Prior to the Great Depression, U.S. residential mortgage markets operated at local levels and were highly sensitive to local conditions. Lenders funded mortgages by relying on local deposits, which were concentrated in heavily populated areas, such as Chicago and New York, rather than less populated areas in need of loans. Interstate banking restrictions made it difficult to move funds from geographical areas with large concentrations of deposits to areas with comparatively smaller amounts. The immobility of funds contributed to differences in mortgage rates and underwriting (loan qualifying) criteria across the nation.
During economic downturns, frequent deposit withdrawals led to cash flow (liquidity) shortages that stymied lending. At the time, savings and loan associations (S&Ls)—nonprofit, member-owned cooperative financial institutions that relied on members' savings deposits to fund mortgages—were the primary sources of home financing during liquidity shortages. S&Ls were unable to borrow temporary funds from the Federal Reserve System because they were not eligible members. For this reason, the lending terms of residential mortgages were structured to reduce liquidity risks borne by S&Ls. For example, borrowers were required to make large down payments (e.g., 50%-60%) to mitigate default risks and to reduce mortgage sizes, thereby reducing the amount of funds small lenders needed to collect to make loans. Mortgages typically had variable interest rates and 10- to 12-year maturities, thus mitigating cash flow disruptions due to frequent changes in local mortgage rates.
Over the years, Congress has addressed market liquidity issues, particularly for single-family mortgages (i.e., loans secured by residential dwellings having one to four separate units), by establishing federal agencies and government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Some of the key ones are listed below.
Following passage of P.L. 101-73 in 1989, the business models and missions of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (F&F) were harmonized, allowing them to purchase mortgages and sell mortgage-backed securities (MBS) linked to the underlying mortgages. (MBS investors are typically large institutional investors, such as pension funds, domestic banks, foreign banks, and hedge funds.) F&F must also fulfill required affordable housing goals regularly set by their primary regulator, FHFA.
The federal government does not facilitate all of the activities that would generate liquidity for mortgage markets. Private financial institutions may issue MBSs, known as private-label securities (PLSs). Although PLSs can be linked to any type of mortgage, they are often linked to pools of nonconforming mortgages, which either exceed the conforming loan limit (jumbo mortgages) or do not meet F&F's creditworthiness standards.
The U.S. mortgage market attracts funding from global investors. Consequently, rather than reflect more of the costs borne by regional lenders to acquire funds, modern mortgage rates better reflect the payment and default risk behaviors of borrowers. Along with assuming various financial risks, the federal government agencies (FHA, VA, Ginnie Mae) and the GSEs (the FHLB System, F&F) have facilitated greater standardization of mortgage products and borrower underwriting criteria. Greater liquidity in the modern mortgage market has made it possible to offer products with less liquid features (e.g., fixed rates, 30-year maturities, larger amounts) than those offered in the early 1900s. These developments have arguably contributed to lowering borrowers' costs to finance homeownership, possibly contributing to rising homeownership rates.
Along with liquidity benefits, government intervention in the mortgage market brings about costs. For example, the financial markets might perceive the GSEs as being too important for the government to allow any of them to fail. In this case, the GSEs may have an incentive to take on greater financial risks, including competing for lending opportunities that the private sector would willingly take. As a result, taxpayers could ultimately bear the costs of risk-taking by the GSEs. The benefits to borrowers have also been debated. F&F, for example, purchase mortgages primarily offered to prime (creditworthy) borrowers and loan refinances for existing homeowners (rather than focusing solely on first-time buyers). Hence, the liquidity benefit may accrue to borrowers who would already have access to favorable mortgage rates. In addition, the benefits received by reducing the costs to finance homeownership may be offset if the overall demand for housing increases, prompting increases in house prices.
On September 6, 2008, FHFA placed F&F in conservatorship (i.e., took control of F&F from their stockholders and management) following financial loss from extreme turmoil in the housing and mortgage markets. Treasury received preferred shares in F&F in exchange for financial support in the form of funding commitments. As of June 15, 2020, Treasury has extended a combined total of $191.4 billion to F&F and received $301 billion in dividend payments, which are not applied to repayment of the $191.4 billion in funding. These developments have led to policy issues for Congress, including the following:
CRS Report R46855, Housing Issues in the 117th Congress
CRS Report R46499, The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System and Selected Policy Issues
CRS Report RS20530, FHA-Insured Home Loans: An Overview
CRS Report R42504, VA Housing: Guaranteed Loans, Direct Loans, and Specially Adapted Housing Grants
CRS Report R45828, Overview of Recent Administrative Reforms of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
CRS Report R44525, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship: Frequently Asked Questions
CRS In Focus IF11413, The Qualified Mortgage (QM) Rule and the QM Patch
CRS Report R46480, Multifamily Housing Finance and Selected Policy Issues