The U.S. Army's Typhon Mid-Range Capability (MRC) System

Updated April 20, 2026 (IF12135)

What Is the Army's Mid-Range Capability System?

Improved Chinese and Russian long-ranged artillery systems, uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs), and the proliferation of special munitions have renewed concerns about the potential operational impact of Russian and Chinese fires against U.S. forces. In response, the U.S. Army is improving the ability to deliver what it refers to as long-range precision fires (LRPF) by upgrading current artillery and missile systems, developing new longer-ranged systems (including hypersonic weapons), and modifying existing air-and sea-launched missiles for ground launch.

The Mid-Range Capability (MRC) system is part of the Army's LRPF modernization portfolio and is intended to hit targets at ranges between the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) and the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) system. The MRC system leverages existing Raytheon-produced SM-6 missiles and Raytheon-produced Tomahawk cruise missiles modified for ground launch. The MRC system is also known as the "Typhon" missile system (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Typhon Launchers and Battery Operations Center

Source: Joseph Trevithick, "Army Fires Tomahawk Missile from Its New Typhoon Battery in Major Milestone," TWZ, July 3, 2023, https://www.twz.com/army-fires-tomahawk-missile-from-its-new-typhon-battery-in-major-milestone.

MRC Weapon System Components

According to the Army, the MRC battery is planned to consist of four launchers and a battery operations center (BOC) (Figure 1). MRC batteries are to be equipped with a number of prime movers, trailers, generators, and support vehicles. The numbers of soldiers assigned to each battery is not known.

MRC Unit Organization

The Army plans to field one MRC battery in the Long-Range Fires Battalion of the Army's five regionally aligned Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) (Figure 2).

Figure 2. MDTF Organization

Source: Army Information Paper provided to CRS, April 10, 2025.

Notes: MDEB = Multi-Domain Effects Battalion; HHC = Headquarters and Headquarters Company; MI = Military Intelligence; ERSE = Extended Range Sensing Element; ID = Information Dominance; LRFB = Long-Range Fires Battalion; HHB = Headquarters and Headquarters Battery; LRHW = Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon; MRC = Mid-Range Capability; HIMARS = High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems; FSC = Forward Sustainment Company; IFPC = Integrated Fire Protection Capability; BSB = Brigade Support Battalion.

The Army describes MDTFs as "theater-level maneuver elements designed to synchronize precision effects and precision fires in all domains against adversary anti access/area denial [A2/AD] networks … enabling joint forces to execute their operational plan[s]."

Program Status

MRC Test Launches and Full Operational Capability

In June 2023, the Army reported,

The Army's Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office's Mid-Range Capability Project Office successfully demonstrated the launch of a Tomahawk missile from the Army's prototype Mid-Range Capability system. Soldiers assigned to the 1st MDTF conducted this live-fire event. This test follows the successful launch of an SM-6 missile from the Mid-Range Capability system earlier this year, confirming the full operational capability of the system.

MRC Battery Activations and Fielding

The Army accepted its first MRC battery in December 2022. Reportedly, the Army activated this first MRC battery—D Battery, 5th Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery Regiment—as part of Joint Base Lewis-McChord's (JBLM's) 1st MDTF in January 2024. Reportedly, a second Typhon battery has been activated at JBLM, WA, and this battery was to be assigned to the Hawaii-based 3rd MDTF later in 2025. It was also reported that,

the Army is working to field another three batteries to the remaining multidomain task force units between fiscal [years] 2026 and 2028 and plans to next field a battery to the 2nd MDTF based in Europe in fiscal [year] 2026.

MRC Activities in the Philippines

Reportedly, in January 2025, the Army moved Typhon launchers from Laoag airfield in the Philippines to another location on the island of Luzon. According to a Philippine government official, "The redeployment would help determine where and how fast the missile battery could be moved to a new firing position." U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) officials reportedly indicated that the United States "has coordinated closely with the Philippine government on every aspect of the MRC deployment, including the location" and further noted "the relocation was not an indication that the batteries would be permanently stationed in the Philippines." In terms of the impact of the Typhon deployment,

The weapon [Typhon] drew sharp criticism from China when it was first deployed in April 2024 during a training exercise. In September, when the United States said it had no immediate plans to pull the Typhons out of the Philippines, China and Russia condemned the deployment as fueling an arms race.

2025 MRC Live Fire Exercises

Reportedly, the Army did not plan to conduct a Typhon live fire exercise during spring 2025 exercises in the Philippines. It was further noted that the

Typhon has remained in the country, angering China, which has criticized the move and warned it could destabilize the region. Officials have yet to fire the missile system in the Philippines. It is unclear how long Typhon will remain in the Philippines or if it will go elsewhere in the Pacific theater.

Reportedly, the Army planned to conduct a Typhon live fire exercise during the summer as part of Exercise Talisman Sabre 25 in Australia.

Typhon Live Fire During Talisman Sabre 25

According to the U.S. Army Pacific Public Affairs Office,

The 3rd MDTF deployed a Mid-Range Capability [unit] to Australia and conducted a SM - 6 live fire on July 15, 2025, successfully sinking a maritime target in support of Exercise Talisman Sabre 25.

Army Considers Marine Corps Long-Range Fires System to Complement Typhon System

Reportedly, the Army has expressed interest in the Marines' new uncrewed LRF Tomahawk cruise missile launch vehicle to possibly complement the larger Typhon system. The Army reportedly is examining options to decrease the size of the existing Typhon system to make it "easier to deploy and operate based on lessons learned from its first overseas deployment to the Philippines." The tractor trailer-mounted Typhon has four launch cells, while the LRF has one launch cell.

FY2027 MRC Budget Request

According to FY2027 Department of Defense (currently using a secondary Department of War designation under Executive Order 14347, dated September 5, 2025) budget documents, the Army is requesting $370 million in FY2027 discretionary procurement funding and $2.33 billion in FY2027 mandatory procurement funding, for a total of $2.701 billion, for MRC system procurement. For FY2027 MRC Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funding, the Army is requesting $212 million in discretionary funding.

Potential Issues for Congress

"Shrinking" the Typhon MRC System

Reportedly, the Army, based on lessons learned, considers the current Typhon system configuration "a bit too large to operate on the battlefield" and "rather large [and] long, because it has to go to a vertical setup to fire the missile system." One potential solution said to be under consideration is the developmental Common Autonomous Multi-Domain Launcher (CAML), reportedly described as an "autonomous/optionally crewed, highly mobile, air transportable, cross domain fires launcher with the potential to augment or replace existing Army launchers." In its oversight role, Congress might examine progress of the CAML program and its suitability to potentially replace the current Typhon MRC configuration.

Potential Deterrence Value of MRC Units

Previously noted reports suggest China and Russia consider the deployment of MRC batteries in the Philippines and the Indo-Pacific as potentially "destabilizing" and that their presence in the region could lead to an "arms race." Given these reactions, it could be argued that MRC units are contributing to deterrence operations in the Indo-Pacific and might play a similar role in other regions. Given this possibility, Congress might decide to engage with the Army and Combatant Commanders to discuss how this potential deterrence value could be applied in other theaters of operation.