



# U.S. Military Operations Against Iran's Missile and Nuclear Programs

March 6, 2026

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel [launched military operations](#) against Iran. The same day, President Donald J. Trump listed among the operation's objectives preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, destroying Iran's missiles, and "[razing] their missile industry to the ground." Some Members of Congress have [questioned](#) the U.S. military operations in Iran given President Trump's [previous comments](#) that, as a result of the June 2025 U.S.-Israeli strikes, "Iran's key nuclear enrichment facilities have been completely and totally obliterated." Other Members have [supported](#) the President's action, [citing](#) Iran's efforts to reconstitute its nuclear program and its ballistic missile capabilities.

## Iran's Ballistic Missile and Drone Programs

Iran has developed ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and space-launch vehicles, as well as drones (i.e., unmanned aircraft systems, or UAS). Iran's ballistic missile inventory has included short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, the largest of which have an estimated range of approximately 2,000 kilometers (1,864 miles), [according](#) to a 2020 U.S. government estimate. Iran has also mass-produced the [Shahed-136](#), a long-range one-way attack drone, and has [provided](#) these drones to Russia for use in its war in Ukraine. The 2025 [Worldwide Threat Assessment](#) stated, "Iran has fielded a large quantity of ballistic and cruise missiles as well as [UAS] that can strike throughout the region and continues efforts to improve their accuracy, lethality, and reliability."

Since February 28, [U.S. and Israeli aircraft](#) have targeted [bases](#) and [equipment](#) associated with Iran's [ballistic missile program](#), including missiles Iran may have [stored](#) in [underground](#) facilities. The effect of the strikes on Iran's inventory of ballistic missiles and production capacity is unclear. Following the Israeli and U.S. attacks, Iran has reportedly [conducted](#) ballistic missile and [drone](#) strikes on U.S. and partner military and [civilian](#) sites in several countries.

The size of Iran's ballistic missile inventory is uncertain. A 2019 Defense Intelligence Agency [report](#) described the inventory as "substantial." In 2022, then-U.S. Central Command Commander General Kenneth McKenzie [testified](#) Iran had an inventory of "over 3,000 ballistic missiles of various types." A 2026 article [reported](#) Iran's inventory at more than 2,000 medium-range ballistic missiles.

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Israeli and U.S. officials have stated varying estimates of Iran's ballistic missile production capacity. On March 1, the Israeli military [estimated](#) Iran was producing “dozens of ballistic missiles per month.” On March 2, Secretary of State Marco Rubio [said](#) Iran had been producing “over 100” such missiles a month. [U.S. officials](#) reportedly said, prior to June 2025, Iran was producing 50 missiles per month.

Iran's ballistic missiles were also the [target](#) of Israeli airstrikes during the June 2025 U.S.-Israeli operation. Iran may have made efforts to rebuild its missile inventory. An October 2025 [media report](#), citing European intelligence sources, stated Iran accepted shipments of chemical precursors for solid rocket motor propellant. In November 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department [sanctioned](#) entities and individuals associated with the “procurement of ballistic missile propellant ingredients” on behalf of Iran.

## Iran's Nuclear Program

Iran for decades has maintained a [uranium enrichment program](#). Uranium enrichment can produce both low-enriched uranium, which can be used in nuclear power reactors, and highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is one of the two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. Tehran asserts its enrichment program is only meant to produce fuel for peaceful nuclear applications.

Whether the U.S.-Israeli strikes since February 28 have affected Iran's nuclear facilities is unclear. On March 4, based on analysis of satellite imagery, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [reported](#) “no damage to facilities containing nuclear material in Iran,” but some damage “at entrances” to Iran's largest enrichment facility. The IAEA, which [implements safeguards](#) on Iran's nuclear facilities because the government is a state party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, withdrew inspectors from Iran in June 2025 after U.S.-Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, including those associated with Tehran's enrichment program.

The extent to which those strikes impacted Iran's enrichment program is unclear. [The IAEA](#) has not been able to inspect the attacked Iranian nuclear facilities. U.S. government reports have provided differing assessments of the June strikes' impacts. According to the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy, the strikes “[significantly degraded](#)” Iran's nuclear program, while the 2026 National Defense Strategy stated the strikes “[obliterated](#)” the program.”

The U.S. intelligence community has for years [assessed](#) that Iran could have the capability to produce nuclear weapons at some point, but also that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in late 2003 and had not mastered all of the necessary technologies for building such weapons. U.S. intelligence has also consistently [assessed](#) that Tehran has not reauthorized the development of nuclear weapons.

Constraints imposed on Iran's nuclear program required by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action addressed concerns about the speed with which Iran could produce sufficient amount of fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Under these constraints, Tehran would have needed one year to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. In May 2025, the [Defense Intelligence Agency](#) assessed that Iran then would have needed “probably less than one week” to produce that amount of fissile material. In November 2025, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi [said](#) Iran was not enriching uranium. On March 2, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano [stated](#) the agency had no evidence of “a structured [Iranian] program to manufacture nuclear weapons.”

## Considerations for Congress

Congress may consider assessing the status and scope of existing [reporting requirements](#) on Iran, including of Section 1245 of P.L. 111-84 ([10 U.S.C. §113 note](#)), which directed the Secretary of Defense (who is using “Secretary of War” as a “secondary title” under [Executive Order](#) 14347, dated September 5, 2025) to submit to Congress an “annual report on the military power of Iran.” Congress has [modified](#) this

requirement, including by directing the Secretary to provide additional information about Iran's nuclear and drone programs (P.L. 119-60, §1222(b)(4)). Congress may consult that report to determine whether or not it should include additional information. Congress may consider directing the Pentagon to publish an unclassified, public version of the report. Members could ask questions concerning the above topics during threat assessment hearings.

## Author Information

Paul K. Kerr  
Specialist in Nonproliferation

Daniel M. Gettinger  
Analyst in U.S. Defense Policy

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