Contents

• Nationwide Injunctions and Trump v. CASA
• Background and Terminology
• Identifying and Counting Nationwide Injunctions
• Trump v. CASA, Inc.
• Effect of CASA on Existing Nationwide Injunctions
• Methodology
• Nationwide Injunctions Issued Since CASA
• Considerations for Congress

Summary

On June 27, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025), imposing new legal limits on nationwide injunctions—judicial orders that prevent the government from implementing challenged laws, regulations, or other policies against all relevant persons and entities. Specifically, the CASA majority held that the Judiciary Act of 1789 does not authorize nationwide injunctions that reach more broadly than needed to provide complete relief to the parties to each case. Id. at 837. At the same time, the Court left open several potential avenues for litigants to seek far-reaching judicial relief. First, it held that nationwide injunctions may be permissible when required to provide complete relief to the parties before the court. Id. at 850–52. Second, the Court in CASA expressly did not consider the legality of other forms of universal relief such as universal stays and vacatur under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and injunctions awarded to nationwide classes in class action cases. Id. at 847 n.10, 849. Some initial reactions to CASA predicted that the decision would have profound effects on federal courts' power, and particularly on their ability to check the executive branch, while others predicted that some cases that might have previously been filed as nationwide injunction cases would instead be litigated as APA suits or class actions, yielding similar practical results.

CRS has tracked nationwide injunctions issued during the last three presidential administrations and has both monitored the status of existing nationwide injunctions and identified new nationwide injunctions issued in the year since the issuance of the decision in CASA. As of the date of issuance of CASA, CRS had identified 34 cases in which federal courts had issued nationwide injunctions against executive branch policies during approximately the first five months of the second Trump Administration. As of one year later, 14 (41.2%) of those nationwide injunctions remained in effect. In two of the cases identified (5.9%), the plaintiffs sought class certification, and the district court certified a nationwide class and awarded preliminary classwide relief that was in effect on the one-year anniversary of CASA. In another case (2.9%), the district court granted class certification and entered a classwide injunction, which was later stayed by the Supreme Court. In two cases (5.9%), a court narrowed the grant of injunctive relief, converting a nationwide injunction to an injunction that covered only the named plaintiffs, and the plaintiff-protective injunction remained in effect as of the one-year anniversary of CASA. In two of the identified cases (5.9%), an appellate court had stayed a nationwide injunction as of June 27, 2026. In another five of the identified cases (14.7%), the nationwide injunction had been vacated, generally meaning that a reviewing court found that the injunction was entered in error and the challenged government policy could take effect. In two of the identified cases (5.9%), the district court ultimately held a challenged agency action unlawful and vacated it pursuant to the APA. In another one of the identified cases (2.9%), the Supreme Court invalidated the challenged policy on the merits. Five of the identified cases (14.7%) were voluntarily dismissed.

CRS has identified 16 cases in which a nationwide injunction was issued for the first time after the decision in CASA, for a total of 50 nationwide injunctions under the second Trump Administration to date. While the pace of issuance of nationwide injunctions has slowed since the decision, it remains historically high. There are several possible reasons for the reduced number of nationwide injunctions issued since CASA, including the limitation articulated in CASA, other developments in the law related to injunctive relief, the reduced pace of issuance of executive orders, and changes in plaintiffs' litigation strategy. If Congress wishes to change the law related to nationwide injunctions and other forms of universal relief, it could consider enacting legislation to either authorize or limit nationwide injunctions or amendments to the APA or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class actions.

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On June 27, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., imposing new legal limits on nationwide injunctions—judicial orders that prevent the federal government from implementing challenged laws, regulations, or other policies against all relevant persons and entities.¹ Some initial reactions to CASA predicted that the decision would have profound effects on federal courts' power, and particularly on their ability to check the executive branch, while others noted that the decision left open the possibility that courts could issue nationwide injunctions or other far-reaching relief in some circumstances.² The CASA decision did not address other forms of universal relief such as universal stays and vacatur under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)³ and injunctions awarded to nationwide classes in class action cases.⁴ Some predicted that, following the decision in CASA, some cases that might have previously been filed as nationwide injunction cases would instead be litigated as APA suits or class actions, yielding similar practical results.⁵

This CRS report surveys the status of nationwide injunctions in the year since the issuance of the decision in CASA. As of the date of issuance of CASA, CRS had identified 34 cases in which federal courts had issued nationwide injunctions against executive branch policies during approximately the first five months of the second Trump Administration through the date of issuance of CASA.⁶ After providing background information on nationwide injunctions and the decision in CASA,⁷ this report gives an update on the status of those cases, surveying the effects of CASA on then-pending litigation.⁸ The report then identifies 16 cases in which a nationwide injunction was issued for the first time after the decision in CASA, for a total of 50 nationwide injunctions under the second Trump Administration to date.⁹ The report concludes with considerations for Congress related to nationwide injunctions and other forms of universal relief.¹⁰

Nationwide Injunctions and Trump v. CASA

Background and Terminology

An injunction is a form of equitable relief¹¹ by which a court either requires an entity to take a certain action or forbids an entity from taking a certain action.¹² The term nationwide injunction is not defined in any federal statute or procedural rule. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in CASA, the term had also not been defined by a majority decision of the Supreme Court. Nonetheless, that term and related terms were used fairly consistently in lower court decisions and legal commentary. As used in those sources, a nationwide injunction was generally defined as an injunction against the federal government that prevents the government from implementing a challenged law, regulation, or other policy against all relevant persons and entities, whether or not such persons or entities are parties participating in the litigation.¹³ A nationwide injunction is one form of what is sometimes called universal relief—a more general term for court orders that provide some form of judicial remedy to all persons or entities who might benefit from it.

Nationwide injunction is not the only term used to describe court orders that enjoin government actions in their entirety. Those orders are also sometimes called universal injunctions, national injunctions, nonparty injunctions, nonparticularized injunctions, or even cosmic injunctions.¹⁴ Prior to the CASA decision, courts and commentators widely used the phrases nationwide injunction and universal injunction, with nationwide injunction appearing to be somewhat more prevalent, particularly in court decisions.¹⁵ Many sources used the terms interchangeably. CRS products on this topic have primarily used the term nationwide injunction, particularly when referring to universal relief granted against the federal government, and have occasionally used the phrase universal injunction when referring to grants of universal relief against states or to all universal relief, regardless of whether it halts a federal or state policy.¹⁶

The Supreme Court majority in CASA adopted the term universal injunction based on concerns that the term nationwide injunction may misleadingly suggest that these injunctions are defined by their geographic scope rather than the entities to which they apply.¹⁷ The Court explained, "The difference between a traditional injunction and a universal injunction is not so much where it applies, but whom it protects: A universal injunction prohibits the Government from enforcing the law against anyone, anywhere."¹⁸ The Court did not provide a more detailed definition of universal injunction, but its usage of the term appears consistent with other sources discussing this issue.

It is possible that CASA will lead to broader consensus around the terminology used to discuss universal relief. For the time being, except when quoting from or discussing other sources, this CRS report continues to use the term nationwide injunction because that term is most reflective of CRS's methodology in identifying these injunctions and consistent with prior CRS products.

Identifying and Counting Nationwide Injunctions

Before the decision in CASA, several sources provided counts of nationwide injunctions. These counts varied because they covered different time frames and used different methodologies.¹⁹ In a May 2019 address, then-Attorney General William Barr stated that federal courts "issued only 27 nationwide injunctions in all of the 20th century."²⁰ By contrast, as of February 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) had identified 12 nationwide injunctions issued during the presidency of George W. Bush, 19 issued during Barack Obama's presidency, and 55 such injunctions issued during the first Trump Administration up to that point.²¹ In April 2024, the Harvard Law Review published an article with counts of nationwide injunctions through 2023.²² With respect to the four most recent presidential administrations, the article identified six nationwide injunctions issued under the George W. Bush Administration, 12 under the Obama Administration, 64 under the first Trump Administration, and 14 from the first three years of the Biden Administration.²³ A March 2025 CRS report identified 86 nationwide injunction cases from the first Trump Administration and 28 from the Biden Administration.²⁴ In a July 2025 report, CRS identified 34 nationwide injunctions issued between January 20, 2025, when President Trump took office for the second time, and June 27, 2025, the date of the CASA decision.²⁵

Trump v. CASA, Inc.

On June 27, 2025, in Trump v. CASA, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the Judiciary Act of 1789 does not authorize nationwide injunctions that reach more broadly than needed to provide complete relief to the parties to each case, but it left open several potential avenues for litigants to seek universal relief.²⁶

The underlying substantive legal issue in the consolidated cases in CASA concerned the validity of Executive Order No. 14160, "Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship" (the Birthright Citizenship E.O.), which provides that the protections afforded to individuals under the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, known as birthright citizenship, shall not apply to certain individuals born in the United States to specified categories of alien parents.²⁷ President Trump issued the order on January 20, 2025. Numerous parties including individuals, nonprofit organizations, and states challenged the E.O. in court and sought injunctions barring its enforcement. Multiple courts granted injunctions against the Birthright Citizenship E.O., including several that issued nationwide injunctions barring its enforcement against all persons or entities.²⁸ The government sought stays of three such injunctions, first from the intermediate appellate courts, where the stay requests were denied,²⁹ and then from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court consolidated the stay requests under the caption Trump v. CASA, Inc. The Supreme Court litigation in CASA focused solely on the procedural question of whether the trial courts erred in entering nationwide injunctions against enforcement of the Birthright Citizenship E.O. and barring enforcement of the E.O. against all relevant persons.³⁰

After receiving briefing and holding oral argument in the consolidated cases, the Supreme Court issued its decision in CASA on June 27, 2025.³¹ While the federal government's stay applications in these cases raised both statutory and constitutional challenges to nationwide injunctions, the Court declined to reach the constitutional question, limiting its opinion to the statutory interpretation question of "whether Congress has granted federal courts the authority to universally enjoin the enforcement of an executive or legislative policy."³² Writing for a six-Justice majority, Justice Barrett concluded that universal injunctions entered for the benefit of nonparties "likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has granted to federal courts."³³ However, the Court further held that a universal injunction may be appropriate when needed to provide complete relief to the parties before the court, even if it also incidentally benefits nonparties.³⁴

Applying that principle to the matters before it, the Court rejected the individual and associational plaintiffs' arguments that a universal injunction was required to provide them with complete relief but held that the "complete-relief inquiry is more complicated for the state respondents," because they asserted that "a universal injunction was necessary to provide the States themselves with complete relief."³⁵ Emphasizing that the government contended that a narrower injunction could adequately protect the states, the Court declined to resolve that dispute in the first instance, instead directing the lower courts to "determine whether a narrower injunction is appropriate."³⁶ The Court thus granted the government's application for a stay "only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue" and "to the extent that [the injunctions] prohibit executive agencies from developing and issuing public guidance about the Executive's plans to implement the Executive Order."³⁷

Following the Supreme Court's decision in CASA, the cases returned to the district courts for consideration of the proper scope of injunctive relief in each case. Substantive challenges to the Birthright Citizenship E.O. remained pending in the consolidated cases in CASA and other cases, and the Court considered a merits challenge to the E.O. later in the October 2025 Term in Trump v. Barbara.³⁸

Effect of CASA on Existing Nationwide Injunctions

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. CASA, an executive branch official stated that the Trump Administration "began working immediately to have every [nationwide] injunction revisited."³⁹ CRS has tracked the status of cases in which nationwide injunctions had been issued under the second Trump Administration prior to the Supreme Court's decision in CASA, seeking to determine the effect of CASA on those nationwide injunctions.

Methodology

A March 2025 CRS report identified and analyzed nationwide injunctions issued during the first Trump Administration and the Biden Administration,⁴⁰ and a July 2025 CRS report identified nationwide injunctions issued under the second Trump Administration through the date of issuance of the Supreme Court's decision in CASA.⁴¹ This report now provides an update on the status of the cases identified in the July 2025 CRS report as of one year from the date of decision in CASA.

As discussed in more detail in the March 2025 CRS report, there are several reasons why it is not possible to provide a single definitive count of nationwide injunctions. Most significantly, nationwide injunction is not a legal term with a precise definition, so counts may vary based on the particular definition used.⁴² In addition, there are practical challenges in searching for all nationwide injunction cases⁴³ and methodological choices about how to count the injunctions that fit any given definition.⁴⁴ The March 2025 CRS report described the methodology CRS used to define, search for, and count nationwide injunctions.⁴⁵

The July 2025 CRS report also used the methodology outlined in the March 2025 report.⁴⁶ When compiling the list of nationwide injunctions included in that report and in Table 1 below, CRS

• included only injunctions issued by federal courts;
• included only injunctions against the federal government or federal officials, not injunctions that bind states, state officials, or private parties;
• included any form of injunctive relief that barred the government from enforcing a policy, such as temporary restraining orders (TROs), preliminary injunctions (PIs), injunctions pending appeal, and permanent injunctions;⁴⁷
• excluded any class action certified at or before the time of the injunction's issuance, including provisional class certification;⁴⁸
• excluded any injunction that combined with one or more other injunctions to block a government action in its entirety but that, standing alone, did not do so;
• excluded any injunction that blocked a government action in its entirety with the exception of limited carveouts to defer to other courts; and
• excluded stays and vacatur of agency actions unless the agencies were also expressly enjoined from implementing the stayed or vacated actions.⁴⁹

To compile the list of cases, CRS searched federal cases in Westlaw for the search terms (("nationwide" OR "nation-wide") w/3 injunction) for the date range January 20, 2025, through June 27, 2025. CRS then manually reviewed results to find cases that fit the criteria outlined above. In addition, CRS reviewed news reports about nationwide injunctions and third-party websites tracking litigation against actions of the second Trump Administration⁵⁰ and included cases that fit the criteria above but did not show up in the Westlaw search. Due to the lack of standardization in nationwide injunction cases, it is possible that there are other cases that fit the criteria for inclusion but were not identified via CRS's methodology.

CRS counts nationwide injunctions by case. Each case (or set of consolidated cases) in which at least one nationwide injunction was issued by a federal court at any level is included as a single entry in the table. Some federal government actions were subject to nationwide injunctions in multiple cases and thus are included in CRS's counts more than once.

Using the foregoing methodology, and subject to the noted caveats, CRS identified 34 cases in which federal courts issued nationwide injunctions between January 20, 2025, and June 27, 2025. The following table lists all of the cases identified in the July 2025 report and notes their status as of June 27, 2026, the one-year anniversary of the issuance of the decision in CASA. The "Caption" column of the table contains a citation to the first nationwide injunction that CRS identified in each case. Cases are listed in chronological order based on the date of issuance of the first decision cited.

The "Main Topic and Notes" column states the subject matter at issue in each case, briefly identifies the government action subject to each nationwide injunction, and provides citations to any additional nationwide injunctions that were issued in each case. CRS manually categorized cases by subject matter. While some cases raised multiple legal and policy issues and could potentially be classified in multiple subject areas, CRS selected one primary issue area per case for ease of analysis. In some cases, only a part of an executive order, guidance document, or other federal initiative was enjoined, but in each case enforcement of the enjoined portion of the challenged action was barred as to all relevant persons or entities.

The "Status" column provides the status of each case as of June 27, 2026, and includes a cite to the court decision(s) or docket most relevant to each case's status. A cited decision may not be the most recent ruling in the case. Litigation remains pending in most of the listed cases, so their status may change after June 27, 2026. In addition, the procedure in some of the listed cases is complex. CRS has not attempted to provide the full procedural history for these cases but rather to capture key developments related to nationwide injunctions in a relatively accessible manner.

As reflected in the foregoing table, of the 34 nationwide injunctions that had been issued as of the date of decision in CASA, 14 (41.2%) remained in effect one year later.

In two of the cases identified (5.9%), the plaintiffs sought class certification, and the district court certified a nationwide class and awarded preliminary classwide relief that was in effect on the one-year anniversary of CASA.⁵⁸ Those classwide injunctions fall outside the scope of the Supreme Court's holding in CASA but have the same practical effect as nationwide injunctions because the certified class is broad enough that the classwide injunction blocks the challenged policy in its entirety. In another case (2.9%), the district court granted class certification and entered a classwide injunction, which was later stayed by the Supreme Court.⁵⁹

In two cases (5.9%), a court narrowed the grant of injunctive relief, converting a nationwide injunction to an injunction that covers only the named plaintiffs, and the plaintiff-protective injunction remained in effect as of the one-year anniversary of CASA.

In two of the identified cases (5.9%), an appellate court had stayed a nationwide injunction as of June 27, 2026.⁶⁰ One of those stay orders predated the Supreme Court's decision in CASA.⁶¹ The grant of a stay does not reflect a final ruling on the validity of the injunction but means that the injunction is paused while litigation continues, and the challenged government policy can take effect. In both of these cases in which a nationwide injunction was stayed, the stay was issued by the Supreme Court.⁶² The stay orders briefly state how matters have been resolved without detailing the Court's legal reasoning, so it is not possible to know with certainty on what grounds they were decided, but one order that contains some explanation focuses on issues other than the scope of injunctive relief.⁶³

In another five of the identified cases (14.7%), the nationwide injunction has been vacated, generally meaning that a reviewing court has found that the injunction was entered in error and the challenged government policy can take effect. Only one of the five vacatur decisions was based in part on CASA.⁶⁴ Three others held that the district court orders were in error for reasons other than the scope of the injunctions. The remaining vacatur was consented to by the parties.

In two of the identified cases (5.9%), the district court ultimately held a challenged agency action unlawful and vacated it pursuant to the APA. The vacatur orders did not expressly enjoin the government from implementing the vacated action, but the government generally does not attempt to enforce policies that have been vacated.⁶⁵ In another one of the identified cases (2.9%), the Supreme Court invalidated the challenged policy on the merits. The Supreme Court decision did not expressly consider the scope of the injunction entered by the lower court, but a Supreme Court holding that a government policy is invalid means that it may not lawfully be enforced against anybody.⁶⁶

Five of the identified cases (14.7%) were voluntarily dismissed. In four of those cases, the matter was dismissed after the government agreed to cease the challenged action.⁶⁷ In those cases, the government is no longer enjoined by a court from implementing the challenged policies but has voluntarily agreed not to implement them.

CRS is continuing to monitor and analyze the cases in Table 1 to determine CASA's effect on federal court litigation. As an initial matter, as of one year from the date of issuance of CASA, it appears the decision has had some effect on pending nationwide injunction cases but has not led to systemic shifts in these cases through either widespread vacatur of existing nationwide injunctions or conversion of a large proportion of those injunctions to classwide injunctions or APA relief unaccompanied by an injunction.

Nationwide Injunctions Issued Since CASA

CRS has also sought to evaluate the impact of Trump v. CASA by searching for nationwide injunctions issued since the date of the CASA decision. To identify relevant cases, CRS used the methodology in the March 2025 CRS report with two modifications. First, because the Supreme Court in CASA preferred the term universal injunction rather than nationwide injunction, CRS added that term to the search, searching federal cases in Westlaw for the search terms (("nationwide" OR "nation-wide" OR "universal") w/3 injunction) for the date range June 28, 2025, through June 27, 2026. Second, CRS manually reviewed all federal cases that cited CASA during the relevant time period, as identified by Westlaw.

The following table contains a list of nationwide injunctions issued during the one-year period following the decision in CASA—June 28, 2025, through June 27, 2026. The "Caption" column in the table contains a citation to the first nationwide injunction that CRS identified in each case. Cases are listed in chronological order based on the date of issuance of the first decision cited. The "Main Topic" column identifies the subject matter at issue in each case.

The "Notes" column briefly identifies the government action enjoined in whole or in part by each nationwide injunction. Any additional nationwide injunctions that were issued in each case are also included in the "Notes" column, while selected other subsequent history is included in footnotes. Litigation remains pending in the cases in Table 2, so their status may change after June 27, 2026. CRS has not attempted to provide the full procedural history for these cases (including all stays issued by appellate courts) but rather to capture key developments related to nationwide injunctions in a relatively accessible manner.

As reflected in Table 1 and Table 2, CRS identified a total of 50 cases in which nationwide injunctions were issued during the second Trump Administration through June 27, 2026. CRS identified significantly more nationwide injunctions granted during the period of just over five months from January 20, 2025, to June 27, 2025 (34) than were granted during the one-year period between June 28, 2025, and June 27, 2026 (16). There are several possible reasons for this difference.

Perhaps the most straightforward explanation for the decrease in nationwide injunctions is that the Supreme Court's decision in CASA may have functioned as intended to limit nationwide injunctions and make courts less likely to grant nonparty relief. Lower federal courts have cited CASA frequently, including when denying or overturning nationwide injunctions as broader than needed to provide complete relief to the parties.⁷² Almost every one of the post-CASA nationwide injunction cases listed in Table 2 cited CASA and considered the limit it imposed before determining that a nationwide injunction was needed to provide complete relief.⁷³ While the complete relief principle existed before CASA,⁷⁴ CASA made clear that courts must apply that principle to limit equitable relief, and lower courts appear to have taken that limitation seriously. At the same time, however, multiple lower courts have refused government defendants' attempts to extend CASA beyond nationwide injunctions by applying the decision to limit classwide injunctions in class actions or universal stays or vacatur under the APA.⁷⁵

Other legal changes besides CASA's limit on nationwide injunctions may also have had an effect on cases challenging government actions. As one example, in addition to its core holding related to nationwide injunctions, the CASA majority opinion also included a statement that "[a]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury."⁷⁶ That passage reflects a tendency in recent Supreme Court decisions to find harm to the government whenever a court enjoins one of its policies.⁷⁷ Considering this harm when balancing the equities related to requests for injunctive relief may make courts less likely to grant injunctions against the government, or more likely to limit such relief when granted by other courts.⁷⁸ The foregoing language has been cited by multiple lower courts when denying or limiting injunctive relief.⁷⁹

Another factor that may have affected the number of nationwide injunctions is the pace of issuance of executive orders. Many nationwide injunction cases involve challenges to executive orders.⁸⁰ President Trump issued 46 executive orders in January 2025 and at least 30 executive orders in each of the three following months.⁸¹ Since May 2025, he has not issued more than 17 executive orders in any month.⁸² In total, between his inauguration and the date of the decision in CASA, President Trump issued 164 executive orders.⁸³ In the full year following the CASA decision, he issued 104.⁸⁴ The fact that President Trump issued more executive orders in the first few months of his second term means that there were more executive actions that might be subject to court challenges during that time period, including possible requests for nationwide injunctions. Moreover, a number of executive orders issued early in the second Trump Administration involved high-profile policies with far-reaching effect, which may be particularly likely to spur requests for universal relief.⁸⁵

An additional factor that may have driven the decrease in nationwide injunctions is plaintiffs' litigation strategy. The Supreme Court in CASA limited nationwide injunctions but expressly did not address universal relief via class actions and suits under the APA. Since CASA, plaintiffs have continued to seek and win injunctions on behalf of nationwide classes and APA stays or vacatur that pause policies in their entirety.⁸⁶ Class actions and APA suits were already well-known alternatives to nationwide injunctions pre-CASA, and more study would be required to attempt to determine the extent to which plaintiffs that previously did seek or would have sought nationwide injunctions have instead elected to pursue other types of universal relief. However, it appears likely that this has happened in at least some cases.⁸⁷

Notwithstanding the slower pace of issuance of nationwide injunctions against the second Trump Administration in the year following the issuance of CASA as compared to the period of approximately five months before the decision was issued, the number of nationwide injunctions remained elevated compared to most previous presidential administrations. By comparison, CRS identified 28 nationwide injunctions issued during the four years of the Biden Administration,⁸⁸ and the Harvard Law Review identified six nationwide injunctions issued under the George W. Bush Administration and 12 under the Obama Administration.⁸⁹ Only the first Trump Administration saw more nationwide injunctions than have been issued so far under the second Trump Administration, with 86 nationwide injunction cases identified by CRS.⁹⁰

Aside from the overall decrease in nationwide injunctions after the Supreme Court's decision in CASA, another aspect of the cases listed above that may be of interest to Congress is the parties that are winning nationwide injunctions. In CASA, the Supreme Court majority held that the states challenging the Birthright Citizenship E.O. made a stronger showing than the individual and organizational plaintiffs that a nationwide injunction was needed to provide them with complete relief.⁹¹ CASA did not categorically limit nationwide relief to suits by states, and the Court majority cited instances when universal relief may be required to protect individual plaintiffs, such as nuisance and gerrymandering cases.⁹² However, the ruling could be read to suggest that states may be particularly well-situated to claim far-reaching harms that can be addressed only by universal relief.⁹³

Of the 34 cases in which nationwide injunctions were issued before the CASA decision, states were plaintiffs in seven (20.6%). Of the 14 of the cases in Table 1 where a nationwide injunction remained in effect one year after the decision in CASA, states were plaintiffs in four (28.6%).⁹⁴ With respect to the post-CASA nationwide injunctions listed in Table 2, states were plaintiffs in 3 of the 16 cases (18.8%).⁹⁵

The relatively small sample size of cases before and after CASA makes it difficult to draw definitive conclusions, but the foregoing numbers at least indicate that CASA did not strictly limit nationwide relief to state or other government plaintiffs as a practical matter. To the extent there has not been a major shift toward limiting universal relief to states, this may be because many courts were already applying the "complete relief" principle before CASA, so the substantive legal test for whether a nationwide injunction is warranted has not changed drastically.⁹⁶

Considerations for Congress

Both before and since the Supreme Court's decision in CASA, there has been ongoing discussion among commentators and stakeholders about when, how, and to what extent federal courts should be able to halt executive branch policies.⁹⁷

On one side of the debate, some have raised concerns that limiting nationwide injunctions could significantly impair the ability of federal courts to check unlawful behavior by the executive branch. If universal relief is unavailable, they contend, each plaintiff affected by an allegedly unlawful policy may need to sue separately and win an injunction, at least unless and until the Supreme Court rules on the matter.⁹⁸ Some plaintiffs may lack the resources to sue and thus may remain subject to unlawful policies.⁹⁹ The dissents in CASA raised these concerns, with Justice Sotomayor objecting that the majority opinion "renders constitutional guarantees meaningful in name only for any individuals who are not parties to a lawsuit" and provides "an open invitation for the Government to bypass the Constitution."¹⁰⁰ Justice Jackson wrote that the "Court's decision to permit the Executive to violate the Constitution with respect to anyone who has not yet sued is an existential threat to the rule of law" and expressed concerns that the Court's ruling would divide persons affected by unlawful government action into two groups: those who are able to sue and win an injunction and those who cannot sue and remain subject to the unlawful action.¹⁰¹ She asserted that this division is inequitable because "the zone of lawlessness the majority has now authorized will disproportionately impact the poor, the uneducated, and the unpopular."¹⁰² As a general matter, the continuing availability of universal relief other than nationwide injunctions may mitigate concerns that CASA would impair the courts' ability to check the executive branch.¹⁰³

Another concern involves the government's decisions whether to appeal. When the government is subject to a nationwide injunction that completely prevents it from implementing a policy, it has a strong incentive to appeal that ruling. By contrast, when the government is subject only to a limited, plaintiff-protective injunction (or even multiple limited injunctions), it may simply decline to appeal, foregoing enforcement against individual plaintiffs but continuing to enforce an allegedly unlawful policy against most affected persons. This concern is particularly acute as relates to government policies that are patently unlawful—if a policy presents a close call, some plaintiffs challenging it may lose and be able to appeal, but if the government loses every case and declines to appeal, it may be able to prevent the issue from coming before the Supreme Court and thus prevent a policy from being struck down in its entirety. This possibility was raised with respect to the Birthright Citizenship E.O. during oral argument in CASA.¹⁰⁴ At that time, the Solicitor General assured the Court that the executive branch would appeal its losses related to that E.O., which it later did.¹⁰⁵ It remains to be seen whether this concern will be borne out in other cases.

On the other side of the debate, some contend that CASA has not done enough to limit far-reaching judicial remedies.¹⁰⁶ Opponents of nationwide injunctions have long argued that these injunctions undermine established litigation procedures by allowing challengers to circumvent the requirements for bringing a class action or by triggering fast-tracked appeals in which the federal courts must evaluate a challenged policy based on a limited factual and legal record.¹⁰⁷ Others argue that nationwide injunctions may prevent the government from effectively implementing its policies and create legal uncertainty as far-reaching government programs may proceed or halt at each level of the federal courts.¹⁰⁸ While the pace of issuance of nationwide injunctions has slowed since the CASA decision, it remains historically high.¹⁰⁹ The fact that courts have continued to issue nationwide injunctions post-CASA may mean that legal and policy objections to nationwide injunctions remain relevant.

Some Justices advocated for firm limits on nationwide injunctions that might mitigate these concerns in concurrences in CASA, with Justice Thomas writing separately to emphasize that "the complete-relief principle operates as a ceiling" rather than "a mandate," and that "[c]ourts may not use the complete-relief principle to revive the universal injunction."¹¹⁰ With respect to universal relief other than nationwide injunctions, Justice Alito cautioned district courts not to view CASA as "an invitation to certify nationwide classes without scrupulous adherence to the rigors of Rule 23. Otherwise, the universal injunction will return from the grave under the guise of 'nationwide class relief,' and today's decision will be of little more than minor academic interest."¹¹¹ As discussed above, it appears that some cases in which courts issued or might have issued nationwide injunctions are now proceeding as class actions.¹¹² Further study would be required to determine the extent to which this is happening and how courts are applying Rule 23 to those requests.

One possible result of limits on nationwide injunctions that may be seen as either a benefit or a drawback is divergent decisions on the same legal issue from different courts. Some worry that, without nationwide injunctions, different courts may rule differently on the lawfulness of a single policy, leaving the policy enjoined as to some persons but not others and creating inconsistency, unpredictability, and unfairness.¹¹³ Some counter that this lack of uniformity is actually a desirable feature of the federal judicial system because it is better to have multiple courts consider a legal issue and perhaps reach different conclusions before the Supreme Court weighs in.¹¹⁴ Others express concerns about whether the Supreme Court can effectively exercise oversight over potentially divergent lower court rulings and ensure uniformity to the extent needed.¹¹⁵

Congress may consider enacting legislation to either authorize or limit nationwide injunctions. The Supreme Court in CASA declined to address the government's constitutional challenge to nationwide injunctions and instead decided the case on statutory interpretation grounds.¹¹⁶ If Congress disagrees with the Court's interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789 or otherwise wishes to change the law in this area, it could do so via legislation. If Congress enacted legislation to expressly allow nationwide injunctions in circumstances where Congress deemed them appropriate, the executive branch might renew the Article III challenge to nationwide injunctions that it raised in CASA. Some members of the Supreme Court have expressed doubt as to the constitutionality of nationwide injunctions.¹¹⁷ It is unclear how a majority of the Court would rule on that question in a future case.

In the alternative, Congress could consider legislation limiting nationwide injunctions. A previous CRS report provides an overview of introduced legislation from the 119th Congress that would limit nationwide injunctions.¹¹⁸ All of the legislative proposals to limit nationwide injunctions that CRS has identified predate the decision in CASA. CASA does not render the proposals moot, because the legislative proposals generally differ in scope or other particulars from the Court's ruling.¹¹⁹ However, the CASA decision and the subsequent reduction in the frequency of nationwide injunctions reflected in Table 1 and Table 2 may lessen the perceived policy need for such legislation.

Outside the immediate context of nationwide injunctions, Congress could also consider legislation related to universal relief in APA litigation and class actions. If Congress wished to clarify, expand, or limit the scope of relief available in such cases, it could amend the APA or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.¹²⁰ As with legislation related to nationwide injunctions, any amendments to the APA or federal procedural rules would be subject to applicable constitutional limits, including Article III standing requirements.¹²¹

Footnotes

1.	606 U.S. 831 (2025).
2.	Compare Mattathias Schwartz, How the Supreme Court's Ruling Could Revive Some Contested Trump Policies, N.Y. Times (June 27, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/27/us/politics/trump-birthright-citizenship-scotus.html (CASA "marks the beginning of a profound shift in the way the federal courts do business" and "will lead to a drastic reduction in the federal courts' ability to check the White House"); Scott Neuman, What Is a Universal Injunction and how Did the Supreme Court Limit its Use?, WGBH (June 29, 2025), https://www.wgbh.org/news/national/2025-06-29/what-is-a-universal-injunction-and-how-did-the-supreme-court-limit-its-use ("the ruling means that using injunctions as a default option to block Trump executive orders is effectively dead"); Austin Sarat and Steve Kramer, The Supreme Court's Injunctions Decision Returns America to the Constitutional Horrors of Dred Scott, The Hill (June 30, 2025), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/5376627-supreme-court-universal-injunctions-ruling/ (CASA "has effectively removed the federal courts as a check on the Trump administration"); Anthony O. Maceira, SCOTUS Decision on Nationwide Injunctions: Trump v. Casa and Its Impact on Federal Litigation, National Law Review (June 29, 2025), https://natlawreview.com/article/scotus-decision-nationwide-injunctions-trump-v-casa-and-its-impact-federal (CASA "represents a fundamental recalibration of federal judicial authority regarding nationwide injunctions, reinforcing narrow judicial remedies and reasserting traditional principles of judicial restraint and equitable relief") with Ankush Khardori & Hassan Ali Kanu, Supreme Court Leaves Open the Question of Nationwide Injunctions When States Sue, Politico (June 27, 2025), https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2025/06/27/supreme-court-rulings-decisions-today-news-analysis/nationwide-injunction-state-lawsuits-00427992 (CASA "leaves room for judges to order relief akin to a nationwide injunction when a state sues the federal government"); Kyle Cheney and Hassan Ali Kanu, Judges Are Finding Workarounds to Trump's Big Supreme Court Win, Politico (July 3, 2025), https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/03/supreme-court-nationwide-injunctions-rulings-00439335 (CASA "may be the tectonic shift that wasn't. . . . So far it simply appears to have led [litigants] to refocus their complaints and arguments on class actions and 'setting aside' agency actions"); Tom Hals and Nate Raymond, Judges Keep Blocking Trump's Policies Despite US Supreme Court Injunction Curbs, Reuters (July 9, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/judges-keep-blocking-trumps-policies-despite-us-supreme-court-injunction-curbs-2025-07-09/ ("President Donald Trump called [CASA] 'a monumental victory,' but his legal win may be less definitive than it first appeared.").
3.	5 U.S.C. §§ 500–596. A stay temporarily pauses a government action, while vacatur holds a government action unlawful, generally meaning that it may not be enforced. See "Nationwide Injunctions and APA Litigation," CRS Report R48467, Nationwide Injunctions Under the First Trump Administration and the Biden Administration, by Joanna R. Lampe and Laura Deal (2025).
4.	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Injunctions in class action cases do not necessarily block challenged policies in their entirety. In some cases, a court may certify a nationwide or universal class of all persons or entities affected by a challenged policy. An injunction protecting such a nationwide class blocks the policy completely, while an injunction protecting a narrower class may allow the government to continue to enforce the policy in part. For discussion of class actions in the wake of CASA, see CRS Report R48972, Class Action Lawsuits and Classwide Injunctive Relief, by Bryan L. Adkins (2026).
5.	See, e.g., CASA, 606 U.S. at 869 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) ("To be sure, in the wake of the Court's decision, plaintiffs who challenge the legality of a new federal statute or executive action and request preliminary injunctive relief may sometimes seek to proceed by class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and ask a court to award preliminary classwide relief that may, for example, be statewide, regionwide, or even nationwide. . . . And in cases under the Administrative Procedure Act, plaintiffs may ask a court to preliminarily 'set aside' a new agency rule. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)."); Lawrence Hurley, Supreme Court Curbs Injunctions that Blocked Trump's Birthright Citizenship Plan, NBC News (June 27, 2025), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/supreme-court-curbs-injunctions-blocked-trumps-birthright-citizenship-rcna199742 (citing commentator stating that, "given the Supreme Court's decision, 'the best and most effective way for us to get relief for everyone is going to be the class action,'" and "that relief 'will be just as effective, just as broad as the nationwide injunction that was previously in place.'").
6.	See CRS Report R48600, Trump v. CASA, Inc. and Nationwide Injunctions During the Second Trump Administration, by Joanna R. Lampe (2025).
7.	See infra "Nationwide Injunctions and Trump v. CASA."
8.	See infra "Effect of CASA on Existing Nationwide Injunctions."
9.	See infra "Nationwide Injunctions Issued Since CASA."
10.	See infra "Considerations for Congress."
11.	Equitable relief is a court-ordered remedy providing relief other than money damages. Equitable Remedy, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) ("A remedy, usu. a nonmonetary one such as an injunction or specific performance, obtained when available legal remedies, usu. monetary damages, cannot adequately redress the injury.").
12.	Injunction, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) ("A court order commanding or preventing an action."). Courts may issue different forms of injunctive relief depending on the circumstances of a case and the status of litigation, including temporary restraining orders (TROs), preliminary injunctions (PIs), injunctions pending appeal, and permanent injunctions. All of those forms of injunctive relief are included in this report to the extent they meet the criteria for a nationwide injunction.
13.	E.g., Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1065, 1071 (2018) (defining nationwide injunction to refer to "an injunction at any stage of the litigation that bars the defendant from taking action against individuals who are not parties to the lawsuit in a case that is not brought as a class action."); Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 912 (7th Cir. 2020) (defining nationwide, or universal, injunctions as "injunctive relief that extends beyond the parties before the court to include third parties."); Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (defining the term to mean "a court ... ordering the government to take (or not take) some action with respect to those who are strangers to the suit."); cf. Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 419 (2017) (using the term national injunction to refer to "injunctions that are universal in scope—injunctions that prohibit the enforcement of a federal statute, regulation, or order not only against the plaintiff, but also against anyone"); Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the "Universal" Injunction, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 922 (2020) (discussing universal injunctions, defined as "injunctions blocking the executive branch from enforcing federal laws, regulations, or policies 'not only against the plaintiff, but also against anyone,' even in cases not certified as class actions") (quoting Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. at 419).
14.	See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, Concepts, Not Nomenclature: Universal Injunctions, Declaratory Judgments, Opinions, and Precedent, 91 U. Colo. L. Rev. 999, 1003–07 (2020).
15.	See Lampe & Deal, supra note 3, at 8–9.
16.	See id. at 5–8.
17.	See Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 837 n.1 (2025).
18.	Id.
19.	For discussion of CRS's methodology for identifying and counting nationwide injunctions, see infra "Methodology."
20.	William P. Barr, Attorney General, Remarks to the American Law Institute on Nationwide Injunctions (May 21, 2019).
21.	Jeffrey A. Rosen, Deputy Attorney General, Address at the Administrative Conference of the United States Forum on Nationwide Injunctions and Federal Regulatory Programs (Feb. 12, 2020).
22.	District Court Reform: Nationwide Injunctions, 137 Harv. L. Rev. 1701 (2024) [hereinafter, District Court Reform].
23.	Id. at 1705. The Harvard Law Review article classified nationwide injunctions based on the President whose Administration issued the challenged government action. See id.
24.	Lampe & Deal, supra note 15. CRS classified nationwide injunctions based on the President who was in office at the time each court order was issued. See id., "Counting Nationwide Injunctions."
25.	Lampe, supra note 6.
26.	Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 847 n.10, 851 (2025).
27.	90 Fed. Reg. 8449 (Jan. 20, 2025).
28.	CASA, Inc. v. Trump, 763 F. Supp. 3d 723 (D. Md. Feb. 5, 2025); Washington v. Trump, 765 F. Supp. 3d 1142 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 2025); Doe v. Trump, 766 F. Supp. 3d 266 (D. Mass. 2025), remanded, No. 25-1169 (1st Cir. July 3, 2025).
29.	See New Jersey v. Trump, 131 F.4th 27 (1st Cir. Mar. 11, 2025); CASA, Inc. v. Trump, No. 25-1153, 2025 WL 654902 (4th Cir. Feb. 28, 2025); Washington v. Trump, No. 25-807, 2025 WL 553485 (9th Cir. Feb. 19, 2025).
30.	CASA, 606 U.S. 839.
31.	Id.
32.	Id. at 839.
33.	Id. at 837.
34.	Id. at 850–52.
35.	Id. at 852–53.
36.	Id. at 854.
37.	Id. at 861.
38.	On June 30, 2026, the Supreme Court held that the Birthright Citizenship E.O. violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause. Trump v. Barbara, No. 25–365, 2026 WL 1870543 (June 30, 2026). See also CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11423, Trump v. Barbara: Supreme Court Considers Birthright Citizenship, by Hannah Solomon-Strauss (2026).
39.	See Haisten Willis, White House Says 'Every' Nationwide Injunction to Be Revisited, Wash. Examiner (July 1, 2025), https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/white-house-says-every-nationwide-injunction-to-be-revisited/ar-AA1HNeqa.
40.	See Lampe & Deal, supra note 15.
41.	See Lampe, supra note 6.
42.	See Lampe & Deal, supra note 15, at 5–8.
43.	See id. at 8–9.
44.	See id. at 9–10.
45.	See id. at 8–10.
46.	See Lampe, supra note 6, at 4.
47.	CRS did not identify any nationwide injunctions pending appeal issued during the second Trump Administration through June 27, 2026. In one decision issued during the relevant date range, a federal appeals court affirmed a district court's nationwide injunction and remanded with instructions to broaden the injunction. Missouri v. Trump, 128 F.4th 979 (8th Cir. 2025). Because that decision involved appellate review of a nationwide injunction originally issued under the Biden Administration, it is not included in Table 1 in this report.
48.	See, e.g., J.G.G. v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-00766, 2025 WL 825115, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2025), vacated, 145 S. Ct. 1003 (2025) (per curiam) (provisionally certifying a class consisting of "[a]ll noncitizens in U.S. custody who are subject to the March 15, 2025, Presidential Proclamation entitled 'Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of The United States by Tren De Aragua' and its implementation" and enjoining the government from removing members of such class).
49.	In addition to stays pending judicial review of agency action under the APA, courts sometimes enter administrative stays to pause initiatives temporarily in time-sensitive emergency litigation. See, e.g., Dellinger v. Bessent, No. 25-CV-00385, 2025 WL 450488, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2025). Administrative stays are not included in this report's counts of nationwide injunctions. In one of the cases included in Table 1, the district court entered an administrative stay before entering a TRO. Nat'l Council of Nonprofits v. Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, 763 F. Supp. 3d 13 (D.D.C. 2025). That case is listed in the table based on the date of entry of the TRO.
50.	Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions, Just Security (July 7, 2025), https://www.justsecurity.org/107087/tracker-litigation-legal-challenges-trump-administration/ [https://perma.cc/US8R-5RH5]; Trump's Legal Battles, Law360 (July 7, 2025), https://www.law360.com/trump-legal-challenges [https://perma.cc/PN4R-W6RY]; Tracking Trump in Court: The Scope of Executive Power Tested, Bloomberg Law (June 27, 2025), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/tracking-trump-in-court-the-scope-of-executive-power-tested-1 [https://perma.cc/4JXU-HLY8].
51.	This case remained pending as of the one-year anniversary of CASA but was subsequently voluntarily dismissed. See Order, No. 1:25-cv-00333 (D. Md. June 30, 2026).
52.	After the Supreme Court granted a stay of the classwide PI in this case, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and entered a classwide permanent injunction. D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 821 F. Supp. 3d 102 (D. Mass. 2026). That injunction was stayed pending appeal by the First Circuit. D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 26-1212, Order Granting Emergency Mot. For Stay (1st Cir. Mar. 16, 2026).
53.	This order, among other things, permitted termination of "employees whom defendants have determined, after an individualized assessment, to be unnecessary to the performance of defendants' statutory duties." No. 25-5091, 2025 WL 1721068 (D.C. Cir. 2025). CRS interprets the result of the partial stay to be that a narrower nationwide injunction remains in effect. A panel of the D.C. Circuit later vacated the PI, 149 F.4th 762 (D.C. Cir. 2025). The full D.C. Circuit then vacated the panel order and granted rehearing en banc. No. 25-5091, 2025 WL 3659406 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 17, 2025). On June 19, 2026, the D.C. Circuit issued an order denying a motion to modify the stay pending appeal and granting a motion for a limited remand for the district court to decide "whether to modify, suspend, or dissolve the preliminary injunction in light of the [CFPB's] issuance of a revised reduction-in-force plan and the other intervening developments identified in the appellants' motion." Order, No. 25-5091 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 2026).
54.	This summary omits additional stay proceedings in this case. The Just Security Litigation Tracker provides a more comprehensive summary of the proceedings with links to the relevant court orders. See Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions, Just Security (June 23, 2026), https://www.justsecurity.org/107087/tracker-litigation-legal-challenges-trump-administration/.
55.	See also Jackson Moore & Sidney Wiswell, Project Labor Agreements – Twists and Turns and Remaining Uncertainty, Smith Anderson (Nov. 10, 2025), https://www.smithlaw.com/newsroom/publications/project-labor-agreements-twists-and-turns-and-remaining-uncertainty.
56.	The Ninth Circuit later granted the government's motion for a limited remand to enable the district court to modify the PI to conform with its ruling on the motion to stay. On remand, the district court issued an order modifying the injunction, but it remains universal in scope. See Order Modifying PI, No. 25-CV-03140-JSW, (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025).
57.	The Supreme Court did not consider the scope of the injunction entered by the Court of International Trade, but a Supreme Court holding that the tariffs are invalid means that they may not lawfully be enforced against anybody. The government is now subject to a nationwide injunction in another case requiring repayment of tariffs that were collected. See Atmus Filtration, Inc. v. United States, No. 26-01259, 2026 WL 616128 (C.I.T. 2026).
58.	In one of these cases, the motion for class certification predated CASA. Pacito v. Trump, Mot. Certify Class, No. 2:25-cv-255-JNW (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2025). The other case was the lead case before the Supreme Court in CASA, and the plaintiffs sought class certification after the Supreme Court decision. See CASA, Inc. v. Trump, 793 F. Supp. 3d 687, 693 (D. Md. 2025).
59.	D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 145 S. Ct. 2153 (Mem.) (2025). After the Supreme Court granted a stay of the classwide PI in this case, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and entered a classwide permanent injunction. D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 821 F. Supp. 3d 102 (D. Mass. 2026). That injunction was stayed pending appeal by the First Circuit. D.V.D. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 26-1212, Order Granting Emergency Mot. For Stay (1st Cir. Mar. 16, 2026).
60.	In other cases, a nationwide injunction was first stayed and then vacated. Those cases are categorized as the inunction having been vacated.
61.	United States v. Shilling, 145 S. Ct. 2695 (Mem.) (2025).
62.	These types of emergency rulings by the Supreme Court have attracted significant attention in recent years. For additional discussion of Supreme Court emergency litigation, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11391, The "Interim Docket" or "Shadow Docket": Non-Merits Matters at the Supreme Court, by Joanna R. Lampe (2026).
63.	Dep't of State v. Aids Vaccine Advocacy Coal., 146 S.Ct. 19 (Mem.) (2025).
64.	Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., AFL-CIO v. Trump, 155 F.4th 1082 (9th Cir. 2025).
65.	For discussion of circumstances in which an agency may decline to follow a judicial order invalidating a policy—for example, by refusing to follow the case law of one court of appeals in actions it takes that will be reviewed by a different court of appeals—see CRS Report R47882, Agency Nonacquiescence: An Overview of Constitutional and Practical Considerations, by Benjamin M. Barczewski (2023).
66.	The government is now subject to a nationwide injunction in another case requiring repayment of tariffs that were invalidated in this case. See Atmus Filtration, Inc. v. United States, No. 26-01259, 2026 WL 616128 (C.I.T. 2026).
67.	See Stip. Dismiss., Mass. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev., No. 25-30041-RGS (D. Mass. Dec. 22, 2025); Settlement Agr., Am. Library Ass'n v. Sonderling, No. 1:25-cv-01050 (D.D.C. May 1, 2025), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/ALA-v-Sonderling-Settlement-Agreement-as-of-April-9-2026-signed-1-6.pdf; Jackson Moore & Sidney Wiswell, Project Labor Agreements – Twists and Turns and Remaining Uncertainty, Smith Anderson (Nov. 10, 2025), https://www.smithlaw.com/newsroom/publications/project-labor-agreements-twists-and-turns-and-remaining-uncertainty; Medical Researchers Win Permanent Restoration of Research on Federal Website, ACLU (Feb. 18, 2026), https://www.aclum.org/press-releases/medical-researchers-win-permanent-restoration-of-research-on-federal-website/. CRS has not found additional background information about the remaining dismissal.
68.	The government sought emergency relief from the Supreme Court, and Justice Jackson granted a temporary administrative stay. Rollins v. R.I. State Council of Churches, No. 25A539, 2025 WL 3124183 (Mem) (S. Ct. Nov. 7, 2025). The administrative stay was temporarily extended, 146 S. Ct. 402 (Mem.) (2025), then the request for emergency relief was withdrawn the day the extended stay lapsed.
69.	The decision in this case stated that "the Court clarifies that it is not issuing universal relief. Instead, consistent with CASA, the Court is issuing only party-specific relief that is no broader than necessary to provide complete relief to Plaintiffs." 814 F. Supp. 3d at 1228. Because the district court decision enjoined portions of the challenged executive order in their entirety, it fits CRS's definition of a nationwide injunction, regardless of whether it is consistent with CASA because it is required to provide complete relief to the parties.
70.	The question of whether to include this order presented a close call. The court stated that it was granting relief to the named plaintiffs and classwide relief to the class of "[a]ll persons who do or will in the future record, observe, and/or protest against Operation Metro Surge and related operations that have been ongoing in this District since December 4, 2025." The order was limited to the judicial district, but it appears that it applied universally to all relevant persons, including nonparties, because all relevant conduct occurred in the district and a class had not yet been certified, even on a provisional basis. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit later stayed the district court's injunction, holding in part that "the grant of relief to such a broad uncertified class is just a universal injunction by another name." Tincher v. Noem, 164 F.4th 1097, 1099 (8th Cir. 2026).
71.	The court in this case held that CASA "does not apply to the orders that will be issued in this case" due to the particular national jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade. 2026 WL 616128, at *1. The order was later amended and superseded by another with a substantively identical holding, 2026 WL 679285 (C.I.T. Mar. 5, 2026), and "suspended to the extent that it directs immediate compliance," 2026 WL 661636 (C.I.T. Mar. 6, 2026).
72.	CRS identified and reviewed over 450 cases citing CASA. While many of those cases cited CASA's holding related to nationwide injunctions, see, e.g., Los Angeles Press Club v. Noem, 171 F. 4th 1179, 1191 (9th Cir. 2026) ("The preliminary injunction here is overbroad in some respects. . . . First, several provisions expressly apply to non-parties and are broader than necessary to afford 'complete relief to the plaintiffs before the court.'") (quoting Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 852 (2025)); Vaping Dragon LLC v. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., No. 1:25-CV-081-H, 2026 WL 266277 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2026) (denying nationwide injunction because the plaintiff did "not explain how a universal injunction is necessary to afford it 'complete relief'") (quoting CASA, 606 U.S. at 852), some cited other portions of the opinion, including but not limited to the proposition that the government suffers irreparable harm whenever it is enjoined from implementing its policies, see, e.g., Tincher v. Noem, 164 F.4th 1097, 1100 (8th Cir. 2026).
73.	See, e.g., R.I. State Council of Churches v. Rollins, No. 25-cv-569-JJM-AEM, 2025 WL 3050100, at *1 n.2 (D.R.I. Nov. 1, 2025) (citing CASA and holding, "Given the geographic diversity of Plaintiffs and their membership as well as the injuries certain Plaintiffs suffer from the elimination of SNAP in their communities, a limited order would not provide complete relief."); Washington v. Trump, 814 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1228 (D. Wash. 2026) ("the Court clarifies that it is not issuing universal relief. Instead, consistent with CASA, the Court is issuing only party-specific relief that is no broader than necessary to provide complete relief to Plaintiffs"); cf. New York v. Kennedy, 789 F. Supp. 3d 174, 213 (D.R.I 2026) (in decision issued less than a week after CASA, directing the parties to "file a notice with the Court . . . addressing the way in which (if at all) [CASA] impacts the scope of this Order.").
74.	See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).
75.	See, e.g., Pacito v. Trump, 169 F.4th 895, 939 (9th Cir. 2026); Louisiana by & through Murrill v. Food & Drug Administration, 175 F.4th 310, 323 (5th Cir. 2026).
76.	CASA, 606 U.S. at 861 (citing Maryland v. King, 567 U. S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers)).
77.	See, e.g., Steve Vladeck, 173. Justice Kavanaugh and the Equities, One First (Aug. 18, 2025), https://www.stevevladeck.com/p/173-justice-kavanaugh-and-the-equities.
78.	See, e.g., Carolyn Shapiro, Whose Irreparable Harm?, SCOTUSblog (July 10, 2025), https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/07/whose-irreparable-harm/.
79.	See, e.g., Tincher v. Noem, 164 F.4th 1097, 1100 (8th Cir. 2026); Dickinson v. Trump, 174 F.4th 634, 648 (9th Cir. 2026); Herrera v. Noem, 2026 WL 800721, at *15 (D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2026).
80.	Nationwide injunctions have frequently been used to challenge executive orders in part because APA relief is unavailable in that context. The APA does not apply to presidential actions, so it cannot be invoked to challenge executive orders. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992).
81.	Donald Trump's Executive Orders and Actions, 2025-2026, Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Donald_Trump%27s_executive_orders_and_actions,_2025-2026.
82.	Id.
83.	See 2025 Donald J. Trump Executive Orders, Federal Register, https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-documents/executive-orders/donald-trump/2025.
84.	See id.; 2026 Donald J. Trump Executive Orders, Federal Register, https://www.federalregister.gov/presidential-documents/executive-orders/donald-trump/2026.
85.	For instance, on the first day of his second term, President Trump issued 26 executive orders, including the Birthright Citizenship E.O. as well as executive orders limiting diversity, equity, and inclusion policies, Ending Radical And Wasteful Government DEI Programs And Preferencing, Exec. Order No. 14151, 90 Fed. Reg. 8339 (Jan. 20, 2025); establishing the Department of Government Efficiency, Establishing And Implementing The President's "Department Of Government Efficiency," Exec. Order No. 14158, 90 Fed. Reg. 8441 (Jan. 20, 2025); and recognizing "two sexes, male and female," that "are not changeable," Defending Women From Gender Ideology Extremism And Restoring Biological Truth To The Federal Government, Exec. Order No. 14168, 90 Fed. Reg. 8615 (Jan. 20, 2025).
86.	See, e.g., Barbara v. Trump, No. 25-cv-244-JL-AJ, 2025 WL 1904338 (D.N.H. July 10, 2025) (provisionally certifying a class of all infants affected by the Birthright Citizenship E.O. and issuing a class-wide PI); City of Columbus v. Kennedy, 796 F. Supp. 3d 123 (D. Md. 2025) (holding that "the limiting principle on universal or national injunctions announced in CASA does not apply to APA cases like the one at bar" and granting APA stay).
87.	The lead case in Trump v. CASA is one example of this. That case was not initially filed as a class action, but on remand following the Supreme Court's decision, the plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint and sought a classwide PI, which the district court granted. See CASA, Inc. v. Trump, 793 F. Supp. 3d 687 (D. Md. 2025).
88.	See Lampe & Deal, supra note 3.
89.	See District Court Reform, supra note 22.
90.	See Lampe & Deal, supra note 3.
91.	Trump v. CASA, 606 U.S. 831, 852–53 (2026).
92.	Id. at 851–52 & n.12.
93.	See, e.g., Kyle Cheney, Hassan Ali Kanu & Erica Orden, Trump Adversaries See Silver Linings in his 'Monumental' Supreme Court Win, Politico (June 27, 2025), https://www.politico.com/news/2025/06/27/trump-supreme-court-birthright-injunction-loopholes-00430225 [https://perma.cc/K67Q-BDAA].
94.	Cities and counties also sought and were awarded nationwide injunctions during the relevant time period. In some cases, both states and cities or counties challenged a federal policy. See, e.g., Doe v. Trump, 766 F. Supp. 3d 266 (D. Mass. 2025) (including claims by states, the District of Columbia, and San Francisco). Cities or counties were plaintiffs in an additional two of the cases in Table 1 in which states were not plaintiffs (5.9%).
95.	Cities or counties were plaintiffs in another two cases in Table 2 (14.3%) in which states were not plaintiffs.
96.	See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).
97.	See generally "The Debate over Nationwide Injunctions," CRS Report R46902, Nationwide Injunctions: Law, History, and Proposals for Reform, by Joanna R. Lampe (2021).
98.	See, e.g., Suzette Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National Injunction, 131 Harv. L. Rev. F. 56, 61 (2017); Rule by District Judge: The Challenges of Universal Injunctions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 6 (2020) (statement of Prof. Mila Sohoni).
99.	Id.
100.	Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 880, 917 (2025) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
101.	Id. at 921, 934 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
102.	Id. at 934.
103.	See, e.g., Mila Sohoni, Trump v. CASA and the Future of the Universal Injunction, SCOTUSblog (July 2, 2025), https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/07/trump-v-casa-and-the-future-of-the-universal-injunction/; Harold Hongju Koh et. al., After CASA: The Administrative Procedure Act Option for Challenging the Birthright Citizenship and Other Illegal Executive Actions, Just Security (June 30, 2025), https://www.justsecurity.org/115917/trump-casa-administrative-procedure-universal-injunctions/.
104.	Transcript of Oral Argument, Trump v. CASA, Inc., No. 24A884, 47–51 (U.S. May 15, 2025).
105.	Id. at 51; see also Trump v. Barbara, No. 25–365, 2026 WL 1870543 (June 30, 2026).
106.	See, e.g., Brian Fitzpatrick, The perils of using class actions as a replacement for universal injunctions, SCOTUSblog (Aug. 12, 2026), https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/08/the-perils-of-using-class-actions-as-a-replacement-for-universal-injunctions/ (expressing "grave misgivings" about injunctive relief in favor of provisional classes); Elias Neibart, The Rise of the All-Writs-Act-Putative-Class-Injunction?, 77 Baylor. L. Rev. 681, 703–04 (2025) ("Increasingly, courts have been issuing preliminary relief to non-certified classes. . . . Preliminary relief given to putative classes is relief given to non-parties. . . . As CASA makes clear, giving relief to non-parties offends equity—and it might offend Article III, too.").
107.	See generally Lampe, supra note 97.
108.	See id. Some also raise constitutional objections to nationwide injunctions, arguing that they award relief to people who are not parties to the litigation and who may lack standing to seek relief in federal court. See id. The Supreme Court declined to address that issue in CASA. See Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 839 (2025).
109.	See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
110.	CASA., 606 U.S.at 862–63, 865 (2025) (Thomas, J., concurring).
111.	Id. at 868 (2025) (Alito, J., concurring).
112.	See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
113.	See e.g., Guaiquire v. Quinones, 818 F. Supp. 3d 1309, 1314 n.4 (M.D. Fla. 2026) ("That petitioners who have the misfortune to be assigned to one of these outlier judges must remain unlawfully detained while others are set free does not escape this Court's notice. This disparate treatment is a consequence of district courts' recent loss of the power to issue nationwide injunctions.").
114.	See, e.g., Beth A. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy, DOJ, Discussion on Nationwide Injunctions: Introductory Remarks, 2019 Federalist Society Texas Chapter Conference, 24 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 315, 318 (2020); Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1065, 1108 (2018).
115.	See, e.g., Steve Vladeck, 162. What Does the Birthright Citizenship Ruling Portend?, One First (June 27, 2025), https://www.stevevladeck.com/p/162-what-does-the-birthright-citizenship; Alan B. Morrison, Trump v. CASA, Inc.: A Non-Universal Response to the Universal Injunction Problem, Geo. Wash. L. Rev. On the Docket (July 10, 2025), https://www.gwlr.org/non-universal-response-to-the-universal-injunction-problem.
116.	See Trump v. CASA, Inc, 606 U.S. 831, 841 n.4 (2025).
117.	See, e.g., Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (mem.) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 716 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
118.	See Lampe, supra note 6, at 23–25.
119.	See id. at 24.
120.	For discussion of class actions in the wake of CASA, see Adkins, supra note 4. For discussion of Congress's ability to amend federal court procedural rules, see CRS In Focus IF11557, Congress, the Judiciary, and Civil and Criminal Procedure, by Joanna R. Lampe (2020).
121.	For more information on standing, see Lib. of Cong., Overview of Standing, Constitution Annotated, https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artIII-S2-C1-6-1/ALDE_00012992/ (last visited June 9, 2026).