



# U.S.-Iran Ceasefire: Assessment, Reactions, and Issues for Congress

Updated April 9, 2026

On April 7, 2026, the United States and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire, which may bring a temporary halt to [40 days of conflict](#). Attacks on and by Iran on April 8, as well as escalated Israeli strikes in Lebanon as of April 9, underscore the fragile and contested nature of the agreement.

During the conflict, Iran has carried out missile and drone attacks against civilian and military targets in multiple countries. The conflict has disrupted regional energy production and maritime and air transit with global economic impacts. The Pakistan-brokered ceasefire came hours after President Donald Trump [wrote](#) on social media that “A whole civilization will die tonight” and hours before his [threatened deadline](#) to [destroy](#) Iran’s bridges and power plants.

U.S. and Iranian understandings of the nature and content of the ceasefire appear to differ as of April 9, ahead of a [tentative April 11](#) meeting between senior Iranian and U.S. negotiators, including Vice President JD Vance. Congress may consider whether and how to support, reject, or modify Administration approaches to subsequent negotiations and any proposed changes to U.S. military operations, diplomatic agreements, sanctions, or assistance to regional partners.

## Assessment

As of April 9, no text reflecting mutual agreement has been publicly released. Rather, the two sides’ public statements on the ceasefire differ and may indicate possible points of tension.

President Trump, in announcing the ceasefire, [wrote](#) on social media that the United States had received “a 10 point proposal from Iran” and that it was “a workable basis on which to negotiate.” Iran has reportedly produced at least two versions of a 10-point proposal that may differ from [each other](#), as well as from the version referenced by [President Trump](#). The United States in March [reportedly](#) transmitted a 15-point proposal, which Iran [rejected](#).

Issues of potential disagreement or contention include

- **Iran’s nuclear program.** The U.S. 15-point plan [reportedly](#) restated U.S. [demands](#) that Iran dismantle its nuclear facilities, abandon its enrichment program, and give up its highly enriched uranium. By contrast, [one version](#) of Iran’s 10-point plan reportedly

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included, per an Iranian source, “acceptance of enrichment.” Previous U.S.-Iran diplomatic engagements during the second Trump Administration (in [April-June 2025](#) and February 2026) stalled over such issues and were followed or interrupted by U.S. and Israeli military action against Iran. A White House spokesperson [said](#) on April 8 that “The President’s red lines, namely the end of Iranian enrichment in Iran, have not changed.”

- **Strait of Hormuz.** Iran’s disruption of commercial shipping (via threatened and executed attacks) has reduced transit through the [Strait of Hormuz](#), a crucial conduit for energy resources and related commodities to reach global markets. President Trump, in the week before the ceasefire, expressed [ambivalence](#) and [strong interest](#) in the status of the Strait. In announcing the ceasefire, he [wrote](#) that the cessation of U.S. military action was “subject to ... Iran agreeing to the COMPLETE, IMMEDIATE, and SAFE OPENING of the Strait of Hormuz.”

Iran’s Foreign Minister [wrote](#) that the ceasefire would entail two weeks of “safe passage” through the Strait “via coordination with Iran’s Armed Forces.” One version of Iran’s 10-point plan, per an Iranian source, reportedly [included](#) “Continued Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz,” which could entail formalizing [the tiered system of payments that Iran reportedly has charged](#) for vessels from selected countries to transit the Strait during the conflict.

- **Lebanon.** U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran also reignited major conflict in Lebanon. In early March, Hezbollah started firing into Israel, and Israel subsequently launched major air and ground operations that have reportedly killed more than [1,700 people](#) and displaced up to [1.2 million](#), or a fifth of the country, as of April 9. In announcing the ceasefire between Iran, the United States, and “their allies,” Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif [wrote](#) on social media that it would apply “everywhere including Lebanon.” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu [wrote](#), “The two-weeks ceasefire does not include Lebanon.” Israeli military operations [continued](#) as of April 9. Iran has [reportedly](#) conditioned the April 11 meeting on a ceasefire in Lebanon. Vice President Vance [described](#) the disconnect as a “legitimate misunderstanding,” echoing other U.S. officials who [maintained](#) the ceasefire does not include Lebanon.

## Reactions

[Oman](#), [Kuwait](#) and [Saudi Arabia](#) (all of which have been attacked by Iran) welcomed the ceasefire announcement; the United Arab Emirates, in an April 8 statement, [said](#) it was “seeking further clarification of the agreement’s provisions to ensure Iran’s full commitment” to a ceasefire and reopening the Strait. Officials from the [European Union](#), [Russia](#), and [China](#) (which [reportedly](#) encouraged Iran to agree to the ceasefire) reacted positively.

In Congress, multiple Member statements welcomed the ceasefire: one Senator [applauded](#) what he described as President Trump’s “Peace Through Strength leadership,” while another expressed relief at the ceasefire but [called](#) for “a real accounting of what President Trump’s war achieved.”

## Issues for Congress

Possible issues on which Members of Congress could engage include

- **War powers.** Some Members in the House and [Senate](#) have indicated their intention to introduce measures under the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) to, as one [Member](#)

- put it, “[end this conflict permanently](#).” [Four similar measures](#) were [rejected](#) by the House and Senate in March 2026.
- **Sanctions.** President Trump [wrote](#) on April 8 that “We are, and will be, talking Tariff and Sanctions relief with Iran.” Members could seek to block or support sanctions relief, including via measures to condition or mandate congressional review of executive branch actions related to sanctions on Iran (H.R. 2012, H.R. 2570).
- **Supplemental appropriations.** Per [one April 7 media report](#), the Administration is reportedly preparing to request from Congress as much as \$100 billion in additional funding related to the conflict with Iran.
- **Oversight.** Any agreement “relating to the nuclear program of Iran” would trigger congressional review requirements under the 2015 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17). More broadly, Members may engage with the Administration regarding the conduct of the conflict and its ramifications for Iran; for U.S. cooperation with Israel and other Middle East partners; for the U.S. and global economies; and for U.S. military readiness, tactics, and strategies.

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