cooperation Organization; the grouping of Brazil, Russia, Iran, China, and South Africa [BRICS] and its New Development Bank), that allow the PRC to regularly engage with foreign countries (sometimes without the United States) and develop consensus around its preferred positions.
- The use of broad policy schemes (e.g., the Belt and Road Initiative and more recently the Global Initiatives, see “**Multilateral and Global Initiatives**”) as organizing concepts for a variety of outward-facing activities, including in the diplomatic realm.

¹⁶ Xinhua News Agency, “Xinhua Headlines: A Quick Review of China's 2024 Global Interactions Through 5 Lenses,” December 30, 2024, <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/p/043BOHBB.html>. In 2024, a scholar found that China used “at least 42 unique combinations of adjectives for different partnerships.” Jacob Mardell, “PRC Partnership Diplomacy in the New Era,” Jamestown Foundation, September 29, 2024.

¹⁷ The 1961 PRC-DPRK Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance commits each party to “immediately make every effort to provide military and other assistance” if the other comes under “armed attack” that leads to a state of war. The alliance lacks key operational components such as a combined headquarters, combined planning, or combined exercises. Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un appeared to affirm the treaty in 2021 in messages of congratulations on the 60th anniversary of the treaty's signing. Sources: State Council of the PRC Gazette, “中华人民共和国和朝鲜民主主义人民共和国友好合作互助条约” (People's Republic of China and Democratic People's Republic of Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance), No. 13, 1961, September 20, 1961, and Xinhua News Agency, “Xi, Kim Exchange Congratulations on 60th Anniversary of China-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance,” July 11, 2021.

¹⁸ Within the PRC's foreign policy, “major countries are the key, neighboring countries are the priority, developing countries are the foundation, and multilateral diplomacy is the new stage,” according to one PRC scholar. Source: Zhang Qingming, “The 20th CPC National Congress and China's Foreign Policy: Implication and Reflection,” *China International Strategy Review*, April 2023, p. 7.

¹⁹ Source: China Institute of International Studies, “《国际形势和中国外交蓝皮书》（2024/2025）” (International Situation and China's Foreign Affairs Blue Book [2024/2025]), August 29, 2025, https://m.ciis.org.cn/yjcg/yjcg_zzybg/202508/t20250829_9659.html.

²⁰ Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, “Wang Yi Meets with U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres,” May 27, 2026, https://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202605/t20260528_11919917.htm.

Table 1. Selected Regional Platforms with PRC Participation

Region	Platform
Africa	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
Central Asia	China + Central Asia (C+C5) Mechanism
Central and Eastern Europe	China and Central and Eastern European (CEECE) Countries Framework
Latin America and the Caribbean	China-Community of Latin America and Caribbean States (CELAC) Forum
Middle East	China-Arab States Cooperation Forum
Pacific Islands	China-Pacific Island Countries Forum
South Asia	China-South Asia Cooperation Forum (CSACF)
Southeast Asia	China-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Process

Source: CRS using open-source data.

The PRC appears to be pursuing several goals by diplomatic means, according to scholars and analysts. These goals include safeguarding a broadly defined conception of national security;²¹ blunting U.S. power and influence relative to the PRC's own, such as by promoting multipolarity;²² isolating Taiwan in service of unifying with the self-ruling island;²³ reforming international institutions;²⁴ and fostering economic growth²⁵ and technological development,²⁶ which may in turn enhance the PRC's diplomatic capabilities. In the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's *2026 Annual Threat Assessment*, the U.S. intelligence community expressed the judgement that the PRC

will seek to increase its power and influence to shape its region and world events; create an environment favorable to Chinese interests; overcome perceived containment efforts by the U.S.; secure its freedom of movement at sea; reduce U.S. military presence and operations on its periphery; and fend off challenges to its reputation, legitimacy, and capabilities at home and abroad.²⁷

²¹ Testimony of Sheena Chestnut Greitens in U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, *An Axis of Autocracy? China's Relations with Russia, Iran, & North Korea*, hearings, 119th Cong, 1st Session, February 20, 2025, p. 223, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2025-04/February_20_2025_Hearing_Transcript_0.pdf. For more on the PRC's conception of national security see Katja Drinhausen and Helena Legarda, "'Comprehensive National Security' Unleashed: How Xi's Approach Shapes China's Policies at Home and Abroad," *Mercator Institute for China Studies*, September 15, 2022, <https://merics.org/en/report/comprehensive-national-security-unleashed-how-xis-approach-shapes-chinas-policies-home-and>.

²² Andrew Latham and Arta Moeini, "Beijing's Aim Is to Erode U.S. Global Hegemony, Not Seek World Domination," *Institute for Peace & Diplomacy*, February 26, 2025, <https://peacediplomacy.org/2025/02/26/unraveling-chinas-grand-strategy-its-aim-is-to-erode-u-s-global-hegemony-not-seek-world-domination>.

²³ Benjamin Herscovitch, "China's Efforts to Isolate and Intimidate Taiwan Are Pushing U.S. Allies Closer," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, Georgetown University, July 5, 2022, <https://gjia.georgetown.edu/conflict-security/chinas-efforts-to-isolate-and-intimidate-taiwan-are-pushing-u-s-allies-closer>.

²⁴ Zongyuan Zoe Liu, "China's Persistent Global Influence Despite Economic Growth Challenges," *China Leadership Monitor*, August 31, 2024, <http://www.prcleader.org/post/china-global-influence>.

²⁵ Timothy R. Heath, "China's Evolving Approach to Economic Diplomacy," *Asia Policy*, no. 22, July 2016, p. 164.

²⁶ Zhao Alexandre Huang and Xiang Meng, "China's Strategic Approach to Tech Diplomacy in a Time of Global Uncertainty," *Global Policy*, July 14, 2025.

²⁷ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community*, March 2026, <https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ATA-2026-unclassified-16-Mar-FINAL.pdf>.

Policymakers, scholars, and analysts hold divergent views on the PRC's foreign policy goals.²⁸ Some argue that the PRC seeks global hegemony and an “antidemocratic order” with itself at the center.²⁹ Others contend that the PRC wants “status and authority without responsibility” and is “more inwardly focused than externally oriented.”³⁰ Others yet suggest that the PRC seeks regional primacy in the Indo-Pacific, but has more modest ambitions globally.³¹ In his address at the CPC's 20th National Congress in 2022, Xi articulated the goal of building the PRC “into a great modern socialist country that leads the world in terms of composite national strength and international influence by the middle of the century.”³²

Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy

Since 2018, the PRC's diplomacy has been conducted under the banner of CPC General Secretary and PRC President Xi Jinping's eponymous “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy,” reflecting his personal imprimatur on this policy area.³³ Xi Thought on Diplomacy reflects a more dynamic, expansive foreign policy vision than that which the PRC had articulated since the 1990s. Framed as part of the PRC's reorientation toward “Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” senior PRC officials including a former top diplomat have described this new foreign policy as responding to “the historical juncture of China's development and seeking to address profound changes in the world unseen in a century.”³⁴ This latter axiom, sometimes framed as “great changes unseen in a century,” is closely linked to PRC rhetoric regarding the “rise of the East, [and] decline of the West” and the party-state's apparent assessment of waning U.S. power.³⁵

²⁸ For more on the debate of China's foreign policy goals, see Andrea Ghiselli, “How to Think About What China Want?,” *Thoughts on China*, August 24, 2025.

²⁹ Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher, “No Substitute for Victory,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2024.

³⁰ Jeremy S. Friedman, “How Far Do China's Ambitions Reach?,” *Foreign Policy*, January 21, 2026, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/01/21/china-united-states-trump-foreign-policy-competition> and David C. Kang, Jackie S. H. Wong, Zenobia T. Chan, “What Does China Want?,” *International Security*, vol. 50, no. 1, Summer 2025, <https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/50/1/46/132729/What-Does-China-Want>.

³¹ See, for example, Timothy R. Heath, Derek Grossman, Asha Clark, *China's Quest for Global Primacy*, RAND Corporation, June 7, 2021, p. 43, 48, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA400/RRA447-1/RAND_RRA447-1.pdf.

³² International Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, “Full Text of The Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” August 2, 2023, <http://www.idcpc.org.cn/english2023/tjzl/cpcjj/20thPartyCongrressReport>.

³³ Communist Party of China, “学习资料 | 习近平外交思想” (Study Materials | Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy), February 20, 2025, <https://www.12371.cn/2025/02/20/ARTI1740017889010506.shtml>.

³⁴ Yang Jiechi, “Yang Jiechi: Advancing China's Major-Country Diplomacy Under the Guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Foreign Affairs,” *Theory China*, February 17, 2020, <https://en.theorychina.org.cn/c/2020-02-17/1511382.shtml>.

³⁵ For more, see China Open Source Observatory, “Great Changes Unseen in a Century,” Council on Foreign Relations, <https://chinaopensourceobservatory.org/glossary#great-changes-unseen-in-a-century>; and Rush Doshi, “Featured Excerpt from The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order,” no. 69, Fall 2021, <https://www.prleader.org/post/featured-excerpt-from-the-long-game-china-s-grand-strategy-to-displace-american-order>. For more on the “rise of the East, [and] decline of the West” axiom, see Ministry of National Defense of the PRC, “习近平强军思想学习问答 | 强军兴军的科学指南——关于习近平强军思想的指导地位” (Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military Q&A | Scientific Guide to Strengthening and Revitalizing the Military—On the Guiding Status of Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military), September 14, 2022, <http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/fgw/4920893.html>.

By law, the PRC's foreign relations are conducted “under the centralized and overall leadership of the [CPC],” which retains authority over every aspect of policy in China.³⁶ Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy further emphasizes the Party's “centralized, unified leadership over external work” and links the PRC's diplomacy with Xi's goal of achieving the “Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation,” as well as Xi's broader ideological project known as “Xi Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”³⁷

Foreign Policy Guidance in the PRC

The PRC party-state provides foreign policy guidance through channels including:

- the quinquennial CPC National Congress (“Party Congress”), which provides the most authoritative policy guidance;
- the quadrennial CPC Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs;³⁸ and
- the foreign minister's annual remarks at a year-end Symposium on the International Situation, held by the China Institute of International Studies, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs-related research institute.³⁹

Other work conferences, such as the annual Taiwan work conference, also can relay foreign policy directives.

Multilateral and Global Initiatives

Under Xi, the PRC has launched multiple large-scale multilateral initiatives that display the PRC's international ambitions. One such program is the **Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)**, which has since grown out of an effort to develop China-centered—and controlled—global infrastructure, transportation, trade, and production networks.⁴⁰

Since 2021, the PRC has launched a series of “global initiatives” that aim to further Beijing's vision for global governance, including:⁴¹

- the **Global Development Initiative** (2021), which sponsors economic development projects and aims to shape global conceptions of development⁴²;
- the **Global Security Initiative** (2022), through which the PRC seeks to influence international security, as well as other countries' domestic security policies;⁴³

³⁶ Ministry of Justice of the PRC, “The Law on Foreign Relations of the Peoples Republic of China,” July 11, 2023.

³⁷ Qiushi, “Ten Core Principles of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy,” July 16, 2021, https://en.qstheory.cn/2021-07/16/c_643502.htm.

³⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs was Held in Beijing Xi Jinping Delivered an Important Address at the Conference,” December 28, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202405/t20240530_11332606.html.

³⁹ See, for example, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Opening up New Horizons for Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics at a Crucial Historical Juncture,” December 30, 2025.

⁴⁰ See CRS In Focus IF11735, *China's “One Belt, One Road” Initiative: Economic Issues*. See also Belt and Road Portal, China Economic Information Service and State Information Center, <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn>.

⁴¹ In addition to these four initiatives, China launched a Global Artificial Intelligence (AI) Governance Initiative in 2023. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Global AI Governance Initiative,” October 20, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367503.html.

⁴² For more on the PRC's Global Development Initiative, see CRS In Focus IF13099, *China Primer: China's Global Development Initiative*.

⁴³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper*, February 21, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367484.html.

- the **Global Civilization Initiative** (2023), which seeks to shape global values and aims to foster people-to-people exchanges⁴⁴; and
- the **Global Governance Initiative** (2025), which was launched to coincide with the 80th anniversary of the United Nations.⁴⁵

It is unclear to what extent the PRC is initiating or funding new programs under these initiatives, or whether they primarily serve as umbrella concepts for existing efforts. Within the PRC's domestic context, the global initiatives are recognized as providing "the strategic guidance" for building a global "community with a shared future for humanity," which is "the core tenet" of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy.⁴⁶ Authoritative PRC sources have described this concept as reflecting "how China proposes to solve the questions of what kind of world to build and how to build it."⁴⁷ According to the independent research group China Media Project, which is based in the United States and Taiwan, the "community" concept serves PRC interests by "promoting a nation-centered view of international governance, human rights and development" that "legitimiz[es the PRC's] domestic approach to governance and its domestic rights situation even as it expands its economic and political reach across the globe."⁴⁸

Domestic Audiences and China's Foreign Policy

Public perceptions among domestic audiences in China have influenced the country's foreign policy for decades. These perceptions, in turn, have been shaped by the party-state since the founding of the PRC. As described in one study, the PRC party-state "invests substantial state resources in managing public opinion through propaganda and rhetoric," which permit Beijing "to instrumentalize nationalism by stoking national sentiment on socially sensitive issues."⁴⁹ According to Johns Hopkins University scholar Jessica Chen Weiss, popular nationalism is both "a potential liability and source of strength" for Beijing.⁵⁰ Nationalist demonstrations, she argues, "can be helpful when the [PRC] government wants to show resolve,"⁵¹ but may pose a potential risk should demonstrations get out of control.⁵² Some scholars have argued that over the past decade, PRC leaders have progressively shifted

⁴⁴ State Council Information Office of the PRC, "Full Text of Xi Jinping's Keynote Address at the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-level Meeting," March 16, 2023, http://english.scio.gov.cn/topnews/2023-03/16/content_85171478.htm; and China Institute of International Studies, *China's Actions for Advancing Global Dialogue Among Civilizations*, June 2026, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/wjbxw/202606/P020260610548611591262.pdf.

⁴⁵ State Council of the PRC, "Xi Proposes Global Governance Initiative at Largest-Ever SCO Summit," September 1, 2025, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202509/01/content_WS68b58afbc6d0868f4e8f53cd.html. See also, State Council Information Office of the PRC, *More Just and Equitable Global Governance: China's Principles, Proposals and Actions*, June 2026, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202606/17/content_WS6a326192c6d00ca5f9a0bab7.html.

⁴⁶ The concept is sometimes also referred to as a "community of common destiny for mankind." Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, "The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs was Held in Beijing Xi Jinping Delivered an Important Address at the Conference."

⁴⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, "The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs was Held in Beijing Xi Jinping Delivered an Important Address at the Conference."

⁴⁸ Stella Chen, "Community of Common Destiny for Mankind," China Media Project, August 25, 2021, https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/community-of-common-destiny-for-mankind.

⁴⁹ Ric Neo and Chen Xiang, "State Rhetoric, Nationalism and Public Opinion in China," *International Affairs*, vol. 98, no. 4, pp.1327-1346. For an example, see Yinan He, "Nationalism and the China-Japan Island Disputes," Council on Foreign Relations, September 18, 2012, <https://www.cfr.org/articles/nationalism-and-china-japan-island-disputes>.

⁵⁰ Jessica Chen Weiss, "Chinese Nationalism: The CCP's 'Double-Edged Sword'," *The Diplomat*, November 25, 2014, <https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/chinese-nationalism-the-ccps-double-edged-sword>.

⁵¹ Weiss, "Chinese Nationalism: The CCP's 'Double-Edged Sword.'"

⁵² ChinaFile, "Powerful Patriots Nationalist Protest in China's Foreign Relations," September 11, 2014, <https://www.chinafile.com/library/books/powerful-patriots>. For more on this, see Jessica Chen Weiss, *Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China's Foreign Relations*, Oxford University Press, 2014.

from selectively encouraging popular nationalist demonstrations to “suppressing nationalist movements at home” and relying on “displays of military force” to strengthen its position in international crises.⁵³

Public perceptions within China may inform PRC foreign policy in different ways. Following then-Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan, international media reported a wave of dissatisfaction among online communities in China that were hoping for a stronger response from Beijing to the visit.⁵⁴ PRC diplomacy may be adapting to cope with such dissatisfaction, for example, by directing some diplomatic messaging at PRC domestic audiences, rather than foreign publics. In one scholar’s view, the “diversionary use of assertive diplomacy” exhibited by PRC “wolf-warrior” diplomats over the last decade “allows Beijing to avoid publicizing its policy failures, buy more time and room for manoeuvre [sic], and plan tactical reforms while preserving its fundamental political system.”⁵⁵

Diplomatic Entities

Numerous entities, including CPC bodies, government ministries, state-owned and private enterprises, state-affiliated organizations (e.g., the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries), state media, and local governments all play roles in China’s foreign affairs (see “**Other PRC Entities Involved in Foreign Affairs**,” below). Within the PRC’s socialist state, the party and government operate as two distinct, interlocking bureaucracies, though some individual institutions may have both party and government titles.

Some of the main entities involved in PRC diplomacy are described below.

Central Foreign Affairs Commission

The Central Foreign Affairs Commission (CFAC) of the CPC’s Central Committee is China’s highest foreign affairs organ. The commission—which the CPC upgraded from a “leading small group” in 2018—is headed by Xi Jinping in his capacity as CPC General Secretary, with Li Qiang (the Party’s second-highest leader by protocol rank and concurrently China’s head of government) as his deputy.⁵⁶ Wang Yi, a member of the CPC Central Committee’s elite Political Bureau (Politburo) and the PRC’s top diplomat, simultaneously serves as the director of the Commission’s office and PRC foreign minister (see below).

According to the PRC Law on Foreign Relations, CFAC is responsible for “policy making, deliberation, and coordination relating to the conduct of [the PRC’s] foreign relations.”⁵⁷ According to the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI), a U.S.-based research group, CFAC plays a broad role in the PRC’s foreign affairs, allowing the party leadership to

⁵³ Raphael J. Piliero and Elliot S. Ji, “Xi Prefers Fleet Power to Street Protest,” *Foreign Policy*, August 26, 2024, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/26/china-xi-nationalist-protest-politics-diplomacy>.

⁵⁴ The former editor of a state-owned media outlet, for example, suggested the use of military force. See Reuters, “Chinese nationalist commentator deletes Pelosi tweet after Twitter blocks account,” July 30, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinese-nationalist-commentator-deletes-pelosi-tweet-after-twitter-blocks-2022-07-30>. See also, Simone McCarthy, “Some Nationalists Felt China Did Too Little to Counter Pelosi. Beijing Wants to Change Their Minds,” CNN, August 5, 2022, <https://www.cnn.com/2022/08/05/china/china-public-opinion-military-response-pelosi-intl-hnk-mic>.

⁵⁵ Xiaolin Duan, “Domestic Sources of China’s Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy: Individual Incentive, Institutional Changes and Diversionary Strategies,” *The Pacific Review*, vol. 37, no.3 (2024), p. 586.

⁵⁶ In China’s party-state, many top leaders have both party and government titles. For example, Xi Jinping is simultaneously general secretary of the CPC and president of the PRC. He is also chairman of the Central Military Commission, which has authority over China’s military.

⁵⁷ Ministry of Justice of the PRC, “The Law on Foreign Relations of the Peoples Republic of China,” July 11, 2023.

make decisions, assign responsibilities, and oversee implementation of a wide variety of foreign-related policies that include traditional diplomacy but also touch on party-to-party diplomacy, external propaganda, foreign trade, overseas intelligence, domestic counterespionage, and the international dimensions of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan affairs.⁵⁸

Part of the commission's effective authority may derive from its membership, which seems to include a cross-section of leaders involved in the PRC's foreign affairs.⁵⁹ Although the commission's full membership is not public, ASPI analysis has suggested it includes national leaders (i.e., the CPC General Secretary, who serves concurrently as the PRC President, as well as the Premier, and Vice President); the directors of the party's International Liaison Department (see below) and Propaganda Department; the ministers of foreign affairs, national defense, public security, state security, and commerce; and the heads of party and state agencies responsible for Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and "overseas Chinese."⁶⁰

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The PRC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the State Council (i.e., government) institution responsible for conducting the PRC's diplomacy. It describes its primary duties as being "to implement the state's diplomatic principles and policies and related laws and regulations; safeguard national sovereignty, security and interests on behalf of the state; run diplomatic affairs on behalf of the state and the government; and handle diplomatic activities between leaders of the CPC and the state and foreign leaders."⁶¹ The MFA structure includes a body known as a Party Committee that serves as the interface between the party and government and oversees party members within the ministry. It is led by an official other than the foreign minister; that individual holds the second-highest bureaucratic rank in the ministry.

The MFA undertakes many of the tasks typically assigned to foreign ministries, including staffing and maintaining missions abroad, engaging in negotiations, and concluding treaties. Some scholars note a general trend of professionalization among the PRC's diplomats, alongside a more recent trend—dating back to the creation of CFAC in 2018—of increased centralization of foreign policy authority in the Party.⁶²

⁵⁸ Asia Society Policy Institute, "Decoding Chinese Politics," accessed March 2026, <https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/decoding-chinese-politics?policy=foreign-affairs&group=organizations&size=rank&connection=personal>.

⁵⁹ Commission meetings often contain hints at the commission's membership. For example, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, "The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs was Held in Beijing Xi Jinping Delivered an Important Address at the Conference."

⁶⁰ Asia Society Policy Institute, "Decoding Chinese Politics," accessed March 2026. Within the PRC, "overseas Chinese," also known as *huaqiao*, refers to PRC nationals residing abroad that meet certain criteria, including the possession of long-term or permanent residency rights in their country of residence. This category is related, but distinct from *huaren*, which encompasses former PRC nationals and their foreign descendants, or the foreign descendants of PRC nationals. For more details, see Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC, "华侨、外籍华人的定义是什么?" (What is the Definition of *Huaqiao* and *Huaren*?), November 25, 2015, <https://www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2015/1125/37146.shtml>.

⁶¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, "Main Responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China," accessed in March 2026, <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zyzz>.

⁶² See Andrew Scobell, Yi Li, and Alison McFarland, *Who Are China's Diplomats? Beyond "Wolf Warrior" Hype*, Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, February 13, 2026 and Yu Jie, *China "Under Siege": How the US's Hardening China Policy is Seen in Beijing*, Chatham House, July 2024.

Wang Yi—the director of the Party's Central Foreign Affairs Office since January 2023—has served as the PRC's foreign minister almost uninterrupted since 2013.⁶³ In October 2022, Wang joined the CPC Central Committee's Politburo, making him the PRC's highest-ranking foreign minister since Qian Qichen (1988-1998).

International Liaison Department

The CPC's International Liaison Department (ILD), also known as the International Department, is the CPC department in charge of the party's external relations. A functional organ of the CPC's Central Committee, the ILD monitors global affairs and developments to inform the Central Committee, carries out the Central Committee's exchanges and communications with foreign political parties and organizations, and supports international exchanges carried out by Party bodies below the national level.⁶⁴ It is led by a minister-rank party official.

Although the ILD engages with political parties and groups with diverse political orientations, it exercises a special role in party-to-party relations with other socialist states: North Korea, Laos, Vietnam, and Cuba.

Other PRC Entities Involved in Foreign Affairs⁶⁵

Many other entities undertake foreign affairs work on behalf of China's party-state. These entities include:

National People's Congress

The National People's Congress (NPC) is the PRC's unicameral legislature. A subset of the NPC's nearly 3,000 delegates regularly engage in parliamentary exchanges with foreign counterparts, customarily with support from the **NPC's Foreign Affairs Committee**. The NPC approves national spending on diplomacy and assigns staff to represent its interests and liaise with local groups in some of the PRC's overseas posts, including the PRC Embassy in Washington, DC.

State Council

The State Council is the cabinet of the PRC Central People's Government and oversees the government bureaucracy. Its head is the PRC premier, who for nearly three decades has concurrently also been China's second-highest ranking party leader. In addition to four vice-premiers, the State Council typically includes five state councilors, one of whom oversees the PRC's diplomacy, although it currently has three.⁶⁶ Vice Premiers outrank State councilors, who outrank government ministers.

Ministry of Commerce

The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) oversees China's foreign trade and investment. MOFCOM also is responsible for the PRC's foreign economic cooperation (including overseas contracting by PRC firms) and foreign

⁶³ Wang first served as foreign minister starting in 2013. He added the more senior position of State Councilor for Foreign Affairs in 2018, and served in the two positions concurrently until 2022, when he won promotion to the Central Foreign Affairs Commission and the Politburo. Wang's successor as foreign minister and state councilor, former Ambassador to the United States Qin Gang, lasted only a few months in the two posts. After Qin's fall from grace, Wang stepped back into the foreign minister position in July 2023. On Qin's saga, see Lingling Wei, "China's Former Foreign Minister Ousted After Alleged Affair, Senior Officials Told," *Wall Street Journal*, September 19, 2023. Executive Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu has held the bureaucratic rank of a full minister since January 2023 and is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the ministry.

⁶⁴ International Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, "Functional Features," November 2, 2014, <https://www.idcpc.org.cn/english2023/zlbj/wbzn>.

⁶⁵ See also Yu Jie and Lucy Ridout, *Who Decides China's Foreign Policy: The Role of Central Government, Provincial-Level Authorities and State-Owned Enterprises*, Chatham House, November 2021.

⁶⁶ As of this writing, the PRC has yet to name a successor to fill the vacancy left by former State Councilor (and Foreign Minister) Qin Gang's removal in 2023 or the vacancy left by the removal of former State Councilor (and Defense Minister) Li Shangfu the same year.

assistance work (see **“Foreign Assistance,”** below).⁶⁷ In 2018, the Party transferred certain aspects of the PRC's foreign assistance work to the newly-created China International Development Cooperation Agency.

Ministry of Finance

The Ministry of Finance (MOF) engages with foreign counterparts and international organizations on matters related to the economy and finance, including foreign taxation and external debt. It also manages the loans and grants from multilateral development institutions and foreign governments.⁶⁸ MOF and the China International Development Cooperation Agency are the PRC's two main agencies responsible for administering China's international development cooperation (see **“International Development,”** below).

China's Armed Forces⁶⁹

The Party's **Central Military Commission (CMC)** is China's highest military decision-making entity, and the commanding authority of the **People's Liberation Army (PLA)**, the armed forces of the CPC. The CMC's **Office of International Military Cooperation (OIMC)** has managed China's military diplomacy since 2016. The OIMC is dual-hatted as both a party and government entity, with the PRC **Ministry of National Defense** serving as the public face of PRC military diplomacy.⁷⁰ According to the U.S. Department of Defense's 2025 annual China military power report, the PLA “supports China's overall foreign policy by engaging with foreign militaries to cultivate friendly relations and promote China as a responsible global power that helps manage international security challenges.”⁷¹ This military diplomacy is visible in activities including senior-level visits, military exercises, professional exchanges and training, security and arms control dialogues, military assistance, and arms sales, particularly with countries along China's periphery, including Russia. In addition to the PLA, China's security forces include the China Coast Guard, which is under the People's Armed Police; and China's Maritime Militia. Both play key roles in China's maritime disputes.⁷²

Ministry of Public Security

The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) oversees the PRC's law enforcement. MPS personnel regularly are posted to PRC posts overseas where they serve as police liaisons with host country authorities. As the PRC has emerged as a global security partner, PRC internal security organs, including MPS, have increased their efforts to train and build capacity among foreign law enforcement and internal security forces around the world.⁷³ Since 2023, the PRC has folded some of these efforts into the Global Security Initiative (see **“Law Enforcement,”** below).

Ministry of State Security

The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is responsible for much of the PRC's non-military intelligence and counterintelligence work, as well as for the preservation of regime (“political”) security.⁷⁴ One of China's most secretive agencies, MSS's visibility and prominence has increased under Xi Jinping, seemingly reflecting “a corresponding increase in the Ministry's political power and influence, both in China and globally,” according to the University of Texas's Sheena Chestnut Greitens.⁷⁵ This increased power and influence reflects a tendency

⁶⁷ Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, “Mission,” accessed March 2026, <https://english.mofcom.gov.cn/About/index.html>.

⁶⁸ Ministry of Finance of the PRC, “中华人民共和国财政部主要职能” (Main Functions of the Ministry of Finance of the PRC), accessed March 2026, <http://www.mof.gov.cn/znjg/bbzn>.

⁶⁹ China's armed forces consist of active duty and reserve forces of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), plus the People's Armed Police (PAP), of which the China Coast Guard is a part, and the People's Militia.

⁷⁰ Frank Miller et al., *The People's Liberation Army as Organization Volume 3.0* (Jamestown Foundation, Exovera), 2025, pp. 71, 85.

⁷¹ U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2025*, December 23, 2025, p. 4, <https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF>.

⁷² For more on the People's Liberation Army, see CRS In Focus IF11719, *China Primer: The People's Liberation Army (PLA)*.

⁷³ Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Isaac B. Kardon, Cameron Waltz, *China's Foreign Police Training: A Global Footprint*, Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, November 13, 2025.

⁷⁴ Qiushi, “初探国家安全机关人民警察” (Initial Look at the State Security Organ the Peoples Police), January 1, 2021, https://www.qstheory.cn/qshyix/2021-01/09/c_1126963583.htm.

⁷⁵ Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Counter-Espionage and State Security: The Changing Role of China's Ministry of State (continued...)”

under Xi toward increased securitization in the PRC, and the elevation of security to be on par with economic development in matters of policy. U.S. government agencies, including the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, have linked MSS to various cyberespionage campaigns targeting entities in the United States.⁷⁶ MSS has limited direct engagement with foreign counterparts.⁷⁷

China International Development Cooperation Agency (China Aid)

The PRC established the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) in 2018 as a sub-ministerial agency directly under the State Council for the purpose of centralizing foreign assistance functions previously dispersed throughout the MFA and MOFCOM.⁷⁸ Its responsibilities include the formulation of strategic guidelines, plans, and policies for foreign aid; coordination on foreign aid issues; identification of major programs; and supervision of their implementation. In 2021, CIDCA became the administrator of PRC concessional loans.⁷⁹

Expenditures on Diplomacy⁸⁰

According to official figures published by the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the PRC government incurred RMB59.7 billion (~\$8.37 billion) in expenses categorized as “diplomatic” in 2024—equivalent to a 65% increase since 2014 (see **Table 2**). Over that same period, MOF reports that officially reported national defense expenditures rose by nearly 104% to RMB1.69 trillion (~\$237.19 billion) and total government expenditures increased 86% to RMB28.46 trillion (~\$3.99 trillion). Over the past decade, the share of PRC government expenditures that MOF defines as “diplomatic” has held steady at approximately 0.2% of government expenditures; national defense spending, over 5%.

Table 2. Selected PRC Expenditures (2014 and 2024)

Year	2014		2024		% Change Since 2014 (in RMB)
	RMB Billions (\$US Billions)	% of Total Annual Expenditures	RMB Billions (\$US Billion)	% of Total Annual Expenditures	
Diplomacy	36.2 (5.7)	0.2%	59.7 (8.4)	0.2%	65.2%
National Defense	829.0 (129.6)	5.5%	1,690.9 (237.2)	5.9%	104.0%
Total	15,178.6 (2,373.9)	100.0%	28,460.6 (3,992.2)	100.0%	87.5%

Security,” China Leadership Monitor, February 26, 2025, <https://www.prcleader.org/post/counter-espionage-and-state-security-the-changing-role-of-china-s-ministry-of-state-security>.

⁷⁶ See U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, “China State-Sponsored Cyber Threat: Advisories,” <https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/nation-state-cyber-actors/china/publications>.

⁷⁷ For examples, see Greitens, Kardon, and Waltz, *Counter-Espionage and State Security*.

⁷⁸ Communist Party of China, “中共中央印发《深化党和国家机构改革方案》” (CPC Central Committee Publishes “Plan for Deepening the Reform of Party and State Agencies”), March 21, 2018, <https://news.12371.cn/2018/03/21/ART11521620729437264.shtml>.

⁷⁹ Cecilia Springer, Oyintarelado Moses, and Rebecca Ray, *Database Methodology Guidebook: Global China Initiative, 2023*, Boston University, Global Development Policy (GDP) Center, accessed March 2026, https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2021/03/GCI-Database-Methodology-Guide_2023-FIN.pdf.

⁸⁰ Data in this section are sourced from the Ministry of Finance of the PRC. Dollar conversions were calculated using annual average exchange rates published by the Internal Revenue Service. Source: Internal Revenue Service, “Yearly Average Currency Exchange Rates,” last revised February 2026, <https://www.irs.gov/individuals/international-taxpayers/yearly-average-currency-exchange-rates>.

Source: Ministry of Finance of the PRC.

Note: The PRC's announced budget figures lack detail and do not appear to include certain defense-related expenditures, such as some paramilitary spending, some personnel compensation costs, and some defense-related research, development, testing, and evaluation expenditures.

Expenditures the PRC considers “diplomatic” include items such as:

- Foreign aid, traditionally the largest category, which in 2024 accounted for approximately 42% (RMB24.8 billion, or ~\$US3.5 billion) of the PRC's diplomatic expenditures;
- Payments to international organizations, including mandatory and voluntary contributions and assessments for United Nations peacekeeping operations, which accounted for 35% (RMB20.6 billion, ~\$US2.9 billion) of diplomatic expenditures in 2024; and
- Funding for overseas posts, which accounted for approximately 16% (RMB9.6 billion, ~\$US1.4 billion) of total diplomatic expenditures in 2024.

Independent evaluation of MOF's numbers is challenging. MOF presents many figures without specifying the offices, agencies, or programs they support. It is unclear whether MOF annual accounts include the expenditures of party departments involved in overseas activities, such as the ILD and the Party's United Front Work Department, which works to win over non-CPC groups at home and abroad.

Overseas Posts and Posture

It is difficult to authoritatively ascertain the number of diplomatic posts a government maintains overseas.⁸¹ On its website, as of July 2026 the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs lists 298 posts—176 embassies, 102 consulates and consulates general, and 20 other posts.⁸² Per reporting from one PRC state-media source, the PRC maintained 240 such posts in 2006—159 embassies, “over 70” consulates, and 12 additional posts.⁸³ According to the Department of State's latest available (2024) Global Talent Management Fact Sheet, the United States maintained 279 posts overseas: 175 embassies, 88 consulates and consulates general, and 16 other posts.⁸⁴ In its latest (FY2027) Congressional Budget Justification, the State Department described activity in “227 countries, and 254 diplomatic posts.”⁸⁵

⁸¹ Challenges include the availability of timely, verifiable information from specific posts. In some instances, posts may be temporarily closed, or erroneously listed as still-closed. Some ambassadors serve concurrent appointments in separate countries. The Australia-based Lowy Institute maintains a Global Diplomacy Index that tracks diplomatic networks and independently compiles data on overseas posts. See Lowy Institute, Global Diplomacy Index, <https://www.globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org>.

⁸² The MFA website lists ten consulates marked as “temporarily closed,” not including the PRC consulate in Houston, which the first Trump Administration ordered to close in 2020.

⁸³ Wang Chong, “我国共有驻外外交机构二百四十多个” (China Has Over Two Hundred Forty Diplomatic Posts), *China Youth Daily*, January 9, 2006, https://zqb.cyol.com/content/2006-01/09/content_1229185.htm.

⁸⁴ U.S. Department of State, *GTM (Global Talent Management) Fact Sheet*, October 2024, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/GTM_Factsheet_092024.pdf.

⁸⁵ U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs FY2027, April 2026, p. 41, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/FY2027-Department-of-State-Congressional-Budget-Justification-Final-4.3.2026.pdf>.

The PRC maintains a presence in some countries and territories without a U.S. post, including North Korea and Iran, with which the United States does not maintain diplomatic relations. The PRC also keeps an office in Palestine led by a diplomat with the rank of ambassador.

The United States conversely maintains posts in some countries without a PRC presence. Some of those U.S. posts are in countries that extend diplomatic recognition to the Republic of China, (Taiwan's formal name for itself. See **Textbox** below).⁸⁶ Another post with a U.S. mission but not a PRC one is in Kosovo, which the PRC does not recognize as a country, having never accepted Kosovo's 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia. The PRC downgraded its embassy in Lithuania to an Office of the Chargé d'Affaires after Lithuania allowed Taiwan to open an unofficial Taiwanese Representative Office in the Lithuanian capital in 2021.

United Nations

The PRC government has represented China at the United Nations (UN) since 1971, when it replaced the Taiwan-based Republic of China (see **Textbox**) in the "China" seat.⁸⁷ China is one of five permanent members (P-5) of the 15-member UN Security Council, charged with maintaining international peace and security.⁸⁸ As such, China has veto power to unilaterally block any resolution under consideration by the Security Council and plays a key role in shaping UN peacekeeping missions.

China and the United Nations

The Republic of China (ROC), established in 1912, was a founding member of the United Nations in 1945. In 1949, the CPC defeated the forces of the ROC and its ruling Kuomintang (KMT) in a civil war, upon which the KMT moved the seat of the ROC government to Taipei, on the island of Taiwan. Though no longer in control of mainland China, the ROC continued to claim to be the government of all of China and, with U.S. backing, retained control of the "China seat" in the UN General Assembly and on the Security Council until 1971. In October 1971, the United Nations adopted UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), which recognized representatives of the PRC as "the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations," and expelled "the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek," the ROC's then-president. PRC representatives replaced those of the ROC in both the General Assembly and the Security Council, as the PRC assumed the rights and obligations of China as a UN member state. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF12646, *Taiwan and the International Community*.

The PRC's official position, as expressed by Xi during a September 2021 speech before the UN General Assembly, is that the world has "only one international system, i.e., the international system with the UN at its core."⁸⁹ This position is reflected in the PRC's Law on Foreign Relations.⁹⁰ PRC engagement, as described below, is robust throughout the UN system, which in addition to the United Nations also includes the UN's 15 specialized agencies and various funds and programs.⁹¹

⁸⁶ As August 2026, 12 countries extended diplomatic recognition to Taiwan: Belize, Eswatini, Guatemala, Haiti, the Holy See, Marshall Islands, Palau, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Tuvalu. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, *Diplomatic Allies*, accessed in March 2026.

⁸⁷ For more on this history, see CRS In Focus IF12503, *The U.S. "One-China" Policy and Taiwan*.

⁸⁸ The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

⁸⁹ Foreign Ministry of the PRC, "Xi Jinping Attends the General Debate of the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly and Delivers an Important Speech," September 22, 2021, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zy/jj/GDI_140002/xw/202109/t20210923_9580033.html.

⁹⁰ Ministry of Justice of the PRC, "The Law on Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China," July 11, 2023.

⁹¹ See United Nations, "UN System Chart," accessed March 2026, <http://www.un.org/en/delegate/page/un-system-chart>.

Funding

The PRC was the fourth-largest financial contributor to the UN system in calendar year 2024 (latest available data), having provided approximately \$2.5 billion, or about 5% of the UN system's \$46.7 billion in total revenue.⁹² (The United States, the largest financial contributor, provided \$14.3 billion, or 30.6%). Ten years prior, the PRC contributed \$908.8 million, or approximately 2.5% of total funding, and was the 12th largest funder. Ninety percent of the growth in the PRC's funding corresponds to increases in the country's regular budget contributions and peacekeeping assessments.⁹³ The PRC also has created or supported certain UN "trust funds" via voluntary contributions. The UN Peace and Development Trust Fund (UNPDTF), for example, was established with \$200 million commitment from the PRC in 2016.⁹⁴ At times, the PRC has delayed some payments to the United Nations.⁹⁵ As of May 2026, the PRC owed the United Nations \$1.3 billion in contributions for 2026; the United States, a cumulative \$4.3 billion over several years.⁹⁶

Personnel

The number of PRC citizens working in the UN system has increased over the past ten years. In 2024, 1,664 (1.3%) of the UN system's 130,948 personnel were PRC citizens, ranking China 21st among countries with the highest number of citizens in the UN system.⁹⁷ This figure represented an increase of 86.3% from the 893 PRC citizens who staffed the UN system in 2014, when they represented 1.1% of the UN system's 83,618 staff.⁹⁸ By comparison, 5,528 (4.2%) of the UN systems' total personnel in 2024 were U.S. citizens, which made the United States the most highly represented country among UN system personnel. In 2014, this figure was 4,910 (5.9%).

UN Peacekeeping

Some UN members contribute military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping missions on a voluntary basis. As of December 2025, the PRC contributed 1,661 (3.4%) of the United Nations' total 49,251 personnel on peacekeeping missions.⁹⁹ The PRC was the largest contributor among

⁹² In 2024, the UN system's largest funders were the United States (30.6%), Germany (10.2%), and the United Kingdom (6.6%). Data from United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, "Revenue by Government Donor," accessed March 2026, <https://unsceb.org/fs-revenue-government-donor>.

⁹³ The UN system is financed primarily by two types of contributions. Assessed contributions are required dues, the payment of which is a legal obligation accepted by a country when it becomes a member. These are separate from voluntary contributions, which are determined by governments and other donors and primarily support UN funds and programs. For more on UN funding, see CRS In Focus IF10354, *United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding to the UN System*.

⁹⁴ United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund, Synthesis Report of the United Nations Peace and Development Trust Fund (2016-2021): Performances, Findings, and the Way Forward, 2022, https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/unpdf_synthesis_report_en.pdf. Although the fund was originally set to expire in 2025, in 2020, Xi Jinping announced that China would extend the fund through 2030.

⁹⁵ James T. Areddy, "The U.N. Is Going Broke as the U.S. and China Withhold Billions," *Wall Street Journal*, May 29, 2026, <https://www.wsj.com/world/the-u-n-is-going-broke-as-the-u-s-and-china-withhold-billions-bd1fae5e>.

⁹⁶ Catherine Pollard, *The United Nations Financial Situation*, May 7, 2026, <https://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/Presentation%20May%202026.pdf>.

⁹⁷ Data from United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, "Personnel by Nationality," accessed March 2026, <https://unsceb.org/hr-nationality>.

⁹⁸ UN Document, CEB/2015/HLCM/HR/19, https://unsceb.org/sites/default/files/imported_files/Human%20Resources%20Network/Document/CEB_2015_HLCM_HR_19_0.pdf.

⁹⁹ UN Peacekeeping, "Troop and Police Contributions," accessed March 2026, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.

the P-5, and the 8th largest contributor overall. In 2015, the PRC ranked 9th and contributed 3,045 troops. In 2025, the United States contributed 20 personnel and ranked 75th. Per official PRC sources, as of September 2025, the PRC had dispatched over 50,000 peacekeepers to more than 20 countries and regions, undertaking 26 UN peacekeeping missions since 1990.¹⁰⁰

Concerns of PRC Influence

Some international observers, including some Members of Congress, have expressed concern regarding the PRC's engagement with the United Nations. A March 2026 investigation published by a U.S. House committee alleged that the PRC “uses monetary contributions, critical UN posts, and strategically deployed troops within UN peacekeeping forces to expand its authoritarian reach.”¹⁰¹ The PRC has used its influence in international organizations to, among other things, impede Taiwan's participation in UN activities, including in UN specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).¹⁰²

A separate study into PRC activity in the United Nations assessed that, although the PRC seeks to “exert influence at the world body to legitimise and disseminate its foreign policy values and interests” across the UN system, “efforts across various domains—whether in terms of funding, staffing, voting alignment, or drafting of UN language—often yield mixed results.”¹⁰³ The same report found that “the United States and numerous European countries still collectively maintain outsized influence over the United Nations.”

Selected International Topics

The PRC engages with other countries and international institutions in many traditional areas of international affairs, including international development and international security, as described below. The PRC's increasing activity in less-traditional areas, such as law enforcement, also have drawn attention from policymakers, including in the United States. The PRC's cross-cutting efforts to curtail Taiwan's international profile at times also drives PRC international engagement and is reflected in China's interactions with some countries and international institutions.

International Development

The PRC has leveraged foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, and other means to engage other countries in what it calls “international development cooperation” as a way of fostering goodwill

¹⁰⁰ Ministry of National Defense of the PRC, “Blue Helmets Under Five-Star Flag: China's 35 Years in UN Peacekeeping Brings Peace, Security,” September 18, 2025.

¹⁰¹ SCOC, “New Investigation Uncovers How China Controls Money, Personnel, and Troops at the United Nations,” March 20, 2026, <https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/media/press-releases/new-investigation-uncovers-how-china-controls-money-personnel-and-troops-at-the-united-nations>. See also SCOC, *Inside China's Strategy to Reshape the United Nations*, March 20, 2026, <https://chinaselectcommittee.house.gov/media/reports/inside-china-s-strategy-to-reshape-the-united-nations>.

¹⁰² See, for example, Xinhua News Agency, “Mainland Spokesperson Says WHA Rejection of Taiwan-Related Proposal Reflects International Consensus,” May 20, 2025, <https://english.news.cn/20250520/4e68032133f8426d8d54c24fa1a5cb81/c.html>; and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *China's Position Paper on the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758*, September 30, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zy/wjzc/202509/t20250930_11721842.html.

¹⁰³ Courtney J. Fung and Shing-hon Lam, “Mixed Report Card: China's Influence at the United Nations,” Lowy Institute, December 18, 2022, <https://www.loyyinstitute.org/publications/mixed-report-card-china-s-influence-united-nations>.

abroad and promoting domestic economic development.¹⁰⁴ This development cooperation includes foreign assistance grants and loans (see “**Foreign Assistance**,” below) that meet the standards for “official development assistance” (ODA), as described by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The PRC’s development cooperation also includes economic development programs that would not be considered ODA, such as export credits, which are non-concessional.¹⁰⁵

State-Backed Development Finance

For approximately two decades, state-backed sovereign lending was a substantive component of the PRC’s international development cooperation, and particularly of the Belt and Road Initiative, which leverages PRC based firms and capital to develop global infrastructure, transportation, trade, and production networks—primarily in low- and middle-income countries. According to data compiled by Boston University’s Global Development Policy (GDP) Center, between 2008 and 2024, the PRC’s two main development finance institutions¹⁰⁶ committed \$472 billion in public and publicly-guaranteed finance to 98 countries across 1,304 loans and more than \$25 million in credit lines.¹⁰⁷ Over half of these loan commitments, some of which were made under concessional terms, supported overseas projects in the transportation and energy sectors.¹⁰⁸ These projects were often contracted out to PRC-based engineering, procurement, and construction firms. The PRC’s overseas development finance flows peaked around 2016 and have since been overtaken by foreign direct investment from PRC-based firms.¹⁰⁹ Although PRC use of overseas development finance has declined over the last decade, PRC institutions still provide development finance for overseas projects, including those under the BRI and Global Development Initiative.

Foreign Assistance

Since the 2000s, the foreign assistance component of PRC development cooperation has consisted of development finance- and grant-supported projects. From 2013 through 2018, loans accounted for approximately \$22.1 billion (53%) out of a cumulative \$41.9 billion, with the remaining \$19.8 billion comprising grants, per the PRC’s latest (2021) development cooperation

¹⁰⁴ Per the PRC, “international development cooperation” refers to “China’s bilateral and multilateral efforts, within the framework of South-South cooperation, to promote economic and social development through foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, and other means.” For more on PRC international development cooperation, see State Council Information Office of the PRC, “Full text: China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era,” January 10, 2021, http://english.scio.gov.cn/whitepapers/2021-01/10/content_77099782_3.htm.

¹⁰⁵ Concessional loans are a type of preferential loan. They typically are provided at a lower interest rate and have a longer time to maturity and as such are generally considered official development assistance. By contrast, the interest rates and terms of non-concessional loans typically are comparable to the market rate. See Springer, Moses, and Ray, *Database Methodology Guidebook*, p.7.

¹⁰⁶ These are the China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China.

¹⁰⁷ GDP Center, “China Overseas Development Finance,” Boston University, accessed March 2026, <https://www.bu.edu/gdp/chinas-overseas-development-finance>. AidData, a nonprofit research group based out of the College of William & Mary, also publishes data related to PRC overseas loans and grants. See AidData, China Global Development Dashboard, <https://china.aiddata.org>.

¹⁰⁸ GDP Center, “China Overseas Development Finance.”

¹⁰⁹ GDP Center, “Peer-to-Peer Lending: China’s Overseas Development Finance Pivots to National and Regional Development Banks,” June 10, 2025, <https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2025/06/10/peer-to-peer-lending-chinas-overseas-development-finance-pivots-to-national-and-regional-development-banks>.

white paper.¹¹⁰ (Comparatively, the United States obligated an estimated \$48 billion in foreign assistance from all sources in FY2018 alone.¹¹¹)

In his September 2021 speech at the UN General Assembly, Xi Jinping announced the launch of the Global Development Initiative (GDI) with a call to the international community to commit to “development as a priority.”¹¹² The GDI sponsors development projects in eight focus areas and officially aims to accelerate the enactment of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, as well as the realization of the agenda’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals.¹¹³ In 2024, the PRC launched a Group of Friends of the GDI to muster support for the initiative among UN member states.¹¹⁴ The PRC launched a similar Group of Friends for China’s Global Governance Initiative in 2025.¹¹⁵

Analysts are still assessing the nature and impact of the GDI. Analysis by AidData, a non-profit U.S.-based research group, does not indicate a surge in foreign assistance from PRC entities since the launch of the GDI, with the researchers noting that “attempting to mimic or replace America as the largest bilateral supplier of grants and concessional loans for health, governance, and humanitarian assistance projects would require a major reorientation in how Beijing channels its assistance.”¹¹⁶ One scholar describes a “conceptual and operational shift” toward “greater emphasis on multilateralism and increased engagement with civil society” resulting from the GDI, particularly with regards to project implementation.¹¹⁷

International Security

The PRC is becoming more active in matters related to international peace and security. Since 2000, the PRC has used its veto at the UN Security Council 17 times, 13 of those vetoes were related to the Middle East.¹¹⁸ Other vetoes—alongside Russia—blocked resolutions on topics including Israel-Palestine, North Korea, and Venezuela. In the Indo-Pacific, PRC sovereignty claims, including those over Taiwan and the South China Sea, impact regional security, including the security of U.S. allies and partners.

¹¹⁰ State Council Information Office of the PRC, “Full text: China’s International Development Cooperation in the New Era.”

¹¹¹ ForeignAssistance.gov. For more on U.S. foreign assistance, CRS In Focus IF10183, *U.S. Foreign Assistance*.

¹¹² Source: Foreign Ministry of the PRC, “Xi Jinping Attends the General Debate of the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly and Delivers an Important Speech,” September 22, 2021, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/jj/GDI_140002/xw/202109/t20210923_9580033.html. For more on the GDI, see CRS In Focus IF13099, *China Primer: China’s Global Development Initiative*

¹¹³ For more on the GDI, see CRS In Focus IF13099, *China Primer: China’s Global Development Initiative*. The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is a common vision for global development adopted by all UN member states in 2015.

¹¹⁴ As of April 2026, more than 80 countries had joined the Group of Friends of the GDI. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun’s Regular Press Conference on April 23, 2026,” April 23, 2026, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbt/202604/t20260423_11898587.html.

¹¹⁵ Permanent Mission of the PRC to the UN, “Joint Statement on the Launch of the Group of Friends of Global Governance,” December 9, 2025, https://un.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/czthd/202512/t20251210_11769936.htm.

¹¹⁶ Samantha Custer, Bryan Burgess, and Narayani Sritharan, *Into the Breach: Will China Step Up as the U.S. Retreats from Global Development?*, College of William & Mary, AidData, March 2025, p. 19, https://docs.aiddata.org/ad4/pdfs/Into_the_Breach.pdf.

¹¹⁷ Prapaporn Tivayanond Mongkhonvanit, “U.S. and Chinese Development Aid in Southeast Asia: The Impact on Vulnerable Groups,” Asia Society Policy Institute, November 2024, <https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/us-and-chinese-development-aid-southeast-asia-impact-vulnerable-groups>.

¹¹⁸ United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld Library, “UN Security Council Meetings & Outcomes Tables,” accessed March 2026, <https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick>.

The PRC's first national security white paper, published in 2025, ascribes a "supporting" role to the promotion of international security in the PRC's so-called "holistic approach to national security."¹¹⁹ It also highlighted PRC efforts to "constructively take part in the political settlement of international and regional hot-spot issues" (CRS translation).¹²⁰ Some countries have welcomed a role for the PRC as a third-party mediator in international conflicts.¹²¹ Other observers have argued that "peace plans" and mediation proposals the PRC has proffered have been superficial.¹²² A number of analysts have maintained that the PRC "has yet to articulate a clear vision for the transformation of the international system and policy responses to address current security crises."¹²³ In May 2025, the PRC launched the International Organization for Mediation (IOMed), a new international organization focused on dispute mediation.¹²⁴

In 2022, the PRC launched a new initiative aimed at reshaping the international security landscape—the Global Security Initiative (GSI). The initiative's concept paper, released by the PRC in 2023, outlines 20 "priorities of cooperation" ranging from "promot[ing] coordination and sound interaction among major countries" and "safeguard[ing] the international nuclear non-proliferation regime" to advancing region-specific security agendas. The paper also addresses transnational organized crime and calls for countries to actively conduct law enforcement cooperation. Many of the cooperation areas and platforms outlined in the concept paper are broad (e.g., "hold high-level conferences on the GSI in due course to strengthen policy communication") or conceptual (e.g., ("actively participate in formulating [the] New Agenda for Peace and other proposals put forth in Our Common Agenda by the UN Secretary-General").¹²⁵

Massachusetts Institute of Technology's M. Taylor Fravel has described the GSI as a way for Beijing "to enhance China's freedom of action and ultimately to constrain the United States" by "build[ing] support in regions, organizations, and issues areas on the edges of U.S. influence," "without directly confronting the United States and its network of alliances."¹²⁶ Noting the GSI's

¹¹⁹ Ministry of National Defense of the PRC, "新时代的中国国家安全白皮书|新时代的中国国家安全" (China's National Security in the New Era White Paper | China's National Security in the New Era), May 2025, <http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/fwxw/16385614.html>.

¹²⁰ Ministry of National Defense of the PRC, "新时代的中国国家安全白皮书|新时代的中国国家安全" (China's National Security in the New Era White Paper | China's National Security in the New Era).

¹²¹ For example see Al Jazeera, "'This is America's war': Iran's Foreign Minister Araghchi," March 18, 2026, <https://www.aljazeera.com/video/talk-to-al-jazeera/2026/3/18/this-is-americas-war-irans-foreign-minister-araghchi>; Egypt State Information Service, "Shoukry: Some Major Countries Giving A Cover To Israeli Attacks," November 20, 2023, sis.gov.eg/en/media-center/news/shoukry-some-major-countries-giving-a-cover-to-israeli-attacks; and President of Ukraine, "President of Ukraine Had A Phone Call With The President Of The People's Republic of China," April 26, 2023, <https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/vidbulasya-telefonna-rozmova-prezidenta-ukrayini-z-golovoyu-82489>.

¹²² Helena Legarda, "The Peace Plan That Wasn't," Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), February 28, 2023, <https://merics.org/en/comment/peace-plan-wasnt>; and Adel Abdel Ghafar, Hana Elshehaby, and Omar H. Rahman, "China's Approach to Palestine and Israel: Towards a Greater Role?," Middle East Council on Global Affairs, July 2024, <https://mecouncil.org/publication/chinas-approach-to-palestine-and-israel-towards-a-greater-role>.

¹²³ Angela Pennisi di Floristella, "China's Strategic Narratives on International Security Issues: Russia's War in Ukraine and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 2026, p. 28.

¹²⁴ See Yun Sun, "The Purpose and Promise of China's International Organization for Mediation," Brookings, June 6, 2025, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-purpose-and-promise-of-chinas-international-organization-for-mediation>.

¹²⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, *The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper*, February 21, 2023, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367484.html.

¹²⁶ M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Global Security Initiative at Two: A Journey, Not a Destination," *China Leadership Monitor*, May 30, 2024.

slow rollout, Fravel likened the initiative to a “‘campaign,’ in the sense that its content and implementation will evolve over time as ideas crystallize and increased support is generated.”¹²⁷

Some specialists have envisioned a non-traditional security role for the initiative, with Chatham House's William Matthews anticipating that “GSI-linked initiatives will spread China's understanding of security abroad, especially where this strengthens host countries' capacity to protect Chinese investments and development projects.”¹²⁸ Other observers have noted how the initiative emphasizes national sovereignty and calls for countries to uphold the principle of “indivisible security,” a phrase also utilized by Russian officials' to criticize U.S. alliances and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion in particular, and which some analysts have linked to Russia's justification for invading Ukraine.¹²⁹ Some PRC scholars have argued that the language concerning indivisible security has a tradition of its own in PRC discourses, covering “a wide range of security topics both traditional and non-traditional, domestic and external, China specific and the world at large.”¹³⁰

Law Enforcement and Domestic Security

Some analysts have identified a steady growth over the past thirty years in the PRC's overseas law enforcement activities, which they contend reflects the PRC's expanding international mandate for its domestic security agencies.¹³¹ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace research suggests that “in recent years,” the PRC's internal security agencies (including the Ministry of Public Security) have “[expanded] their physical and digital presence abroad through law enforcement, counterterrorism, and intelligence partnerships with foreign counterparts, carrying out activities that shape domestic law and order in other countries.”¹³² Subsequent research published by the Carnegie Endowment suggests that the PRC provided “nearly 900 trainings” to “at least 138 countries” between 2000-2025, and asserts that such trainings constitute “one of the major pillars of Beijing's narrative that China has emerged as a major global security provider.”¹³³

Some observers have expressed concern that growing PRC participation in law enforcement overseas may undermine norms regarding transparency and due process, including within international institutions, citing the case of Meng Hongwei.¹³⁴ In January 2020, a PRC court sentenced Meng—the first PRC national to serve as president of the International Criminal Police

¹²⁷ M. Taylor Fravel, “China's Global Security Initiative at Two: A Journey, Not a Destination,” *China Leadership Monitor*, May 30, 2024.

¹²⁸ William Matthews, “Security with Chinese Characteristics: How the Global Security Initiative Reflects Beijing's Priorities at Home,” *Lowy Institute*, May 13, 2025.

¹²⁹ Polina Ivanova and John Paul Rathbone, “What is ‘Indivisible Security’? The Principle at the Heart of Russia's Ire against NATO,” *Financial Times*, February 7, 2022, <https://www.ft.com/content/84a43896-2dfd-4be4-8d2a-c68a5a68547a>.

¹³⁰ See Zha Daojiong and Dong Ting, “A Chinese Notion of Indivisibility of Security?,” *Asian Perspective*, vol. 47, no. 2, 2023, pp. 328.

¹³¹ Lindsey W. Ford, “Extending the Long Arm of The Law: China's International Law Enforcement Drive,” *Brookings Institution*, January 15, 2021.

¹³² Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Isaac B. Kardon, Cameron Waltz, *A New World Cop on the Beat? China's Internal Security Outreach Under the Global Security Initiative*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2025.

¹³³ Greitens, Kardon, Waltz, *China's Foreign Police Training*.

¹³⁴ See, for example, Frank Sieren, “Sieren's China: Meng Hongwei on a Knife Edge,” *Deutsche Welle (DW)*, October 10, 2018, <https://www.dw.com/en/sierens-china-former-interpol-chief-meng-hongwei-on-a-knife-edge/a-45830396>.

Organization (INTERPOL)—to 13 and a half years in prison for taking bribes.¹³⁵ Meng, who had served as the PRC's Vice Minister of Public Security since 2004, was elected Interpol's president in November 2016. Meng disappeared during a trip to China in September 2018. In October 2018, PRC authorities announced that Meng was under criminal investigation, and he subsequently resigned as head of Interpol in absentia.¹³⁶ One international rights group criticized Meng's disappearance and detention, calling into question the PRC's commitment to the rule of law.¹³⁷ Meng's wife, granted asylum in France, has publicly claimed that the charges against him were a "fake case ... a political disagreement being turned into a criminal affair."¹³⁸

Taiwan¹³⁹

The PRC has never controlled Taiwan but has claimed sovereignty over it and has vowed to "unify" with it, potentially by force.¹⁴⁰ As part of its effort to pressure Taiwan to accept unification, the PRC has spent decades seeking to isolate Taiwan internationally. The PRC requires its diplomatic partners to abstain from official relations with Taiwan and exerts pressure on countries to limit interactions, sometimes including unofficial interactions, with Taiwan.¹⁴¹ In April 2026, Taiwan's president delayed a trip to Eswatini—Taiwan's only diplomatic partner in Africa—after three countries denied overflight permission to his aircraft, reportedly under PRC pressure.¹⁴² As of July 2026, a dozen countries have chosen to forgo diplomatic relations with the PRC in order to recognize Taiwan diplomatically as the ROC.¹⁴³ The PRC also has leveraged its presence within, and influence over, international institutions to compel Taiwan to accept unification. Since 2017, for example, the PRC has blocked invitations to Taiwan to participate as an observer in the World Health Assembly—the governing body of the World Health Organization.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁵ Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, "China: Ex-Interpol Chief Sentenced to 13 ½ Years for Bribery," January 22, 2020.

¹³⁶ CPC Yancheng City Tinghu District Commission for Discipline Inspection, "公安部副部长孟宏伟涉嫌违法接受国家监委监察调查" (Vice Minister for Public Security Meng Hongwei Investigated by National Supervisory Commission for Suspected Violations of the Law), October 7, 2018, https://www.ycthlzw.gov.cn/m/news_show.asp?id=7661; and Reuters, "Interpol Says China's Meng Resigns As President Of Organization," October 7, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/world/interpol-says-chinas-meng-resigns-as-president-of-organization-idUSKCN1MH0XN>.

¹³⁷ Maya Wang, "Where Is China's Interpol Chief?," Human Rights Watch, April 2, 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/02/where-chinas-interpol-chief>.

¹³⁸ John Leicester, "The AP Interview: Meng Hongwei's Wife Slams 'Monster' China," Associated Press, November 18, 2021, <https://apnews.com/article/europe-china-france-lyon-china-government-b620d9229eba0dfe2617b98b4f2f7867>.

¹³⁹ For more information, see CRS In Focus IF12646, *Taiwan and the International Community*.

¹⁴⁰ See International Department of the CPC, "Full Text of the Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China," August 2, 2023, <https://www.idcpc.org.cn/english2023/tjzl/cpcjj/20thPartyCongrressReport>. For more on this topic, see CRS In Focus IF12646, *Taiwan and the International Community*.

¹⁴¹ Since breaking diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1979, the United States has maintained close unofficial relations with Taiwan. For more information, see CRS In Focus IF10275, *Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations*.

¹⁴² Fabian Hamacher and Ann Wang, "Taiwan Won't Give in to Pressure, President Says of Africa Trip China Denounced," Reuters, May 4, 2026, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-president-speak-airport-after-arriving-back-eswatini-2026-05-05>.

¹⁴³ As of August 2026, those countries were Belize, Eswatini, Guatemala, Haiti, the Marshall Islands, Palau, Paraguay, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Tuvalu, and the Vatican.

¹⁴⁴ Reuters, "WHO Members Reject Proposal to Invite Taiwan to Participate in Annual Assembly," May 18, 2026, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/who-members-reject-proposal-invite-taiwan-participate-annual-assembly-2026-05-18>.

Issues Facing Congress

Starting in the 115th Congress, some Members of Congress have placed PRC diplomatic activity within the context of competition between the United States and the PRC. Numerous hearings since then have examined China's activity across the globe.¹⁴⁵ In the 119th Congress, Members have introduced legislation with provisions related to U.S. competition with the PRC, such as monitoring the PRC's diplomatic posture (Section 5176 of P.L. 119-60), countering its purported foreign malign influence (H.R. 7969), and leveraging U.S. foreign assistance to gain the upper hand in "strategic competition" with the PRC (S.Res. 51). Other pieces of legislation seek to discourage PRC activity in, or cooperation with, other countries (e.g., the MEGOBARI Act, H.R. 36 and the U.S.-South Africa Bilateral Relations Review Act, S. 2752) and international institutions (e.g., the Ending Lending to China Act of 2025, S. 2362).

During the 118th Congress, the House passed H.Res. 11, which established the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (SCOC) "to investigate and submit policy recommendations on the status of the [CPC's] economic, technological, and security progress and its competition with the United States." The House retained (via H.Res. 5) the SCOC during the 119th Congress and broadened the committee's jurisdiction to include policy recommendations to counter the "ideological threats" posed by the CPC to the United States and U.S. allies and partners.

Congress may face issues related to China's diplomacy in policy areas including those discussed below.

U.S. Diplomacy

The PRC's active diplomatic posture may pose a challenge to the United States' interests and image abroad. Successive Congresses have adopted efforts to increase the U.S. government's knowledge of the PRC's diplomatic activity, as well as its overseas intentions. In the FY2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 119-60), the 119th Congress codified the Regional China Officers program, which the State Department began under the first Trump Administration to monitor PRC activity around the world and build up the department's China expertise. Members of Congress may consider whether directly engaging the PRC via parliamentary exchanges would deepen their understanding of the PRC's diplomatic positions and objectives and improve Congress's ability to address related challenges.

A 2026 Pew Research Center survey found that "positive views [of China] have become more widespread" since the beginning of the decade, with most countries in the 36-country survey having a more positive view of the PRC than the United States.¹⁴⁶ Congress may consider to what

¹⁴⁵ See, for example, U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and the Environment, *China's Expanding Influence in Europe and Eurasia*, 116th Congress, 1st Session, May 9, 2019; and U.S. Congress, House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, *Examining the PRC's Strategic Port Investments in the Western Hemisphere and the Implications for Homeland Security*, 1st Session, February 11, 2025.

¹⁴⁶ Laura Silver, Jonathan Schulman, Laura Clancy and William Miner, "Views of China and Xi Are Improving Globally," Pew Research Center, July 15, 2026, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/07/15/views-of-china-and-xi-are-improving-globally>; and Jonathan Schulman, Laura Silver, Laura Clancy and William Miner, "People in Many Countries Now View China More Positively Than the U.S.," Pew Research Center, July 15, 2026, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2026/07/15/people-in-many-countries-now-view-china-more-positively-than-the-u-s>.

extent, if at all, such changing global perceptions of the United States and China should inform U.S. foreign policymaking and diplomatic practice.

Parliamentary Exchanges. Members of Congress may consider whether to engage directly with the PRC. Since 2023, Members of Congress have directly engaged with PRC leaders and officials during congressional delegations (CODELs) to China, resuming a practice that was discontinued at the outbreak of the COVID pandemic.¹⁴⁷ During these interactions, Members have discussed with PRC interlocutors topics of international importance including the ongoing conflicts in Gaza, Iran, and Ukraine. Members of Congress also may consider discussing matters related to the PRC in exchanges with parliamentary counterparts from other countries, to better understand PRC policy and activity in their respective parts of the world.

Bilateral Representation. Congress may consider whether the United States' current level of diplomatic representation overseas adequately meets U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy needs. Congress has cited concerns about PRC influence to justify enhancing, for example, the United States' global diplomatic presence, including in the Pacific Island countries (see Section 9303 of P.L. 117-263). The first Trump Administration adopted a similar approach, expanding the United States' diplomatic presence in several countries, including Maldives.¹⁴⁸ International media reports from March 2025 suggested that the second Trump Administration had planned to shut down “almost a dozen consulates” and was “looking to reduce its workforce globally.”¹⁴⁹ In its latest (FY2027) Congressional Budget Justification, the State Department requested \$9.4 billion for Diplomatic Programs, which “funds personnel and programs spanning over 42 bureaus and offices, 227 countries, and 254 diplomatic posts,” including overseas programs.¹⁵⁰ For FY2026, the State Department had requested \$8.6 billion for personnel and programs in 41 bureaus, 191 countries, and “over 270” diplomatic posts.¹⁵¹

Multilateral Representation. Congress may consider whether U.S. participation in international organizations, including in the UN system, is sufficient to support U.S. interests. In January 2026, President Trump announced the United States' withdrawal from 66 international organizations, including 31 UN entities, “that no longer serve American interests.”¹⁵² The announcement followed President Trump's issuance of Executive Order 14199 in February 2025, which withdrew U.S. participation from the UN Human Rights Council and ordered the Secretary of State, in consultation with the UN Ambassador, to review all international organizations, conventions, and treaties in which the United States participates.¹⁵³ Congress may consider how a

¹⁴⁷ Senate Democrats, “Majority Leader Schumer Statement Following Meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping,” press release, October 10, 2023, <https://www.democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/majority-leader-schumer-statement-following-meeting-with-chinese-president-xi-jinping>. In May 2026, Senator Steve Daines led a bipartisan delegation to the PRC, where they discussed topics including “cooperation to stop the flow of fentanyl precursors, [the conflict in] Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, and supply chain security,” as well as the then-upcoming summit between Trump and Xi. Source: Senator Steve Daines, “Readout of Daines' Congressional Delegation Trip to China,” press release, May 7, 2026, <https://www.daines.senate.gov/2026/05/07/readout-of-daines-congressional-delegation-trip-to-china>.

¹⁴⁸ Pranshu Verma, “U.S. to Establish Embassy in the Maldives,” *New York Times*, October 28, 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/28/us/politics/us-embassy-maldives.html>.

¹⁴⁹ Humeyra Pamuk, “Trump Administration Weighs Closure of Nearly a Dozen Diplomatic Missions Abroad,” Reuters, March 6, 2025.

¹⁵⁰ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification FY2027*, p. 41.

¹⁵¹ U.S. Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification FY2026*, p. 18.

¹⁵² White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Withdraws the United States from International Organizations that Are Contrary to the Interests of the United States,” January 7, 2026.

¹⁵³ Executive Order 14199 of February 4, 2025, “Withdrawing the United States from and Ending Funding to Certain (continued...) ”

decreased U.S. presence in multilateral organizations might affect PRC influence in such entities and to what extent that would impact U.S. foreign policy interests. Congress may also consider whether U.S. participation in regional fora meets U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy needs.

International Development

The nature and scale of China's economic development cooperation activities have spurred some Members of Congress to reconsider the U.S. approach to international development. For nearly a decade, Members of Congress have expressed concern regarding the scale and impact of China's international development programs, including the impact of PRC sovereign lending on recipient countries' debt sustainability and relations with the United States.¹⁵⁴ Competing more effectively against PRC state-backed development finance was one of Congress's main rationales for passing the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (the BUILD Act [Div. F of P.L. 115-254], 22 U.S.C. §§9612 et seq.), which created the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. Congress also has faced the question of whether, and to what extent, U.S. foreign assistance programs should be used to counter PRC influence overseas, and how to measure the effectiveness of such programs.

U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).¹⁵⁵ In the BUILD Act, Congress set out U.S. policy "to provide countries a robust alternative to state-directed investments by authoritarian governments and [U.S.] strategic competitors" and consolidated several development finance authorities to form DFC—a federal agency that uses financial tools to promote private investment in less-developed countries. The 119th Congress reauthorized the DFC for six years under the DFC Modernization and Reauthorization Act (Div. H, Title LXXXVII of the NDAA for FY2026, P.L. 119-60). As part of that reauthorization and the agency's FY2026 appropriations, Congress required that DFC engage with Members of Congress on a new Congressional Strategic Advisory Group. It also required, as part of DFC's investment policies for high-income countries, that the chief executive officer submit a report to Congress that describes whether a supported project "(I) is a preferred alternative to state-directed investments by a foreign country of concern;" including the PRC, "or (II) otherwise furthers the strategic interest of the United States to counter or limit the influence of foreign countries of concern." Prior to taking up the question of the agency's reauthorization in 2031, Congress may conduct oversight over DFC's activities (e.g., by holding hearings, writing letters to executive branch agencies, or engaging in relevant travel) to evaluate whether the agency is adhering to U.S. policy as laid out in the BUILD Act and the effectiveness of such a policy. Congress may also consider whether to adjust that policy.

U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs. The second Trump Administration has made competing with China a key objective of some U.S. foreign assistance programs.¹⁵⁶ Since FY2020, Congress has

United Nations Organizations and Reviewing United States Support to All International Organizations," 90 *Federal Register* 9275, February 10, 2025, <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/02/10/2025-02504/withdrawing-the-united-states-from-and-ending-funding-to-certain-united-nations-organizations-and>.

¹⁵⁴ See, for example, Office of Senator Chris Coons, "Sens. Coons, Rubio Write Letter to Secs. Pompeo, Mattis Expressing Concern About China's Expanding Influence in the Horn of Africa," press release, November 13, 2018, <https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/sens-coons-rubio-write-letter-to-secs-pompeo-mattis-expressing-concern-about-chinas-expanding-influence-in-the-horn-of-africa>.

¹⁵⁵ For more on the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, see CRS In Focus IF11436, *U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)*.

¹⁵⁶ For example, Pillar 2 of the America First Global Health Strategy notes that "U.S. health foreign assistance has the potential to be an important counterweight to China especially in Africa, a continent of strategic importance to U.S. national interests. U.S. Department of State, *2025 America First Global Health Strategy*, September 2025, p.17, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/America-First-Global-Health-Strategy-Report.pdf>.

directed foreign assistance funds from selected State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (as of FY2026, National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs [NSRP]) appropriations accounts for a Countering PRC Influence Fund (CPIF), and made projects supported with these funds subject to regular congressional notification procedures. For FY2026, the 119th Congress directed that not less than \$400 million be made available for CPIF “to counter the influence of the Government of the [PRC] and the [CPC] and entities acting on their behalf globally” (P.L. 119-75). In its oversight capacity, Congress may examine the State Department’s administration of U.S. foreign assistance, including programs under CPIF. Congress may seek to evaluate the effectiveness of CPIF programs. Based on that assessment, Congress may also evaluate whether to refine or otherwise adjust CPIF or other U.S. assistance programs. As part of that effort, Congress may consider whether to provide additional direction to the State Department on how CPIF funds may be utilized. For example, as part of FY2026 appropriations, Congress directed that some CPIF funding be made available for assistance for Pacific Island Countries. The joint explanatory statement for FY2026 NSRP appropriations specified \$5 million for “Cambodia countering PRC programs” under National Security Investment Programs.¹⁵⁷

Regional Development Issues. Members of Congress may consider focusing on addressing the effects of China’s development activities in certain regions. In the 119th Congress, for example, the Strengthening United States Leadership at the IDB Act (S. 2626) includes provisions that would require the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to instruct the US Executive Director at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) “to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to reduce the influence of the PRC and PRC entities in IDB operations, activities, and projects.” Similar legislation (H.R. 4865 and companion bill S. 2470) was introduced in the 118th Congress.

International Security and Law Enforcement

Growing PRC military power, and the PRC’s growing influence in matters of international security have been a source of concern for some Members of Congress. Since 2000, Congress has required (Section 1202 of P.L. 106-65, 10 U.S.C. 113 note) the Secretaries of Defense and State to publish an annual report on PRC military and security developments (also known as the “China Military Power Report,” CMPR).¹⁵⁸ The 117th Congress amended the reporting requirement (under Section 1243 of P.L. 117-81) to include information related to the role of the PLA in PRC foreign policy. More recently, some Members of Congress have sought to address the international activities of PRC law enforcement entities and such activities’ potential influence in third countries.

U.S. Allies and Partners. The U.S.-led alliance system has been a cornerstone of international security since the end of World War II. Congress may consider whether to more closely examine PRC engagements with U.S. allies and partners (and particularly those in NATO and in the Asia-Pacific region). Among other topics, Congress may examine whether, and to what extent, PRC activity (including diplomatic activity) is meant to drive a wedge between the United States, its allies, and its partners, and any efforts taken by the executive branch in response. Congress may consider whether to amend the CMPR reporting requirement to explicitly address topics such as PRC security activity in allied and partner countries, and these activities’ impact on allied and partner relations with the United States. In engagements with allied and partner countries,

¹⁵⁷ House Section, Congressional Record, vol. 172, part 10 (January 14, 2026), p. H860.

¹⁵⁸ For the latest (2025) iteration of the report, see U.S. Department of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2025*, December 23, 2025, p. 4, <https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF>.

Members of Congress may consider discussing topics related to PRC security and overseas law enforcement cooperation. They also may use those engagements to assess the impact of certain Administration statements and actions that have caused concern among U.S. treaty allies and may be undermining these alliances.¹⁵⁹

Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Congress has passed several laws containing reporting requirements that address bilateral and potential multilateral, coordinated action between the PRC, Russia, North Korea, and Iran in the security realm.¹⁶⁰ Congress may consider whether to require the executive branch to take action to address the potential security challenges posed by the four countries. In the 119th Congress, for example, the DISRUPT Act (H.R. 5912, and companion bill S. 1883) would require the executive branch to “develop a whole-of-government strategy to disrupt growing cooperation” between the four countries. Congress also may consider whether the current U.S. government toolset (including sanctions and export controls, among other things) is suitable to address the potential security challenges posed by the four countries’ coordinated action.

Preventing Abuse of Law Enforcement Cooperation. Congress may consider whether to take action to prevent the potential abuse of the PRC’s bilateral law enforcement cooperation with third countries. First introduced in the 117th Congress, the Uyghur Human Rights Protection Act (H.R. 2349), for example, would seek to protect Uyghur refugees who have fled to countries outside of China (other than the United States) by directing the Secretary of State to prioritize diplomatic efforts in those countries that “often face intense pressure from the Chinese government to extradite Uyghurs back to China.”¹⁶¹ Congress may consider amending the CMPR to require reporting on PRC law enforcement cooperation with foreign countries, including incidents of suspected abuse.

Taiwan

Following the Jimmy Carter Administration’s decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC and break diplomatic relations with the Taiwan-based ROC effective January 1, 1979, Congress passed the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8, 22 U.S.C. §§3301 et seq.), which provides the legal basis for unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations.¹⁶² Successive Congresses have elaborated on U.S. policy toward Taiwan. In response to the PRC’s efforts to exclude Taiwan from participation in UN activities, including serving as an observer, Congress has stated that it is U.S. policy “to advocate for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the United Nations” and other international bodies (Section 314(b) of P.L. 116-260; 22 USC §3301). While crafting U.S. policy toward Taiwan, Congress may consider how the PRC may respond to such efforts, including any subsequent actions Beijing may take towards Taiwan. Congress might also contemplate whether to maintain or amend the language to address current congressional concerns related to Taiwan.

¹⁵⁹ For more of this topic within the context of NATO, see CRS Report R49018, *NATO: Issues for the July 2026 Ankara Summit*.

¹⁶⁰ For example, the 117th Congress passed P.L. 117-81, which amended CMPR reporting requirements to include security and military-related information pertinent to China’s relations with Russia and Iran. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Congress passed P.L. 117-263, which required a report on PRC support for Russia’s invasion, including any effort by China to “[coordinate] to hinder the response of multilateral organizations, including the United Nations, to provide assistance to the people or Government of Ukraine, to condemn Russia’s war, to hold Russia accountable for the invasion and its prosecution of the war, or to hold those complicit accountable.”

¹⁶¹ Office of Rep. Suhas Subramanyam, “Congressman Suhas Subramanyam Introduces Bipartisan Legislation to Help Uyghurs Fleeing Persecution in China,” March 25, 2025.

¹⁶² For more on Taiwan, see CRS In Focus IF10275, *Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations*.

Oversight of Executive Branch Efforts. Congress may conduct oversight to assess to what extent the U.S. executive branch has implemented statutes intended to bolster Taiwan's participation in the international community (including 22 U.S.C. §286v, §290, §§3301, and §§3371-3373). Congress may consider requesting a status update on a strategy that the 117th Congress required from the Secretary of State “to advance Taiwan’s meaningful participation in a prioritized set of international organizations (IOs),” and respond “to growing pressure from the PRC on foreign governments, IOs, commercial actors, and civil society organizations to comply with its ‘One-China Principle’, with respect to Taiwan” (Section 5518 of P.L. 117-263). Congress also may consider providing further direction(s) to the executive branch on how to implement that policy. Congress may observe the potential trade-offs between providing explicit directions and providing more general statements of policy that leave greater room for executive discretion in their implementation.

Preventing Threats to Taiwan’s Security. Congress also may consider whether to counter or address efforts by the PRC that threaten Taiwan’s security or otherwise reduce Taiwan’s presence on the international stage. For example, the House-passed Protect Taiwan Act (H.R. 1531) would make it U.S. policy to seek to exclude China from participating in the activities of six international organizations if the President informs Congress that China’s actions pose “any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States.” The House-passed version of the Taiwan International Solidarity Act (H.R. 2416, companion bill to S. 2224) would amend the Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (P.L. 116-135) to add a sense of Congress statement that the U.S. government should “encourage, as appropriate, United States allies and partners to oppose the [PRC’s] efforts to undermine Taiwan’s official diplomatic relationships and its partnerships with countries with which it does not maintain diplomatic relations.”

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