Democracy and Human Rights Promotion in the Trump Administration's Foreign Policy: In Brief

Contents

• Background
• Change in Prioritization of Democracy and Human Rights Promotion Abroad
• Emphasis on Ideological and Political Priorities
• Congressional Response
• Options for Congress

Background

U.S. law states that the promotion and protection of democracy and human rights are "principal" and "fundamental" goals of U.S. foreign policy.¹ Congress, having enacted such goals, has shaped the manner and degree to which U.S. government policy strives to achieve them in practice. Since the 1970s in particular, Congress has prescribed an array of statutory provisions and associated policy tools to address matters related to democracy and human rights promotion in foreign contexts. Congress authorizes, appropriates resources for, and oversees the use of these tools.

Proponents of U.S. democracy and human rights promotion have argued for these efforts on the basis of long-term U.S. interests as well as on moral grounds. Some proponents have contended, for example, that rights-respecting democracies are more reliable U.S. partners, less likely to go to war with one another, and less frequently associated with threats to U.S. security—such as instability, terrorism, transnational crime, and migration crises—than non-democracies. Other analysts have questioned the extent to which foreign government regime types and human rights conditions abroad are vital to U.S. interests, or have expressed doubts about the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to help improve democracy and human rights conditions abroad.

The extent to which presidential Administrations have prioritized promoting democracy and human rights abroad as U.S. foreign policy objectives has varied. Administrations' political and ideological priorities also have influenced to some degree the specific issues or countries that have been the focus of democracy and human rights policies. These variations across executive branch Administrations, coupled with laws that articulate broad U.S. policy in this area and require certain executive branch actions, have resulted in both policy continuity and some discontinuities across time. Relative to other Administrations in the post-Cold War era, the second Trump Administration appears to have put less priority on the promotion of democracy and human rights in other countries as foreign policy objectives, and has asserted that some associated activities and expenditures do not align with U.S. interests.

Change in Prioritization of Democracy and Human Rights Promotion Abroad

Various statements and actions of the second Trump Administration suggest it has put less priority on democracy and human rights promotion abroad as U.S. foreign policy objectives relative to other Administrations in the post-Cold War era, including the first Trump Administration. The first Trump Administration's December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), for instance, framed various challenges to U.S. interests as "fundamentally political contests between those who favor repressive systems and those who favor free societies";⁶ asserted that advancing democracy had historically supported U.S. interests; encouraged other countries "to join our community of like-minded democratic states and improve the condition of their peoples"; and vowed to "continue to champion American values and offer encouragement to those struggling for human dignity in their societies."⁷ The second Trump Administration's November 2025 NSS (publicly released in December 2025) states that the United States does not seek to "impos(e)" on other countries "democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions or histories," except when "push[ing] like-minded friends to uphold our shared norms":

We seek good relations and peaceful commercial relations with the nations of the world without imposing on them democratic or other social change that differs widely from their traditions and histories. We recognize and affirm that there is nothing inconsistent or hypocritical in acting according to such a realistic assessment or in maintaining good relations with countries whose governing systems and societies differ from ours even as we push like-minded friends to uphold our shared norms, furthering our interests as we do so.... We will oppose elite-driven, anti-democratic restrictions on core liberties in Europe, the Anglosphere, and the rest of the democratic world, especially among our allies.⁸

The 2025 NSS appears to be the first NSS document in the post-Cold War era that does not articulate objectives related to the promotion of democratic values globally.⁹ Consistent with the 2025 NSS, the State Department's 2026-2030 strategic plan, released in January 2026, does not describe a general goal of promoting democracy and human rights.¹⁰ Several actions by the second Trump Administration also suggest movement away from prioritizing democracy and human rights promotion abroad as U.S. foreign policy objectives. Among them:

• In early 2025, the Trump Administration initiated a review of nearly all foreign assistance, paused assistance programs globally, and then reportedly terminated most democracy and human rights projects administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the State Department. In general, such programs had been congressionally directed to support good governance, credible elections, human rights, the rule of law, and related aims. The Administration also sought to withhold appropriated funding for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a private nonprofit organization that promotes democracy globally and has been chiefly funded by congressional appropriations pursuant to the National Endowment for Democracy Act.¹¹ The Administration later proposed, and Congress approved, rescinding a substantial amount of FY2025 funding for foreign assistance accounts used to fund democracy assistance.¹² A subsequent August 2025 "pocket rescission" proposal by the Administration resulted in the further cancellation of funding appropriated in prior years for such accounts, without action from Congress.¹³ The Administration largely dismantled USAID, which has generally administered funding for a large portion of U.S. democracy promotion assistance.¹⁴
• The Administration in early 2025 initiated a broad reorganization of the State Department in order to, according to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, consolidate region-specific functions, remove "redundant offices," and eliminate "non-statutory programs that are misaligned with America's core national interests."¹⁵ The reorganization entailed the elimination of the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and the closure of most offices of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) as well as certain other human rights-related offices.¹⁶ The DRL Assistant Secretary position, which is statutorily mandated, was retained.¹⁷
• Consistent with policy under the first Trump Administration, President Trump in February 2025 stated that the United States would not seek election to the UN Human Rights Council and directed that U.S. funding be withheld from the Council, arguing that it "has protected human rights abusers by allowing them to use the organization to shield themselves from scrutiny."¹⁸ In contrast with prior Administrations (including the first Trump Administration), the Administration has declined to participate in the Council's Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of the United States' human rights record.¹⁹ In January 2026, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from several other international organizations related to democracy and human rights (among other international organizations).²⁰
• In July 2025, Secretary of State Rubio reportedly put in place a policy generally restricting the State Department from publicly commenting on the fairness or integrity of foreign elections "or the democratic values of the country in question."²¹ The policy reportedly cited "the administration's emphasis on national sovereignty."²² Under most prior Administrations in the post-Cold War era, the State Department had publicly criticized foreign electoral processes that the department assessed fell short of standards for free and fair elections. The State Department has continued to reference shared democratic values in some public statements about foreign elections.²³
• The Administration in August 2025 "streamlined" the scope of the State Department's most recent annual human rights reports;²⁴ the narrowed scope and substance of the reports drew criticisms from some human rights organizations. See related discussion below and CRS In Focus IF10795, Global Human Rights: The Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. To date, the State Department has not released statutorily mandated annual reports on International Religious Freedom (IRF) covering calendar years 2024 and 2025.²⁵
• The Administration in 2025 used targeted human rights sanctions tools less frequently than the Biden and first Trump Administrations did, according to a data comparison by a nongovernmental human rights organization.²⁶

Some actions by the Trump Administration have prompted legal challenges related to, in part, whether such actions usurped congressional powers.²⁷ Relatedly, some observers have argued that the Administration's reorganizations and staffing cuts have implications for the capacity of the executive branch to implement democracy- and human rights-related laws.²⁸

The Trump Administration has addressed democracy- and human rights-related issues abroad in some contexts. For example, the Administration has imposed targeted sanctions in response to democracy- or human rights-related issues in several countries, including Honduras, Nicaragua, Cuba, Iran, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), among others.²⁹ The Administration also has taken some policy actions related to promoting IRF, including a visa restriction policy for individuals involved in religious freedom violations announced in December 2025.³⁰ After many IRF foreign assistance programs were reportedly terminated following the aforementioned 2025 U.S. foreign aid review,³¹ the State Department in 2026 began soliciting proposals for some new IRF assistance programs.³²

The Administration has also cited democracy- or human rights-related rationales in connection with overseas military operations, though such issues have generally not been the primary stated reason for these actions. The Administration described December 2025 U.S. military strikes against Islamic State targets in Nigeria as intended to protect Christians suffering violence.³³ In Venezuela, the Administration did not emphasize the restoration of democracy as an immediate objective following the January 2026 U.S. operation to capture and arrest President Nicolás Maduro. Secretary of State Rubio has described a long-term objective of free and fair elections in the country.³⁴ The Administration has backed Maduro's vice president to serve as acting president rather than opposition leaders that the State Department previously recognized as having won Venezuela's 2024 presidential election, and U.S. engagement following Maduro's ouster to date has focused primarily on stabilizing Venezuela's economic situation.³⁵ In Iran, President Trump referred to facilitating regime change and freedom for the Iranian people as among the objectives of the U.S. military campaign launched in February 2026. The Administration has since stated at times that its objectives have largely been achieved, even as Iran's repressive government remains in place.³⁶ Some U.S. actions and Administration statements during the Iran conflict (including a social media post in April 2026 that referred to "destroy[ing]" Iran's "civilization") appear incongruent with stated democracy-related goals, and some observers have raised human rights or humanitarian law concerns.³⁷

Emphasis on Ideological and Political Priorities

The Administration has justified some of its actions to curtail certain U.S. policy efforts related to the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad as respecting the sovereignty of other countries.³⁸ Some Administration actions or reported plans appear also to reflect the Administration's ideological and political priorities. The Administration has described some actions as a correction to "left-wing" or "liberal" ideology supported under prior U.S. policy.³⁹

Changes to State Department Human Rights Reports. The statutory requirements for the State Department's annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices mandate a "full and complete report" on the status of "internationally recognized human rights" in foreign countries. These provisions also specifically require discussion of some issues (e.g., press freedom), but do not explicitly mandate coverage of most human rights.⁴⁰ Some prior Administrations in the post-Cold War era have added or removed certain non-statutorily required topics from the reports to reflect their priorities, while maintaining an otherwise heretofore broadly consistent structure and substantive scope. In August 2025, the State Department "streamlined" the scope of the reports covering 2024,⁴¹ removing coverage of several human rights topics that are set out in international human rights documents and that had been included in prior iterations of the reports since at least 1990, but that are not specifically required in statute.⁴² These include fair trial rights, privacy rights, freedom of peaceful assembly and association, freedom of movement, freedom to participate in the political process/elections, and discrimination. Other topics that had been included in the reports for roughly two decades were also removed.⁴³

In November 2025, the State Department reportedly issued internal instructions that, in preparation for the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices covering 2025, U.S. diplomatic missions were to report on several topics of concern to the Trump Administration, including diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) policies; the prevalence of abortion; gender-transition surgery among children; and mass migration.⁴⁴ These topics are not statutorily required and have not been included in prior iterations of the reports. According to one media report, the State Department also directed staff not to cite any nongovernmental source that advances policies inconsistent with Administration executive orders (e.g., concerning DEI).⁴⁵ The reports covering 2025 were statutorily due to Congress by February 25, 2026. They have not yet been released as of the date of this report.

Emphasis on Europe and Support for Foreign Ideological Allies. Trump Administration statements and documents suggest that the Administration intends to emphasize purported challenges to human rights and democracy within the democracies of Europe—a shift from the focus of many prior Administrations, which generally focused on fledgling democracies and authoritarian states with poor human rights records.⁴⁶ The aforementioned State Department reorganization created new offices and positions reportedly to focus in part on "criticisms of free speech backsliding in Europe and other developed nations," while eliminating long-standing DRL geographic offices that focused on democracy- and human rights-related issues in other regions around the world.⁴⁷ The Administration's 2025 NSS appears to be the first NSS document to raise democracy- and human rights-related concerns about the longstanding democracies of Europe.⁴⁸ The 2025 NSS states that the United States will prioritize "cultivating resistance to Europe's current trajectory within European nations," which risks "civilizational erasure" from "activities of the European Union and other transnational bodies that undermine political liberty and sovereignty, migration policies that are transforming the continent and creating strife, censorship of free speech and suppression of political opposition, cratering birthrates, and loss of national identities and self-confidence." The NSS expresses support for "the growing influence of patriotic European parties." Some media reports indicate that the Administration is exploring efforts to fund ideologically aligned think tanks and policy groups in Western Europe.⁴⁹

The Administration has openly advocated for its favored political leaders or parties in some foreign elections. Ahead of April 2026 elections in Hungary, for example, the Administration urged Hungarians to support the ruling government under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.⁵⁰ (Nongovernmental democracy research organizations assess that Hungary experienced democratic backsliding under Orbán, who, prior to his party's defeat in the 2026 elections, had led Hungary since 2010.⁵¹) President Trump also has used carrots and sticks to support ideologically aligned political figures in Latin America and in some cases has overtly pledged to condition positive bilateral relations on his favored political leaders or parties prevailing in elections.⁵² Some critics have argued that the Administration has used human rights sanctions tools in some instances to support the President's foreign political allies or punish disfavored figures.⁵³

Statutory provisions concerning democracy and human rights promotion objectives and policy tools broadly emphasize developing democracy- and human rights-supportive principles, practices, and institutions in foreign countries.⁵⁴ Some provisions impose restrictions on seeking particular electoral outcomes. Section 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, which authorizes certain foreign assistance for purposes of promoting civil and political rights, states that "none of these funds may be used, directly or indirectly, to influence the outcome of any election in any country."⁵⁵ At the same time, appropriations acts have generally provided the executive branch with broad flexibility by specifying that democracy assistance programs may be implemented "notwithstanding" other provisions of law.⁵⁶

Congressional Response

Views vary among Members of Congress over how and to what extent U.S. foreign policy should emphasize promotion of and assistance for democracy and human rights abroad. In the 119^th Congress, some congressional statements and enacted legislation appear to reflect broad support for U.S. foreign policy to continue addressing these issues.⁵⁷ Members have had contrasting reactions to some democracy- and human rights-related actions by the Administration (e.g., foreign assistance terminations and pertinent aspects of the State Department reorganization).⁵⁸ Congressional interests and priorities with respect to these issues have been expressed in part through enacted appropriations legislation. In response to an Administration proposal, Congress enacted a law (P.L. 119-28) in July 2025 that rescinded funding for several foreign assistance accounts, including some used to fund democracy assistance programs. In February 2026, Congress enacted the FY2026 National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act (NSRP; Division F of P.L. 119-75), which directed that $2.175 billion should be made available for democracy assistance programs.⁵⁹ This compares to $2.9 billion directed for such programs in FY2025 (as carried forward from FY2024 through continuing resolutions).

The FY2026 NSRP includes a broad definition of democracy assistance programs consistent with that included in prior appropriations laws,⁶⁰ while the accompanying explanatory statement specifies that such programs are to focus on "adversarial, anti-American countries, countries whose malign activities pose a national security threat to the United States, or countries seeking to strengthen democratic institutions and processes."⁶¹ Reflecting USAID's now-diminished role, the law appropriates democracy assistance-related foreign assistance accounts solely to the State Department, including $205 million in Democracy Fund resources to be managed by the DRL bureau.⁶² The accompanying explanatory statement requires regular reporting to Congress on terminated foreign assistance awards that had been funded using prior year appropriations and, separately, on the status of FY2026 appropriated funds (i.e., the amounts apportioned, allocated, obligated, and disbursed).

Separate from the aforementioned foreign assistance appropriations, the FY2026 NSRP appropriates $315 million for NED, the same level as in FY2025 (as carried forward from FY2024 through continuing resolutions).⁶³ The law also retains several long-standing recurring foreign policy provisions related to democracy and human rights promotion.⁶⁴ The explanatory statement requires a report detailing changes to Leahy Law human rights vetting of foreign security force units resulting from the State Department's 2025 reorganization.⁶⁵

In April 2026, the House Appropriations Committee reported a FY2027 NSRP bill (H.R. 8595; H.Rept. 119-631) that, if enacted, would direct that $2.175 billion be made available for democracy assistance programs and would appropriate $296.1 million for NED.⁶⁶

Options for Congress

Congress for decades has debated the integration of democracy and human rights promotion concerns in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, at times pushing the executive branch to place greater and more consistent emphasis on these objectives. As it has with prior Administrations, Congress may conduct oversight over executive branch actions and consider whether to accept, reject, or seek to modify the executive branch's policy approach. Members may consider whether to take legislative or other action to further prescribe U.S. policy related to promoting democracy and human rights abroad in a manner reflective of congressional priorities. More broadly, Congress may assess the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to promote democracy and human rights abroad, and consider the prioritization of such efforts relative to other U.S. foreign policy objectives. Possible options for Congress include the following:

• Assessing the effectiveness of U.S. policies and activities to promote democracy and human rights abroad in advancing U.S. foreign policy interests over the decades and considering possible lessons learned or potential reforms.
• Considering the extent to which existing statutory provisions related to the promotion of democracy and protection of human rights abroad in U.S. foreign policy reflect the current views of Congress.
• Considering how much, if any, funding to direct for foreign assistance programs to promote democracy and human rights abroad and whether and how to take steps to ensure any such appropriations are expended in accordance with congressional intent. Such consideration may be informed by review of assessments of the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of prior programs, assessments of the impacts of the democracy assistance terminations in 2025, and review of the Administration's budget request or other Administration documents.
• Prescribing that U.S. democracy promotion activities focus on particular countries, categories of countries, or issues (e.g., Congress may consider the extent to which, if at all, democracy assistance resources should focus on longstanding, established democracies, versus fledgling democracies and countries with authoritarian governments or poor human rights records).
• Conducting oversight over U.S. government activities that entail one-sided support for particular political groups or figures within foreign democracies, particularly in the context of elections. Were Congress to assess that such activities are contrary to U.S. interests, Congress could consider placing limits on executive branch activities, such as by enacting legislation barring funding from being used to influence overseas election outcomes. Conversely, were Congress to assess that such activities support U.S. interests, Congress could consider maintaining or enhancing the executive branch's ability to take such action.
• Further shaping the particular democracy and human rights promotion-related objectives that U.S. foreign policy emphasizes, such as by amending the statutory requirements for the State Department's annual human rights reports. Such amendments could, for example, articulate a more (or less) prescriptive overarching topical scope or require increased (or decreased) coverage of specific issues.
• Conducting oversight of the executive branch's implementation of existing statutory requirements related to democracy and human rights promotion abroad, including assessing the impact of the State Department's reorganization and related staffing cuts.
• Assessing the effectiveness and implications of the Administration's shifting greater responsibility for democracy and human rights promotion policy and foreign assistance to the State Department's regional bureaus (as opposed to functional bureaus/offices within the State Department, such as the DRL bureau, or USAID). Based on such assessment, Congress may choose to endorse and possibly codify the Administration's approach, may seek to establish or re-establish functional offices to focus on issues related to democracy and human rights and/or direct resources to support the work of such offices, or may pursue other institutional arrangements and bureaucratic entities.

Footnotes