



Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum

Updated May 18, 2026

In 2025, President Trump expanded and increased existing steel and aluminum tariffs, imposed since 2018 under [Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 \(19 U.S.C. §1862\)](#). Section 232 authorizes the President to impose trade restrictions if the Secretary of Commerce determines that imports of a good “threaten to impair the U.S. national security.” The United States imposes tariffs on steel, aluminum, and products containing steel and aluminum (“derivatives”) from nearly all trading partners. Congress may consider whether to exercise its legislative prerogatives related to trade policy and/or monitor potential effects of steel and aluminum tariffs on the U.S. economy.

Background

In 2018, President Trump proclaimed a [25% tariff on steel](#) and a [10% tariff on aluminum](#) imports from most trading partners following a Commerce Department investigation. In 2020, President Trump expanded the tariffs to include 13 new product codes for [steel and aluminum derivatives](#). The Biden Administration largely maintained these tariffs and, in 2023, [increased tariffs on imports of Russian aluminum to 200%](#) in response to Russia’s war on Ukraine. From 2018 to 2022, the United States negotiated country exemptions from the tariffs and granted [entity-specific exclusions](#) as well as [General Approved Exclusions \(GAEs\)](#) applicable to any importer.

Modifications During the Second Trump Administration

February 2025. President Trump modified the Section 232 [steel](#) and [aluminum](#) tariffs, including to

- increase aluminum tariffs to 25%, eliminate all country exemptions (see **Error! Reference source not found.**), and terminate all existing GAEs effective March 2025;
- prohibit new product exclusions (entity-specific product exclusions to “remain effective until their expiration date or until excluded product volume is imported, whichever occurs first”);
- expand the scope of derivatives covered; and
- direct the Commerce Secretary to establish an “inclusions” process to allow U.S. stakeholders to request the addition of derivatives to the scope of tariffs.

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President Trump [stated](#) that he terminated country exemptions and product exclusions because they “undermine” the tariffs’ objectives, such as increasing U.S. production.

Figure 1. Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Country Exemptions Terminated in March 2025

Eliminated by Proclamations 10895 and 10896

	STEEL	ALUMINUM
Argentina*	●	●
Australia	●	●
Brazil*	●	
Canada	●	●
European Union countries*	●	●
Japan*	●	
Mexico	●	●
South Korea*	●	
Ukraine**	●	
United Kingdom*	●	●

* Negotiated import quota
** Temporary tariff suspension

Source: CRS, from various presidential proclamations. With the exception of Ukraine, country exemptions terminated in March 2025 were granted between 2018 to 2022.

June 2025. President Trump [increased](#) both steel and aluminum tariffs to 50%, except for imports from the United Kingdom (UK), which faced a 25% tariff pursuant to the [U.S.-UK Economic Prosperity Deal](#). For most derivatives, Section 232 tariffs applied only to the steel or aluminum content and did not apply to derivatives containing only U.S.-sourced steel or aluminum.

August 2025. Following the [first-ever inclusions process](#), the Commerce Department [added](#) more than 400 product codes within the scope of tariffs.

April 2026. President Trump made significant [changes](#) to the tariffs, including imposing tariffs on the full value of goods (not just the metal content), lowering/eliminating tariffs for certain derivatives, imposing a 10% tariff on derivatives containing primarily U.S.-sourced steel and aluminum, and eliminating the inclusions process (see [Table 1](#)). The White House [stated](#) that a reduced tariff rate of 15% on certain industrial and electrical grid equipment through 2027 was aimed at supporting companies’ investments in new or expanded U.S. production. The White House [asserted](#) that the April 2026 changes strengthen the tariffs and more effectively protect U.S. national security. At a [House Ways and Means hearing](#), U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer stated that the exclusion of some derivatives from tariffs and simplified compliance requirements in the April 2026 proclamation could benefit some U.S. manufacturers that may have been negatively affected by tariffs. [Other analyses](#) found that some products may face higher tariffs under the new rules.

Relation to Other Tariffs. Goods subject to [Section 232 automotive tariffs](#) are exempt from steel and aluminum tariffs. Temporary global 10% tariffs implemented under [Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974](#) do not apply to products covered by Section 232 tariffs. Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs apply in addition to

- most-favored nation (MFN) tariffs imposed on goods from most trading partners without a U.S. [free trade agreement](#) (FTA) or which do not meet FTA rules (also called Column 1 duties);
- [trade remedies](#); and
- tariffs under [Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974](#).

Potential Implications for the U.S. Economy

In 2025, the United States imported \$25 billion worth of steel articles—20% less than 2024—and \$18 billion worth of aluminum—5% less than 2024 (see **Table 2**), excluding derivatives. Some U.S. [steel](#) and [aluminum](#) producers assert that tariffs are critical for boosting U.S. production. Other groups [assert](#) that the 2025 tariff expansion has negatively affected U.S. manufacturers. [Some groups](#) are seeking further expansion of the tariffs. [Some groups](#) support the tariff actions while also emphasizing policy alignment in North America through the [U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement](#) (USMCA). Currently, Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs apply to USMCA-compliant goods. Since [September 2025](#), Canada has imposed [25% tariffs](#) on C\$15.6 billion (approximately \$11 billion) worth of U.S. steel and aluminum imports. Except for the abovementioned U.S.-UK deal and limited exceptions for aircraft-related goods, U.S. bilateral framework agreements have not addressed steel and aluminum tariffs.

Issues for Congress

Some Members support the tariffs and advocate for expanding the President’s tariff authorities, including under Section 232 (e.g., H.R. 735). Others argue that Congress should play a stronger role in overseeing U.S. trade actions (e.g., S. 348, H.R. 1903). Some Members have called for more targeted tariffs or tariff exemptions to mitigate potential adverse impacts on the U.S. economy. Other Members have called for imposing tariffs on additional steel and aluminum products.

Some Members have called for commissioning reports on the potential economic effects of tariffs (e.g., H.R. 2287, H.R. 4326). In 2023, at the [direction of Congress](#), the U.S. International Trade Commission [analyzed](#) the effects of the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs on the U.S. economy.

Members also may consider the extent to which Congress should exercise oversight of [executive branch-led trade negotiations](#) or whether Section 232 tariffs violate [U.S. international trade obligations](#). For example, Section 232 tariffs were a key issue during the first Trump Administration’s negotiation of USMCA, which is scheduled to undergo a [review](#) in July 2026. As part of USMCA oversight, Members may assess whether the United States should maintain or eliminate Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs on Canada and Mexico or exempt USMCA-compliant products.

Table 1. Section 232 Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum

April 2026 Revisions

<p>Annex I-A (steel and aluminum articles, certain copper articles, certain steel/aluminum derivatives)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 50% tariff on full value • 25% tariff on full value of steel and aluminum articles and derivatives from the United Kingdom (UK) composed of at least 95% UK-sourced steel/aluminum (UK-origin steel articles made by Tata Steel UK may count steel from the Netherlands towards the 95% until January 2028) • 10% tariff on full value of derivatives composed of at least 95% U.S.-sourced steel, aluminum, and copper
<p>Annex I-B (certain steel/aluminum derivatives, certain copper articles)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 25% tariff on full value • 15% tariff on full value of steel and aluminum derivatives from the UK composed of at least 95% UK-sourced steel/aluminum (UK-origin steel articles made by Tata Steel UK may count steel from the Netherlands towards the 95% until January 2028) • 10% tariff on full value of derivatives composed of at least 95% U.S.-sourced steel, aluminum, and copper

<p>Annex I-A (steel and aluminum articles, certain copper articles, certain steel/aluminum derivatives)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 50% tariff on full value • 25% tariff on full value of steel and aluminum articles and derivatives from the United Kingdom (UK) composed of at least 95% UK-sourced steel/aluminum (UK-origin steel articles made by Tata Steel UK may count steel from the Netherlands towards the 95% until January 2028) • 10% tariff on full value of derivatives composed of at least 95% U.S.-sourced steel, aluminum, and copper
<p>Annex II (items not subject to tariffs)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Sec. 232 tariff • Goods not subject to Sec. 232 duties may no longer be exempt from other tariffs (e.g., those imposed under Sec. 122 of the Trade Act of 1974)
<p>Annex III (items with reduced tariffs until December 31, 2027)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Column I duty rate \geq15% 0% Sec. 232 tariff • Column I duty rate $<$15% Column I duty rate + Sec. 232 tariff = 15% • 25% tariff on products from trading partners with whom the United States does not maintain normal trading relations (i.e., Cuba, North Korea, Russia, Belarus) • For products composed of at least 95% U.S.-sourced steel/aluminum: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Column I duty rate \geq10% 0% Sec. 232 tariff • Column I duty rate $<$10% Column I duty rate + Sec. 232 tariff = 10%
<p>Annex IV (items not subject to tariffs)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Goods in Annex I-B or Annex III that do not contain any aluminum, steel, or copper content are not subject to Sec. 232 duties • Goods in Annex I-B or Annex III (except those in HTS chapter 72, 73, 74, or 76) are not subject to Sec. 232 duties if the weight of aluminum, steel, and/or copper is less than 15% of the weight of the imported article • Goods not subject to Sec. 232 duties may no longer be exempt from other tariffs (e.g., those imposed under Sec. 122 of the Trade Act of 1974)
<p>Other provisions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 0% tariff on certain parts listed in Annex I-B imported for use in motorcycle manufacturing; continued exemption for certain trading partners related to certain civil aircraft and aircraft parts • Inclusions processes terminated for steel, aluminum, and copper. The Commerce Secretary and U.S. Trade Representative may jointly determine to add products within the scope of tariffs • Russia-specific tariff codes (10%-50% for steel, copper; continued 200% tariff on aluminum)

Source: CRS, summary of key provisions from annexes in Proclamation 11021 of April 2, 2026; U.S. Customs and Border Protection Cargo Systems Messaging Service (CSMS) #68253075, April 3, 2026; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, "Notice of Technical Corrections to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States for Duties Imposed by Presidential Proclamation 11021," 91 FR 23056, April 29, 2026.

Note: In the same proclamation, President Trump also modified copper tariffs. See CRS Insight IN12614, *Section 232 National Security Tariffs on Copper Imports*.

Table 2. U.S. Steel and Aluminum Imports, 2024 and 2025
Millions of U.S. Dollars

Partner	2024		2025	
	Value	% Share Total Imports	Value	% Share Total Imports
Steel				
Canada	\$7,177.9	23%	\$4,560.1	18%
European Union	\$6,804.2	22%	\$5,831.2	23%
Mexico	\$3,530.3	11%	\$2,238.0	9%
South Korea	\$2,938.3	9%	\$2,448.8	10%
Brazil	\$2,910.4	9%	\$2,259.0	9%
All Other	\$8,168.5	26%	\$7,581.2	30%
Total Steel Imports	\$31,529.7	100%	\$24,918.3	100%
Aluminum				
Canada	\$9,440.1	51%	\$7,535.4	43%
European Union	\$1,540.4	8%	\$1,618.3	9%
United Arab Emirates	\$1,147.3	6%	\$1,512.3	9%
China	\$827.1	4%	\$528.9	3%
South Korea	\$797.8	4%	\$1,062.2	6%
Bahrain	\$605.7	3%	\$671.7	4%
All Other	\$4,214.1	23%	\$4,568.4	26%
Total Aluminum Imports	\$18,572.4	100%	\$17,566.0	100%

Source: CRS. General imports data from the U.S. Census Bureau (accessed via Trade Data Monitor, April 23, 2026) using U.S. Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) product codes for “articles of aluminum” and “articles of steel” attached to U.S. Customs and Border Protection CSMS [#68253075](#).

Notes: Table sorted by top import sources in 2024. This table *excludes* derivative articles. Columns may not sum due to rounding.

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