

Iran: Congressional Reporting Requirements

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Iran: Congressional Reporting Requirements

Congress has mandated that the executive branch provide it with significant amounts of information related to Iran via singular and recurring reporting requirements. Iran-related issues about which Congress has mandated executive branch reporting include:

- Iran's missile and drone activities and the capability of U.S. forces and U.S. partners to counter those threats;
- Iran's support for terrorist and other armed groups across the Middle East, including the resources Iran dedicates to supporting those groups;
- Iran's nuclear program, including uranium enrichment and possible nuclear weapons development;
- U.S. sanctions on Iran;
- Human rights in Iran and the Iranian government's efforts to target dissidents at home and abroad;
- Iran's relations with North Korea, the People's Republic of China (China or PRC), and other countries; and
- Iranian leaders' assets.

Reflecting the broad array of Iran-related topics of interest to Congress, nearly half of all congressional committees have received a report related to Iran in the past decade. Some reports are available to the general public, though most, while unclassified, are only accessible to the committees to which the executive branch is required to submit them.

In reviewing the reports to which Congress formerly had, and presently has, access, Members of Congress could consider how those reports have or have not impacted U.S. policymaking, and whether or not to expand, restrict, or otherwise amend the Iran-related information they require from the executive branch.

SUMMARY

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Scope and Introduction

This report provides a list of Iran-related reports, strategies, and other informational products that Congress has required from the executive branch since the 111th Congress (2009-2010). Reporting requirements may vary widely in terms of deadlines, requested content, and congressional entities to which the reports are to be submitted. The forms in which reports are delivered, including the submission of written materials or in-person delivery through briefings, also vary. This report includes only those written reports required by enacted legislation (e.g., not reports required by explanatory statements or committee reports accompanying legislation enacted by Congress or passed by a committee).¹ The reports listed in this product are those related primarily to Iran, though Iran often appears in other reports, such as those related to U.S. adversaries in general. This product does not include situational Iran-related reports that Congress requires the executive branch to submit in specific instances, such as when applying, or waiving the application of, certain sanctions. The tables of reports in this product should not be considered comprehensive of all reporting requirements related to Iran.

Some of the reports below are required to be submitted to the entire Congress, or to senior leaders in each chamber, but most are to be submitted to specific committees. Reflecting the broad array of Iran-related issues of interest to Members of Congress, recipients of at least one of the reports below include 8 of 20 standing committees in the House and 7 of 16 standing committees in the Senate, as well as both chambers' intelligence committees. Report recipients generally reflect the committees with jurisdiction over the legislation in which the reporting requirement is included (e.g., the appropriations committees receive reports required in appropriations bills; the armed services committees receive reports required in a National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA). Most of the reports below are not publicly available and CRS cannot confirm whether or not reports (which the executive branch often has the option to submit alongside a classified annex) have been submitted as directed.

Major Themes and Issues for Congress

The topics about which Congress has directed the Administration provide it information since the 111th Congress have generally aligned with broader trends in U.S. Iran policy. Congressional reporting requirements reflect congressional interests in overseeing executive branch policymaking towards Iran, including using reports to prompt or compel the executive branch to initiate policy changes.

In the 111th and 112th Congresses (2009-2010 and 2011-2012), as growing concern about Iran's nuclear program prompted UN restrictions on Iran, Congress passed landmark legislation related to Iran sanctions, including the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA, P.L. 111-195) and the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (ITRSHRA, P.L. 112-158). Those laws, building on previous efforts to limit the Iranian government's access to revenue by sanctioning aspects of the country's energy sector, introduced a number of regular reporting requirements that are still operative, including biannual reports on investments in Iran's energy sector (Section 110 of CISADA) and executive branch efforts to

¹ "When found in statutes, reporting requirements are legally binding directives by Congress to federal entities. By contrast, when found in committee reports, reporting requirements do not carry the force of law. Nonetheless, because committee reports are authoritative records and serve to establish congressional intent and need, federal entities may still choose to satisfy the reporting requirements due to the significance Congress has imparted upon them and to preserve their relationships with committees of jurisdiction." CRS Report R46661, *Strategies for Identifying Reporting Requirements and Submitted Reporting to Congress*, by Kathleen E. Marchsteiner.

expand multilateral sanctions on Iran (Section 102(b) of ITRSHRA). In the FY2010 NDAA (P.L. 111-84), Congress also initiated the annual report on Iran's military power, which currently is required through December 2025; that reporting requirement, the text and legislative history of which is available in the Appendix, has seen numerous changes over the years related to the growing scope of congressional interest regarding threatening Iranian behaviors. The violent crackdown against popular protests after the disputed 2009 presidential election in Iran also prompted congressional reporting requirements, including still-operative requirements for reports on Iranian officials determined to be responsible for human rights abuses (Section 105 of CISADA) and on senior Iranian officials determined to be involved in proliferation activities, support for terrorism, or human rights abuses, as well as family members of such officials (Section 221 of ITRSHRA).²

Starting in the 113th Congress (2013-2015), Members also sought greater transparency regarding multilateral negotiations related to Iran's nuclear program, requiring reports from the Administration on the status of those negotiations and Iran's adherence to various agreements (culminating in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA). In response to the JCPOA, the 114th Congress passed the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA, P.L. 114-17), which includes several reporting requirements. In subsequent legislation, Congress required a biannual report on the monetary value of JCPOA-related sanctions relief and Iran's use of those funds (Section 514 of P.L. 114-113).

Reporting requirements in the 115th Congress (2017-2019), a period when the Trump Administration ceased U.S. participation in the JCPOA and initiated a campaign of "maximum pressure" to try to compel Iran to seek a new agreement, included a number of reports related to U.S. diplomatic efforts. Many of those requirements were in the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44), which authorized additional sanctions on Iran and required still-operative reports from the executive branch on a strategy to deter Iranian threats (Section 102); on discrepancies between U.S. and European Union sanctions on Iran (Section 109); and on U.S. citizens detained by Iran or Iran-backed groups (Section 110).

Though Iran's support for terrorist and other armed groups in the Middle East had long been a major concern for U.S. policymakers (an issue included in regular reporting requirements), the prominence of Iran's regional activities appears to have risen in reporting requirements beginning with the 116th Congress (2019-2021). In that term, as U.S.-Iran tensions escalated into periodic direct military confrontation across the region, Congress enacted reporting requirements related to deconfliction (Section 1227 of the FY2020 NDAA, P.L. 116-92), Iran's activities in Syria and Lebanon (Section 5521 of Division E, P.L. 116-92), and UN arms restrictions (Section 609 of Division W, P.L. 116-260). Iran-related reporting requirements added in the 117th Congress include annual reports on the Iranian government's efforts to target dissidents at home and abroad (Section 204 of Title II, P.L. 117-328) and on Iranian uranium enrichment and related activities (Section 5593(e)(1) of P.L. 117-263).

A week after Iran's unprecedented direct missile and drone attack on Israel in April 2024, Congress began consideration of, and later passed, an emergency supplemental appropriations bill (P.L. 118-50) that included numerous Iran-related measures. Reporting requirements in that law include a number of recurring reports, including reports on Iranian petroleum exports (annually,

² The U.S. State Department has on occasion publicly released the CISADA Section 105 report but does not appear to have done so since June 2021 (available at https://www.state.gov/report-to-congress-list-of-persons-who-are-responsible-for-or-complicit-in-certain-human-rights-abuses-in-iran/); the most recent ITRSHRA Section 221 report, from January 2024, is available at https://www.state.gov/report-to-congress-on-identification-of-and-immigration-restrictions-on-senior-officials-of-the-government-of-iran-and-their-family-members-sec-221-of-the-iran-threat-reduction-and-syria-human-righ/.

Section 4 of Division J), on Iran's use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against U.S. persons (every 180 days, Section 6 of Division K), and on Iranian officials' assets (every two years, Section 3 of Division R).

Possible Issues for Congress

Considerations for requiring a report. Congress may consider requiring an executive branch report for various reasons, including gathering information related to Iran or U.S. policy toward it; seeking policy options; attempting to get the executive branch to take a specific policy position; or verifying implementation of previous positions or requirements. Members of Congress may examine how, if at all, reports have shaped congressional and/or executive branch actions toward Iran.

Cost/value of reports. Some reports, including some U.S. Department of Defense reports, include information on the estimated costs of preparing the report.³ Congress may consider whether or not to make such cost estimates more universal and, more broadly, may consider whether or not the resources expended by the executive branch in preparing Iran-related reports are commensurate with the value that Congress derives from those reports.

Accessibility of reports. Congress may consider whether to broaden, restrict, or otherwise change the categories of individuals who receive or otherwise have access to ran-related reports. Many Iran-related reports that are 'public' are not classified, but are not necessarily available to the public on a website or otherwise. There is currently no single repository or database for digitized or physical reports submitted to Congress.⁴

The following tables list enacted legislation regarding congressionally-mandated reporting requirements related to Iran. The tables cover the 111th Congress (2009-2010) through the 118th Congress (2023-2024) in reverse chronological order. The tables are followed by a key to congressional committee abbreviations.

³ See, for example, the April 2024 Section 1090 Report, available at

https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/Section1090Reports/Estimated_Cost_to_Each_US_Taxpayer_of _Each_Wars_in_Afghanistan_Iraq_and_Syria_and_Ukraine_dated_June_2024.pdf.

⁴ For more information on where to find reports submitted to Congress, see CRS Report R46661, *Strategies for Identifying Reporting Requirements and Submitted Reporting to Congress*, by Kathleen E. Marchsteiner.

Table 1. Iran-Related Legislative Reporting Requirements in the 118th Congress (2023-2024 to date)

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
Stop Harboring Iranian Petroleum (SHIP) Act Division J of P.L. 118-50 Sec. 4 (enacted April 24, 2024)		Energy Information Administration To: HFAC/SFRC, HJC/SJC,	Due: 120 days after enactment Future submissions: Annually until President certifies that Iran no longer provides support for terrorism and has ceased pursuit of, and dismantled, its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs
	Report on the role of China in the evasion of sanctions on Iran, including options to strengthen enforcement and expand designations targeting PRC involvement in Iran oil exports (Section 5)	By: Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate Federal agencies To: HFAC/SFRC, HJC/SJC, HFSC/SBHUAC	Due: 120 days after enactment Future submissions: none
Fight and Combat Rampant Iranian Missile Exports (Fight CRIME) Act Division K of P.L. 118-50 (enacted April 24, 2024)	Report on diplomatic strategy to secure renewal of international restrictions on Iran's missile activities, including how expiration of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 restrictions impacts Iran's arms programs (Section 4)	By: Secretary of State, in coordination with other appropriate Federal agencies To: HFAC/SFRC, HJC/SJC, HFSC/SBHUAC	Due : 90 days after enactment Future submissions: Annually thereafter for two years
	Report identifying any Iranian person who, during the reporting period, has attacked a U.S. citizen using an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (Section 6)	By: Secretary of State To: HFAC/SFRC, HJC/SJC, HFSC/SBHUAC	Due: 90 days after enactment Future submissions: Every 180 days thereafter, terminating 4 years after enactment

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
Holding Iranian Leaders Accountable Act Division R of P.L. 118-50 (enacted April 24, 2024)	Report estimating total funds/assets under control of various senior Iranian officials and how such funds/assets were acquired	By: President To: House and Senate majority and minority leaders, chairman and ranking member of HFAC/SFRC and HFSC/SBHUAC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: Every 2 years thereafter; division sunsets 5 years after enactment or 30 days after certification that Iran is not a jurisdiction of money laundering concern
	Report identifying all Iranian government assets blocked by U.S. government greater than \$5 million ^a (Section 3(d))	By: Secretary of the Treasury To: Same as above	Due: 30 days after enactment Future submissions: same as above
Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 P.L. 118-47 (enacted March 23, 2024)	Report on status of U.S. bilateral sanctions on Iran, including renewed enforcement of such and their impact on Iran's destabilizing regional activities (Section 7041(b))	By: Secretary of State, in consultation with Secretary of the Treasury To: HAC/SAC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None
FY2024 NDAA P.L. 118-31 (enacted December 22, 2023)	Assessment of air and missile defense capabilities related to potential attacks from Iran and associated groups against military installations in CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), with a strategy to "expedite the hardening" of such installations and improve air and missile defense capabilities at them (Section 351)	By: Secretary of Defense, in coordination with CENTCOM Commander To: HAC/SAC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: Update within 180 days of submission of first report
	Strategy to build upon incorporation of Israel into CENTCOM AOR to develop a regional integrated maritime domain awareness and interdiction capability to protect against Iranian capabilities (as well as terrorist groups, criminal networks, and pirates) (Section 1261)	By: Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State To: HAC/SAC, HFAC/SFRC, HASC/SASC	Due: 60 days after enactment Future submissions: None

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
	Amends FY2010 NDAA Sec. 1245 report to include, among other items, assessments of the Iranian threat to Europe and to U.S. and partner military bases, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) involvement in narcotics trafficking (see Appendix) (Section 1268)	By: Secretary of Defense To: Congress	Due: N/A Future submissions: N/A
	Amends FY2022 NDAA Sec. 1227 report to include, among other items, assessment of Iranian involvement in narcotics trade and requires update of original report within 180 days (Section 1269)	By: Director of National Intelligence (DNI) To: N/A	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: N/A

Notes: FY = Fiscal Year; NDAA = National Defense Authorization Act; HFAC = House Foreign Affairs Committee; SFRC = Senate Foreign Relations Committee; HAC/SAC = House/Senate Appropriations Committee; HASC/SASC = House/Senate Armed Services Committee; HFSC = House Financial Services Committee; SBHUAC = Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee; HJC/SJC = House/Senate Judiciary Committee; HPSCI = House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; SSCI = Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

a. On June 13, 2024, SBHUAC Ranking Member Tim Scott wrote to Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen requesting her to "provide a day by which I can expect the Treasury Department to comply with the law's reporting requirement." Available at https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/letter_to_sec_yell_re_iran_reports.pdf

Table 2. Iran-Related Legislative Reporting Requirements in the 117th Congress (2021-2022)

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 P.L. 117-328 (enacted December 29, 2022)	Report on status of U.S. bilateral sanctions on Iran, including renewed enforcement of such and their impact on Iran's destabilizing regional activities (Section 7041(b))	By: Secretary of State, in consultation with Secretary of the Treasury To: HAC/SAC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
Masih Alinejad Harassment and Unlawful Targeting (HUNT) Act Title II of P.L. 117-328 (December 29, 2022)	Report on state of human rights in Iran and efforts by the Iranian government to target dissidents at home and abroad (Section 204)	By: Secretary of State, in consultation with Treasury, DNI, and Attorney General To: HFAC/SFRC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HJC/SJC, and HSCI/SSCI	Due : 180 days after enactment Future submissions: Not less frequently than annually for 10 years after enactment
	Report identifying foreign financial institutions that knowingly conduct significant financial transactions with foreign persons designated as having worked for the Iranian government to harass and surveil dissidents (Section 205)	By: Secretary of the Treasury To: HFAC/SFRC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HJC/SJC, and HSCI/SSCI	Due: 30-60 days after the Section 204 report above Future submissions: Same as above
FY2023 NDAA P.L. 117-263 (December 23, 2022)	Amends FY2010 NDAA Sec. 1245 report to include Iranian support for various armed and terrorist groups (see Appendix) (Section 1231)	By: Secretary of Defense To: Congress	Due: N/A Future submissions: N/A
	Report on "all" Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated operatives serving in diplomatic posts abroad and how U.S. Departments of State and Defense are working to inform partner countries of the threat posed by those officials (Section 1236)	By: Secretary of State, in consultation with Secretary of Defense To: HASC/SASC, HFAC/SFRC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None
	Report on whether Iranian arms proliferation increased after October 2020 expiration of UN conventional arms restrictions and measures State/DOD are taking to constrain Iran's ability to proliferate weapons (Section 1240)	By: Secretary of State, in consultation with Secretary of Defense To: HASC/SASC, HFAC/SFRC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
	Report on Fifth Fleet capabilities, including assessment of seaborne threats from Iran and upgrades necessary to address them (Section 1273)	By: Secretary of Defense To: HASC/SASC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None
	Strategy on cooperation with CENTCOM AOR partners to implement integrated air and missile defense architecture to defend against missile, UAV, and rocket attacks from Iran and Iran-linked groups (Section 1658)	By: Secretary of Defense, in consultation with State/DNI To: HASC/SASC, HFAC/SFRC, and HPSCI/SSCI	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None
	Assessment regarding Iranian uranium	By: DNI	Due: 120 days after enactment
	enrichment, nuclear weapons development, delivery vehicle development, and associated engineering and research activities (Section 5593(e)(1))	To: HFAC/SFRC, HAC/SAC, HASC/SASC, HECC/SENRC, and HPSCI/SSCI	Future submissions: Every 180 days thereafter until December 31, 2028
	Assessment of Iran's support for	By: DNI	Due: 120 days after enactment
	terrorist groups and other malign activities (Section 5593(e)(2))	To: HFAC/SFRC, HAC/SAC, HASC/SASC, HECC/SENRC, and HPSCI/SSCI	Future submissions: Annually thereafter until December 31, 2028
	Diplomatic strategy for engaging with	By: Secretary of State, in consultation with	Due: 30 days after submission of
	partners regarding Iranian nuclear, proliferation, and terrorism-related activities (Section 5593(f))	Interagency Task Force on Nuclear Activity and Global Regional Terrorism of the Islamic Republic of Iran (which Section 5593(d) directs the Secretary of State to establish)	5593(e)(1) assessment above Future submissions: Annually thereafter until December 31, 2028
		To: HFAC/SFRC, HAC/SAC, HASC/SASC, HECC/SENRC, and HPSCI/SSCI	

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
	Report on activities of the DNI- designated Coordinator to lead intel community efforts to counter Iranian drones (Section 6513)	By: DNI To: HASC/SASC, HFAC/SFRC, HAC/SAC Defense Subcommittees	Due: January 1, 2024 Future submissions: None
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 P.L. 117-103 (enacted March 15, 2022)	Report on status of U.S. bilateral sanctions on Iran, including renewed enforcement of such and their impact on Iran's destabilizing regional activities (Section 7041(b))	By: Secretary of State, in consultation with Secretary of the Treasury To: HAC/SAC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None
	Assessment of activities and objectives of the Iranian Organization of Defensive Research and Innovation (Section 716)	By: DNI, in consultation with other departments as appropriate To: HPSCI/SSCI, HASC/SASC. HFAC/SFRC, HAC/SAC	Due: 120 days after enactment Future submissions: None
FY2022 NDAA P.L. 117-81 (enacted December 27, 2021)	Report on Iran's military capabilities and related activities (Section 1227)	By: DNI To: HASC/SASC. HPSCI/SSCI, HFAC/SFRC	Due: 180 days after enactment ⁵ Future submissions: None (update required in FY2024 NDAA)

Notes: FY = Fiscal Year; NDAA = National Defense Authorization Act; HFAC = House Foreign Affairs Committee; SFRC = Senate Foreign Relations Committee; HAC/SAC = House/Senate Appropriations Committee; HASC/SASC = House/Senate Armed Services Committee; HFSC = House Financial Services Committee; SBHUAC = Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee; HJC/SJC = House/Senate Judiciary Committee; HPSCI = House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; SSCI = Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; HECC = House Energy and Commerce Committee; SENRC = Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee

⁵ On February 16, 2023, Representative Claudia Tenney wrote to Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stating that "you still have not filed this critical report with the House Foreign Affairs Committee" and asking her "to immediately submit this report to Congress." Available at https://tenney.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/tenney.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/letter-to-dni-haines-re-fy22-ndaa-report-final.pdf.

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 P.L. 116-260 (enacted December 27, 2020)	Report on status of U.S. bilateral sanctions on Iran, including renewed enforcement of such and their impact on Iran's destabilizing regional activities (Section 7041(b))	By: Secretary of State, in consultation with Secretary of the Treasury To: HAC/SAC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2021 Division W of P.L. 116-260 (enacted December 27, 2020)	Report on Iranian government plans to acquire arms if UN restrictions are lifted and the effect of such acquisitions on regional security and stability (Section 609)	By: DNI, in consultation with heads of other intelligence community elements To: HPSCI/SSCI, HASC/SASC, HFAC/SFRC	Due : 90 days after enactment Future submissions: None
Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 P.L. 116-94 (enacted December 20, 2019)	Report on status of U.S. bilateral sanctions on Iran, including renewed enforcement of such and their impact on Iran's destabilizing regional activities (Section 7041(b))	By: Secretary of State, in consultation with Secretary of the Treasury To: HAC/SAC, HFAC/SFRC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: N/A
FY2020 NDAA P.L. 116-92 (enacted December 20, 2019)	Report on status of U.S. diplomatic deconfliction channels with Iran (Section 1227)	By: President To: Congress	Due: 30 days after enactment Future submissions: None
Intelligence Authorizations for Fiscal Years 2018, 2019, and 2020 Division E of P.L. 116-92 (enacted December 20, 2019)	Report on Iranian efforts in Syria and Lebanon (Section 5521)	By: DNI, in coordination with Secretaries of State and Defense To: HPSCI/SSCI, HASC/SASC, HFAC/SFRC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None
	Report on Iranian expenditures on support for certain terrorist/armed groups and on ballistic missile research/testing (Section 6705)	By: DNI To: HPSCI/SSCI	Due: 90 days after enactment Future submissions: None (but annual briefing)

Table 3. Iran-Related Legislative Reporting Requirements in the 116th Congress (2019-2020)

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 P.L. 116-6 (enacted February 15, 2019)	Report on status of U.S. and multilateral sanctions on Iran and enforcement actions (Section 7041(b))	By: Secretary of State, in consultation with Secretary of Treasury To: HAC/SAC, HFAC/SFRC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None

Notes: FY = Fiscal Year; NDAA = National Defense Authorization Act; HFAC = House Foreign Affairs Committee; SFRC = Senate Foreign Relations Committee; HAC/SAC = House/Senate Appropriations Committee; HASC/SASC = House/Senate Armed Services Committee; HPSCI = House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; SSCI = Senate Select Committee on Intelligence;

Table 4. Iran-Related Legislative Reporting Requirements in the 115th Congress (2017-2018)

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
FY2019 NDAA P.L. 115-232 (enacted August 13, 2018)	Amends FY2010 NDAA Sec. 1245 report to include information on Iranian ties with Russia and the Houthis (see Appendix) (Section 1236)	By: Secretary of Defense To: Congress	Due: N/A Future submissions: N/A
	Report on actions taken to enhance cooperation between U.S. and foreign partners to counter Iran (Section 1237)	By: Secretary of Defense, in consultation with Secretary of State To: HASC/SASC, HFAC/SFRC	Due : 180 days after enactment Future submissions: Annually through December 31, 2021
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 P.L. 115-141 (enacted March 23, 2018)	Report on status of bilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran and enforcement actions (Section 7041(b))	By: Secretary of State, in consultation with Secretary of the Treasury To: HAC/SAC, HFAC/SFRC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: N/A

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
FY2018 NDAA P.L. 115-91 (enacted December 12, 2017)	Amends FY2010 NDAA Sec. 1245 report to include information on military cooperation with various countries (see Appendix) (Section 1225)	By: Secretary of Defense To: Congress	Due: N/A Future submissions: N/A
	Extends FY2017 Sec. 1226 report (on ballistic missile launches) from 2019 to 2022 (Section 1226)	By: N/A To: N/A	Due: N/A Future submissions: N/A
Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) P.L. 115-44 (enacted August 2, 2017)	Strategy to deter Iranian threats (Section 103)	By: Secretary of State, Defense, and the Treasury and DNI "jointly" To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, and HFAC/SFRC and majority/minority leaders of both chambers	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: every 2 years thereafter
	Report describing persons determined to have contributed to Iran's ballistic missile program (Section 104(e))	By: President To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, and HFAC/SFRC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: Every 180 days thereafter
	List of persons determined to be responsible for human rights abuses in Iran (Section 106)	By: Secretary of State To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, and HFAC/SFRC	Due: 90 days after enactment Future submissions: Annually thereafter
	Report describing instances where the U.S. has imposed sanctions on a person for their involvement in Iran- related terrorism, human rights abuses, or proliferation but the EU has not, and vice versa, and explanation for any discrepancy (Section 109)	By: President To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, and HFAC/SFRC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: Every 180 days thereafter

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
	Report on U.S. citizens detained by	By: President	Due: 90 days after enactment
	Iran or Iran-supported groups (Section 110)	To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, and HFAC/SFRC and majority/minority leaders of both chambers	Future submissions: Every 180 days thereafter
	and North Korea (Section 316) To HF HF ma	By: President	Due: 180 days after enactment
		To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, and HFAC/SFRC and majority/minority leaders of both chambers	Future submissions: Annually thereafter for 5 years
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017	Report on status of U.S. and	By: Secretary of State, in	Due: 180 days after enactment
P.L. 115-31 (enacted May 5, 2017) multilateral sanctions on Iran and enforcement actions (Section 7041(b))	consultation with Secretary of the Treasury	Future submissions: None	
		To: HAC/SAC, HFAC/SFRC	

Notes: FY = Fiscal Year; NDAA = National Defense Authorization Act; HFAC = House Foreign Affairs Committee; SFRC = Senate Foreign Relations Committee; HAC/SAC = House/Senate Appropriations Committee; HASC/SASC = House/Senate Armed Services Committee; HFSC = House Financial Services Committee; SBHUAC = Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee; HWMC = House Ways and Means Committee; SFC = Senate Finance Committee

Table 5. Iran-Related Legislative Reporting Requirements in the 114th Congress (2015-2016)

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
FY2017 NDAA P.L. 114-328 (December 23, 2016)	Amends FY2010 NDAA Sec. 1245 report to include information on Iranian cyber capabilities (see Appendix) (Section 1225)	By: Secretary of Defense To: Congress	Due: N/A Future submissions: N/A

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
	Report (concurrent with report below) on any confirmed ballistic missile launches by Iran (Section 1226(a))	By: DNI To: HASC/SASC, HFAC/SFRC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HPSCI/SSCI	Due : By the end of first fiscal year quarter beginning with enactment Future submissions: Quarterly until December 31, 2019
	Report (concurrent with report above) on efforts to impose unilateral or multilateral sanctions against appropriate individuals in connection with confirmed ballistic missile launches (Section 1226(b))	By: Secretary of State, in consultation with Secretary of Treasury To: HASC/SASC, HFAC/SFRC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HPSCI/SSCI	Due : By the end of first fiscal year quarter beginning with enactment Future submissions: Quarterly until December 31, 2019
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 P.L. 114-113 (December 18, 2015)	Report on status of bilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran and enforcement (Section 7041(b))	By: Secretary of State, in consultation with Secretary of the Treasury To: HAC/SAC, HFAC/SFRC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2016 Division M of P.L. 114-113 (December 18, 2015)	Report on monetary value of sanctions relief to Iran and how Iran has used funds, including to provide support for sanctioned individuals/entities (Section 514)	By: DNI, in consultation with Treasury To: HFSC/SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC, HWMC/SFC, HPSCI/SSCI	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: Every 180 days while Joint Plan of Action is in effect and within 1 year of subsequent nuclear agreement with Iran
FY2016 NDAA P.L. 114-92 (November 25, 2015)	Extends FY2010 NDAA Sec. 1245 reporting requirement through 2025 and amends report to include Iranian cyber capabilities and FY2014 NDAA Sec. 1232 to do same (Section 1231)	By: Secretary of Defense To: Congress	Due: N/A Future submissions: N/A
	Report on any military-to-military engagements between United States and Iran (Section 1233)	By: Secretary of Defense To: HASC/SASC, HFAC/SFRC	Due: One year after enactment Future submissions: Annually thereafter for 2 years

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) P.L. 114-17 (enacted May 22, 2015)	Report assessing extent to which Secretary of State will be able to verify Iranian compliance with agreement	By: President To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HPSCI/SSCI, HFAC/SFRC, majority/minority leaders of both houses	Due: Within 5 calendar days of reaching an agreement with Iran related to its nuclear program
	and adequacy of safeguards and IAEA capacity to implement verification majority/		Future submissions: None
	Report on Iran's nuclear program and	By: President	Due: 180 days of enactment
	adherence to agreement	To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HPSCI/SSCI, HFAC/SFRC, majority/minority leaders of both houses	Future submissions: At least every 180 days thereafter

Notes: FY = Fiscal Year; NDAA = National Defense Authorization Act; HFAC = House Foreign Affairs Committee; SFRC = Senate Foreign Relations Committee; HAC/SAC = House/Senate Appropriations Committee; HASC/SASC = House/Senate Armed Services Committee; HFSC = House Financial Services Committee; SBHUAC = Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee; HPSCI = House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; SSCI = Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Table 6. Iran-Related Legislative Reporting Requirements in the 113th Congress (2013-2014)

Legislation listed in r	reverse chronological	order by date	of enactment
Legislation listed in i	evel se chi onological	Under by date	or enacument

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
FY2015 NDAA	Report on Iranian compliance with	By: President	Due: 30 days after enactment
P.L. 113-291 (enacted December 19, 2014)	interim nuclear agreement (Section 1271)	To: HASC/SASC, HFAC/SFRC	Future submissions: 90 days after renewal of interim agreement or final agreement, and every 180 days thereafter for 10 years

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
	Extends FY2010 NDAA Sec. 1245 reporting requirement through 2016 (Section 1277)	By: Secretary of Defense To: Congress	Due: N/A Future submissions: N/A
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 P.L. 113-235 (enacted December 16, 2014)	Report on implementation of Joint Plan of Action (Section 7041(b))	By: Secretary of State To: HAC/SAC, HFAC/SFRC	Due : 30 days after enactment Future submissions: Every 30 days thereafter
FY2014 NDAA P.L. 113-66 (enacted December 26, 2013)	Report detailing sensor capabilities to defend U.S. homeland from future Iranian long range ballistic missile threats (Section 235)	By: Secretary of Defense To: HASC/SASC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None
	Amends FY2010 NDAA Sec. 1245 report to include "structure of Iran's global network of terrorist and criminal groups" (Section 1232)	By: Secretary of Defense To: Congress	Due: N/A Future submissions: N/A

Notes: FY = Fiscal Year; NDAA = National Defense Authorization Act; HFAC = House Foreign Affairs Committee; SFRC = Senate Foreign Relations Committee; HAC/SAC = House/Senate Appropriations Committee; HASC/SASC = House/Senate Armed Services Committee

Table 7. Iran-Related Legislative Reporting Requirements in the 112th Congress (2011-2012)

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
FY2013 NDAA P.L. 112-239 (enacted January 2, 2013)	Report on efforts to improve homeland ballistic missile defense capabilities, including those needed to defeat missiles launched from Iran (Section 228)	By: Secretary of Defense To: HASC/SASC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
	Report assessing adequacy of defense against Iranian missile attacks against U.S. troops deployed in Europe (Section 229)	By: Secretary of Defense To: HASC/SASC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None
	Report on U.S. capabilities "in relation to" the PRC, North Korea, and Iran	By: Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, in consultation with	Due : 90 days after enactment (or March 31, 2014)
	(Section 1231)	relevant combatant command commanders To: HASC/SASC	Future submissions: None
	Report on military capabilities of GCC states, including to defend collectively against Iran (Section 1232)	By: Secretary of Defense, in consultation with Secretary of State	Due: 180 days of enactment Future submissions: None
		To: HASC/SASC, HFAC/SFRC, HAC/SAC	
Iran Freedom and Counterproliferation Act (IFCA)	Report on large vessels that have entered Tidewater Middle East	By: President	Due: 180 days of enactment
Subtitle D of P.L. 112-239 (enacted January 2, 2013)	entered Tidewater Middle East Company-controlled seaports in Iran and airports at which sanctioned Iran air carriers have landed (Section 1252)	To: HWMC/SFC,Future submiHFSC/SBHUAC,through 2016HFAC/SFRC, HASC/SASC	Future submissions: Annually through 2016
Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere	Strategy to address Iranian activities in	By: Secretary of State	Due: 180 days after enactment
Act of 2012 P.L. 112-220 (enacted December 28, 2012)	the Western Hemisphere (Section 5)	To: HFAC/SFRC	Future submissions: None
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human	Report on diplomatic efforts to	By: President	Due: 180 days after enactment
Rights Act of 2012 (ITRSHRA) P.L. 112-158 (enacted August 10, 2012)	expand multilateral sanctions on Iran (Section 102(b))	To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Future submissions: Every 180 days thereafter

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
	Report on vessel operators and others who conduct significant financial transactions with sanctioned Iranian	By: Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with Secretary of State	Due: 90 days after enactment Future submissions: Every 90 days thereafter
	port managers (Section 211(d))	To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	
	Report on effect of sanctions on Iranian economy and financial system	By: Secretary of the Treasury	Due: 180 days after enactment
	(Section 216)	To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Future submissions: Every 180 days thereafter
	Report on persons who provide	By: President	Due: 60 days after enactment
	specialist financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran or other financial institutions and assessment of efforts to end the provision of such services (Section 220)	To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Future submissions: Every 90 days thereafter
	Report on all foreign investors in	By: Comptroller General	Due: 120 days after enactment
	energy sector of Iran (Section 223)	To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Future submissions: Update one year after first report
	Made CISADA Sec 110 report (on	By: President	Due: 180 days after enactment
	volume of import to/export from Iran of oil and gas) recurring, due every 180 days (Section 224)	To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Future submissions: Every 180 days thereafter
	Report on foreign persons identified	By: President	Due: 90 days after enactment
	as supporting or engaging with the IRGC (Section 302)	To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Future submissions: Every 180 days thereafter

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
	Report on foreign government agencies identified as supporting or engaging with IRGC or entities subject to financial sanctions pursuant to UN resolutions (Section 303)	By: President To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Due: 120 days after enactment Future submissions: Every 180 days thereafter
	Report on whether specified Iranian leaders are responsible for human rights abuses in Iran (Section 401)	By: Secretary of State To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None
	Report on persons determined to have transferred to Iran specified goods or technologies that enable the government to commit human rights abuses (Section 402)	By: President To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Due: 90 days after enactment Future submissions: Updates required "as new information becomes available"
	Report on Iranian natural gas exports (Section 505(a))	By: Administrator of Energy Information Administration To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Due: 60 days after enactment Future submissions: None
	Report assessing extent to which natural gas revenues are enriching Iranian government and whether a sanctions regime similar to that imposed with respect to petroleum could be effectively applied to Iranian natural gas (Section 505(b))	By: President To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Due: 60 days after receiving EIA report above Future submissions: None
	Report listing international organizations of which Iran is a member and detailing the amount the U.S. contributes to each organization (Section 506)	By: Secretary of State To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC/SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: By September 1 of each year thereafter

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
FY2012 NDAA P.L. 112-81 (enacted December 31, 2011)	Review of Iran's (and China's) conventional and anti-access capabilities and U.S. capabilities to overcome them (Section 1232)	By: Comptroller General To: HASC/SASC	Due: By January 31, 2013 Future submissions: None
	Report on efforts to carry out multilateral diplomatic initiative to persuade Iranian oil-buying countries to limit Iran's use of oil revenues to purchases of consumer goods and prohibit Iran's weapons purchases, and to conduct outreach to other countries to encourage oil producers to increase their output (Section 1245(e))	By: President To: Congress	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: Every 180 days thereafter

Notes: FY = Fiscal Year; NDAA = National Defense Authorization Act; HFAC = House Foreign Affairs Committee; SFRC = Senate Foreign Relations Committee; HAC/SAC = House/Senate Appropriations Committee; HASC/SASC = House/Senate Armed Services Committee; HFSC = House Financial Services Committee; SBHUAC = Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee; HWMC = House Ways and Means Committee; SFC = Senate Finance Committee; the 112th Congress ended on January 3, 2013.

Table 8. Iran-Related Legislative Reporting Requirements in the IIIth Congress (2009-2010)

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
FY2011 NDAA	Report assessing merits of multilateral	By: Secretary of Defense, in	Due: I year after enactment
P.L. 111-383 (enacted January 7, 2011)	or bilateral Incidents at Sea military- to-military agreement between U.S.,	coordination with Secretary of State	Future submissions: None
	Iran, and other countries operating in Persian Gulf (Section 1240)	To: HASC/SASC, HFAC/SFRC	

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and	Amends Section 10 of the ISA to add	By: President	Due: 90 days after enactment
Divestment Act (CISADA)	report on G20 trade with Iran	To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC,	Future submissions: Annually
P.L. 111-195 (enacted July 1, 2010)	(Section 102(d))	SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	thereafter
	Report on diplomatic efforts to	By: President	Due: months after enactment
	dissuade foreign persons from engaging in Iran's petroleum export activities, and successes/failures of those efforts (Section 102(h))	To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC, SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Future submissions: None
	Report listing Iranian officials	By: President	Due: 270 days after enactment
	determined to be responsible for serious human rights abuses (Section 105)	To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC, SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Future submissions: Every 180 days thereafter
	Report assessing effect of prohibition	By: Comptroller General	Due: I year after enactment
	on exports of sensitive technology to Iran (Section 106)	To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC, SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Future submissions: None
	Report on investments in Iranian	By: President	Due: 90 days after enactment
	energy sector (Section 110)	To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC, SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Future submissions: Every 180 days thereafter
	Report on foreign export credit	By: President	Due: 90 days after enactment
	agencies activities comparable to those described in Sections 5(a) or 5(b) of the Iran Sanctions Act (Section 1	To: HWMC/SFC, HFSC, SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Future submissions: "as new information becomes available"
	Report of countries believed to be	By: DNI	Due: 180 days after enactment
	allowing the diversion to Iran of goods to develop weapons of mass destruction/missiles or support terrorism (Section 302)	To: President; Secretaries of Defense, Commerce State, and the Treasury; and HWMC/SFC, HFSC, SBHUAC, HFAC/SFRC	Future submissions: Updates "not less frequently than annually

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 P.L. 111-117 (enacted December 16, 2009)	Report on status of bilateral and multilateral efforts to curtail Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons technology (Section 7043(c)(1))	By: Secretary of State To: HAC/SAC	Due: 90 days after enactment Future submissions: Every 90 days thereafter until September 30, 2010
	Report on status of bilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran, including list of all sanctions, enforcement efforts, waivers, and related diplomatic efforts (Section 7043(c)(2))	By: Secretary of State, in consultation with Secretary of the Treasury To: Congress	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None
FY2010 NDAA P.L. 111-84 (enacted October 28, 2009)	Report on diplomatic engagement with Iran, as well as Iran's support for terrorism and nuclear activities and all U.S. sanctions against Iran (Section 1241)	By: President To: Congress	Due: By January 31, 2010 Future submissions: None
	Annual report on military power of Iran, including Iranian strategies and capabilities (Section 1245)	By: Secretary of Defense To: Congress	Due: By January 30 of each year Future submissions: Until December 31, 2014ª
Victims of Iranian Censorship Act Subtitle D of P.L. 111-84 (enacted October 28, 2009)	Report on U.Sfunded international broadcasting efforts in Iran, efforts by Iran to block international broadcasting or internet access, and Iranians' access to the internet (Section 1264)	By: President To: Congress	Due: 90 days after enactment Future submissions: Annually thereafter for 5 years
	Report on U.Sfunded international broadcasting efforts in Iran, efforts by Iran to block international broadcasting or internet access, and Iranians' access to the internet (Section 1265)	By: President To: Congress	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None

Legislation	Report	Submitted By/To	Submission dates
Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 P.L. 111-8 (enacted March 11, 2009)	Report on status of bilateral and multilateral sanctions against Iran, including list of all sanctions, enforcement efforts, waivers, and related diplomatic efforts (Section 7043)	By: Secretary of State To: HAC/SAC	Due: 180 days after enactment Future submissions: None

Notes: FY = Fiscal Year; NDAA = National Defense Authorization Act; HFAC = House Foreign Affairs Committee; SFRC = Senate Foreign Relations Committee; HAC/SAC = House/Senate Appropriations Committee; HASC/SASC = House/Senate Armed Services Committee; HFSC = House Financial Services Committee; SBHUAC = Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee; HWMC = House Ways and Means Committee; SFC = Senate Finance Committee; P.L. 111-383 was passed by both chambers in December 2010 and signed by the President on January 7, 2011, after the 111th Congress had already ended.

a. Later extended through 2016 (P.L. 113-291) and 2025 (P.L. 114-92)

Appendix. Legislative History of Annual Report on Iran's Military Capabilities (Sec. 1245 of the FY2010 NDAA)

Changes since FY2010, shaded by NDAA year FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2023 FY2024

SEC. 1245. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY POWER OF IRAN.

- (a) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than January 30 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report, in both classified and unclassified form, on the current and future military strategy of Iran.
- (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required under subsection (a) shall include a description of the security posture of Iran, including at least the following:
 - A description and assessment of Iranian grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy, including—
 - (A) the goals of Iran's grand strategy, security strategy, and military strategy;
 - (B) trends in Iran's strategy that would be designed to establish Iran as the leading power in the Middle East and to enhance the influence of Iran in other regions of the world; and
 - (C) Iranian strategy regarding other countries in the region, including other specified countries; and
 - (D) Iranian strategy regarding offensive cyber capabilities and defensive cyber capabilities.
 - (2) An assessment of the capabilities of Iran's conventional forces and Iran's unconventional or parallel military forces, including—
 - (A) the size and capabilities of Iran's conventional forces;
 - (B) an analysis of the effectiveness of Iran's conventional forces when facing United States forces in the region and other specified countries;
 - (C) a description of Iranian military doctrine; and
 - (D) an estimate of the funding provided for each branch of Iran's conventional forces.

(3) An assessment of Iran's unconventional forces and related activities, including-

- (A) the size and capability of Iranian special operations units, including the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps– Quds Force;
- (B) the types and amount of support, including funding, lethal and non-lethal supplies, and training, provided to groups designated by the United States as foreign terrorist organizations, regional militant groups, and Iranian-linked proxy groups, in particular those forces as having been assessed as to be willing to carry out terrorist operations on behalf of Iran or in response to a military attack by another country on Iran; and regional militant groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the Special Groups in Iraq, in particular those forces as having been assessed as to be willing to carry out terrorist operations on behalf of Iran or in response to a military attack by another country on Iran; and the Special Groups in Iraq, in particular those forces as having been assessed as to be willing to carry out terrorist operations on behalf of Iran or in response to a military attack by another country on Iran;
- (C) the types and amount of support to be assessed under subparagraph (B) shall include support provided to Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Asa'ib ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Kata'ib Sayyid alShuhada, Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, Kata'ib Hezbollah, the Badr Organization, the Fatemiyoun, the Zainabiyoun, and Ansar Allah (also known as the 'Houthis');
- (D) the threat from Special Groups in Iraq, including Kata'ib Hezbollah and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, to United States and coalition forces located in Iraq and Syria;

FY2024

FY2023

FY2019

	·	E) an analysis of the effectiveness of Iran's unconventional forces when facing United States forces in the region and other specified countries in the region; and	
	(Ø	F) an estimate of the amount of funds spent by Iran to develop and support special operations forces and terrorist groups; and	
	(ℤ	G) a description of the structure of Iran's global network of terrorist and criminal groups and an analysis of the capability of such network of groups and how such network of groups operates to support and reinforce Iran's grand strategy; and	FY2014
	<u>(F)</u>	offensive cyber capabilities and defensive cyber capabilities; and	FY2016
	(₹	H) Iran's cyber capabilities, including—	FY2017
		 (i) Iran's ability to use proxies and other actors to mask its cyber operations; 	112017
		 (ii) Iran's ability to target United States governmental and nongovernmental entities and activities; and 	
		(iii) cooperation with or assistance from state and non-state actors in support or enhancement of Iran's cyber capabilities;	
	(Ø	I) Iranian ability to manipulate the information environment both domesti- cally and against the interests of the United States and its allies ; and	FY2016 FY2023
	(J)	all formal or informal agreements involving a strategic military or security partnership with the Russian Federation, the People's Republic of China, or any proxies of either such country.	
(4)	An ass	essment of Iranian capabilities related to nuclear and missile forces,	
	includi	0	
	(A)	a summary of nuclear weapons capabilities and developments in the preceding year;	
	(B)	a summary of the capabilities of Iran's ballistic missile forces, including developments in the preceding year, the size of Iran's ballistic missile forces and Iran's cruise missile forces, and the locations of missile launch	FY2024
	(C)	a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of Iran's ballistic missile forces and Iran's cruise missile forces when facing United States forces in the region and other specified countries; and	
	(D)	an estimate of the amount of funding expended by Iran since 2004 on programs to develop a capability to build nuclear weapons or to enhance Iran's ballistic missile forces;	
	(E)	an assessment of Iran's space launch vehicle program and the ability of	FY2024
		Iran to use those technologies to develop and field an intercontinental ballistic missile;	
	(F)	a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of Iran's drone forces; and	
	(G)	a description or estimation of the threat posed by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to European citizens or to member countries	
(5)	An ass	of the European Union. essment of transfers to <mark>and from</mark> Iran of military equipment, technology,	FY2016
~ /	and tra	aining from non-Iranian sources from or to non-Iranian sources or	FY2018
	missile	ations, including transfers that pertain to nuclear development, ballistic s, and chemical, biological, and advanced conventional weapons, weapon is, and delivery vehicles.	
(6)	An ass	essment of the use of civilian transportation assets and infrastructure,	
		ng commercial aircraft, airports, commercial vessels, and seaports, used to ort illicit military cargo to or from Iran, including military personnel,	
		y goods, weapons, military-related electric parts, and related components.	

 whicles. (8) An assessment of the extent to which the commercial aviation sector of Iran knowingly provides financial, material, or technological support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, the Bashar al-Assad regime, Hezbollah, Hamas, Kata'ib Hezbollah, or any other foreign terrorist organization. (9) An assessment of the threat posed by Iran against United States and partner military bases, to include missile, unmanned aircraft systems, and loitering munition attacks. (10) An assessment of groups that are supported by Iran and designated by the United States as foreign terrorist organizations and regional military groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the Special Groups in Iraq, in particular those forces as having been assessed as to be willing to carry out terrorist operations on behalf of Iran. (12) An assessment of how Iran would utilize additional resources to further activities described in paragraphs (1) through (9). (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: (1) IRAN'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES.—The term "Iran's conventional forces"— (a) means military forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran designed to conduct operations on sea, air, or land, other than Iran's unconventional forces."— (b) IRAN'S UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES.—The term "Iran's unconventional forces."— (c) IRAN'S UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES.—The term "Iran's unconventional forces."— (d) IRAN'S UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES.—The term "Iran's unconventional forces."— (e) IRAN'S UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES.—The term "Iran's unconventional forces."— (f) RAN'S UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES.—The term "Iran's unconventional forces."— (g) includes (h) has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States: (h) necules assistance from Iran; and (h) as assessed as being willing in some or all cases of carrying out attacks on behalf of Iran; or (b)	(7) An assessment of military-to-military cooperation between Iran and foreign counties, including the People's Republic of China, Cuba, North Korea, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, and any other country designated by the Secretary of Defense with additional reference to cooperation and collaboration on the trafficking or development of nuclear, biological, chemical, and advanced conventional weapons, weapon systems, and delivery	FY2024 FY2019 FY2019
 Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, the Bashar al-Assad regime, Hezbollah, Hamas, Kata'ib Hezbollah, or any other foreign terrorist organization. (9) An assessment of the threat posed by Iran against United States and partner multiary bases, to include missile, unmanned aircraft systems, and loitering munition attacks. (10) An assessment of the sale, supply, or transfer of narcotics in the Middle East region by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran backed groups. (11) An assessment of groups that are supported by Iran and designated by the United States as foreign terrorist organizations and regional military groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the Special Groups in Iraq, in particular those forces as having been assessed as to be willing to carry out terrorist operations on behalf of Iran. (12) An assessment of how Iran would utilize additional resources to further activities described in paragraphs (1) through (9). (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: (1) IRAN'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES.—The term "Iran's conventional forces"— (A) means military forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran designed to conduct operations on sea, air, or land, other than Iran's unconventional forces and Iran's ballistic missile forces and Iran's cruise missile forces; and (8) includes Iran's Army, Iran's Air Force, Iran's Navy, and elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard CorpsQuds Force; and (8) includes Iran's Army, Iran's Aur Force, Iran's Navy, and elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force; and (8) includes Iran's Army Guard Corps-Quds Force; and (9) IRAN'S UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES.—The term "Iran's unconventional forces"— (A) means forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran that carry out missions typically associated with special operations forces; and (9) includes — (1) the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qud	vehicles.(8) An assessment of the extent to which the commercial aviation sector of Iran	
 (c) An inserve to include missile, unmanined aircraft systems, and loitering munition attacks. (d) An assessment of the sale, supply, or transfer of narcotics in the Middle East region by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran backed groups. (e) An assessment of groups that are supported by Iran and designated by the United States as foreign terrorist organizations and regional military groups, including Hezbolah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the Special Groups in Iraq, in particular those forces as having been assessed as to be willing to carry out terrorist operations on behalf of Iran. (f) An assessment of how Iran would utilize additional resources to further activities described in paragraphs (1) through (9). (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: (i) IRAN'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES.—The term "Iran's conventional forces"— (A) means military forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran designed to conduct operations on sea, air, or land, other than Iran's unconventional forces and Iran's ballistic missile forces and Iran's Navy, and elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, other than the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, other than the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.—Quds Force. (2) IRAN'S UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES.—The term "Iran's unconventional forces"— (i) the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.—Quds Force; and (ii) any organization that— (i) has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States; (iii) nay organization that— (i) has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States; (ii) receives assistance from Iran; and (iii) (aa) is assessed as being willing in some or all cases of carrying out attacks on behalf of Iran; or (b) is assessed as being willing in some or all cases of carrying out attacks on behalf of Iran; or (b) is assessed as being willing in some or all cases of carrying multicasto substance for Iran; and <td>Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, the Bashar al-Assad regime, Hezbollah, Hamas, Kata'ib Hezbollah, or any</td><td></td>	Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran, the Bashar al-Assad regime, Hezbollah, Hamas, Kata'ib Hezbollah, or any	
 region by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran backed groups. (II) An assessment of groups that are supported by Iran and designated by the United States as forcing netrorist organizations and regional military groups, including Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and the Special Groups in Iraq, in particular those forces as having been assessed as to be willing to carry out terrorist operations on behalf of Iran. (I2) An assessment of how Iran would utilize additional resources to further activities described in paragraphs (I) through (9). (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: (I) IRAN'S CONVENTIONAL FORCES.—The term "Iran's conventional forces"— (A) means military forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran designed to conduct operations on sea, air, or land, other than Iran's unconventional forces and Iran's ballistic missile forces and Iran's ruise missile forces; and (B) includes Iran's Army, Iran's Air Force, Iran's Navy, and elements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, other than the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps—Quds Force. (2) IRAN'S UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES.—The term "Iran's unconventional forces"— (A) means forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran that carry out missions typically associated with special operations forces; and (B) includes— (I) the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps—Quds Force; and (ii) any organization that— (I) has been designated a terrorist organization by the United States; (III) crecives assistance from Iran; and (III) (a) is assessed as being willing in some or all cases of carrying out attacks on behalf of Iran; or (b) is assessed as likely to carry out attacks in response to a military attack by another country on Iran. (3) IRAN'S BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES.—The term "Iran's ballistic missile forces" means those elements of the military forces of Iran that employ cruise missiles. 	military bases, to include missile, unmanned aircraft systems, and loitering	FY2024
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- (5) SPECIFIED COUNTRIES.—The term "specified countries" means the countries in the same geographic region as Iran, including Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
- (d) TERMINATION.—The requirement to submit the report required under subsection (a) shall terminate on December 31, 2014 December 31, 2016 December 31, 2025.

FY2015 FY2016

Source: CRS.

Author Information

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