

Haiti in Crisis: Developments Related to the Multinational Security Support Mission

Updated June 3, 2025

Haiti's political and security situation has continued to deteriorate in 2025 despite the 2024 deployment of a Kenya-led, UN-authorized Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) that the U.S. government has helped train and equip. Between January and March 2025, [1,617](#) people were killed after [5,600](#) deaths were recorded in 2024, most attributed to gang-related violence. The gangs—some of which are aligned with political elites—amassed control over territory and illicit markets amid political instability following the 2021 assassination of then-President Jovenel Moïse. Since April 2024, Haiti has been governed by a [Transitional Presidential Council](#) (TPC). The TPC, tasked with governing until elections can be convened, has been plagued by allegations of corruption and [infighting](#).

The Biden Administration sought to support Haitian-led efforts to restore political stability and security and the MSS; the Trump Administration has highlighted the increasing violence in Haiti and has suggested options for regional bodies and countries to take the lead on combating gang violence. The 119th Congress may consider options for addressing violence and instability in Haiti, including potential appropriations for the MSS or other security efforts.

Origins of the Multinational Security Support Mission

In October 2022, then-Prime Minister Ariel Henry [requested](#) the deployment of an international force to help the Haitian National Police (HNP) quell insecurity and facilitate humanitarian aid. [Canada, Brazil, and other Western Hemisphere countries](#), some of which participated in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH; 2004-2017), declined U.S. requests to lead such a force. MINUSTAH remains controversial in Haiti due to alleged [sexual abuse](#) by some of its forces and its inadvertent [introduction of cholera](#) into the country.

In July 2023, Kenya announced it would [consider](#) leading a multinational force in Haiti and sending up to 1,000 police, if authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Whereas [U.S.](#) and Caribbean Community ([CARICOM](#)) officials praised Kenya, some analysts [questioned](#) the human rights record of the Kenyan police and whether they could overcome language and cultural barriers. Others [opposed](#) any international security force, arguing that previous foreign interventions in Haiti had failed.

Congressional Research Service

<https://crsreports.congress.gov>

IN12331

In October 2023, the UNSC adopted [Resolution 2699](#) authorizing a non-UN-conducted multinational force, financed by voluntary contributions, to provide security for critical infrastructure and operational support to the HNP for 12 months; the mission's mandate was extended, through [Resolution 2751](#), until October 2, 2025.

Current Status

Kenya's deployment of the MSS was delayed until June 2024 amid debate in Kenya about the deployment's [constitutionality](#) and the need to conclude a court-ordered bilateral security agreement with Haiti. Kenya also [delayed deployment](#) until the TPC replaced Prime Minister Henry.

MSS leaders have developed an operational plan and created an oversight mechanism to monitor the mission's conduct. Participating personnel are subject to UN vetting, and those receiving U.S. support are to complete U.S. human rights vetting pursuant to the Leahy Laws ([22 U.S.C. §2378d](#) and [10 U.S.C. §362](#)).

As of May 2025, the United Nations reported there was [\\$110.9 million](#)—primarily from Canada—in the Haiti MSS Trust Fund. As of March 2025, the MSS mission consisted of just over [1,000 personnel](#) from Kenya, Jamaica, Belize, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

Some [observers](#) suggest the MSS mission may need to be strengthened. In an October 2024 letter to the Secretary-General, the TPC president [requested](#) that the MSS be transformed into a UN peacekeeping mission; the Secretary-General [asserted](#) in February 2025 that such a transition is “not assessed as a feasible option.” The Secretary-General specified that, “such a transition could be considered once significant progress has been made in substantially reducing gang territorial control.” Reportedly, up to [90%](#) of Port-au-Prince is controlled by gangs. In April 2025, the UN Special Representative to Haiti [stated](#) that Haiti is on the verge of “total chaos.” Most recently, the TPC reportedly has begun using [drones](#) to combat criminal gangs.

U.S. Policy

The Biden Administration sought to [support](#) Haiti, in part, by funding the MSS to help address gang violence and promote security. Some Members of Congress have [supported the MSS](#); others have criticized what they view as [inadequate planning](#) for the mission. Almost a year after the first Kenyan police officers [arrived](#), experts [assess](#) that the MSS remains underfunded, understaffed, and unable to quell gang-related violence.

On [February 6, 2025](#), Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the United States “will continue to support the mission” and that he had issued a waiver to allow approximately [\\$40 million](#) of security assistance to flow to the MSS mission and the Haitian National Police amid the Trump Administration's foreign assistance “pause.” In May 2025, the Administration [designated](#) the Viv Ansanm gang coalition and the Gran Grif gang as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists. Further, in May 20 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, [Secretary Rubio](#) suggested that the Organization of American States (OAS) could play a larger role in Haiti and potentially coordinate a security mission, asserting that the MSS “alone will not solve this problem.” The Secretary also [stated](#) that the Trump Administration is “prepared to play a leading role” in supporting the OAS but that buy-in would be necessary from other partners in the region.

Congressional Considerations

During the Biden Administration, the United States pledged at least \$380 million to support the MSS. That total included \$100 million in foreign assistance and \$200 million in Department of Defense

enabling support. U.S. support for the MSS aimed to complement assistance provided to train and equip the HNP through bilateral U.S. programs and the multi-donor [UN Basket Fund](#).

Congress did not specifically designate any U.S. foreign assistance for Haiti to help quell insecurity or support the MSS mission or the HNP in FY2024 or FY2025 appropriations legislation. Congress may consider whether to designate funding for such activities during the FY2026 appropriations process. Congress also may examine how the Trump Administration's foreign assistance policies, including allocations, reprogramming, and/or rescissions of funds, may impact the situation in Haiti. Additionally, Congress may consider legislation that could complement U.S. security assistance efforts, such as bills to impose sanctions on those who collude with Haitian gangs (e.g., H.R. 2643, S. 1854).

Author Information

Karla I. Rios
Analyst in Latin American Affairs

Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS's institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.