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Federal Government and Anthropic: Considerations for AI Innovation and Competition

On February 27, 2026, President Trump [directed](#) federal agencies to stop using technology developed by the U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) company Anthropic, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth [announced](#) he was directing the Department of Defense (DOD) to designate Anthropic a “Supply-Chain Risk to National Security.” (DOD and the Secretary are now using “Department of War” and “Secretary of War,” respectively, as “secondary” designations per [Executive Order 14347](#).) These actions followed a [reported](#) months-long dispute between DOD and Anthropic regarding certain uses of its AI technologies. On June 12, 2026, the Department of Commerce (DOC) [reportedly imposed export controls](#) on certain AI models—Mythos 5 and Fable 5—from Anthropic’s Claude family of models that were lifted on June 30, 2026. The national security risk designation, use prohibitions, and export control restrictions may have implications for AI innovation and competition, including at Anthropic and other domestic AI companies. This In Focus provides information on the AI models under debate, actions taken by the U.S. government (USG) and their potential implications, and considerations for Congress.

Frontier AI Models: Potential Capabilities and Limitations

[Frontier AI models](#) are the most advanced [foundation models](#)—general-purpose AI models pretrained on large datasets that can be used for many applications. Anthropic’s Claude models, including several frontier models, have reportedly been deployed across DOD and national security agencies for such applications as intelligence analysis, operational planning, and cyber operations. In June 2024, Anthropic [stated](#) that it was the first AI company to deploy frontier models in classified USG networks. In July 2025, four U.S. AI companies, including Anthropic, entered into [contracts](#) of up to \$200 million each with DOD to “accelerate [DOD] adoption of advanced AI capabilities to address critical national security challenges.” The Pentagon reportedly agreed to the use in classified systems of [xAI’s Grok model](#), [Google’s Gemini model](#), and [five other tech companies’ AI models](#) as of May 1, 2026. Anthropic was not included.

In February 2026, Anthropic [claimed](#) that, during contract negotiations with DOD, it requested two use exceptions for its Claude models. First, Anthropic [stated](#) that it “do[es] not believe that today’s frontier AI models are reliable enough to be used in fully autonomous weapons. Allowing current models to be used in this way would endanger America’s warfighters and civilians.” Second, Anthropic [asserted](#) that “mass domestic surveillance of Americans constitutes a violation of fundamental rights.”

Anthropic’s requested use exceptions highlight a broader debate over frontier AI model capabilities and limitations. Though frontier AI models demonstrate powerful capabilities, as measured by publicly available benchmarks and assessments, some studies have described their potential limitations, particularly regarding safety risks. A December 2025 [Frontier AI Trends Report](#) by the UK’s AI Security Institute reported that, in its evaluations of frontier AI systems across domains critical to national security and public safety, model safeguards are improving, but the institute found “vulnerabilities in every system [it] tested.”

Anthropic released Mythos Preview to about 50 partners in April 2026 through a collaborative called [Project Glasswing](#). According to Anthropic, the company limited availability because of the model’s advanced capability to find and exploit software vulnerabilities. On June 9, 2026, Anthropic [launched](#) Mythos 5 for “a small group of cyberdefenders and infrastructure providers” via Project Glasswing, “in collaboration with the [USG],” and Fable 5, a “Mythos-class model ... made safe for general use,” to the public.

Recent Federal Actions

On February 27, 2026, President Trump [directed](#) federal agencies to “IMMEDIATELY CEASE all use of Anthropic’s technology” and outlined a six-month “phase out period for Agencies like [DOD] who are using Anthropic’s products, at various levels.” On March 5, 2026, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei [confirmed](#) receipt of a letter from DOD designating Anthropic a supply chain risk to America’s national security, which [reportedly](#) went into immediate effect. In response, federal agencies took actions to stop using Anthropic’s Claude models. For example, the [General Services Administration \(GSA\)](#) announced that it was removing Anthropic from USAi.gov and its [multiple award schedule](#) (i.e., long-term government-wide contracts with commercial firms).

On June 12, 2026, DOC [required](#) Anthropic to restrict Mythos 5 and Fable 5 access to “any foreign national, whether inside or outside of the United States.” In response, Anthropic [disabled access](#) to both models for all customers. This followed [Executive Order 14409](#) of June 2, 2026, which directed the establishment of a [voluntary](#) framework to facilitate USG-industry evaluation of frontier AI models. On June 30, 2026, DOC [lifted](#) export control restrictions, and Anthropic subsequently [redeployed](#) Mythos 5 and Fable 5.

Potential Effect on Anthropic

As a private company, Anthropic provides limited public financial information. Some information suggests that USG

actions might not have a significant financial effect on the company. The \$200 million awarded by DOD and an \$18,960 award from the [Department of State](#) in 2026 (the only [government contract](#) with Anthropic on [usaspending.gov](#)) are relatively small compared to its run-rate revenue (i.e., annual revenue estimate based on its current financial performance). On February 12, 2026, [Anthropic stated](#) that its run-rate revenue had reached \$14 billion, and on May 28, 2026, [Anthropic announced](#) that its run-rate revenue had surpassed \$47 billion earlier in the month. On June 1, 2026, Anthropic [filed a](#) Form S-1 with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for a proposed initial public offering.

[Anthropic has stated](#) that USG actions are “harming Anthropic irreparably.” If Anthropic were to lose a significant share of its revenue or funding from investors, it might have difficulty continuing to develop its AI models, potentially affecting its ability to compete and innovate.

The effect of USG actions on Anthropic may partially depend on the response of its other clients and the scope of the prohibition, which is under dispute. On February 27, 2026, [Secretary Hegseth stated](#), “Effective immediately, no contractor, supplier, or partner that does business with the United States military may conduct any commercial activity with Anthropic.” [Anthropic responded](#) that it does not believe that this action is legal, [asserting](#) that “a supply chain risk designation under [10 U.S.C. §3252](#) can only extend to the use of Claude as part of [DOD] contracts—it cannot affect how contractors use Claude to serve other customers.” Anthropic filed two federal lawsuits on March 9, 2026. [One lawsuit](#) claims that the government’s actions exceed its legal authority and violate the Administrative Procedure Act as well as Anthropic’s due process and First Amendment rights. The [second lawsuit](#) seeks review of the designation of Anthropic as a supply chain risk under a [separate statute](#). On March 26, 2026, a federal judge ordered a [preliminary injunction](#) to temporarily block the implementation of this designation and halted the President’s directive ordering federal agencies to stop using Claude, and [GSA restored](#) Anthropic in USAi.gov and its multiple award schedule. In the second lawsuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit [denied Anthropic’s request](#) to stop DOD from labeling it as a security risk. Some [initial reporting](#) indicated that a subset of defense contractors [stopped using](#) Anthropic’s AI models, while others were [waiting to see](#) how the conflict resolved.

Potential Implications for Innovation and Competition

USG actions against Anthropic might have broader effects on AI markets and competition. For example, if USG actions negatively impact Anthropic’s revenues and thereby its ability to develop frontier models, that would reduce the number of innovative AI models that other companies could use to create AI products. However, USG actions also appear to have contributed to a boost in public adoption of Claude, which became the [most popular app](#) on Apple’s [top free apps](#) in the United States on February 28, 2026. Separately, OpenAI’s decision to strike a deal with the Pentagon [reportedly resulted](#) in a “massive wave of public backlash” as users uninstalled ChatGPT.

USG actions against Anthropic have also [raised concerns](#) about potential effects on innovation and U.S. competitiveness. Some trade groups reportedly raised concerns that designating an American technology company as a national security risk would “have a chilling effect on U.S. innovation.” A [letter reportedly sent](#) by former defense officials, academics, and tech policy leaders to congressional committees asserted that “blacklisting an American company weakens U.S. competitiveness” and warned that “this is not a marketplace any serious entrepreneur or investor can build around.” The sudden inability to use Mythos 5 and Fable 5 [reportedly renewed efforts](#) in other countries to lessen their reliance on American technology. Further, while some analysts have [noted](#) that the DOC export controls were aimed at preventing national security risks from possible access to Mythos by the Chinese government, others have voiced [concern](#) that the process leading to DOC’s reversal of the restrictions was “opaque” and “will not lend itself to a stable, investable, trustworthy industry over time.”

Considerations for Congress

Federal policies and actions may influence competition among AI companies and potentially encourage or stifle innovation. Congress may wish to conduct oversight on the extent of DOD’s authority to declare Anthropic a supply chain risk to national security and how such actions may affect private sector innovation. Congress may also consider legislation to clarify safety and security considerations around the use of AI technologies for sensitive applications, such as public surveillance, and to establish an AI regulatory approach that balances safety, national security, and innovation. Alternatively, Congress may wait for federal courts to determine the legal merits of the Trump Administration’s actions against Anthropic before considering a legislative response. In weighing these options, among others, Congress might consider a range of questions, including the following:

- How do certain types of government actions, such as restricting access to specific models, affect revenue reliability for AI businesses?
- How might disputes between Anthropic and the federal government influence future agreements between private companies and the federal government?
- How difficult and costly is it for government agencies to switch from one AI foundation model to another?
- How might USG actions in response to a company’s efforts to maintain safety measures affect industry efforts to innovate in AI safety and security?
- In light of [international competition](#) to lead in AI development, what might be the effects of USG actions against one AI company on the ability of (or incentives for) other U.S. AI companies to innovate and invest in building AI models?

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