Contents

• Introduction
• Issue for Congress
• Sources and Terminology
• Background
• Brief Overview of China's Naval Modernization Effort
• Numbers of Ships; Comparisons to U.S. Navy
• Overview
• Ultimate Size and Composition of China's Navy Not Publicly Known
• Number of Ships Is a One-Dimensional Measure, but Trends in Numbers Can Be of Value Analytically
• Tables Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships
• Graphs Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships
• Selected Elements of China's Naval Modernization Effort
• Anti-Ship Missiles
• Submarines
• Aircraft Carriers
• Surface Combatants
• Amphibious Ships
• Operations Away from Home Waters
• U.S. Navy Response
• Overview
• Planned Size of Navy
• Highly Capable Ships, Aircraft, Weapons, and Other Systems
• New Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Operating Concept
• Cooperation with Naval Forces of Allies and Other Countries
• Issues for Congress
• Overview
• U.S.-China Balance of Naval Power
• Davidson Window/Decade of Concern
• Shipbuilding Capacity
• Other Specific Issues
• Legislative Activity for FY2025
• Coverage in Related CRS Reports
• FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 8070/S. 4638/H.R. 5009 /P.L. 118-159)
• House
• Enacted

Summary

China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting. China's naval modernization effort has been underway for about 30 years, since the early to mid-1990s, and has transformed China's navy into a much more modern and capable force. China's navy is a formidable military force within China's near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe.

China's navy is, by far, the largest of any country in East Asia, and sometime between 2015 and 2020 it surpassed the U.S. Navy in numbers of battle force ships, meaning the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy. DOD states that China's navy "is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 platforms [i.e., ships], including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries. Notably, this figure does not include approximately 60 HOUBEI-class patrol combatants that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The… overall battle force [of China's navy] is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030." The U.S. Navy, by comparison, included 296 battle force ships as of September 30, 2024, and the Navy's FY2025 budget submission projects that the Navy will include 294 battle force ships by the end of FY2030. U.S. military officials and other observers are expressing concern or alarm regarding the pace of China's naval shipbuilding effort, the capacity of China's shipbuilding industry compared with the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, and trend lines regarding the relative sizes and capabilities of China's navy and the U.S. Navy.

China's naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of ship, aircraft, weapon, and C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) acquisition programs, as well as improvements in logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises. China's navy currently has certain limitations and weaknesses, which it is working to overcome. China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is assessed as being aimed at developing capabilities for, among other things, addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; achieving a greater degree of control or domination over China's near-seas region, particularly the South China Sea; defending China's commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly those linking China to the Persian Gulf; displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China's status as the leading regional power and a major world power. Observers believe China wants its navy to be capable of acting as part of an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China's near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces.

The U.S. Navy has taken a number of actions to counter China's naval modernization effort. Among other things, the U.S. Navy has shifted a greater percentage of its fleet to the Pacific; assigned its most-capable new ships and aircraft to the Pacific; maintained or increased general presence operations, training and developmental exercises, and engagement and cooperation with allied and other navies in the Indo-Pacific; increased the planned future size of the Navy; initiated, increased, or accelerated numerous programs for developing new military technologies and acquiring new ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and weapons; and developed new operational concepts for countering PRC maritime A2/AD forces. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Trump Administration's proposed U.S. Navy plans, budgets, and programs for responding to China's naval modernization effort.

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Introduction

Issue for Congress

This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the naval modernization effort of the People's Republic of China (PRC, or China) and its implications for U.S. Navy capabilities. China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting.¹ The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Trump Administration's proposed U.S. Navy plans, budgets, and programs for responding to China's naval modernization effort. Congress's decisions on this issue could affect U.S. Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. defense industrial base.

Sources and Terminology

This report is based on unclassified open-source information, such as the annual Department of Defense (DOD) report to Congress on military and security developments involving China,² a 2019 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report on China's military power,³ a 2015 Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) report on China's navy,⁴ published reference sources such as IHS Jane's Fighting Ships,⁵ and press reports.

For convenience, this report uses the term China's naval modernization effort to refer to the modernization not only of China's navy, but also of PLA forces outside China's navy that can be used to counter U.S. naval forces operating in the Western Pacific, such as land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), land-based surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based Air Force aircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based long-range radars for detecting and tracking ships at sea.

China's military is formally called the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Its navy is called the PLA Navy, or PLAN (also abbreviated as PLA[N]), and its air force is called the PLA Air Force, or PLAAF. The PLA Navy includes an air component that is called the PLA Naval Air Force, or PLANAF. China refers to its ballistic missile force as the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF).

This report uses the term China's near-seas region to refer to the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea—the waters enclosed by the so-called first island chain. The so-called second island chain encloses both these waters and the Philippine Sea that is situated between the Philippines and Guam.⁶

Background

Brief Overview of China's Naval Modernization Effort

Key overview points concerning China's naval modernization effort include the following:

• China's naval modernization effort, which forms part of a broader PRC military modernization effort that includes several additional areas of emphasis,⁷ has been underway for about 30 years, since the early to mid-1990s, and has transformed China's navy into a much more modern and capable force.
• China's navy is a formidable military force within China's near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe.
• China's navy is, by far, the largest of any country in East Asia, and as shown in Table 2, sometime between 2015 and 2020, China's navy surpassed the U.S. Navy in numbers of battle force ships (meaning the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy), making China's navy the numerically largest in the world. DOD states, "The PLAN is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 platforms [i.e., ships], including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries. Notably, this figure does not include approximately 60 HOUBEI class patrol combatants that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The PLAN's overall battle force is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030. Much of this growth will be in major surface combatants."⁸ The U.S. Navy, by comparison, included 296 battle force ships as of September 30, 2024, and the Navy's FY2025 budget submission projects that the Navy will include 294 battle force ships by the end of FY2030.⁹
• U.S. military officials and other observers are expressing concern or alarm regarding the pace of China's naval shipbuilding effort, the capacity of China's shipbuilding industry compared with the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, and trend lines regarding the relative sizes and capabilities of China's navy and the U.S. Navy.¹⁰ China's navy is viewed as posing a major challenge to the U.S. Navy's ability to achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water ocean areas in the Western Pacific—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War. China's navy forms a key element of a PRC challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific.
• China's naval ships, aircraft, and weapons are much more modern and capable than they were at the start of the 1990s, and are comparable in many respects to those of Western navies. DOD states, "Today, the PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors."¹¹ ONI states that "Chinese naval ship design and material quality is in many cases comparable to [that of] USN [U.S. Navy] ships, and China is quickly closing the gap in any areas of deficiency."¹²
• China's naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles (UVs),¹³ and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China's naval modernization effort also includes improvements in logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.¹⁴
• China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is assessed as being aimed at developing capabilities for, among other things, addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; achieving a greater degree of control or domination over China's near-seas region, particularly the South China Sea; enforcing China's view that it has the right to regulate foreign military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ);¹⁵ defending China's commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly those linking China to the Persian Gulf; displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China's status as the leading regional power and a major world power.¹⁶ Additional missions for China's navy include conducting maritime security (including antipiracy) operations, evacuating PRC nationals from foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations.
• Observers believe China wants its navy to be capable of acting as part of an anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China's near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces.
• The planned ultimate size and composition of China's navy is not publicly known. In contrast to the U.S. Navy, China does not release a navy force-level goal or detailed information about planned ship procurement rates, planned total ship procurement quantities, planned ship retirements, and resulting projected force levels.
• Although China's naval modernization effort has substantially improved China's naval capabilities, China's navy currently is assessed as having limitations or weaknesses in certain areas,¹⁷ including joint operations with other parts of China's military,¹⁸ anti-submarine warfare (ASW), long-range targeting, a limited capacity for carrying out at-sea resupply of combatant ships operating far from home waters,¹⁹ a limited number of overseas bases and support facilities,²⁰ a need to train large numbers of personnel to crew its new ships,²¹ non-commissioned officers (NCOs) that are not empowered by unit commanders through mission command to achieve a commander's intent,²² and a lack of recent combat experience.²³ China is working to reduce or overcome such limitations and weaknesses.²⁴ Although China's navy has limitations and weaknesses, it may nevertheless be sufficient for performing missions of interest to China's leaders. As China's navy reduces its weaknesses and limitations, it may become sufficient to perform a wider array of potential missions.
• In addition to modernizing its navy, China has substantially increased the size and capabilities of its coast guard. DOD states that China's coast guard is "the largest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world."²⁵ China also operates a sizeable maritime militia that includes a large number of fishing vessels. China relies primarily on its maritime militia and coast guard to assert and defend its maritime claims in its near-seas region, with the navy operating over the horizon as a potential backup force.²⁶

Numbers of Ships; Comparisons to U.S. Navy

Overview

DOD states

The PLAN is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 platforms [i.e., ships], including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries. Notably, this figure does not include approximately 60 HOUBEI class patrol combatants that carry anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). The PLAN's overall battle force is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030. Much of this growth will be in major surface combatants.²⁷

DIA states that "the PLAN is rapidly retiring older, single-mission warships in favor of larger, multimission ships equipped with advanced antiship, antiair, and antisubmarine weapons and sensors and C2 [command and control] facilities."²⁸

Another set of observers states

China's rapid military buildup has left the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) poised to overtake the U.S. Navy in several measures of maritime might more quickly than sometimes assumed. If China continues to expand its fleet at the current pace and the United States does not revitalize its shipbuilding industry, China will grow increasingly likely to emerge victorious from interstate war, especially a prolonged great power war….

China now possesses the world's largest maritime fighting force, operating 234 warships [excluding auxiliary and support ships] to the U.S. Navy's 219 [warships excluding auxiliary and support ships].²⁹

Ultimate Size and Composition of China's Navy Not Publicly Known

The planned ultimate size and composition of China's navy is not publicly known. The U.S. Navy makes public its force-level goal and regularly releases a 30-year shipbuilding plan that shows planned procurements of new ships, planned retirements of existing ships, and resulting projected force levels, as well as a five-year shipbuilding plan that shows, in greater detail, the first five years of the 30-year shipbuilding plan.³⁰ In contrast, China does not release a navy force-level goal or detailed information about planned ship procurement rates, planned total ship procurement quantities, planned ship retirements, or resulting projected force levels. The ultimate size and composition of China's navy might be an unsettled and evolving issue among China's military and political leaders. One observer states that "it seems the majority of past foreign projections of Chinese military and Chinese navy procurement scale and speed have been underestimates…. All military forces have a desired force requirement and a desired 'critical mass' to aspire toward. Whether the Chinese navy is close to its desired force or not, is of no small consequence."³¹

Number of Ships Is a One-Dimensional Measure, but Trends in Numbers Can Be of Value Analytically

Relative U.S. and PLA naval capabilities are sometimes assessed by showing comparative numbers of U.S. and PLA ships (or comparative aggregate fleet displacements [i.e, tonnages]). Although the total number of ships in a navy (or a navy's aggregate displacement) is relatively easy to calculate, it is a one-dimensional measure that leaves out numerous other factors that bear on a navy's capabilities and how those capabilities compare to its assigned missions. As a result, as discussed in further detail in Appendix A, comparisons of the total numbers of ships in China's navy and the U.S. Navy (or aggregate displacements) are highly problematic as a means of assessing relative U.S. and PLA naval capabilities and how those capabilities compare to the missions assigned to the two navies. At the same time, however, an examination of trends over time in these relative numbers of ships (or aggregate displacements) can shed some light on how the relative balance of U.S. and PLA naval capabilities might be changing over time.

Tables Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships

Table Showing Figures from Annual DOD Reports

Table 1 shows numbers of certain types of PLA Navy ships—those that might be thought of as the principal combat ships (PCSs)³² of China's navy—from 2004 to the present, along with the number of China Coast Guard ships from 2016 to the present, as presented in DOD's annual reports on military and security developments involving China. (The DOD report for a given year presents data for PLA forces for the previous year.)³³ As can be seen in Table 1, most PLA Navy ships shown in the table have increased numerically since 2004.

As can be seen in Table 1, about 84% of the net increase in the total number of PLA ships since 2004 (a net increase of 97 ships out of the total net increase of 116 ships) resulted from increases in cruisers and destroyers (29 ships), corvettes (i.e., light frigates) (50 ships), and amphibious ships (18 ships). The corvettes alone account for about 43% of the total net increase.

Table 1 lumps together less capable older PLA ships with more capable modern PLA ships. In examining the numbers in the table, it can be helpful to keep in mind that for many of the types of PLA ships shown in the table, the percentage of the ships accounted for by more capable modern designs was growing over time, even if the total number of ships for those types was changing little.

For reference, Table 1 also shows the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships (BFSs), meaning the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy, and compares it to the total number of the types of PLA ships that are shown in the table. The result is an apples-vs.-oranges comparison, because the PLA figures exclude auxiliary and support ships, while the U.S. Navy figure includes auxiliary and support ships but excludes patrol craft (although the U.S. Navy has very few patrol craft). Changes over time in this apples-vs.-oranges comparison, however, can be of value in understanding trends in the comparative sizes of the U.S. and PLA navies.

On the basis of the figures in Table 1, it might be said that in 2014, the total number of principal combat ships in China's navy (a figure that excludes PLAN auxiliary and support ships) surpassed the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships (a figure that includes U.S. Navy auxiliary and support ships). It is important, however, to keep in mind the differences in composition between the two navies. The U.S. Navy, for example, has many more aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, and cruisers and destroyers, while China's navy has many more diesel attack submarines, frigates, and corvettes.³⁴

Table Showing ONI Figures from February 2020

Table 2 shows comparative total numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy battle force ships (BFSs), as well as specific figures for certain types of ships that contribute toward China's total number of battle force ships from 2000 to 2030, with the figures for 2025 and 2030 being projections. The figures for China's ships are taken from an ONI information paper of February 2020. (As noted earlier, battle force ships are the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy. The ONI information paper applied the same counting rules to the PLA Navy.) For China, the total number of battle force ships shown excludes the missile-armed patrol craft (PCs) shown in Table 1, but includes auxiliary and support ships that are not shown in Table 1. Compared to Table 1, the figures in Table 2 come closer to providing an apples-to-apples comparison of the two navies' numbers of ships, although it could be argued that China's missile-armed patrol craft can be a significant factor for operations within the first island chain.³⁵

As shown in Table 2, China's navy surpassed the U.S. Navy in terms of total number of battle force ships sometime between 2015 and 2020. As mentioned earlier in connection with Table 1, however, it is important to keep in mind the differences in composition between the two navies. The U.S. Navy, for example, currently has many more aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, and cruisers and destroyers, while China's navy currently has many more diesel attack submarines, frigates, and corvettes.³⁶

Table Showing U.S. Navy Figures from October 2020

Table 3 shows numbers of certain types of PLA Navy ships in 2020, and projections of those numbers for 2025, 2030, and 2040, along with the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in 2020, and projections of those numbers for 2025, 2030, and 2040. The figures for China's ships were provided by the Navy at the request of CRS. As with Table 1, the result is an apples-vs.-oranges comparison between the PLA Navy and U.S. Navy totals, because the PLA total excludes auxiliary and support ships, while the U.S. Navy total includes auxiliary and support ships, but excludes patrol craft (although the U.S. Navy has very few patrol craft).

As shown in Table 3, the U.S. Navy projects that between 2020 and 2040, the total number of PLA ships of the types shown in the table will increase by 94, or about 39%, with most of that increase (77 ships out of 94) coming from roughly equal increases in numbers of large surface combatants (cruisers and destroyers—39 ships) and small surface combatants (frigates and corvettes—38 ships). The total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships projected for 2040 assumes that the Navy's FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan is fully implemented. As shown by Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis, the realized number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in a given year has often been less than the number that was projected for that year in prior-year editions of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan.³⁷

Graphs Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships

Graph Showing PLA Navy Principal Combat Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships

Figure 1, which uses numbers from Table 1 and Table 3, shows the total number of PLA Navy principal combat ships (PCSs)—a figure that excludes auxiliary and support ships—and the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships—a figure that includes auxiliary and support ships. In other words, Figure 1 depicts the apples-vs.-oranges comparison discussed earlier in connection with Table 1 and Table 3. The total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships projected for 2025 through 2040 assumes that the Navy's FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan is fully implemented. As shown by CBO analysis, the realized number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in a given year has often been less than the number that was projected for that year in prior-year editions of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan.³⁸

Figure 1. PLA Navy Principal Combat Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships PLAN principal combat ships (PCSs) excludes auxiliary and support ships; U.S. Navy battle force ships (BFSs) includes auxiliary and support ships

Sources: Data from Table 1 and Table 3 of this CRS report and (for U.S. Navy figures) U.S. Navy data, including projected figures for 2025 and beyond shown in Navy's FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan. PCSs are principal combat ships (which exclude auxiliary and support ships); BFSs are battle force ships (which include auxiliary and support ships).

Graph Showing PLA Navy Battle Force Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships

Figure 2, which uses figures from Table 1 and Table 3, shows the total number of PLA Navy battle force ships (BFSs), the total number of PLA Navy battle force ships plus missile-armed patrol craft (PCs), and the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships. (As mentioned earlier, the U.S. Navy has very few patrol craft.) As discussed in connection with Table 2, comparing total numbers of battle force ships comes closer to providing an apples-to-apples comparison of the two navies' numbers of ships, although it could be argued that China's missile-armed patrol craft can be a significant factor for operations within the first island chain. As discussed in connection with Figure 1, the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships projected for 2025 through 2040 assumes that the Navy's FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan is fully implemented. As shown by CBO analysis, the realized number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in a given year has often been less than the number that was projected for that year in prior-year editions of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan.³⁹

Figure 2. PLA Navy Battle Force Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships Figures for both PLAN and U.S. Navy are total number of battle force ships (BFSs), which include auxiliary and support ships.

Sources: Data from Table 1 and Table 2 of this CRS report and (for U.S. Navy figures) U.S. Navy data, including projected figures for 2025 and beyond shown in Navy's FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan. BFSs are battle force ships; PCs are missile-armed patrol craft.

Graph Showing PLAN and U.S. Navy Principal Combat Ships Excluding Patrol Craft

Figure 3, which was prepared by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) using data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), shows numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy principal combatant ships, excluding missile-armed patrol craft (PCs). The dashed line at the top is the line for the U.S. Navy.

Figure 3. PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Principal Combat Ships Excluding missile-armed patrol craft (PCs)

Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, "Unpacking China's Naval Buildup," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024.

Figure 4, which was prepared by CSIS using data from IISS, shows the launch dates of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy warships. (Launched means the ship has been put into the water for the final stages of its construction.)

Figure 4. Launch Dates for PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships

Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, "Unpacking China's Naval Buildup," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024. Note: Launched means the ship has been put into the water for the final stages of its construction.

Figure 5, which was prepared by CSIS using data from IISS, shows the aggregate displacement (i.e., tonnage) of PLA Navy submarines and U.S. Navy submarines. A ship's displacement is sometimes used as a rough proxy for its capability, as a larger ship can carry more combat system equipment and more weapons. As mentioned earlier and discussed in further detail in Appendix A, displacement is a one-dimensional measure that leaves out other factors bearing on a ship's capability.

Figure 5. PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Submarine Displacements

Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, "Unpacking China's Naval Buildup," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024. Notes: "Chinese conventio…" is Chinese conventionally powered submarines. "Chinese nuclear-p…" is Chinese nuclear-powered submarines.

Figure 6, which was prepared by CSIS using data from IISS, shows the ratio between the aggregate number of vertical launch system (VLS) cells on U.S. Navy ships and the aggregate number of VLS cells on PLA Navy ships. VLS cells are cells on a ship for storing and firing missiles. A ship's number of VLS cells is one measure of the ship's weapon capacity, though not a complete one, as ships can be armed with additional missiles that are fired from deck-mounted box launchers rather than VLS cells, and ships can be armed with weapons other than missiles, including guns. Even so, aggregate numbers of VLS cells are sometimes used as a shorthand for measuring a navy's total missile capacity.⁴⁰

Figure 6. Aggregate Numbers of VLS Cells: Ratio of PLA Navy to U.S. Navy

Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, "Unpacking China's Naval Buildup," Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024. Notes: VLS is vertical launch system.

Selected Elements of China's Naval Modernization Effort

Below are brief overviews of selected elements of China's naval modernization effort.

Anti-Ship Missiles

Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)

China has fielded two types of land-based ballistic missiles with a capability of hitting ships at sea at extended ranges—the DF-21D (Figure 7), a road-mobile anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) with a range of more than 1,500 kilometers (i.e., more than 810 nautical miles),⁴¹ and the DF-26 (Figure 8), a road-mobile, multi-role intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) with a maximum range of 3,000 kilometers to 4,000 kilometers⁴² (i.e., about 1,620 nautical miles to 2,160 nautical miles). DOD states that "the multi-role DF-26 is designed to rapidly swap conventional and nuclear warheads and is capable of conducting precision land-attack and anti-ship strikes in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the SCS [South China Sea] from mainland China."⁴³

Figure 7. DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Andrew S. Erickson, "China's DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)—Officially Revealed at 3 September Parade—Complete Open Source Research Compendium," AndrewErickson.com, September 10, 2015, accessed August 28, 2019.

Observers have expressed strong concerns about China's ASBMs, because such missiles, in combination with broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting systems, would permit China to attack aircraft carriers, other U.S. Navy ships, or ships of allied or partner navies operating in the Western Pacific.⁴⁴ Prior to the advent of these weapons, the U.S. Navy had not previously faced a threat from highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. For this reason, some observers have referred to ASBMs as a "game-changing" weapon.

China reportedly is developing hypersonic glide vehicles that, if incorporated into PLA ASBMs, could make PLA ASBMs more difficult to intercept.⁴⁵ DOD states:

In April 2022, the PRC had reportedly developed a new type of ASBM, possibly designated the YJ-21, small enough to fit into a surface combatant's VLS cell and tested-fired from a RENHAI [i.e., Type 055 cruiser or large destroyer]….

In April 2019, the PLAN revealed during its 70th anniversary celebration that its new guided-missile cruiser [i.e., the Renhai or Type 055] can employ long-range, land-attack cruise missiles and, in 2022, launched the YJ-21 hypersonic missile designed to defeat aircraft carriers.⁴⁶

Figure 8. DF-26 Multi-Role Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Missile Defense Project, "Dong Feng-26 (DF-26)," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 8, 2018, last modified January 15, 2019, accessed August 28, 2019.

An August 9, 2024, press report states

Through a series of images and videos that went viral via Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) sources, the latest test launches of the new YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship missile from a Type 055 destroyer of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) have come to light….

The YJ-21 is one of the most advanced hypersonic anti-ship missiles in service at the People's Liberation Army Navy, with an operational range of approximately 1,500 kilometers [about 810 nm] and cruising speeds of Mach 6, reaching terminal speeds of Mach 10.

Although many details about the missile remain classified, various sources speculate that the missile is an adapted version for launch from surface ships, based on the CM-401 missile, but with substantial improvements in speed and range. Furthermore, as various reports suggest, there are versions designed to be launched from H-6N bombers in service with the People's Liberation Army Air Force.⁴⁷

A February 2, 2023, press report states

For the first time, the PLA has officially revealed the performance of its advanced anti-ship hypersonic missile, sending a warning to the US amid high tensions in the Taiwan Strait, Chinese analysts said.

China's YJ-21, or Eagle Strike-21, has a terminal speed of Mach 10, cannot be intercepted by any anti-missile weapons system in the world and can launch lethal strikes towards enemy ships, according to an article posted by the official Weibo account of the People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force on Monday [January 30]....

The article declares that the missile travels six times the speed of sound all the way, and has a terminal speed of 10 times the speed of sound, meaning a speed of 3,400 metres per second (11,155 feet per second) when it hits the target.

"Such a terminal speed cannot be intercepted by any anti-missile weapon system at this stage. Even if it is dropped directly at this terrifying speed [hitting the target] without an explosion it will cause a fatal strike to the enemy ship," the article stated.

The debut of its export variant, the YJ-21E, at last year's Airshow China "shows that the domestic version of the Eagle Strike-21 ship-borne hypersonic missile is no longer the navy's most advanced ship-borne hypersonic missile, and more advanced ship-borne hypersonic missiles are likely to have appeared," it said.

The article was first published on the website of China Science Communication, Guangming Online last year, but it was reposted by an official PLA account for the first time, a development experts described as a clear message for the US.⁴⁸

Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)

Although China's ASCMs do not always receive as much press attention as China's ASBMs, observers are nevertheless concerned about them. As discussed later in this report, the relatively long ranges of certain PLA ASCMs have led to concerns among some observers that the U.S. Navy is not moving quickly enough to arm U.S. Navy surface ships with similarly ranged ASCMs.

China's anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) (see Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 11 for examples of reported images) include both Russian- and PRC-made designs, including some advanced and highly capable ones, such as the PRC-made YJ-18.⁴⁹ Press reports in April 2019 and December 2021 stated that China might be developing a YJ-18 launcher that can be packaged inside a standard commercial shipping container, for the potential purpose of surreptitiously deploying YJ-18s on merchant ships (Figure 12),⁵⁰ a capability that, if implemented, could violate the law of naval warfare.⁵¹ DOD states, "It is possible the PRC is developing a launcher that can fit inside a standard commercial shipping container for covert employment of the YJ-18 aboard merchant ships."⁵²

Figure 9. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)

Source: Detail of photograph accompanying Pierre Delrieu, "China Promotes Export of CM-302 Supersonic ASCM," Asian Military Review, July 3, 2017. (The article states "This is an article published in our December 2016 Issue.") The article states "According to Chinese news media reports, the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) CM-302 missile is being marketed for export as 'the world's best anti-ship missile.' The missile was showcased at the Zhuhai air show in the southern People's Republic of China (PRC) in early November [2016], and is advertised as [a] supersonic Anti-Ship Missile (AShM) [ASCM] which can also be used in the land attack role. The report, published by the national newspaper China Daily, suggest[s] that the CM-302 is the export version of CASIC's YJ-12 supersonic AShM, which is in service with the PRC's armed forces."

Figure 10. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)

Source: Photograph accompanying "YJ-18 Eagle Strike CH-SS-NX-13," GlobalSecurity.org, updated October 1, 2019. The article states, "A grand military parade was held in Beijing on 01 October 2019 to mark the People's Republic of China's 70th founding anniversary.… One weapon featured was a new generation of anti-ship missiles called YJ-18. China unveiled YJ-18/18A anti-ship cruise missiles in the National Day military parade in central Beijing."

Figure 11. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)

Source: Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier, Assessing China's Cruise Missile Ambitions, Published by National Defense University Press for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, 2014. The image appears on an unnumbered page following page 14. The caption to the photograph states, "YJ-83A/C-802A ASCM on display at 2008 Zhuhai Airshow." The photograph is credited to Associated Press/Wide World Photos.

Figure 12. Illustration of Reported Potential Containerized ASCM Launcher

Source: Illustration accompanying Tariq Tahir, "China Feared to be Hiding Missiles in Shipping Containers for Trojan Horse-Style Plan to Launch Attack Anywhere in World," U.S. Sun, December 6, 2021.

Submarines

Overview

China has been steadily modernizing its submarine force, and most of its submarines are now built to relatively modern PRC and Russian designs.⁵³ Qualitatively, China's newest submarines might not be as capable as Russia's newest submarines,⁵⁴ but compared to China's earlier submarines, which were built to antiquated designs, its newer submarines are much more capable.⁵⁵ An August 2023 Naval War College Report on China's submarines states

After nearly 50 years since the first Type 091 SSN was commissioned, China is finally on the verge of producing world-class nuclear-powered submarines. This report argues that the propulsion, quieting, sensors, and weapons capabilities of the Type 095 SSGN could approach Russia's Improved Akula I class SSN. The Type 095 will likely be equipped with a pump jet propulsor, a freefloating horizontal raft, a hybrid propulsion system, and 12-18 vertical launch system tubes able to accommodate anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles. China's newest SSBN, the Type 096, will likewise see significant improvements over its predecessor, with the potential to compare favorably to Russia's Dolgorukiy class SSBN in the areas of propulsion, sensors, and weapons, but more like the Improved Akula I in terms of quieting. If this analysis is correct, the introduction of the Type 095 and Type 096 would have profound implications for U.S. undersea security.⁵⁶

A September 2023 Naval War College report on China's submarine industrial base states

In recent years, China's naval industries have made tremendous progress supporting the modernization of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force, both through robust commitment to research and development (R&D) and the upgrading of production infrastructure at the country's three submarine shipyards…. Nevertheless, China's submarine industrial base continues to suffer from surprising weaknesses in propulsion (from marine diesels to fuel cells) and submarine quieting. Closer ties with Russia could provide opportunities for China to overcome these enduring technological limitations by exploiting political and economic levers to gain access to Russia's remaining undersea technology secrets.⁵⁷

Types and Numbers

Most of China's submarines are non-nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSs). China also operates a small number of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and a small number of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The number of SSNs and SSBNs may grow in coming years, but the force will likely continue for some time to consist mostly of SSs. DOD states that China's navy "has highly prioritized modernizing its submarine force but its force structure continues to grow modestly as it matures its force, integrates new technologies, and expands its shipyards. The PLAN operates six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 48 diesel-powered/air-independent powered attack submarines (SS). Despite the ongoing retirement of older hulls, the PLAN's submarine force is expected to grow to 65 units by 2025 and 80 units by 2035 due to an expansion of submarine construction capacity."⁵⁸

ONI states that "China's submarine force continues to grow at a low rate, though with substantially more-capable submarines replacing older units. Current expansion at submarine production yards could allow higher future production numbers." ONI projects that China's submarine force will grow from a total of 66 boats (4 SSBNs, 7 SSNs, and 55 SSs) in 2020 to 76 boats (8 SSBNs, 13 SSNs, and 55 SSs) in 2030.⁵⁹ A November 27, 2022, press report states "The dry-docks at China's nuclear submarine facility at Huludao, Liaoning province, show increased activity. New construction halls are primed. Another dry dock is ready to go. International analysts point to this as evidence Beijing is gearing up for the mass production of a new generation of nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines."⁶⁰

China's newest series-built SS design is the Yuan-class (Type 039) SS (Figure 13), its newest SSN class is the Shang-class (Type 093) SSN (Figure 14), and its newest SSBN class is the Jin (Type 094) class SSBN (Figure 15). DOD states

The PRC continues to increase its inventory of conventional submarines capable of firing advanced ASCMs. Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the PLAN purchased 12 Russian-built KILO class SS units, eight of which can launch ASCMs. PRC shipyards have delivered 13 SONG class SS units (Type 039) and 21 YUAN class diesel-electric air-independent propulsion attack submarines (SSP) (Type 039A/B). The PRC is expected to produce 25 or more YUAN class submarines by 2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired the first two KILO class submarines (both non-ASCM capable) purchased from Russia in the 1990s.⁶¹

Figure 13. Yuan (Type 039) Attack Submarine (SS)

Source: Photograph accompanying "Type 039A Yuan class," SinoDefence.com, July 10, 2018, accessed August 28, 2019.

Figure 14. Shang (Type 093) Attack Submarine (SSN)

Source: Photograph accompanying SinoDefence.com, "Type 093 Shang Class," July 1, 2018, accessed August 27, 2019, at http://sinodefence.com/type093_shang-class/.

Figure 15. Jin (Type 094) Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Minnie Chan, "China Puts a Damper on Navy's 70th Anniversary Celebrations As It Tries to Allay Fears Over Rising Strength," South China Morning Post, April 23, 2019. The article credits the photograph to Xinhua.

DOD states further that

Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed 12 nuclear-powered submarines—two SHANG I class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II class SSNs (Type 093A), and six JIN class SSBNs (Type 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) (3,900 nm) or the CSS-N-20 (JL-3) SLBM (5,400 nm), the PLAN's six operational JIN class SSBNs represent the PRC's first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. Each JIN class SSBN can carry up to 12 missiles. In 2019, Beijing displayed these missiles at the PRC's 70th founding anniversary parade. The PRC's next-generation Type 096 SSBN will reportedly be armed with follow-on longer range SLBM. The Type 096 will likely begin construction soon. Considering the projected 30-plus-year service life of the platforms [i.e., submarines], the PRC will operate its JIN and Type 096 SSBN fleets concurrently in the 2030s. This would align with Xi's 2018 directive for the SSBN force to achieve "stronger growth."

The PRC launched four SHANG III class (Type 093B) guided-missile nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSGN) between May 2022 and January 2023 and could have three hulls of this class operational by 2025. This new SHANG class variant enhances the PLAN's anti-surface warfare capability and could provide a clandestine land-attack option if equipped with LACMs. The PLAN is improving its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities through the development of its surface combatants and special mission aircraft but continues to lack a robust deep-water ASW capability.⁶²

A June 21, 2024, press report states

China's increased focus on nuclear-powered submarines is aimed at boosting long-distance naval combat and deterrence power amid growing risks of high-seas confrontation with the US, according to military analysts.

The People's Liberation Army has for the first time publicly acknowledged a strategic shift away from conventional submarines, as Beijing pushes to build a modernised military by 2027.

"The current development of China's submarine fleet is dual-capable, both nuclear-powered and conventional, with a focus on nuclear capabilities," Wen Xuexing, a member of a PLA Navy submarine unit, told state broadcaster CCTV.⁶³

Submarine Weapons

China's submarines are armed with one or more of the following: ASCMs, wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes, and mines. Wake-homing torpedoes can be very difficult for surface ships to decoy. China reportedly is also developing a capability for submarines to deploy drones.⁶⁴ DOD states that each Jin-class SSBN is equipped to carry up to 12 JL-2 or JL-3 nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).⁶⁵ The JL-3 is a new SLBM with a range longer than that of the JL-2. A May 2, 2021, press report stated that China's latest Jin-class SSBN is armed with JL-3s.⁶⁶

Aircraft Carriers

Overview

China's first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (Type 001), entered service in 2012. China's second aircraft carrier (and its first fully indigenously built carrier), Shandong (Type 002), entered service in 2019. China's third carrier, Fujian (Type 003), reportedly began conducting sea trials in 2024. China's fourth carrier reportedly has begun construction.

Liaoning and Shandong are conventionally powered and launch fixed-wing aircraft using an upward-sloping "ski ramp" at the ship's bow. Compared with Liaoning and Shandong, U.S. Navy aircraft carriers are larger, nuclear powered (giving them greater cruising endurance than a conventionally powered ship), able to embark and operate a larger number of aircraft, and launch fixed-wing aircraft using catapults, which can give those aircraft a range/payload capability greater than that of aircraft launched with a ski ramp. Fujian is conventionally powered, closer in size and flight deck configuration to U.S. Navy aircraft carriers,⁶⁷ and equipped with catapults rather than a ski ramp for launching aircraft.

Observers have speculated that China may eventually field a force of four to six (or possibly more than six) aircraft carriers. Observers expect that it will be some time before China masters carrier-based aircraft operations on a substantial scale.⁶⁸

Although aircraft carriers might have some value for China in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios, they are not considered critical for PLA operations in such scenarios, because Taiwan is within range of land-based PLA aircraft. Consequently, most observers believe that China is acquiring carriers primarily for their value in other kinds of operations, and to demonstrate China's status as a leading regional power and major world power. PLA aircraft carriers could be used for power-projection operations, particularly in scenarios that do not involve opposing U.S. forces, and to impress or intimidate foreign observers.⁶⁹ In a combat situation involving opposing U.S. naval and air forces, PLA aircraft carriers would be highly vulnerable to attack by U.S. ships and aircraft, but conducting such attacks could divert U.S. ships and aircraft from performing other missions. PLA aircraft carriers could also be used for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, maritime security operations (such as antipiracy operations), and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).

Liaoning (Type 001)

Liaoning (Figure 16) is a refurbished ex-Ukrainian aircraft carrier that China purchased from Ukraine in 1998 as an unfinished ship.⁷⁰ It has an estimated full load displacement of about 60,000 tons, and reportedly can accommodate an air wing of 30 or more fixed-wing airplanes and helicopters, including 24 fighters. China has used Liaoning in part for pilot training. In May 2018, China reportedly announced that the aircraft carrier group formed around Liaoning had reached initial operational capability (IOC),⁷¹ although that term might not mean the same as it does when used by DOD in connection with U.S. weapon systems.

Shandong (Type 002)

Shandong (Figure 17) is a modified version of the Liaoning design that incorporates some design improvements, including features that reportedly will permit it to embark and operate a larger air wing of 40 aircraft that includes 36 fighters.⁷² Its displacement is estimated at about 66,000 tons.

Fujian (Type 003)

Fujian (and Figure 18, Figure 19, and Figure 20) was launched (i.e., put into the water for the final stages of its construction) on June 17, 2022,⁷³ and reportedly began conducting sea trials in early May 2024.⁷⁴ Some observers believe it could be years before the ship begins making regular deployments.⁷⁵ The ship has an estimated full load displacement of about 80,000 tons and is equipped, as observers had expected, with electromagnetic catapults rather than a ski ramp, which will improve the range/payload capability of the fixed-wing aircraft that it operates.⁷⁶

China's Fourth Carrier

China reportedly is building a fourth aircraft carrier.⁷⁷ The ship's design, including its estimated displacement and whether it will be nuclear-powered or conventionally powered, had not been announced as of April 2025.

Reported New Dedicated Drone Carrier

China reportedly is building a new dedicated drone carrier (i.e., a carrier whose embarked air wing would consist entirely of unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs]) (Figure 21).⁷⁸

Figure 16. Liaoning (Type 001) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Chris Osieck, "Analysis of Chinese Aircraft Carriers Their History, Modifications, Spotted Places, and What the Future Has in Store for Us," Medium, June 14, 2022.

Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship

See also the discussion of the Type 076 amphibious assault ship that might be equipped with an electromagnetic aircraft catapult, in the section on China's amphibious ships.

Commercial Heavy-Lift Ship Reportedly Used in Exercise as Helicopter Carrier

In August 2020, it was reported that China had used a commercial heavy-lift ship in a military exercise as a platform for operating at least two PLA Army helicopters.⁷⁹

Figure 17. Shandong (Type 002) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying "China's Shandong Aircraft Carrier Strike Group Operated under Strict Surveillance by Japanese Naval Air Assets," Zona Militar, July 17, 2024.

Figure 18. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Orange Wang, "China Says Its Fujian Carrier Is World's Largest Conventionally Powered Warship," South China Morning Post, June 23, 2024. The caption to the photograph credits the photograph to Xinhua.

Figure 19. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Photograph accompanying Ryan Chan, "China Puts Most Advanced Aircraft Carrier to Sea," Newsweek, September 3, 2024. The caption to the photograph credits the photograph to "Pu Haiyang/Xinhua via AP."

Carrier-Based Aircraft⁸⁰

China's primary carrier-based fighter aircraft is the J-15, or Flying Shark (Figure 22), an aircraft derived from the Russian Su-33 Flanker aircraft design that can operate from carriers equipped with a ski ramp rather than catapults, but that some observers have critiqued for its range/payload limitations in operations from carriers equipped with ski ramps rather than catapults.⁸¹ China has developed an upgraded, catapult-capable version of the J-15 that could have improved range/payload when operated from a catapult-equipped carrier.⁸²

Figure 20. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier

Source: Photograph accompanying Zhao Lei, "Chinese Aircraft Carrier Fujian Completes Maiden Sea Trials," China Daily, May 8, 2024. The caption to the photograph credits the photograph to Xinhua.

Figure 21. Reported New Dedicated Drone Carrier

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying H. I. Sutton, "China Builds World's First Dedicated Drone Carrier," Naval News, May 15, 2024. The uncropped version carries a mark showing that it is from Airbus DS. The line extending away from the left end of the ship is an annotation that was added to the uncropped version to indicate that this is the dedicated drone carrier.

DOD states that China is developing a carrier-capable variant of its FC-31/J-31 fifth-generation stealth fighter, known as the F-35 (Figure 23), to complement or succeed the J-15 on catapult-equipped PLA carriers.⁸³ China reportedly is also developing a carrier-based airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, called the KJ-600, that is similar to the U.S. Navy's carrier-based E-2 Hawkeye AEW aircraft,⁸⁴ and stealth drone aircraft.⁸⁵

Figure 22. J-15 Flying Shark Carrier-Capable Fighter

Source: Photograph accompanying "China Developing Elite New Variants of the J-15 Flying Shark to Deploy from EMALS Equipped Future Carriers; Implications for the Balance of Power at Sea," Military Watch Magazine, August 17, 2018, accessed August 28, 2019.

Figure 23. J-35 Carrier-Capable Fighter

Source: Photograph accompanying Gordon Arthur, "China Unveils J-35A and Other New Fighters at Zhuhai Airshow," Defense News, November 13, 2024. The caption to the photograph credits the photograph to China Military.

Surface Combatants

Overview

China since the early 1990s has put into service numerous new classes of indigenously built surface combatants, including a highly capable new cruiser (also referred to as a large destroyer), several successive classes of increasingly modern and capable destroyers and frigates, a new class of corvettes (i.e., light frigates), and a new class of missile-armed patrol craft. These new classes of surface combatants demonstrate a significant modernization of PLA Navy surface combatant technology.

DOD states that China's navy "remains engaged in a robust shipbuilding program for surface combatants. As of early 2024, the PLAN is building a new batch of CG [cruisers], DDG [destroyers], and two different classes of guided-missile frigates, including a larger, more capable variant: designated JIANGKAI III ([Type] 054B). These assets will significantly upgrade the PLAN's air defense, anti-ship, and anti-submarine capabilities and will be critical as the PLAN expands its operations beyond the range of the PLA's shore-based air defense systems."⁸⁶ DIA states that "the era of past designs has given way to production of modern multimission destroyer, frigate, and corvette classes as China's technological advancement in naval design has begun to approach a level commensurate with, and in some cases exceeding, that of other modern navies."⁸⁷ China has also upgraded some of its older surface combatants with new weapons and other equipment.⁸⁸

Type 055 Cruiser/Large Destroyer

China is building a new class of cruiser (also referred to as a large destroyer), called the Renhai-class or Type 055 (Figure 24 and Figure 25) that reportedly displaces between 12,000 and 13,000 tons.⁸⁹ A March 7, 2021, press report by a PRC media outlet states that the ship displaces more than 12,000 tons.⁹⁰ By way of comparison, the U.S. Navy's Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers (aka the U.S. Navy's Aegis cruisers and destroyers) displace about 10,100 tons and 9,700 tons, respectively, while the U.S. Navy's three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers displace about 15,700 tons. ONI states that Type 055 ships are being built by two shipyards.⁹¹ The first Type 055 ship was reportedly commissioned into service in January 2020,⁹² and the 10^th was reportedly launched (i.e., put into the water for the final stages of its construction) in May 2024.⁹³

Figure 24. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Liu Zhen, "Meet the Type 055 Destroyers Steering China's Blue-Water Ambitions as Far as Australia," South China Morning Post, February 26, 2025. The article credits the photograph to CCTV.

China since the early 1990s has put into service multiple new classes of indigenously built destroyers, the most recent of which is the Luyang III (Type 052D) class (Figure 26), which displaces about 7,500 tons and is equipped with phased-array radars and vertical launch missile systems that outwardly are broadly similar to those on U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers. Type 052D ships have been in serial production for some time; a March 12, 2023, press report states that the 27^th and the 28^th Type 052D ships had been launched (i.e., put into the water for the final stages of their construction), and that three additional Type 052D ships were under construction at the same shipyard.⁹⁴

Figure 25. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer)

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Joseph Trevithick, "China's Sudden Live Fire Naval Drills Off Australia Rattle Canberra," The War Zone, February 21, 2025. The article credits the photograph to "Chinese Navy."

Figure 26. Luyang III (Type 052D) Destroyer

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying "Type 052D Luyang-III Class," SinoDefence.com, September 3, 2017, accessed August 28, 2019.

Type 054 Frigate

China since the early 1990s has also put into service multiple new classes of indigenously built frigates, the most recent of which is the Jiangkai II (Type 054A) class (Figure 27), which displaces about 4,000 tons. ONI stated in February 2020 that 30 Type 054As entered service between 2008 and 2019.⁹⁵ Construction of Type 054 frigates reportedly has shifted to improved versions called the Type 054AG and 054B (Figure 28).⁹⁶ The first Type 054B reportedly was commissioned into service in January 2025.⁹⁷

Figure 27. Jiangkai II (Type 054A) Frigate

Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying "Steaming Ahead for Training," China Military Online, March 30, 2025. The photograph is credited to "eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Fang Zhikun." The ship (hull number 553) is identified as a Type 054A frigate in China Military Online, "Helicopter Engages in Take-Off and Landing Training," People's Daily Online, March 7, 2025.

Type 056 Corvette

China has built a new class of corvettes (i.e., a light frigates, or FFLs) called Jiangdao class or Type 056 ships (Figure 29) that reportedly displace 1,300 tons to 1,500 tons.⁹⁸ Type 056 ships were built at a high annual rate in four shipyards—the first was commissioned in 2013, and the 72^nd and final ship of the type was reportedly commissioned in early 2021, implying an average commisisoning rate of about eight ships per year. DOD states that China's navy "commissioned the 72nd JIANGDAO in February 2021, completing the production run. The PLAN subsequently transferred the early flight Type 056 variants, likely 22 ships total, to the CCG [China Coast Guard] in 2021, probably due to the early models' lack of towed-array sonar. The remaining JIANGDAOs (056A) are equipped with a towed-array sonar and are, thus, capable of contributing to ASW operations."⁹⁹ As shown in Table 1, the rapid growth in the number of Type 056 corvettes since 2013 accounts for a substantial share of the net increase in the total number of ships in China's navy since 2013.

Figure 28. Jiangkai II (Type 054B) Frigate

Source: Photograph accompanying Christopher Bodeen, "China's Navy Commissions New-Generation Frigate as Competition Rises with US and Others," Associated Press, January 22, 2025. The article credits the photograph to "Pu Haiyang/Xinhua via AP."

Figure 29. Jingdao (Type 056) Corvette

Source: Photograph accompanying "Type 056 Corvette," Wikipedia, updated April 9, 2025, accessed April 24, 2025. The photograph is credited to Japan's Ministry of Defense.

Reported New Corvette Design

China reportedly has built at least one example of a new corvette (i.e., light frigate or FFL) design that observers estimate to be somewhat larger than the Type 056 design. It is not clear whether this ship is a test platform or the lead ship of a new class of corvettes.¹⁰⁰

Figure 30. Reported New Corvette Design

Source: Photograph accompanying Dylan Malyasov, "China's New Stealth Warship Unveiled in Leaked Images," Defence Blog, August 28, 2024.

Amphibious Ships

Type 071 Amphibious Ship

China's new Yuzhao or Type 071 amphibious ships (Figure 31) have an estimated displacement of more than 19,855 tons,¹⁰¹ compared to about 25,900 tons for the U.S. Navy's new San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships. A May 6, 2021, press report states that the eighth Type 071 ship "recently made its first publicly known maritime exercise appearance."¹⁰²

Figure 31. Yuzhao (Type 071) Amphibious Ship

Source: Cropped version of photograph from Chinese Military Review, "Jinggang Shan (999) Type 071 YUZHAO Class Amphibious Transport Dock," undated (but with a URL suggesting that it was posted in February 2012), accessed August 29, 2018.

Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship

In April 2021, China commissioned into service the first of a new type of amphibious assault ship,¹⁰³ called the Yushen or Type 075 (Figure 32 and Figure 33), that has an estimated displacement of about 36,000 tons, compared to 41,000 to 45,000 tons for U.S. Navy LHA/LHD-type amphibious assault ships.¹⁰⁴ In March 2022, it was reported that the first Type 075 ship had achieved initial operational capability (IOC),¹⁰⁵ although that term might not mean the same as it does when used by DOD in connection with U.S. weapon systems. The second Type 075 ship reportedly was commissioned into service in late December 2021.¹⁰⁶ The third was reportedly commissioned on or perhaps a few days prior to October 1, 2022.¹⁰⁷ The fourth reportedly "arrived at the port of Zhanjiang on an undisclosed date after leaving the Hudong-Zhonghua shipyard on January 8 [2025]."¹⁰⁸

Figure 32. Yushen (Type 075) Amphibious Assault Ship

Source: Photograph accompanying David Axe, "China Is Finishing Its First Large Helicopter Assault Ship," National Interest, October 29, 2019.

Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship

China reportedly is building a new type of amphibious assault ship called the Yulan or Type 076 that has an estimated displacement of roughly 50,000 tons and is equipped with an electromagnetic aircraft catapult for launching drones (Figure 34). The first such ship reportedly was launched (i.e., put into the water for the final stages of its construction) on December 27, 2024.¹⁰⁹

Figure 33. Yushen (Type 075) Amphibious Assault Ship

Source: Photograph accompanying Liu Zhen, "Chinese Military's First Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship Begins Sea Trial," South China Morning Post, August 7, 2020. The article credits the photograph to Weibo. Possible Type 076 Catapult-Equipped Amphibious Assault Ship.

Bridge-Equipped Landing Barges

China reportedly is building new bridge-equipped landing barges that observers assess as being intended to enhance China's ability to conduct an amphibious landing on the shores of Taiwan.¹¹⁰

Figure 34. Yulan (Type 076) Amphibious Assault Ship

Source: Photograph accompanying Enoch Wong, "China Confirms PLA Navy's New Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship Will Be a Drone Carrier," South China Morning Post, January 13, 2025. The article credits the photograph to Xinhua.

Amphibious Ship Roles and Missions

Although larger amphibious ships such as the Type 071, Type 075, and Type 076 would be of value for conducting amphibious landings in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios, some observers believe that China is building such ships in part for their value in conducting other operations, such as operations for asserting and defending China's claims in the South and East China Seas, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, maritime security operations (such as antipiracy operations), and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Politically, amphibious ships can also be used for naval diplomacy (i.e., port calls and engagement activities) and for impressing or intimidating foreign observers.

Figure 35. Bridge-Equipped Landing Barge

Source: Photograph accompanying Alex Wilson, "Bridge-Forming Barges Could Speed Up a Chinese Invasion Of Taiwan, Experts Say," Stars and Stripes, March 20, 2025. The caption to the photograph credits the photograph to "Screenshot from X."

Potential Use of Commercial Ships

Whether and when China will become capable of conducting a large-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan is an ongoing matter of debate and discussion.¹¹¹ In assessing China's capacity for conducting a large-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan, some observers have focused on China's potential for using civilian ferries and other commercial ships to augment the transport and landing capacity of China's amphibious ships. Reported PLA exercises indicate that China is exploring and testing this concept.¹¹²

Operations Away from Home Waters

Ship Operations

Although China's navy operates primarily in China's home waters, PLA Navy ships are conducting increasing numbers of operations away from China's home waters, including the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the waters surrounding Europe, including the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea. A November 23, 2019, DOD news report quoted Admiral Philip Davidson, the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, as stating that China's navy had conducted more global naval deployments in the previous 30 months than it had in the previous 30 years.¹¹³

DOD states that "the PLAN's ability to perform missions beyond the FIC [first island chain] is modest but growing as it gains more experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger and more advanced platforms. The PRC's experience in extended range operations primarily comes from extended task group deployments and its ongoing counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of Aden."¹¹⁴ China has been conducting antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since December 2008 via a succession of more than 45 rotationally deployed naval escort task forces.¹¹⁵ China's long-distance naval deployments have also been for making diplomatic port calls and conducting training exercises.

Current or Potential Bases Outside China

China's distant naval operations are supported in part by China's military base in Djibouti, which is located where the Gulf of Aden meets the Red Sea. China officially opened the base in August 2017 as its first overseas military base.¹¹⁶

Some observers expect that China in coming years will seek to establish a global network of locations in various parts of the world for refueling and resupplying PLA Navy ships conducting distant naval operations.¹¹⁷ DOD states that

Beyond its base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely considering and planning for additional military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection.

The PRC has likely considered Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan. The PRC has probably already made overtures to Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands. The PLA is probably most interested in military access along the SLOCs from the PRC to the Strait of Hormuz and Africa.¹¹⁸

Observers are following developments at Cambodia's Ream naval base, which fronts onto the Gulf of Thailand.¹¹⁹ DOD states, "In June 2022, a PRC official confirmed that the PLA would have access to parts of Cambodia's Ream Naval Base. Two PLAN corvettes became the first ships to dock at the newly constructed pier there in December 2023."¹²⁰

A security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands that was announced by the Solomon Islands in April 2022 has led some observers to express concern that the agreement could eventually lead to, among other things, the establishment of a PRC naval base in that country.¹²¹ The Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands reportedly ruled out that possibility, stating that it would "put our country and our people as targets for potential military strikes."¹²²

In December 2021, it was reported that China may be seeking to establish a military (including naval) base at a port in Equatorial Guinea, a country located on the Atlantic coast of Africa—a location that could enhance China's ability to conduct naval operations in the Atlantic.¹²³

A January 3, 2023, press report states, "China is once again pressuring Argentina to build a naval base in Ushuaia, Tierra del Fuego province, which would mean opening the door to Antarctica for Beijing."¹²⁴

A November 7, 2023, press report states, "President Joe Biden has been briefed on what his advisers see as a PRC plan to build a military facility in Oman, people familiar with the matter said, amid a broader effort by Beijing to deepen defense and diplomatic ties with the Middle East."¹²⁵

U.S. Navy Response

Overview

The U.S. Navy has taken a number of actions to counter China's naval modernization effort. Among other things, the U.S. Navy has

• shifted a greater percentage of its fleet to the Pacific;¹²⁶
• assigned its most-capable new ships and aircraft to the Pacific;
• maintained or increased general presence operations, training and developmental exercises, and engagement and cooperation with allied and other navies in the Indo-Pacific;
• increased the planned future size of the Navy;
• initiated, increased, or accelerated numerous programs for developing new military technologies and acquiring new ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and weapons;
• developed new operational concepts (i.e., new ways to employ Navy and Marine Corps forces) for countering PLA maritime A2/AD forces; and
• signaled that the Navy in coming years will shift to a more distributed fleet architecture that will feature a substantially greater use of unmanned vehicles.

Some of the above items are discussed in more detail below.

Planned Size of Navy

As discussed in greater detail in another CRS report,¹²⁷ the Navy's preferred force-level goal calls for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 381 battle force ships, compared to the Navy's 296 battle force ships as of September 30, 2024. Under the Navy's FY2025 30-year (FY2025-FY2054) shipbuilding plan, the U.S. Navy would grow to more than 300 ships in FY2032 and reach a total of more than 381 ships in FY2042.

Highly Capable Ships, Aircraft, Weapons, and Other Systems

Many of the Navy's programs for acquiring highly capable ships, aircraft, weapons, and other systems can be viewed as intended, at least in part, at improving the U.S. Navy's ability to counter PLA maritime A2/AD capabilities. Examples include the following:

• Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs);¹²⁸
• the Navy's envisaged next-generation SSN, called the SSN(X);¹²⁹
• Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs);¹³⁰
• Navy and Marine Corps versions of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF);¹³¹
• Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class guided missile destroyers (DDGs);¹³²
• the Navy's envisaged next-generation DDG, called the DDG(X);¹³³
• Constellation (FFG-62) class frigates;¹³⁴
• new anti-ship weapons, such as the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM);¹³⁵
• hypersonic weapons, including the ship-launched Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) weapon and the Hypersonic Air-Launched OASuW (HALO) weapon, also known as OASuW Increment 2;¹³⁶
• an ability to do at-sea reloading of Vertical Launch System (VLS) missile tubes on Navy surface combatants, so that VLS-equuipped Navy surface combatants engaged in combat operations do not need to withdraw to a distant port to be reloaded;¹³⁷
• shipboard high-energy lasers;¹³⁸
• new electronic warfare systems;¹³⁹ and
• undersea surveillance systems for detecting and tracking adversary submarines.¹⁴⁰

New Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Operating Concept

As discussed in another CRS report,¹⁴¹ the Department of the Navy (which includes the Navy and Marine Corps) is implementing a new operating concept called Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) for using U.S. naval (i.e., Navy and Marine Corps) forces in combat operations against an adversary, particularly China, that has substantial capabilities for detecting and attacking U.S. Navy surface ships with anti-ship missiles and other weapons. Key features of DMO appear to include the following:

• Dispersing Navy units over a larger area within the theater of operations, so as to make it harder for an adversary to detect and target Navy units, while still permitting Navy units to support one another and concentrate their fires on adversary targets.
• Spreading the Navy's sensors and weapons across a wider array of ships and aircraft, so as to reduce the fraction of the Navy's sensors and weapons that would be lost due to the destruction of any one Navy ship or aircraft (i.e., avoid "putting too many eggs into one basket").
• Making greater use of longer-ranged weapons, unmanned vessels, and unmanned aircraft in support of the previous two points.
• Using resilient communication links and networking technologies to knit the resulting widely dispersed force of manned and unmanned ships and aircraft into a coordinated battle force that can withstand and adapt to enemy attacks on Navy communications and networks.

Some examples of Navy acquisition programs that appear associated with DMO include the following:

• Programs for acquiring longer-ranged weapons, such as the Maritime Strike Tomahawk (a new anti-ship variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile) and the previously mentioned Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM).
• The Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV), which is to be equipped with a Vertical Launch System (VLS) for storing and firing anti-ship missiles and other weapons. LUSVs are intended to act as adjunct missile magazines for manned Navy surface combatants.¹⁴²
• The Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel (MUSV), which is to be equipped with radars or other sensors. MUSVs are intended to help form a distributed sensor network for supporting Navy operations.¹⁴³
• The light replenishment oiler (TAOL) shipbuilding program for building a new class of smaller oilers. TAOLs are intended to enhance the Navy's ability to provide fuel and supplies to Navy ships that are operating in a more distributed manner across a wider sea area.¹⁴⁴
• The Medium Landing Ship (LSM) program for building a class of smaller amphibious ships. The LSM program is central to implementing a Marine Corps operating concept associated with DMO that is called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).¹⁴⁵

Cooperation with Naval Forces of Allies and Other Countries

In General

U.S. Navy efforts to increase cooperation with naval forces from allies such as Japan and Australia and other countries such India, including exercises and other forms of engagement, appear aimed not only at improving interoperability between U.S. and allied naval forces, but also at expanding existing bilateral forms of naval cooperation (e.g., U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Australia, U.S.-India) into trilateral (e.g., U.S.-Japan-Australia, U.S.-Australia-India) or quadrilateral (e.g., U.S.-Japan-Australia-India) forms that could enhance the ability of the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region to balance against China's growing military capabilities and deter potential assertive actions by China.¹⁴⁶

AUKUS Security Agreement

The Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) trilateral security partnership announced in September 2021 includes a major initiative (called Pillar 1) to homeport U.S. and UK nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) in Australia and establish an eight-boat Australian SSN force,¹⁴⁷ and another major initiative (called Pillar 2) for the three countries to cooperatively pursue advanced military capabilities, including undersea capabilities other than SSNs (such as unmanned underwater vehicles and undersea weapons); quantum technologies; artificial intelligence and autonomy; advanced cyber capabilities; hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities; and electronic warfare.¹⁴⁸

Issues for Congress

Overview

The overall issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Trump Administration's proposed U.S. Navy plans, budgets, and programs for responding to China's naval modernization effort. Within this overall issue, specific issues include but are not limited to the following:

• the current and potential future U.S.-China balance of naval power in general, and in specific geographic areas, particularly the Taiwan Strait and other waters surrounding Taiwan, and the South China Sea;
• whether the planned size and capabilities of the Navy will be appropriate for countering China's naval modernization effort in coming years while also permitting the Navy to perform other missions, including countering Russian military forces in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, and defending U.S. interests in the Middle East;
• whether the Navy is doing enough to
• improve its ability to counter China's ASBMs, hypersonic weapons, and other maritime A2/AD weapons, such as wake-homing torpedoes;
• develop and procure in sufficient numbers new ASCMs with ranges that match or exceed those of China's longer-ranged ASCMs;
• increase the operating range of Navy carrier air wings, so as to improve the ability of carriers and their air wings to achieve effects while operating at longer distances from PLA ASBMs and other A2/AD weapons; and
• whether constraints on U.S. shipbuilding capacity are hampering the U.S. Navy's ability to counter China's naval modernization effort, and could hamper the ability of the United States to compete with China for post-conflict naval superiority in the aftermath of a U.S.-China conflict in which large numbers of U.S. and PRC navy ships are destroyed and both countries work to reconstitute their fleets.

U.S.-China Balance of Naval Power

Regarding the U.S.-China balance of naval power in general, U.S. and other observers generally assess that while the United States today has more naval capability overall, China's naval modernization effort since the 1990s has substantially reduced the U.S. advantage, and that if current U.S. and PLA naval capability trends (such as those for numbers of ships shown in Table 1, Table 2, Table 3, Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3, and Figure 4) do not change, China might eventually draw even with or surpass the United States in overall naval capability. In remarks to a conference on November 3, 2022, for example, Admiral Charles A. Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, stated

As I assess our level of deterrence against China, the ship is slowly sinking. It is sinking slowly, but it is sinking, as fundamentally they are putting capability in the field faster than we are. As those curves keep going, it isn't going to matter how good our [operating plan] is or how good our commanders are, or how good our forces are—we're not going to have enough of them. And that is a very near-term problem....

Undersea capabilities is still the one ... maybe the only true asymmetric advantage we still have against our opponents. But unless we pick up the pace, in terms of getting our maintenance problems fixed, getting new construction going ... if we can't figure that out ... we are not going to put ourselves in a good position to maintain strategic deterrence and national defense.¹⁴⁹

Regarding the U.S.-China naval balance of power specifically in the South China Sea, some observers are concerned that China has already drawn even with or even surpassed the United States. U.S. Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, in responses to advance policy questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee for an April 17, 2018, hearing before the committee to consider nominations, including Davidson's nomination to become Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM),¹⁵⁰ stated that "China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States."¹⁵¹

Skeptics of assessments like those above might argue that they do not give adequate weight to relative U.S. strengths (and corresponding PLA relative weaknesses and limitations) in areas such as undersea warfare; personnel quality, training, and initiative; operational experience (particularly in combat situations); joint operations with other U.S. military services; and potential support from allies and partners, particularly Japan and Australia. A December 7, 2022, blog post, for example, states

One of the data points used to bolster the China threat argument is the relative size of the two naval fleets, but not all fleets are created equal. In terms of the number of ships, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is significantly larger than the U.S. Navy.... The discrepancy between the Chinese fleet and the U.S. fleet is already striking, but it will likely only grow in the coming years, and that simple fact will undoubtedly continue to be exploited by defense hawks....

While the raw data may seem alarming, they hardly tell a complete story. What the U.S. fleet lacks in total numbers it more than makes up in tonnage. The relative weight of a fleet is significant because it indicates the sailing range and purpose of the fleet. Larger ships are needed for longer voyages, since they can carry more fuel and munitions. For instance, the U.S. Navy's global mission necessitates larger ships capable of spanning oceans and operating away from friendly shores and land-based defenses.

The Chinese fleet combined displaces approximately 1,854,000 tons, less than half of the total tonnage of the U.S. Navy. The difference is easy to see when comparing similar vessel types....

The larger American ships give the fleet a significant advantage in a number of areas, including the capacity to launch cruise missiles. U.S. surface ships have more than 9,000 vertical missile launch cells, compared to the 1,000 in the Chinese fleet.

When it comes to submarines, the Chinese force is about the same size as the U.S. Navy's, but the two differ significantly in capability....

China's Navy would have a difficult time operating outside the waters adjacent to the mainland because it lacks the structure necessary to do so. Much has been made about Chinese aircraft carriers in recent years, but the carrier fleet remains in its infancy....

The Chinese military overall lacks experience conducting major modern combat operations. The Chinese last fought a war in 1979, when the People's Liberation Army briefly invaded northern Vietnam in support of China's allies in Cambodia and to disrupt the alliance between the Vietnamese and the Soviet Union.... Chinese military leaders are now two generations removed from actual combat experience, which calls into question their potential prowess.¹⁵²

Davidson Window/Decade of Concern

Some Members of Congress and other U.S. observers are concerned about the possibility that China might attack Taiwan sometime between now and 2027 (a timeframe that began in 2021 and is sometimes referred to as the Davidson window)¹⁵³ or between now and 2030 (a timeframe that began in 2020 and is sometimes referred to as the decade of concern),¹⁵⁴ and about the readiness the U.S. military, including the U.S. Navy, for a conflict in that timeframe. A "navigation plan" (i.e., guidance document) for the U.S. Navy released by then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti on September 18, 2024, refers to a "North Star of raising readiness across the force by 2027 to be ready for crisis or conflict," states that "this Navigation Plan drives toward two strategic ends: readiness for the possibility of war with the People's Republic of China by 2027 and enhancing the Navy's long-term advantage," and further states that "the Chairman of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has told his forces to be ready for war by 2027—we will be more ready."¹⁵⁵

In addition to the Davidson window and the decade of concern, some observers have offered alternative near-term time windows.¹⁵⁶ Still other observers, including some DOD officials, believe a PRC attack on Taiwan does not appear to be imminent or is not particularly likely to occur in the near term,¹⁵⁷ or have questioned the notion of identifying a particular time window.¹⁵⁸

For observers who are concerned about the Davidson window or decade of concern, given the time needed to build major U.S. Navy warships (typically several years), decisions made now on procuring new ships for the Navy will have little or no impact on the number of ships the Navy will have in service during the Davidson window or the decade of concern. (Decisions made now on procuring new ships for the Navy will primarily impact the number of ships the Navy will have in service in years after the Davidson window or the decade of concern, a time period which is also of potential concern to policymakers.) Options for bolstering Navy capabilities during the Davidson window or the decade of concern focus mostly on matters other than procuring new ships, including but not limited to the following, which are not presented in any particular order:

• keeping existing ships and aircraft in service during the Davidson window or decade of concern rather than retiring them during the Davidson window or decade of concern (while preserving the option of retiring them after the end of the Davidson window or decade of concern);
• increasing the material readiness of existing ships and aircraft, so as to maximize the percentage of them that are available for operations, by working down ship and aircraft maintenance backlogs;
• shifting additional ships, aircraft, weapons, and supplies from the Atlantic theater to the Pacific theater (although the risks of doing that in connection with deterring and responding to Russian actions in the Atlantic and Mediterranean would be a factor to consider);
• upgrading existing ships, aircraft, and weapons, particularly through the installation of improved or additional systems, improved software for those systems,¹⁵⁹ or components that can be quickly switched out or bolted on;
• procuring new aircraft, weapons, and unmanned systems, if they can enter service before the end of the Davidson window or the decade of concern;¹⁶⁰
• procuring spare parts and supplies and positioning them in the Pacific;
• acting to alleviate bottlenecks or otherwise increase the capacity of the industrial base to produce aircraft, weapons, and supplies and/or repair ships, aircraft, weapons, and supplies;
• hardening air bases and other land-based facilities in the Pacific that support U.S. Navy operations so as to improve their ability to withstand attack by PLA missiles or other weapons;
• increasing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities for understanding and monitoring China's naval forces;
• increasing activities for measuring and understanding the physical operating environment in the Pacific;
• increasing the operational proficiency of Navy personnel through training and exercises; and
• increasing operations for demonstrating U.S. Navy capabilities to China and/or perhaps creating uncertainty or confusion in China about U.S. Navy capabilities, concepts of operations, or tactics.¹⁶¹

Shipbuilding Capacity

As discussed at length in another CRS report,¹⁶² industrial base capacity constraints for building U.S. Navy ships have become more prominent as an oversight matter for the congressional defense committees since about 2022. Industrial base capacity constraints for building U.S. Navy ships are present at both shipyards and supplier firms, and arise from limits on production facilities (i.e., numbers and ages of production spaces and equipment) and workforce challenges, including limits on available numbers of naval architects and marine engineers to design new classes of ships, and challenges in recruiting and retaining desired numbers of production workers at shipyards and supplier firms to build new ships.

Some Members of Congress and other observers, viewing China's much-larger shipbuilding capacity, are concerned that constraints on U.S. shipbuilding capacity are hampering the U.S. Navy's ability to counter China's naval modernization effort, and could hamper the ability of the United States to compete with China for post-conflict naval superiority in the aftermath of a U.S.-China conflict in which large numbers of U.S. and PRC navy ships are destroyed and both countries work to reconstitute their fleets.

Contributing to this concern is an unclassified U.S. Navy briefing slide with a graphic showing that China has about 230 times as much shipbuilding capacity as the United States when measured in terms of gross tons of ships that can be produced per unit of time.¹⁶³ This measure appears to relate to capacity for building relatively less complex and unarmed commercial cargo ships (China is a world leader in the production of commercial cargo ships) as opposed to capacity for building relatively more complex warships that are equipped with complex combat system equipment. China's capacity for building complex combat system equipment for warships may be far less than 230 times the U.S. capacity for building such equipment, meaning that the effective PRC-U.S. ratio for capacity for building warships with complex combat system equipment may be far less than 230:1.¹⁶⁴ Even so, the ratio may be higher, and perhaps considerably higher, than 1:1. Some observers have characterized limits on U.S. shipbuilding capacity, particularly in relation to China's shipbuilding capacity, as a strategic liability or major cause for concern for the United States in competing militarily with China.¹⁶⁵

The most prominent U.S. naval shipbuilding industrial base capacity constraints are those for building submarines. Virginia-class attack submarines have been procured at a rate of two boats per year since FY2011, but the submarine construction industrial base since about 2019 has not been able to complete two Virginia-class boats per year, resulting in a growing backlog of Virginia-class boats that have been procured but not completed. Since 2022, the completion rate has been about 1.2 to 1.2 Virginia-class boats per year. The Navy aims to increase the completion rate two 2.0 Virginia-class boats per year by 2028. Shipbuilding capacity constraints are also affecting the construction rates for surface ships such as DDG-51 class destroyers.

As discussed in the above-cited CRS report that discusses at length the issue of industrial base capacity constraints for building Navy ships, the Navy and the U.S. shipbuilding industry are taking certain steps to increase U.S. industrial capacity for building Navy ships. The above-cited CRS report also outlines options for expanding current efforts to increase U.S. industrial capacity for building Navy ships and for making better use of available shipbuilding capacity.

Other Specific Issues

Longer-Range Weapons

The Navy has initiated efforts to develop and procure longer-ranged ASCMs and other new weapons. The Navy testified in May 2024 as follows:

Tomahawk [cruise missile]

The Navy is continuing investment into Tomahawk Block V new production, Maritime Strike Tomahawk, and recertification/modernization of Tomahawk Block IV. Ally and partner interest in Tomahawk capability emphasized missile production throughput challenges. The FY 2025 budget request continues to fund factory improvements to increase industrial capacity, increasing throughput to 600 missiles per year by FY27. In the FY 2025 budget request, the Department sustains the Tomahawk as the nation's premier all-weather, long-range, survivable deep strike offensive weapon to include new production of and recertification of current inventory into modernized BLK V Tomahawk missiles. BLK V(a) Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) provides a long-range moving maritime strike capability to meet current and future threats, supporting the Surface Warfare Mission area through the inclusion of a seeker suite in the Tomahawk BLK V missile. The FY 2025 budget request for MST provides continuation of Operational and Integration Testing and ultimately fields hardware, software, and munitions for the MST capability in 2025. The FY 2025 budget request continues engineering, manufacturing, and development of the Joint Multiple-Effects Warhead System (JMEWS), which will deliver a hardened target penetration capability with the Tomahawk BLK V(b) missile in FY 2027. The FY 2025 budget request continues engineering, manufacturing, and development of the Military Code Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver, which will deliver significant increased resiliency in spoofing and jamming threat environments capability to the Tomahawk BLK V missile in 2026.

Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment 1/ Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), LRASM C-1/C-3, and OASuW Increment 2 / HALO

The LRASM C-1 and C-3 variants add near-term, cost-effective capacity to the DON's long range strike capability while enhancing the OASuW mission. The FY 2025 President's Budget requests $102.5 million in procurement funding to buy 30 DON LRASM C-1 weapon systems with associated support to provide economic order quantity [EOQ] funding in support of the MYP [multiyear procurement]¹⁶⁶ initiated in FY24, and to provide the assets for operational test of the C-1 configuration. The FY 2025 President's Budget request also includes $163.3 million in RDT&E funding for the continuing development of the LRASM C-3 capability improvement. Navy AGM-158 development efforts involve integration of a Beyond Line-of-Sight radio subsystem to enable enhanced operational flexibility.

The FY 2025 President's Budget continues developing the AGM-158 C-3 variant through software development and test, platform integration, and entry into integrated test. The FY 2025 President's Budget request also includes $223.9 million for procurement of 60 LRASM in the C-3 configuration migrating the primary production line to the more-capable C-3 configuration as the program reaches sufficient maturity.

The FY 2025 President's Budget includes $178.6 million for development of OASuW Increment 2, which is now referred as Hypersonic Air Launched OASuW (HALO). HALO supports the national imperative to mature hypersonic capabilities and transition them into warfighting systems, increasing the lethality and deterrent effect of our Carrier Wings. The program represents a longer-term capability that encompasses increased performance and will provide the Navy with the necessary air-launched, carrier-based weapon to address evolving long-range, -threats from near peer competitors. HALO will complete Milestone B and enter formal Engineering and Manufacturing Development, to include a competitive contract award during FY 2025.

Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile (AARGM) & AARGM Extended-Range (AARGM-ER)

AARGM domestic procurement completed in FY 2021 with the award of the last Navy Full Rate Production (FRP) contract. There have been 1450 AARGMs (All Up Rounds, Training Missiles, and Spares) delivered to the Fleet as of March 2024. Program of record delivery is 1803 missiles. Deliveries continue through FY 2025 in support of the transition to AARGM-ER. AARGM-ER provides the DON with a 5th generation compatible extended range asset to project power and provide Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, both at-sea and on land. The first AARGM-ER delivery is scheduled for 3QFY24 [third quarter of FY2024]. The FY 2025 President's Budget requests $22.3 million in RDT&E to support operational and integration testing of production representative hardware. The budget requests $248.6 million in [the] Weapons Procurement, Navy (WPN) [appropriation account] to procure 151 AARGM-ER all-up-rounds and six Captive Air Training Missiles and advance procurement.

Hypersonic Program

The DON is developing a hypersonic weapon system that will enable precise and timely strike capability against deep inland targets in contested environments. In collaboration with the Army, the Department is leveraging a common missile design and joint test opportunities to field a conventional hypersonic weapon system. Zumwalt [DDG-1000] Class DDGs will be the first Navy platform to field this hypersonic capability in the mid-2020's, followed by Block V Virginia Class SSNs. In March 2020, the Services executed a successful flight test of the Common Hypersonic Glide Body, and in 2022, the Services followed up that testing with several static-fire tests and a flight test of the newly-developed two stage Solid Rocket Motor. The DON has validated the design of the Navy's cold-gas launch approach and is continuing subscale and component testing in support of future capability development, manufacturability, and affordability improvements. This rapid development and demonstration of hypersonic strike weapon systems supports the U.S. ability to deter, and if necessary, defeat potential adversaries.

The Department's FY 2025 budget request will support critical milestones on the path to fielding CPS to the first Zumwalt Class DDG. The request totals $903.9 million in CPS R&D funding.

The Marine Corps is working towards the capability to employ smaller, highly mobile hypersonic weapons through science and technology initiatives. The Marine Corps is pursuing an acquisition strategy that leverages the developmental work of other Services and agencies, investing when the capability has reached a higher technology readiness level that allows for expedited prototype experimentation at reduced costs.

Torpedoes

As the primary weapon in maintaining an advantage in the undersea domain, Heavyweight and Lightweight Torpedoes remain a critical component of the Department's munitions inventory. Continued investments in torpedo capacity and capability are vital to outpace our strategic competitors. The MK 48 Heavyweight Torpedo remains the Navy's primary submarine-launched ASW [antisubmarine warfare] and ASuW [anti-surface warfare] weapon, while the MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo provides additional undersea dominance from the surface and air domains. The Navy continues to modernize and upgrade existing inventory to incorporate the latest capability advancements, the Navy has also restarted production of the MK 48, ramping up production through FY23 after accepting delivery of the first new production heavyweight torpedoes in over twenty years during the summer of 2022. Furthermore, the MK 48 MOD 8 and MK 48 MOD 9 will bring new capabilities and technologies to ensure our advantage is maintained will into in the future. The Department also continues to deliver and upgrade MK 54 Lightweight Torpedoes to surface ships and air platforms to maintain our edge over the ASW threat. Producing the upgraded MK 54 MOD 1 for the U.S. Navy as well as MK 54 MOD 0 torpedoes for our allied partners ensures the torpedo industrial base remains healthy.

The Department continues its partnership with industry and university affiliated research centers to develop next-generation torpedoes. These include the MK 54 MOD 2 Advanced Lightweight Torpedo designed to fight the high-end threat, and the Compact Rapid Attack Weapon, a Very Light Weight Torpedo with multi-mission capability providing both a hard-kill torpedo countermeasure and a short range ASW weapon. The Navy continues to procure the High Altitude ASW Weapon Capability (HAAWC) wing kit to employ MK 54 from high altitude via the P-8A, and we've made great progress in developing the Hammerhead encapsulated effector, continuously demonstrating the flexibility and effectiveness of MK 54 payloads for the US and our Allies.¹⁶⁷

An April 10, 2025, press report states

The Hypersonic Air Launched Offensive (HALO) missile in development for the U.S. Navy's high priority Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare Increment 2 (OASuW Inc 2) program has been cancelled, according to a statement given to Naval News by a U.S. Navy spokesperson familiar with the matter.

"The Navy cancelled the solicitation for the Hypersonic Air-Launched Offensive Anti-Surface Warfare (HALO) Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) effort in fall 2024 due to budgetary constraints that prevent fielding new capability within the planned delivery schedule."

U.S. Navy Spokesperson

Tedford cited the reason for cancellation as an analysis of cost trends and overall program performance. HALO was set to be an exotic weapon, making it an expensive system to procure.

"The decision was made after the Navy conducted a careful analysis, looking at cost trends and program performance across the munitions industrial base compared to the Navy's priorities and existing fiscal commitments."

U.S. Navy Spokesperson¹⁶⁸

A March 10, 2025, press report states

Members of the U.S. Navy's Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 31 (VX-31) contributed to an important increase in live-fire testing of the secretive AIM-260A [Joint Advanced Tactical Missile, or JATM] long-range air-to-air missile last year, it has emerged. In 2024, the "Dust Devils" of VX-31 also made important contributions to the initial fielding of the AIM-174B air-launched version of the Standard Missile 6 (SM-6), which was in response to an "emergent Pacific Fleet requirement."…

JATM is a joint program that the Navy is working on together with the U.S. Air Force. Active testing of the new missile, including live-fire shots, has already been ongoing for years now. F/A-18E/F Super Hornets are expected to be among the first types to carry AIM-260s operationally along with Air Force F-22 Raptor stealth fighters.

It's unclear when the AIM-260 might be slated to enter operational service now. When the existence of the JATM first became public in 2019, the goal was to start fielding the missiles in 2022, but there are no indications that this has occurred.

Details about the AIM-260 itself remain limited and no imagery of the missile has emerged to date….

The Navy previously confirmed that the AIM-174B has already entered at least limited operational service….

The AIM-174B is derived from the combat-proven SM-6, a highly-capable multi-purpose missile in U.S. service in multiple ship and ground-launched configurations. SM-6 can engage aerial threats, including ballistic missiles in the terminal phase of flight and highly maneuverable hypersonic weapons under specific circumstances, as well as targets at sea and on land when used in a quasi-ballistic mode.¹⁶⁹

A February 27, 2024, press report states

The US Navy is seeking industry's assistance to rapidly prototype and field a new air-launched, stand-off weapon inexpensive enough to manufacture en masse and perform on par with the service's current anti-ship cruise missile.

Dubbed the "Multi-mission Affordable Capacity Effector (MACE)," the service posted a public notice earlier this month that it should have "increased range at lower costs" and "integrated a high-maturity propulsion system with proven payloads."

"The objective of this notice is to help the government determine if there are existing sources with the capability and experience to rapidly prototype, integrate, test and field a long-range, network-enabled weapon system capable of launch from a F/A-18E/F and F-35A/C," according to the notice.

The exact ranges of most Pentagon weaponry are classified, but the notice states MACE should be "complimentary" to the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, the Lockheed Martin-made missile fielded on the Navy's F/A-18 and Air Force's B-1B.¹⁷⁰

Countering ASBMs

For background information on the Navy's ability to counter China's ASBMs and hypersonic weapons, see Appendix B.

Carrier Air Wing Operating Range

The issue of the operating range of Navy carrier air wings is a key component of an ongoing debate over the future survivability, utility, and cost-effectiveness of aircraft carriers and their air wings, with critics arguing that the current operating range of Navy carrier air wings will force Navy aircraft carriers to operate well within the ranges of PLA ASBMs or other A2/AD systems, which could put the carriers' survivability at substantial risk, or alternatively require carriers to operate beyond the range of those PLA A2/AD systems, in locations that are safer but so far away that the carriers and their air wings will contribute little combat capability.

A key U.S. Navy program for increasing the operating range of Navy carrier air wings is the MQ-25 Stingray program, which is a program to acquire a carrier-based unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for use as a tanker for in-flight refueling of manned carrier-based aircraft (with a secondary mission of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). Some observers, while not necessarily objecting to the MQ-25 program, have argued that the Navy should do more to increase the operating range of Navy carrier air wings, such as developing a stealthy, carrier-based UAV capable of penetrating enemy air defenses and striking land targets at very long ranges.

Legislative Activity for FY2025

Coverage in Related CRS Reports

A variety of CRS reports cover U.S. Navy programs that in varying degrees can be viewed as responses to, at least in part, China's naval modernization effort. These reports, which include legislative activity on the programs they cover, include but are not limited to the following:

• CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
• CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
• CRS In Focus IF11826, Navy Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN[X]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
• CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
• CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by Jeremiah Gertler (the JSF program is a joint DOD program with Navy participation)
• CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
• CRS In Focus IF11679, Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation Destroyer Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
• CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
• CRS Report R44972, Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
• CRS Report R46374, Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) (Previously Light Amphibious Warship [LAW]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
• CRS In Focus IF11674, Navy Light Replenishment Oiler (TAOL) (Previously Next-Generation Logistics Ship [NGLS]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
• CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke
• CRS Report R44175, Navy Shipboard Lasers: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke

FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 8070/S. 4638/H.R. 5009 /P.L. 118-159)

House

In H.R. 8070 as reported by the House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 118-529 of May 31, 2024) and passed by the House on June 14, 2024,

• Section 1017 would require the Navy to submit the Navy to submit a strategy for delivering a rearm-at-sea capability to the U.S. Navy's surface fleet consisting of "the capability to employ transportable rearming mechanism equipment to load missile canisters into MK 41 vertical launch system [VLS] cells on Navy destroyers operating";
• Section 1059 would direct DOD to submit a report containing the findings of a study on the feasibility of implementing one or more naval blockades of shipments of fossil fuels to China in the event of an armed conflict between the United States and China;
• Section 1306 would delete a national security waiver for a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to certify certain things before DOD can enable or facilitate PRC participation in any Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercise;¹⁷¹
• Section 1308 would expand a requirement for the Secretary of Defense to certify certain things before DOD can enable or facilitate PRC participation in any RIMPAC naval exercise by adding a requirement for the Secretary to certify that the PRC has held an internationally recognized free and fair presidential election;¹⁷²
• Section 1315 would direct the Secretary of Defense to designate an official to be responsible, in coordination with appropriate DOD officials, for coordinating DOD efforts to monitor the PLA's network of overseas military bases and the PLA's global pursuit of military access agreements, and require DOD to submit an annual report each year from 2025 to 2030 detailing matters relating to the PLA's network of overseas military bases and the PLA's global pursuit of military access agreements;
• Section 1318 would direct DOD to invite the naval forces of Taiwan to any RIMPAC exercise that is to take place following the date of enactment of the FY2025 NDAA; and
• Section 1319 would direct DOD, in consultation with the heads of other relevant federal departments and agencies, to submit a report on
• the feasibility of developing and deploying asymmetric naval assets for a potential defense of Taiwan,
• whether Taiwan's ability to deter or confront a PRC maritime invasion would be enhanced by the deployment of certain new armed boats,
• the capabilities of certain existing and planned Taiwan corvettes, and
• the vulnerability of certain existing Taiwan destroyers and frigates.

H.Rept. 118-529 states

Long-range fires

The committee notes that American adversaries are rapidly developing strike capabilities designed to push U.S. forces to engage at longer ranges. The committee is concerned about the Navy's ability to execute the necessary volume of long-range surface and undersea fires in a contested environment. The committee understands there are various efforts underway to address this concern but is concerned about the planning, progress, and coordination of these efforts.

Therefore, the committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct a review of the Navy's systems and technologies needed for its long-range fires. The review should examine:

(1) the requirements and digital infrastructure associated with long-range fires in a contested environment including any external information and systems the Navy is reliant on to execute long-range fires;

(2) the Navy's development and acquisition plans for the systems and technologies it seeks in the near- and long-term to improve its long-range fires;

(3) challenges the Navy faces in developing, acquiring, and fielding systems and technologies needed to implement its plans for long-range fires and the Navy's plans to address those challenges;

(4) the extent to which the Navy is developing and assessing architectures to improve information flow and the ability to integrate new capability quickly; and

(5) any other areas the Comptroller General deems important.

The committee directs the Comptroller General of the United States to provide a briefing to the House Committee on Armed Services not later than February 1, 2025, with one or more reports to follow. (Pages 22-23)

H.Rept. 118-529 also states

Maritime De-Risking

The committee is aware that our strategic competitor, the People's Republic of China, is expanding its influence over the high seas. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views its control over the oceans as a vital national security interest and has used the authority and resources of their government to direct, resource, and gain the world's most dominant position over shipbuilding, shipping, and international maritime infrastructure. Their actions have often disregarded legal norms, principles, and values shared by the United States and its allies.

The United States faces significant risks to both national security and economic vitality from the Government of China's potential to cripple the critical supplies and lifeline of the American people during peacetime, crisis, or war by shutting off access to the world's oceans, as well as by controlling critical shipping interests and infrastructure. To address this threat, the United States must pursue a strategy of "de-risking," aimed at mitigating reliance and vulnerability to Chinese shipbuilding, shipping, and maritime infrastructure.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretaries of Transportation, Commerce, Treasury, Homeland Security, State, as well as the U.S. Trade Representative and Office of Management and Budget to provide a report to the House Armed Services and Senate Armed Services committees by November 1, 2024:

(1) An analysis of the current risks posed to US interests by the CCP's dominance of the maritime industry and its civilian and military impacts to security and economic prosperity.

(2) A comprehensive strategy for de-risking America's maritime domain from the People's Republic of China and other asymmetric or emerging maritime threats, recognizing that our security and economic way of life relies on assured access to free, open, safe, and sustainable oceans without coercion from our global competitors.

(3) An assessment of the possible establishment of a National Maritime Council to oversee implementation of the nation's maritime strategies, and requirements for annual reporting to Congress on status of implementing such strategies.

The report shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classified annex. (Pages 251-252)

Enacted

In H.R. 5009/P.L. 118-159 of December 23, 2024,

• Section 1027 requires the Navy to submit a strategy for delivering a rearm-at-sea capability to the U.S. Navy's surface fleet consisting of "the capability to employ rearming equipment to load missile canisters into MK 41 vertical launch system [VLS] cells on Navy destroyers while operating at sea," and
• Section 1324 expresses the sense of Congress that the naval forces of Taiwan may be invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise, as appropriate, conducted in 2025.

The joint explanatory statement for H.R. 5009 states

Designation of official responsible for coordination of department of defense efforts to monitor People's Liberation Army overseas basing efforts

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1315) that would require the Secretary of Defense to designate an official within the Department of Defense to be responsible for coordination of Department efforts to monitor the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) overseas basing efforts.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include the House provision.

We direct the Secretary of Defense, not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to provide a briefing to the congressional defense committees that, at a minimum, identifies the Department of Defense official or officials responsible for:

(1) Monitoring the PLA's network of overseas military bases and its global pursuit of military access agreements;

(2) Representing the Department of Defense in the interagency process on such matters; and

(3) Consulting regularly with the congressional defense committees to keep such committees fully informed on all matters relating to such responsibilities. (PDF page 371 of 696)

The joint explanatory statement also states:

Report on feasibility of developing and deploying asymmetric naval assets in defense of Taiwan

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1319) that would require the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, to submit a report on the feasibility of developing and deploying asymmetric naval assets in Taiwan.

The Senate committee-reported bill contained no similar provision.

The agreement does not include the House provision.

We direct the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, to provide the congressional defense committees, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a briefing on:

(1) The feasibility of developing and deploying asymmetric naval assets for a potential defense of Taiwan;

(2) Whether Taiwan's ability to deter a maritime invasion by the People's Republic of China would be enhanced by deployment of small, high-speed, long-range (200 or more nautical miles), extreme-weather-capable, reduced-radar-signature boats with the capacity for launching missiles, addressing subsurface threats or delivering and recovering small troop units to coastal and littoral locations in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait, and, if so, in what number and in what configurations;

(3) Whether existing and planned Tuo Chiang class catamaran-hulled corvettes are naval assets capable of fully meeting the needs of an effective asymmetric naval defense strategy; and

(4) The vulnerability of Taiwan's existing larger-platform surface naval fleet, including Keelung-class destroyers, Cheung Kung-class frigates, Chi Yang-class frigates, and Kang Ding-class frigates. (PDF pages 371-372 of 696)

Appendix A. Comparing U.S. and PRC Numbers of Ships and Naval Capabilities

This appendix presents some additional discussion of factors involved in comparing U.S. and PRC numbers of ships and naval capabilities.

U.S. and PRC naval capabilities are sometimes compared by showing comparative numbers of U.S. and PRC ships. Although the total number of ships in a navy (or a navy's aggregate displacement [i.e., tonnage]) is relatively easy to calculate, it is a one-dimensional measure that leaves out numerous other factors that bear on a navy's capabilities and how those capabilities compare to its assigned missions. One-dimensional comparisons of the total numbers of ships in China's navy and the U.S. Navy are highly problematic as a means of assessing relative U.S. and PRC naval capabilities and how those capabilities compare to the missions assigned to those navies, for the following reasons:

• A fleet's total number of ships (or its aggregate displacement) is only a partial metric of its capability. Many factors other than ship numbers (or aggregate displacement) contribute to naval capability, including types of ships, types and numbers of aircraft, the sophistication of sensors, weapons, C4ISR systems, and networking capabilities, supporting maintenance and logistics capabilities, doctrine and tactics, the quality, education, and training of personnel, and the realism and complexity of exercises.¹⁷³ In light of this, navies with similar numbers of ships or similar aggregate displacements can have significantly different capabilities, and navy-to-navy comparisons of numbers of ships or aggregate displacements can provide a highly inaccurate sense of their relative capabilities. The warfighting capabilities of navies have derived increasingly from the sophistication of their internal electronics and software. This factor can vary greatly from one navy to the next, and often cannot be easily assessed by outside observation. As the importance of internal electronics and software has grown, the idea of comparing the warfighting capabilities of navies principally on the basis of easily observed factors such as ship numbers and displacements has become increasingly less reliable, and today is highly problematic.
• Total numbers of ships of a given type (such as submarines or surface combatants) can obscure potentially significant differences in the capabilities of those ships, both between navies and within one country's navy. Differences in capabilities of ships of a given type can arise from a number of other factors, including sensors, weapons, C4ISR systems, networking capabilities, stealth features, damage-control features, cruising range, maximum speed, and reliability and maintainability (which can affect the amount of time the ship is available for operation).
• A focus on total ship numbers reinforces the notion that changes in total numbers necessarily translate into corresponding or proportional changes in aggregate capability. For a Navy like China's, which is modernizing by replacing older, obsolescent ships with more modern and more capable ships, this is not necessarily the case.
• Comparisons of total numbers of ships (or aggregate displacements) do not take into account the differing global responsibilities and homeporting locations of each fleet. The U.S. Navy has substantial worldwide responsibilities, and a substantial fraction of the U.S. fleet is homeported in the Atlantic. As a consequence, only a certain portion of the U.S. Navy might be available for a crisis or conflict scenario in China's near-seas region, or could reach that area within a certain amount of time. In contrast, China's navy has more-limited responsibilities outside China's near-seas region, and its ships are all homeported along China's coast at locations that face directly onto China's near-seas region. In a U.S.-China conflict inside the first island chain, U.S. naval and other forces would be operating at the end of generally long supply lines, while PLA naval and other forces would be operating at the end of generally short supply lines.
• Comparisons of numbers of ships (or aggregate displacement) do not take into account maritime-relevant military capabilities that countries might have outside their navies, such as land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), land-based anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based Air Force aircraft armed with ASCMs or other weapons. Given the significant maritime-relevant non-navy forces present in both the U.S. and PRC militaries, this is a particularly important consideration in comparing U.S. and PRC military capabilities for influencing events in the Western Pacific. Although a U.S.-China incident at sea might involve only navy units on both sides, a broader U.S.-China military conflict would more likely be a force-on-force engagement involving multiple branches of each country's military.
• The missions to be performed by one country's navy can differ greatly from the missions to be performed by another country's navy. Consequently, navies are better measured against their respective missions than against one another. Although Navy A might have less capability than Navy B, Navy A might nevertheless be better able to perform Navy A's intended missions than Navy B is to perform Navy B's intended missions. This is another significant consideration in assessing U.S. and PRC naval capabilities, because the missions of the two navies are quite different.

As mentioned earlier, while comparisons of the total numbers of ships in China's Navy and the U.S. Navy are highly problematic as a means of assessing relative U.S. and PRC naval capabilities and how those capabilities compare to the missions assigned to those navies, an examination of the trends over time in the relative numbers of ships can shed some light on how the relative balance of U.S. and PRC naval capabilities might be changing over time.

Appendix B. U.S. Navy's Ability to Counter PLA ASBMs and Hypersonic Weapons

This appendix provides background information on the issue of the U.S. Navy's ability to counter China's ASBMs and hypersonic weapons.

Ability to Counter ASBMs

Although China's ASBMs have in past years sometimes been characterized as "game changers," that does not mean they cannot be countered. There are several potential approaches for countering an ASBM that can be imagined, and these approaches could be used in combination. ASBMs are not the first "game changer" that the Navy has confronted; the Navy in the past has developed counters for other new types of weapons, such as ASCMs, and is likely exploring various approaches for countering ASBMs.

Countering China's projected ASBMs could involve employing a combination of active (i.e., "hard-kill") measures, such as shooting down ASBMs with interceptor missiles, and passive (i.e., "soft-kill") measures, such as those for masking the exact location of Navy ships or confusing ASBM reentry vehicles. Employing a combination of active and passive measures would attack various points in the ASBM "kill chain"—the sequence of events that needs to be completed to carry out a successful ASBM attack. This sequence includes detection, identification, and localization of the target ship, transmission of that data to the ASBM launcher, firing the ASBM, and having the ASBM reentry vehicle find the target ship.

Attacking various points in an opponent's kill chain is an established method for countering an opponent's military capability. A September 30, 2011, press report, for example, quotes Lieutenant General Herbert Carlisle, the Air Force's deputy chief of staff for operations, plans, and requirements, as stating in regard to Air Force planning that "We've taken [China's] kill chains apart to the 'nth' degree."¹⁷⁴

To attack the ASBM kill chain, Navy surface ships, for example, could operate in ways (such as controlling electromagnetic emissions or using deception emitters) that make it more difficult for China to detect, identify, and track those ships.¹⁷⁵ The Navy could acquire weapons and systems for disabling or jamming China's long-range maritime surveillance and targeting systems, for attacking ASBM launchers, for destroying ASBMs in various stages of flight, and for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets. Options for destroying ASBMs in flight include the SM-3 midcourse BMD interceptor missile (including the new Block IIA version) and the SM-6 terminal-defense BMD interceptor missile.¹⁷⁶ Options for decoying and confusing ASBMs as they approach their intended targets include equipping ships with systems, such as electronic warfare systems or systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds or radar-opaque carbon-fiber clouds, that could confuse an ASBM's terminal-guidance radar.¹⁷⁷

An October 4, 2016, press report states the following:

Several times in the past, [Chief of Naval Operations John] Richardson has stressed that long range weapons developments from adversarial nations like Russia and China aren't the end-all, be-all of naval conflicts.

Just because China's "carrier-killer" missile has a greater range than the planes aboard a US aircraft carrier doesn't mean the US would shy away from deploying a carrier within that range, Richardson has stated on different occasions.

Again, Richardson challenged the notion that a so-called A2/AD zone was "an impenetrable keep out zone that forces can only enter at extreme peril to their existence, let alone their mission."

Richardson took particular issue with the "denial" aspect of A2/AD, repeating his assertion that this denial is an "aspiration" not a "fait accompli." The maps so common in representing these threats often mark off the limits of different system's ranges with "red arcs that extend off coastlines," with the implication that military forces crossing these lines face "certain destruction."

But this is all speculation according to Richardson: "The reality is far more complex, it's actually really hard to achieve a hit. It requires the completion of a really complex chain of events.... these arcs represent danger for sure... but the threats they are based on are not insurmountable, and can be managed, will be managed."

"We can fight from within these defended areas, and we will... this is nothing new and has been done before," said Richardson.

So while Russia and China can develop missiles and radars and declare their ranges on paper, things get a lot trickier in the real world, where the US has the most and best experience in operating.

"Potential adversaries actually have different geographic features like choke points, islands, ocean currents, mountains," said Richardson, who urged against oversimplifying complicated, and always unique circumstances in so-called A2/AD zones.

"Have no doubt, the US navy is prepared to go wherever it needs to go, at any time, and stay there for as long as necessary in response to our leadership's call to project our strategic influence," Richardson concluded.

Similarly, an August 29, 2016, press report states the following:

The United States Navy is absolutely confident in the ability of its aircraft carriers and carrier air wings to fly and fight within zones defended by so-called anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) weapons....

In the view of the U.S. Navy leadership, A2/AD—as it is now called—has existed since the dawn of warfare when primitive man was fighting with rocks and spears. Overtime, A2/AD techniques have evolved as technology has improved with ever-greater range and lethality. Rocks and spears eventually gave way to bows and arrows, muskets and cannons. Thus, the advent of long-range anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles is simply another technological evolution of A2/AD.

"This is the next play in that," Adm. John Richardson, chief of naval operations, told The National Interest on Aug. 25 during an interview in his office in the Pentagon. "This A2/AD, well, it's certainly a goal for some of our competitors, but achieving that goal is much different and much more complicated."

Indeed, as many U.S. Navy commanders including Richardson and Rear Adm. (Upper Half) DeWolfe Miller, the service's director of air warfare, have pointed out, anti-access bubbles defended by Chinese DF-21D or DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missile systems or Russian Bastion-P supersonic anti-ship missile systems are not impenetrable 'Iron Domes.' Nor do formidable Russian and Chinese air defense systems such as the S-400 or HQ-9 necessarily render the airspace they protect into no-go zones for the carrier air wing.

Asked directly if he was confident in the ability of the aircraft carrier and its air wing to fight inside an A2/AD zone protected by anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles as well as advanced air defenses, Richardson was unequivocal in his answer. "Yes," Richardson said—but he would not say how exactly how due to the need for operational security. "It's really a suite of capabilities, but I actually think we're talking too much in the open about some of the things we're doing, so I want to be thoughtful about how we talk about things so we don't give any of our competitors an advantage."...

Miller said that there have been threats to the carrier since the dawn of naval aviation. In many ways, the threat to the carrier was arguably much greater during the Cold War when the Soviet Union massed entire regiments of Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfires and deployed massive cruise missile-armed Oscar-class SSGN submarines to hunt down and destroy the Navy's flattops. The service developed ways to defeat the Soviet threat—and the carrier will adapt to fight in the current environment.

"We could have had this interview twenty-years-ago and there would have been a threat," Miller said. "The nature of war and A2/AD is not new—that's my point. I don't want to downplay it, but our improvements in information warfare, electronic warfare, payloads, the weapons systems that we've previously talked about—plus our ability to train to those capabilities that we have—we will create sanctuaries, we'll fight in those sanctuaries and we're a maneuver force."¹⁷⁸

An October 18, 2017, blog post states the following:

Assuming the DF-21D is ready for battle, can America defend against China's mighty missile?

While opinions are clearly mixed—in speaking to many sources over the last several years on this topic—it seems clear there is great nervousness in U.S. defense circles. However, as time has passed, initial fears have turned towards a more optimistic assessment....

In the end, the weapon might not be the great "game-changer" that many point it out to be, but a great complicator.¹⁷⁹

A January 28, 2021, press report states

The U.S. Navy's top intelligence officer has said the service is watching closely as China expands its anti-ship missile capabilities, particularly in and around the disputed South China Sea, to include the ongoing development of long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles. At the same time, he said he "hopes" that China's People's Liberation Army will continue to invest significant resources into these efforts, hinting that the U.S. Navy already has extensive measures to counter these threats already in use now or in development.

Navy Vice Admiral Jeffrey Trussler, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare, made his remarks about China's anti-ship missile arsenal during an online event put on by the non-profit Intelligence and National Security Alliance on Jan. 27, 2021….

… not only did Vice Admiral Trussler seem less concerned about PLA anti-ship missile capabilities than one would expect, he made clear he was happy with them continuing to pour time and resources into those efforts.

"I hope they just keep pouring money into that type of thing," he said. "That may not be how we win the next war."

The clear indication here is that Trussler is aware of countermeasures, whether they be certain systems or tactics, techniques, and procedures, that are either available now or in development. The Vice Admiral did not offer any specific details about what the Navy is doing to go along with these remarks….

We also know that, by 2019, warships assigned to the Navy's 7^th Fleet, which is based in Japan, were fitted with the AN/SLQ-59 Transportable Electronic Warfare Modules (TEWM). TEWM is described as a "counter-terminal threat defensive system," indicating that it is designed to help defeat incoming anti-ship missiles, or other threats, such as swarms of small drones, in the final phase of their attack on a ship. Based on the information available, The War Zone previously assessed that the AN/SLQ-59 was most likely acquired in response to growing cruise missile threats, and Chinese developments, in particular, given its fielding first on ships forward-deployed in Japan.

The Navy has also been hard at work developing an entire networked electronic warfare "ecosystem," as part of its shadowy Netted Emulation of Multi-Element Signature against Integrated Sensors program, or NEMESIS. The goal here has been to craft a 'system of systems' comprising of various manned and unmanned ships, as well as submarines and aircraft, equipped with electronic warfare systems that can work together cooperatively. One of the key uses of these capabilities would be to generate signals that mimic real fleets of ships and aircraft to distract and confuse opponents, making it difficult for them to effectively spot and target real Navy assets. These networked electronic warfare platforms could also employ other kinds of electronic warfare tactics across a broad area to protect against various kinds of threats. You can read more about NEMSIS in detail in this past War Zone feature.¹⁸⁰

A highly adaptive and deeply networked electronic warfare ecosystem could be particularly useful against long-range anti-ship missile strikes, especially using ballistic missiles, which would require targeting information from offboard platforms and the ability to send updated information to the weapon during the mid-course stage of flight….

The Navy does have Arleigh Burke class destroyers outfitted specifically for ballistic missile defense, including the ability to launch the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, which is designed to knock down ballistic missiles during the mid-course portion of their flight. Those ships are also slated to get interceptors designed to bring down hypersonic weapons in the future as part of the Regional Glide Phase Weapon System (RGPWS) program….

The Navy, which has been looking to stop deploying Arleigh Burkes on dedicated missile defense missions, could seek to make more widespread use of the SM-3 Block IIA in the future. Those destroyers and other ships could gain additional missile defense capabilities as the improved Block IB variant of the SM-6 missile begins to enter service. Existing Block I and IA versions of the SM-6 already have the ability to intercept ballistic missiles during the terminal phase of their flight, as well as engage various other aerial and surface threats. The SM-6, in particular, potentially provides a potent defense against anti-ship ballistic missiles, especially those that break through mid-course traditional ballistic missile defenses, if mid-course ballistic missile defense assets are available at all.

There's the possibility that Vice Admiral Trussler is aware of other developments in the classified realm that could further mitigate some or all of these threats, as well. Beyond that, there's no discounting that his public comments, which are certain to be scrutinized by the PLA itself, are a form of misinformation designed to prompt concerns within the Chinese military that its priorities may be, in some way, seriously off base.

Whatever the case, the threat posed by China's anti-ship missile arsenal, which continues to grow in capability, including with the development of new anti-ship ballistic missiles, is real. At the same time, while the Navy obviously knows this, the service seems to be strongly hinting that it feels it making very good progress on getting around these challenges, or at least wants to make the Chinese think so.¹⁸¹

Regarding the above-reported remarks by Vice Admiral Trussler, a January 29, 2021, press report stated

That confident [U.S. Navy] posture caught the attention of the Chinese military establishment. "What Trussler is saying is that the U.S. has sufficient power to handle the anti-ship missile threat from China," former People's Liberation Army instructor Song Zhongping told the South China Morning Post on Friday [January 29]. "The U.S. is emphasizing that threat and it will further boost its defenses against Chinese missiles."¹⁸²

A February 5, 2024, press report stated

A U.S. aircraft carrier would be capable of executing its mission in a conflict with China, a senior Navy official says, responding to the argument that Beijing's "carrier killer" missiles would make the vessel less relevant to a battle in the western Pacific.

"Our highly trained sailors can operate these complex, contested domains and be lethal and survivable, and execute the mission regardless of what the threat is," Rear Adm. Carlos Sardiello, commander of the USS Carl Vinson strike group, told a few reporters aboard the carrier on Wednesday [January 31].¹⁸³

Ability to Counter Hypersonic Weapons

Another CRS report provides a brief survey of DOD (including Navy) efforts for developing defenses against hypersonic weapons.¹⁸⁴ Regarding the Navy efforts to develop capabilities for countering hypersonic weapons, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) testified in April 2024

Initially just focused on ballistic missile defense, MDA today is developing weapons systems and sensors to defeat the serious threat posed by hypersonic glide vehicles and maneuvering threats. MDA continues to develop a layered defense capability to defeat regional hypersonic threats with the Glide Phase Intercept (GPI) development program. By the end of FY 2024, MDA will select a single GPI interceptor design with which to complete development. In FY 2025, MDA will continue to develop and mature the GPI capability with a focus on critical technology maturation and risk reduction activities. We will also continue to update the [U.S. navy] Aegis Weapon System to integrate the GPI interceptor. Our FY 2025 budget request supports the planned cooperative development of the glide phase interceptor with Japan. We expect to complete the formal agreement on that project this spring. Japan will fund and develop key missile components, primarily propulsion elements.

The GPI weapon system design will provide a layered defense with currently deployed [U.S. Navy] Sea-Based Terminal (SBT) capabilities. SBT provides terminal defense of assets at sea and forces ashore. We anticipate delivering SBT Increment 3 capabilities in FY 2025 to provide expanded capability. SBT will demonstrate a simulated engagement against an operationally realistic hypersonic glide vehicle target in FY 2025, and an engagement using a [U.S. Navy] Standard Missile (SM)-6 against a hypersonic glide target in FY 2026.¹⁸⁵