

# Haiti in Crisis: What Role for a Multinational Security Support Mission?

Updated October 2, 2024

The political and security situation in Haiti has deteriorated since the start of 2024; more than 3,600 people were killed or injured by gang violence in the first half of 2024. The gangs—some of which are aligned with political elites—amassed control over territory and illicit markets amid the [deeply unpopular](#) government of former Prime Minister Ariel Henry, who [assumed office](#) following the July 2021 assassination of then-President Jovenel Moïse. Henry resigned on [April 25](#) after the formation of a [Transitional Presidential Council](#) (TPC). The TPC subsequently [selected Garry Conille](#) to serve as acting prime minister until elections are expected to be convened in [2026](#). The TPC has been plagued by [corruption allegations](#), which could potentially affect the pending elections and challenge the TPC's [perceived legitimacy](#). Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about the crisis in Haiti and its potential to [destabilize](#) the Caribbean and fuel irregular migration.

The Biden Administration has [pledged to support](#) Haiti, in part, by helping fund a United Nations (UN)-authorized, Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS) to address gang violence and promote security. Some Members have [supported the MSS](#) concept; others have criticized what they viewed as [inadequate planning](#) for the mission. The first contingent of Kenyan police officers arrived in Port-au-Prince on [June 25](#) and the second on [July 16](#).

## Origins of the Multinational Security Support Mission

In October 2022, then-Prime Minister Henry [requested](#) the deployment of an international force to help the Haitian National Police (HNP) quell insecurity and facilitate humanitarian aid. [Canada, Brazil, and other Western Hemisphere countries](#), some of which participated in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH; 2004-2017), declined U.S. requests to lead such a force. MINUSTAH remains controversial in Haiti due to alleged [sexual abuse](#) by some of its forces and its inadvertent [introduction of cholera](#) into the country.

In July 2023, Kenya announced it would [consider](#) leading a multinational force in Haiti and sending up to 1,000 police, if authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Whereas [U.S.](#) and Caribbean Community ([CARICOM](#)) officials praised Kenya, some analysts [questioned](#) the human rights record of the Kenyan police and whether they could overcome language and cultural barriers. Others [opposed](#) any international security force, arguing that previous foreign interventions in Haiti have failed.

Congressional Research Service

<https://crsreports.congress.gov>

IN12331

In October 2023, the UNSC adopted [Resolution 2699](#) to authorize a non-UN-conducted multinational force, financed by voluntary contributions, to provide security for critical infrastructure and operational support to the HNP for 12 months.

## Current Status

Kenya's deployment of the MSS was delayed until June 2024 amid debate about the deployment's [constitutionality](#) and the need to conclude a court-ordered bilateral security agreement with Haiti. Kenya also [delayed deployment](#) until a new Haitian government took power.

As of September 2024, the MSS [consisted](#) of over 380 personnel from Kenya, some 25 from Jamaica, and 2 from Belize; 600 more Kenyans are [expected to join the MSS](#) by the end of the year. In addition to U.S. funding, UN officials report at least [\\$85.3 million](#) in donations, primarily from Canada.

MSS leaders have developed an operational plan and created an oversight mechanism to monitor the mission's conduct. Participating personnel are subject to UN vetting, and those receiving U.S. support are to complete U.S. human rights vetting pursuant to the Leahy Laws ([22 U.S.C. §2378d](#) and [10 U.S.C. §362](#)). Some human rights experts have [advocated](#) additional training and mechanisms to prevent and punish human rights violations. Others have [raised](#) concerns about a perceived lack of transparency on the MSS's rules of engagement.

Some [observers](#) express concerns about how complex the security situation in Haiti has become since authorization of the MSS, saying the mission may need to be strengthened. The mission's partner, the HNP, is weak and, at times, [allegedly complicit](#) with criminal groups. In September 2024, a top UN expert on Haiti [stated](#) that the equipment received has been inadequate and the resources insufficient.

The Biden Administration discussed the possibility of transitioning the MSS into a [traditional UN peacekeeping operation](#) with Kenya, Haiti, and others at the UNSC. On September 30, 2024, however, the UNSC adopted [Resolution 2751](#), extending the current MSS mandate for another 12 months.

## U.S. Funding and Congressional Consideration

To date, the United States has pledged at least \$380 million to support the MSS. In October 2023, Secretary of State Antony Blinken [announced](#) \$100 million in foreign assistance for the MSS and \$100 million in Department of Defense (DOD) funds for enabling support; in March 2024, Blinken [announced](#) the DOD commitment had doubled to \$200 million. Additionally, via presidential drawdown authority ([22 U.S.C. §2318\(a\)\(2\)](#)), President Biden has authorized the transfer of at least \$70 million in defense articles and services from U.S. stocks to Haiti—[\\$10 million](#) in March and [\\$60 million](#) in April. Haiti and/or Kenya also may receive additional DOD funding through other funding streams. U.S. support for the MSS is intended to complement assistance that has been provided to train and equip the HNP through bilateral U.S. programs and the multi-donor [UN Basket Fund](#).

The United States allocated [\\$230.9 million](#) to Haiti in FY2023, including \$45 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) assistance focused primarily on the HNP. The Administration is requesting [\\$356.7 million](#) in bilateral aid to Haiti in FY2025, including \$169 million in INCLE—\$100 million of which would support the MSS.

In addition to evaluating the Administration's FY2025 budget request, Congress may consider whether to provide funding for Haiti and the MSS and/or to shape how prior-year appropriations are used in Haiti.

Congress also may assess possible additional measures, should the crisis in Haiti deteriorate further. The Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47, Division F), does not specify a total funding level for Haiti but [directs](#) the Administration to comply with

reporting requirements in H.Rept. 118-146 and S.Rept. 118-71, including reports to the Appropriations Committees on options to counter destabilization in Haiti.

## Author Information

Karla I. Rios  
Analyst in Latin American Affairs

---

## Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS's institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.