CRS INSIGHT Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress
The 27-member European Union (EU) has implemented various policy responses to Russia’s war against Ukraine. EU actions and coordination with the United States are of interest to Congress given the EU’s role as an important U.S. partner. (Also see CRS In Focus IF12277, Russia’s War on Ukraine: U.S. Policy and the Role of Congress.)
Since February 2022, the EU has imposed 14 packages of sanctions—or restrictive measures—intended to reduce Russia’s ability to finance the war against Ukraine, to enact costs on Russia’s elites, and to diminish Russia’s economic base. Imposing sanctions requires unanimity among EU members.
To date, EU sanctions on Russia’s government and financial, business, defense, technology, and media sectors include
• Freezing the assets of over 2,300 individuals and entities; travel bans also apply to designated individuals.
• Restricting transactions with Russia’s central bank and blocking access to its reserve holdings.
• Imposing debt and equity restrictions on certain banks and companies.
• Banning transactions with certain Russian state-owned military-industrial enterprises.
• Disconnecting 10 leading Russian financial institutions—including Sberbank, Russia’s largest bank—from SWIFT (the world’s dominant international financial messaging system).
• Expanding and tightening export controls on dual-use goods and technologies to Russia and to selected entities in China, India, Kazakhstan, and elsewhere directly supporting Russia’s military-industrial complex.
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• Banning certain exports in the aviation, maritime, and technology sectors (e.g., semiconductors) and the export of drone engines and luxury goods to Russia.
• Prohibiting imports of steel, spirits, seafood, gold, diamonds, and other products from Russia.
• Closing EU airspace, seaports, and roads to Russian operators.
• Suspending broadcasting activities of 18 Russian media outlets (including subsidiaries).
EU energy dependence on Russia has made targeting its energy sector challenging. The EU has not prohibited Russian natural gas imports, but sanctions include
• Prohibiting most imports of Russian crude oil and petroleum products (applying to around 90% of Russian oil imports), with an exemption for crude oil delivered by pipeline.
• Banning EU companies from providing oil transport services, except for Russian crude oil and petroleum products sold to non-EU countries at or below agreed price caps (established in cooperation with the Group of Seven [G7] price cap coalition to reduce Russia’s oil revenues while keeping global energy markets stable).
• Prohibiting transshipment of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) through EU ports, among other LNG-related measures.
• Banning EU exports of oil refining technologies.
• Prohibiting Russian coal imports.
The EU also has established mechanisms aimed at preventing the circumvention of sanctions and sought to tighten implementation of the oil price cap.
According to EU data, EU and member state support to Ukraine as of October 2024 totaled nearly €122 billion in military, financial, humanitarian, and emergency assistance and EU funding to help Ukrainian refugees within the EU. (U.S. dollar figures are slightly higher at the current €1:$1.09 exchange rate.)
Financial and Other Aid. Since 2022, the EU, its member states, and European financial institutions have collectively made available €60 billion in financial, humanitarian, and emergency aid for Ukraine, including
• €15.4 billion committed for 2024 (part of €50 billion in financial assistance for the 2024-2027 period, provided through a new Ukraine Facility agreed to in March 2024).
• €18 billion in EU financial assistance for 2023 (in the form of favorable loans).
• €12.2 billion from member states.
The EU also coordinates the delivery of in-kind emergency supplies to Ukraine.
Military Assistance. The EU and its member states have committed €43.5 billion in military support to Ukraine to date, consisting of
• €6.1 billion through the European Peace Facility (EPF), including €3.6 billion in military assistance financing and €2 billion for 1 million rounds of ammunition (either from member state stocks or through joint procurement).
• An estimated €37.4 billion in bilateral military support from member states.
In May 2024, EU member states approved using the financial proceeds (of up to €3 billion per year) generated by immobilized Russian sovereign assets held in the EU (around €210 billion) to help support
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Ukraine. The EU made the first such transfer of €1.5 billion to Ukraine in July 2024, with 90% of this amount designated for military support through the EPF and the remaining 10% for reconstruction needs. The EU also has trained almost 60,000 members of Ukraine’s armed forces.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU pledged to phase out all Russian fossil fuel imports— including natural gas—before 2030. According to the EU, the share of Russia’s pipeline gas in EU imports decreased from over 40% in 2021 to about 8% in 2023, although this decrease reflects in part Russia’s decision to reduce deliveries. EU statistics also indicate imports of Russian LNG have increased somewhat since 2022.
The U.S. government and the EU have worked together closely in responding to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Cooperation has included devising and enforcing sanctions, suspending Russia’s preferential trade treatment under World Trade Organization rules, formulating the G7 oil price cap, and ensuring accountability for war crimes. The Biden Administration also committed to help the EU reduce its dependency on Russian gas, in part by boosting LNG shipments to the EU.
In October 2024, U.S. and EU officials agreed to a G7 plan for a $50 billion loan to Ukraine, backed by the interest earned on immobilized Russian sovereign assets. The United States and the EU are to provide $20 billion each, with the remaining $10 billion from the other G7 partners. The Biden Administration intends to seek congressional approval to use half of the U.S. loan amount for military assistance to Ukraine.
Some in Congress may be interested in monitoring EU responses to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and implications for other aspects of U.S.-EU relations, including
• Security and Defense. The war in Ukraine has prompted debate on improving EU military capabilities and strengthening the NATO-EU partnership.
• Energy and Climate. Russia’s actions have accelerated the EU’s energy transition and U.S.-EU energy cooperation, despite some tensions over U.S. “green” subsidies.
• EU Enlargement. Traditionally, bipartisan support has existed in Congress for EU enlargement. The EU declared Ukraine an official candidate for membership in June 2022. Joining the EU typically takes many years.
Kristin Archick Section Research Manager
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IN11897 · VERSION 24 · UPDATED
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