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Office of the U.S. Trade Representative: Overview and Issues for Congress in Brief

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Office of the U.S. Trade Representative: Overview and Issues for Congress in Brief

The Office of the United States Trade Representative (Office of the USTR) is located in the Executive Office of the President (EOP). It is headed by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), an ambassador-level position. The USTR leads U.S. international trade agreement negotiations and other dialogues, with interagency and advisory input. USTR also administers laws to combat certain foreign trade practices and administers trade preference agreements that allow certain imports from qualifying developing countries to enter the United States duty-free. Additionally, the USTR leads interagency coordination of U.S. trade policy in the federal government and administers the advisory committee system for obtaining private and public input on U.S. trade policy.

By statute, the USTR has “primary responsibility for developing, and for coordinating the implementation of,” U.S. trade policy; serves as the President’s “principal advisor” and “principal spokesman” on trade; has “lead responsibility” for conducting international trade negotiations; serves as the “chief representative of the United States” for international trade negotiations; and “assures the coordination of international trade policy” (19 U.S.C. §2171). The USTR’s precursors date to the 1960s, with Congress and the executive branch expanding and elevating the USTR’s role in U.S. trade policy over time.

In the past decade, key shifts unfolding in U.S. trade policy include a proliferation of executive-led trade initiatives with no formal role for Congress in their approval relative to comprehensive U.S. free trade agreements, increased use by the executive branch of congressionally delegated tariff authorities, and a potentially expanded role of other agencies in trade negotiations relative to the USTR compared with some prior trade negotiations. In the context of major changes to U.S. trade policy, some Members of Congress are debating the USTR’s authorities and role in U.S. trade policy. Some key issues facing Congress are

- To what extent is the USTR fulfilling its statutory mandates?
- Is the Office of the USTR’s organizational structure suited to its role?
- Is the Office of the USTR sufficiently transparent in its decisionmaking process and in trade negotiations?
- Should the agency have an Inspector General?
- How effective is the agency’s advisory system, and does the agency appropriately represent stakeholder views?

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Introduction and Background

The Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618) established the Office of the United States Trade Representative (Office of the USTR) within the Executive Office of the President (EOP) to develop and coordinate U.S. international trade policy and lead U.S. trade negotiations. Congress faces a range of legislative and oversight questions on the agency’s fulfillment of its statutory authorities, structure, transparency, and advisory process. These issues intersect with changes in U.S. trade policy during the Trump and Biden Administrations and debates about whether Congress should maintain or modify the trade authorities it has delegated to the executive branch.

Statutory Authorities and Structure

The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) heads the Office of the USTR, serving in an ambassador-level position with a pay level commensurate with that of executive department heads. Over the past 50 years, Presidents have accorded the USTR position Cabinet rank. The position is subject to presidential appointment and Senate confirmation. In February 2025, Jamieson Greer was confirmed as the USTR. The USTR’s duties (19 U.S.C. §2171) are to

- have “primary responsibility for developing, and for coordinating implementation” of U.S. international trade policy;
- serve as the President’s “principal advisor on international trade policy”;
- have “lead responsibility” for conducting, and serving as the “chief representative of the United States” for, international trade negotiations in which the United States participates, including in the World Trade Organization (WTO);
- “issue and coordinate policy guidance to departments and agencies” on trade;
- serve as the “principal spokesman of the President on international trade”;
- “report directly” to both the President and Congress, and “be responsible to” both on administering trade agreements programs;
- report to Congress on international trade negotiations and trade agreements; and
- among other duties, serve as the “chairman of the interagency trade organization,” with which the USTR is to consult and by which is to be advised.

Congress has specified three Deputy U.S. Trade Representatives, a Chief Agricultural Negotiator, and a Chief Innovation and Intellectual Property (IP) Negotiator.¹ The agency also has a Chief Transparency Officer by statute.²

Historical Origins

Until the early 1960s, the U.S. Department of State was the lead agency responsible for conducting U.S. trade and investment diplomacy and administering the President’s trade

¹ P.L. 106-200, §406, and P.L. 114-125, §609. The Chief Innovation and IP Negotiator position appears to have been unfilled since the position was authorized in statute in 2016. A formal nomination in 2021 received a hearing but did not advance. U.S. Congress, Senate Finance Committee, *Nominations of ... Christopher S. Wilson, to be Chief Innovation Officer and Intellectual Property Negotiator, Office of the United States Trade Representative...*, 117th Cong., 1st sess., October 26, 2021; Dan Dupont, “Biden’s Pick for IP Negotiator Still in Limbo Amid GOP Objections to TRIPS Waiver,” *Inside U.S. Trade*, June 3, 2022; Letter from Todd Young, United States Senator, et al. to USTR Jamieson Greer and Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick, July 18, 2025.

² P.L. 114-26, §104(f). In 2024, USTR Acting General Counsel was designated as Acting Chief Transparency Officer.

agreements program. At the time, U.S. trade policy largely consisted of negotiating and implementing international agreements to reduce tariffs. Per historical accounts, some Members of Congress were reportedly concerned that trade policy and commercial interests were being subsumed by foreign policy considerations.³ In the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-794, §241), Congress transferred most trade negotiation functions from the State Department to a newly created Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (“Special Representative”). President John F. Kennedy located the Special Representative in the EOP in 1963.⁴

The Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618) codified the Office of the Special Trade Representative for Trade Negotiations in the EOP, to be headed by a Special Representative who would be entitled to receive ambassadorial rank. The act elevated the position to the pay level commensurate with that of Cabinet members and made the Special Representative responsible for administering the U.S. trade agreements program, chairing the interagency trade policy process, and other functions.⁵ With the law, Congress sought to balance “competing domestic and international interests” in formulating U.S. trade policy and negotiations.⁶

President Jimmy Carter further expanded and redesignated the position of the Special Representative in the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1979.⁷ He submitted the plan under the authority of the Reorganization Act of 1977 (P.L. 95-17)⁸ and pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (P.L. 96-39), which required the President to develop and present a trade reorganization plan to boost the Special Representative’s coordination and functional roles. Reorganization Plan No. 3 redesignated the Office of the Special Trade Representative for Trade Negotiations as the newly established Office of the USTR. The plan also specified the USTR’s duties, assigning the USTR lead responsibility for developing and coordinating U.S. trade policy, conducting international trade negotiations, and serving as the principal adviser to the President on trade policy. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (OCTA, P.L. 100-418) amended the Trade Act of 1974 to further expand and specify the role of the USTR.⁹

Responsibilities

The USTR is responsible for negotiating and administering U.S. trade agreements, including multilateral commitments under the WTO and regional and bilateral free trade agreements

³ Douglas A. Irwin, *Clashing Over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy* (University of Chicago Press, 2017), p. 526.

⁴ Executive Order 11075, “Administration of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,” 28 *Federal Register* 473, January 15, 1963.

⁵ See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Finance Committee, *Trade Expansion Act of 1962*, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., September 14, 1962, Report No. 2059, p. 5. (“It was the purpose of the committee to provide that the interests of agriculture, industry, labor, and American consumers should be adequately represented in the Inter-Agency Trade Organization. The committee felt that the Chairman, if he was chosen from one of the departments, would represent more the views of that department than the overall broader perspective represented by the Special Representative.”)

⁶ U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means Committee, *Overview and Compilation of U.S. Trade Statutes: Part I of II*, committee print, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., December 2010, 63-160 (Washington: GPO, 2010) (House Ways and Means, *U.S. Trade Statutes Overview*, 2010), p. 387. See also I.M. Destler, *American Trade Politics*, Fourth Edition (Institute for International Economics, 2005).

⁷ 93 Stat. 1381.

⁸ For background, see CRS Report R44909, *Executive Branch Reorganization*, by Henry B. Hogue.

⁹ House Ways and Means, *U.S. Trade Statutes Overview*, 2010, p. 389. For example, with OCTA, Congress aimed to “elevate the importance of the USTR in trade matters” by shifting implementation responsibility of Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 from the President to the USTR (subject to presidential direction). Section 301 concerns authorities to address certain foreign trade practices. See CRS In Focus IF11346, *Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974*, by Danielle M. Trachtenberg.

(FTAs). The United States has 14 “comprehensive” FTAs with 20 countries that have reciprocal commitments by the parties to reduce and eliminate tariffs and nontariff barriers to trade and establish rules in various areas (e.g., government procurement, IP, investment, labor, environment, and digital trade), which are enforceable through dispute settlement mechanisms.¹⁰ Most U.S. FTAs have been negotiated under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) statutes, with FTAs entering into force through the passage of implementing legislation. The most recent TPA, which expired in 2021, was used to negotiate the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA).¹¹

The USTR also is involved in negotiating executive-led trade agreements that focus on a targeted set of issues, have more cooperative rather than “binding” commitments, and generally have no formal role for Congress in their approval.¹² These initiatives, which may address new and emerging trade and economic issues, also may also feature a lead role for other agencies. For example, during the Biden Administration’s negotiation of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), the USTR led IPEF’s trade pillar and the Secretary of Commerce led its supply chain pillar. During the second Trump Administration, the USTR has been involved in negotiating tariff and trade framework agreements with other countries; the Secretaries of Commerce and the Treasury also have played an active role in these negotiations. These framework agreements generally include commitments to modify U.S. tariffs, as well as other matters, such as regulatory cooperation and economic security, but often have been limited in detail and required additional steps to be implemented formally.¹³ To date, the negotiation and approval of tariff and trade framework agreements have not had a formal role for Congress.

The USTR also co-leads the U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) program with the State Department, to negotiate reciprocal commitments to open investment markets and protect foreign investors in the U.S. market and U.S. investors in the foreign party’s market. BITs historically have been transmitted for Senate ratification.¹⁴

Trade enforcement of foreign trading partners’ commitments in the WTO and under U.S. FTAs is another area of responsibility for the USTR. Enforcement can occur through diplomatic engagement and formal dispute settlement procedures.

The USTR has other responsibilities. For example, Section 301 of the Trade Action of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §§2411-2420) authorizes the USTR to investigate and take action (e.g., applying tariffs) to enforce U.S. rights under trade agreements and respond to certain foreign trade practices (e.g., Section 301 tariff actions on China).¹⁵ The USTR also administers the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which provides duty-free treatment to qualifying products from eligible

¹⁰ Under the WTO, regional trade agreements such as FTAs must cover “substantially all the trade” among parties. See Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Office of the USTR refers to these agreements as “comprehensive” FTAs. See <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements>.

¹¹ CRS In Focus IF10038, *Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)*, by Christopher A. Casey and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, and CRS In Focus IF10997, *U.S.-Mexico-Canada (USMCA) Trade Agreement*, by M. Angeles Villarreal, Kyla H. Kitamura, and Danielle M. Trachtenberg.

¹² See CRS Report R47679, *Congressional and Executive Authority Over Foreign Trade Agreements*, by Christopher T. Zirpoli. USTR has negotiated trade and investment framework agreements (TIFAs), which have provided a forum for government-to-government dialogue and “soft” commitments and cooperation on trade and investment issues.

¹³ CRS Report R48716, *Executive Branch Tariff Actions in the 119th Congress: CRS Products, Experts, and Points of Contact*, coordinated by Christopher A. Casey and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, “United States Bilateral Investment Treaties,” <https://www.state.gov/investment-affairs/bilateral-investment-treaties-and-related-agreements/united-states-bilateral-investment-treaties>.

¹⁵ CRS In Focus IF11346, *Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974*, by Danielle M. Trachtenberg.

developing countries.¹⁶ The USTR has reporting requirements on a variety of trade matters, such as to issue annually a report on the President’s trade policy agenda and operations of trade agreements programs (19 U.S.C. §2213) and on foreign trade barriers facing U.S. exporters (19 U.S.C. §2241).

Funding

The Office of the USTR has been funded out of the Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations. For FY2026, Congress provided the agency with \$88 million in total appropriations, comprising \$65 million in direct appropriations for salaries and expenses and \$23 million to be derived from the Trade Enforcement Trust Fund (TETF) to support the agency’s trade enforcement.¹⁷ Enacted funding was 7% lower than the Administration’s request (\$95 million), including 10% less for salaries and expenses (\$72 million) and unchanged for the TETF.¹⁸

Interagency and Advisory Bodies

Congress established a USTR-led tiered interagency system in 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1872), the components of which develop and review policy and negotiating documents and advise the Office of the USTR. Participants in the system draw from select trade agencies and White House bodies. The Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) is composed of senior civil servants on issue-specific subcommittees (e.g., GSP). Issues under TPSC consideration are referred to the Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG), whose members are at the Deputy/Under Secretary level, or to Cabinet-level review.¹⁹

Congress also established an advisory committee system in 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2155) to bring input from the public and private sector, representing industry, labor, and other interests, into U.S. trade policy. The USTR manages the advisory committee system in collaboration with agencies such as the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. In the aforementioned statute, Congress directed the President to establish an Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN) to “provide overall policy advice” on U.S. trade negotiations and agreements, and authorized the President to establish general policy, sectoral, and functional committees.²⁰ In addition to the ACTPN, the advisory committee system also includes policy advisory committees that are oriented on specific issues (e.g., agricultural, intergovernmental, labor, Africa, and environment), as well as Agricultural Technical Advisory Committees (ATACs) and Industry Trade Advisory Committees (ITACs) that provide input based on specialized sectoral knowledge.²¹

¹⁶ GSP’s authorization expired in December 2020 after Congress did not renew the program. CRS In Focus IF11232, *Generalized System of Preferences (GSP): FAQ*, by Liana Wong.

¹⁷ Congress established the TETF in 2016 (P.L. 114-125) to (1) enforce commitments under the WTO and U.S. FTAs, (2) monitor implementation of countries’ U.S. FTA obligations, (3) investigate and respond to petitions for Section 301 action, and (4) support FTA partners’ trade capacity building measures.

¹⁸ For more information, see CRS Report R48733, *Trade-Related Agencies: FY2026 Appropriations, Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS)*, by Keigh E. Hammond.

¹⁹ Office of the USTR, *2026 Trade Policy Agenda and 2025 Annual Report*, February 2026.

²⁰ 19 U.S.C. §2155.

²¹ Office of the USTR, “Advisory Committees,” <https://ustr.gov/about-us/advisory-committees>.

Select Issues for Congress

To what extent is the U.S. Trade Representative fulfilling its statutory mandates? With the growing prominence of industrial policy and economic security in U.S. trade under the Trump Administration, the Departments of Commerce, State, and the Treasury appear to be taking a greater role in trade initiatives. Some observers question whether this possible shift is limiting USTR leadership in the coordination of trade policy and negotiation of trade agreements.²² After his election to a second term, President-elect Trump stated that his selection for the Secretary of Commerce position “will lead our tariff and trade agenda, with ... direct responsibility for” USTR.²³ After this announcement, some observers questioned whether the Trump Administration was seeking to enhance the Commerce Department’s role in trade policy, potentially to a degree that could conflict with USTR’s statutory role in trade policy. At his nomination hearing, Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick stated that the “statutory responsibilities of USTR remain unchanged” and expressed his expectation that Commerce and USTR “will collaborate to ensure a strong America First trade policy is implemented under President Trump’s leadership.”²⁴ Congress may assess whether the USTR is fulfilling its statutory responsibilities. It could take oversight or legislative action to clarify USTR’s role in leading tariff and trade policy in general or to specific aspects of tariff and trade policy (e.g., H.R. 591, on both the Office of the USTR and Commerce Department). Congress also could assess whether USTR requires any changes in its authorities, funding, and staff to fulfill its statutory role in implementing U.S. trade policy.

In the 119th Congress, legislation has been introduced to mandate the USTR to commence trade negotiations with certain partners (e.g., H.R. 509, Latin American and Caribbean partners) and on certain issues (e.g., S. 2839, critical minerals). Other bills seek to limit or expand the USTR’s authority to impose Section 301 tariffs (e.g., H.R. 2712, H.R. 3575, S. 1886). Appropriations committees also have directed or encouraged the USTR to conduct certain activities (e.g., on USMCA).²⁵

Is the agency’s organizational structure suited to its role? Proposals to reorganize the Office of the USTR have been debated periodically. For example, in 2012, President Obama asked Congress for authority to consolidate into one department the business- and trade-related functions of certain agencies, including the Office of the USTR and the Commerce Department.²⁶ Some critics argued that subsuming the USTR into Commerce would constrain the USTR’s ability to maintain its focus and compel it to favor some stakeholders over others. For example, the USTR engages with various stakeholder groups, both large and small companies and across sectors, including manufacturing and agriculture; in comparison, Commerce and other agencies, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. Small Business Administration, have specific constituencies.²⁷ Critics also fear that such reorganization would slow the “nimble, lean,

²² Edward Allen, “Why the U.S. Trade Office No Longer Runs Trade,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 20, 2023.

²³ Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social post, November 19, 2024, <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/113511235978420631>.

²⁴ U.S. Congress, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, *Nomination of Howard Lutnick, Nominee to be Secretary, U.S. Department of Commerce*, committee print, 119th Cong., 1st sess., January 29, 2025, S Hrg. 119-27 (Washington: GPO, 2025), p. 123.

²⁵ See H.Rept. 119-272, p. 110, accompanying H.R. 5342, and S.Rept. 119-44, p. 12, accompanying S. 2354.

²⁶ White House (President Obama), “Government Reorganization Fact Sheet,” January 13, 2012, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/13/government-reorganization-fact-sheet>.

²⁷ For example, Commerce’s International Trade Administration takes the lead on nonagricultural export promotion, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Foreign Agricultural Service takes the lead on agricultural export promotion.

and effective” agency, and/or limit the USTR’s clout by removing it from the EOP.²⁸ Some supporters countered that the move could reduce costs, enhance government efficiency, and retain the USTR’s clout by maintaining the position at a level equivalent to Cabinet rank. Bills were introduced during that debate to authorize the President to undertake reorganization (112th Congress, S. 2129, H.R. 4409), but none were enacted.

Amid increased focus on economic statecraft and economic security by the Trump Administration, Congress could consider whether the Office of the USTR is suited to address these issues. It could maintain the status quo. It also could elevate the State Department in economic matters, and/or transfer Office of the USTR functions to the State Department.²⁹ Such moves could raise the profile of foreign policy and economic security in trade policy, yet cut against traditional U.S. trade policy functions that have been more oriented toward advancing U.S. commercial interests.

Conversely, Members may reexamine proposals to move certain trade functions, such as those of the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service (CS), which seeks to advance U.S. business interests overseas, to the Office of the USTR or State Department.³⁰ Given the distinct roles that these entities play, a shift of CS to the Office of the USTR could elevate U.S. trade policy interests in CS work, yet present tensions to the extent that particular business interests may conflict with USTR’s broader trade negotiation and enforcement functions. Likewise, a shift of CS to State could elevate foreign policy considerations in CS work, yet risk de-prioritizing commercial interests relative to State’s broader foreign policy functions.

Members also could consider whether to transfer USTR functions to Congress (H.Con.Res. 2), reexamining historical rationales for the congressional delegation of trade authorities to the executive branch.³¹

Is the Office of the USTR sufficiently transparent? The agency has faced a tension between ensuring confidentiality of pre-decisional texts in negotiations and keeping Congress and the public informed. These issues came to a head during the Biden Administration’s negotiations on IPEF. During the negotiations, some questioned whether the Administration sufficiently consulted Congress and whether congressional approval was necessary for the executive-led trade initiative since it was not an FTA. Senate Finance Committee leadership and other Members called for the Administration to provide “robust consultation with Congress” and increase “transparency with stakeholders and the broader public.”³² Separately, in 2023, Congress mandated that in any future negotiations arising from the U.S.-Taiwan trade agreement, the USTR must share U.S. negotiating texts with Congress before sharing the text with Taiwan or parties outside the executive branch, and must brief certain Members during negotiating rounds (P.L. 118-116).³³

²⁸ U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means, “Camp/Baucus Statement on White House Trade Agency Reorganization,” January 12, 2012.

²⁹ For example, at a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee hearing on U.S. commercial diplomacy, Rep. Young Kim stated that the committee “will examine whether returning the US Foreign Commercial Service to the State Department and strengthen our commercial diplomacy regime, reinvigorate a neglected FCS, sharpen and accountability and better align economic tools with foreign policy objectives.” U.S. Congress, House Foreign Affairs Committee, East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, *Advancing U.S. Economic Interest Abroad*, 119th Cong., 1st sess., May 14, 2025, transcript accessed *Congressional Quarterly*.

³⁰ See, for example, H.R. 1756 in the 104th Congress; and an amendment to H.R. 5248 in the 119th Congress.

³¹ CRS In Focus IF11030, *U.S. Tariff Policy: Overview*, by Christopher A. Casey.

³² U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, “Wyden, Crapo and Bipartisan Senate Committee Members Raise Concerns about Process to Approve and Implement Indo-Pacific Trade Pact and Other Trade Agreements,” December 1, 2022.

³³ CRS In Focus IF10256, *U.S.-Taiwan Trade and Economic Relations*, by Karen M. Sutter.

Some Members have voiced concerns in hearings about insufficient consultation by the second Trump Administration of its tariff and trade negotiations; USTR Greer has cited its consultations with congressional offices to defend the Administration’s approach.³⁴ Some Members also have raised such concerns in the funding context, with a committee report stating the Administration “has not shared which countries have solicited negotiations, commenced negotiations, or both, with the United States” on tariffs (S.Rept. 119-44, accompanying S. 2354). Congress may consider whether to maintain or strengthen transparency requirements for USTR negotiations through legislation or funding conditions.

Should the agency have an Inspector General (IG)? Some Members have sought to establish an IG at the Office of the USTR. For instance, in proposing a bill to do so, one Member raised concerns that the tariff exclusion process gives “preference to donors and millionaires who can hire lobbyists.”³⁵ The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended the agency “fully document the internal procedures it used to make Section 301 tariff exclusion and extension decisions.”³⁶ Others options include moving USTR functions outside of the EOP or legislating to require more transparency.³⁷

Does the agency appropriately represent stakeholder views? Some lawmakers and civil society members argue that the trade advisory committee system is too tilted toward business interests and gives participating businesses, unlike the public, access to and influence over classified trade negotiating texts.³⁸ Some in industry contend that the system needs the specialized knowledge of the business community to provide effective input.³⁹ Congress could examine to what extent the advisory system incorporates various stakeholder interests, whether such representation is desirable, and whether to modify the balance.

Author Information

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³⁴ U.S. Congress, House Ways and Means Committee, *The Trump Administration’s 2025 Trade Policy Agenda*, 119th Cong., 1st sess., April 9, 2025; and U.S. Congress, Senate Finance Committee, *The President’s 2025 Trade Policy Agenda*, 119th Cong., 1st sess., April 8, 2025. Transcripts accessed via *ProQuest Congressional*.

³⁵ S. 1265; Senator Ruben Gallego, “On ‘Tariff Liberation Day’, Gallego Introduces Bill to Ensure Transparency, Accountability at U.S. Trade Representative,” press release, April 2, 2025.

³⁶ GAO, *U.S.-China Trade: USTR Should Full Document Internal Procedures for Making Tariff Exclusion and Extension Decisions*, GAO-21-506, July 28, 2021. GAO has listed the status of implementation as “closed.”

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Letter from Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senator, and Pramila Jayapal, Members of Congress, to Katherine Tai, USTR, Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, Antony Blinken, Secretary of State, August 9, 2023.

³⁹ John G. Murphy, “The Voice of Business: Stakeholder Consultation and U.S. Trade Policy,” U.S. Chamber of Commerce, August 29, 2023.

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