INSIGHTi
Israel, Iran, Hamas, and Lebanese Hezbollah:
Various Strikes amid Regional Turmoil
July 31, 2024
Since the October 7, 2023, attacks led by Hamas (a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization, or
FTO), conflicts between Israel and Iran and/or its allies have spread across the Middle East. More than
three months after Israel and Iran exchanged direct fire in April 2024, these conflicts face another
potential inflection point following three late July incidents:
• Civilians killed in Israeli-controlled Golan Heights. On July 27, a rocket fired from
Lebanon reportedly killed 12 young people in the Druze town of Majdal Shams in the
Golan Heights. U.S. and Israeli officials said Lebanese Hezbollah (another FTO) was
responsible despite the group’s denial. Israeli leaders said the strike crossed a “red line.”
• Hezbollah military leader reportedly killed in Lebanon. On July 30, Israeli authorities
said that an Israeli drone strike in Beirut killed Hezbollah senior commander Fuad Shukr,
whom Israel blamed for the Golan Heights attack. Shukr is on the U.S. government’s
“Rewards for Justice” list for playing a “central role” in the 1983 bombing of the U.S.
Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut.
• Top Hamas leader reportedly killed in Iran. On July 31, Ismail Haniyeh—the top
political leader of Hamas—was reportedly assassinated by an “airborne projectile” while
visiting Tehran for the inauguration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Hamas and
Iran blamed Israel for the strike; Israel has not commented, and the White House has said
it cannot independently confirm Haniyeh’s death.
In blaming Israel for Haniyeh’s death, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that “it is
our duty to take revenge.” According to one report, he has ordered direct retaliation against Israel, but
further details are unclear. Iran’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations has said, “The response to an
assassination will indeed be special operations—harder and intended to instill deep regret in the
perpetrator,” and “the responsibility of the United States, as the strategic ally and main supporter of the
Israeli regime in the region, cannot be overlooked.” Secretary of State Antony Blinken asserted that
Haniyeh’s reported killing “is something we were not aware of or involved in.” In April 2024, Iranian
leaders declared a “new equation,” stating that Iran would meet any Israeli attack against Iranian
“interests, assets, figures, and citizens anywhere” with a counterattack.
Factors potentially influencing key actors’ decisions going forward include the following:
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• Israel. What risks Israel might accept in an effort to counter and deter Iran and its allies,
and to return some 60,000 evacuees to northern Israel. Such risks may affect Israel’s
ongoing war with Hamas and prospects for a cease-fire, as well as its overall military and
self-defense capacity.
• Iran. How Iran perceives that its responses, including to the killing of a key allied leader
in its capital just after its new president took office, may strengthen or weaken its
capacity to deter future Israeli military operations against it or its partners.
• Hamas. What the implications are of Haniyeh’s reported killing for Hamas’s approach to
cease-fire and hostage negotiations with Israel, and for Hamas’s broader objectives in
Gaza, the West Bank, and the wider region.
• Hezbollah. Whether Hezbollah’s military options and capabilities would strengthen its
deterrence of Israel or magnify the threat of escalation, when considered alongside the
group’s relations with Iran and its own future as a militia and political party in troubled
Lebanon.
Issues for Congress
In assessing potential legislative and oversight options, Congress may consider the following.
U.S. Support for Israel and Other Partners
Escalation could have political-military implications for Israel and other U.S. partners in the Middle East,
and affect bilateral and multilateral U.S. coordination efforts regarding regional security. Israel may face
challenges in maintaining military strength vis-à-vis Gaza, Lebanon, and the West Bank, while also facing
threats or potential threats from Iran and Iran-backed actors in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. Hezbollah’s battle-
tested militia, proximity to Israel, and large arsenal of drones, rockets, and missiles appears to pose a
considerably greater sustained threat to Israel than Hamas does.
Congress and the Biden Administration may consider the nature of Israeli operations and any potential
shortfalls in Israel’s defense capacity and stockpiles when weighing future direct U.S. involvement in
Israel’s defense; the movement and use of military assets and personnel to and within the region; and/or
the timing, nature, and volume of arms shipments. After the Golan Heights strike, the White House said
that Israel had a right to respond, while also stating that the United States seeks to avoid broader regional
war. On July 30, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said, “we’ve committed to helping Israel defend itself
for whatever it takes.”
Impact on U.S. Forces/Citizens
Heightened regional conflict may put at further risk thousands of U.S. military personnel deployed to and
near the eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, along with U.S. citizens residing in the region. Prior to
the late July incidents, the U.S. Navy had deployed a 4,000-person Wasp Amphibious Ready Group to the
eastern Mediterranean.
Potential Israel-Hamas Cease-Fire and Gaza Transition
The Biden Administration and some Members of Congress have been actively pushing for an Israel-
Hamas cease-fire and hostage-prisoner exchange (based on a proposal endorsed by the U.N. Security
Council) that they assert could ultimately lead to the end of the war in Gaza, expedite a political and
security transition there, and bolster humanitarian assistance.
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It is unclear whether July 2024 strikes and attacks, including Israel’s possible killing of top Hamas
military leader Muhammad Deif, and reports of general attrition to Hamas’s fighting strength might affect
the timing and terms of a cease-fire deal, and whether a deal (if reached) might help calm regional
tensions more broadly. Egyptian and Qatari officials who help mediate talks have suggested that
Haniyeh’s killing could scuttle or delay the negotiations. A senior Hamas official has remarked, “the
absence of one comrade or another does not change the movement’s compass on any issues.”
Author Information
Jim Zanotti
Clayton Thomas
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Disclaimer
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