Updated June 14, 2024
Hamas: Background, Current Status, and U.S. Policy
Hamas (or the Islamic Resistance Movement) is a
Muhammad Deif, Hamas’s military leader, reportedly
Palestinian Sunni Islamist military and sociopolitical
masterminded the October 7 assault, and apparently are
movement, and a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist
priority targets for Israel (which has assassinated several
organization (FTO). Hamas’s primary base of action and
Hamas leaders over years of conflict). Sinwar, who appears
support is in the Gaza Strip, which it has controlled since
to be Hamas’s key wartime decision-maker, returned to
2007. It also operates in the West Bank and Lebanon, and
Gaza from Israel in 2011 as part of a hostage-prisoner
some Hamas leaders and personnel live and/or work in
swap, after 22 years in prison for the abduction and murder
various Arab countries and Turkey. Hamas reportedly
of two Israeli soldiers and the killing of four Palestinians.
receives material assistance and training from Iran and
Timeline of Key Events
some of its allies, including the Lebanese Shia group
Hezbollah (another FTO). From its inception, Hamas has
1987-2005
Hamas emerges as main Palestinian “rejectionist”
overseen a social welfare network that appears to have
group (with support from Iran and private Arab
aided its popularity among Palestinians while serving as a
sources) by engaging in violent attacks against
conduit for some funding for Hamas military operations.
Israelis; the United States begins subjecting Hamas
On October 7, 2023, Hamas led a surprise assault against
to financial sanctions in 1995 and designates
Israel that killed some 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals
Hamas as an FTO in 1997.
(including 35 Americans) and took around 250 persons
2005
After the second intifada (2000-2005), Israel
hostage (including some Americans)—more than 100 of
unilaterally cedes responsibility for Gaza to the
whom were released in November. The attack’s scope and
PA, but Israel (with Egypt) retains control over
lethality were unprecedented for Hamas. The ensuing
land/sea/air access.
conflict, which has reportedly killed more than 37,000
Palestinians in Gaza, has reshaped Middle Eastern
2006
Hamas wins a majority in Palestinian Legislative
dynamics, with implications for U.S. policy and Congress.
Council election and leads new PA cabinet; Israel,
A Hamas spokesperson has said the group is committed to
United States, and European Union confine
repeating October 7-style attacks against Israel.
interactions and funding to PA President
Origins, Ideology, and Leadership
Mahmoud Abbas.
An outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim
2007
West Bank-Gaza split: Hamas forcibly seizes
Brotherhood, Hamas emerged in 1987 in Gaza during the
control of Gaza Strip; Abbas reorganizes PA
first Palestinian intifada (uprising). After the Palestine
cabinet to lead West Bank; Israel and Egypt
Liberation Organization (PLO) entered into a peace process
impose security-related restrictions on the transit
with Israel that created the Palestinian Authority (PA) to
of people and goods in and out of Gaza.
exercise limited rule in the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas
established itself as an alternative to the secular Fatah
2008-2021
Rounds of major Israel-Hamas conflict in 2008-
movement, which leads the PLO, by violently attacking
2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021 end with little or no
Israeli civilian and military targets. Hamas’s ideology
change to status quo in Gaza; 2011 exchange for
combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic
Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit returns more than 1,000
fundamentalism. Hamas’s 1988 charter committed the
Palestinian prisoners (including Sinwar).
group to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of
2023
Hamas-led October 7 assault begins major
an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine (comprising
ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza.
present-day Israel, the West Bank and Gaza), and included
anti-Semitic rhetoric. Observers differ on the extent of
Military Capabilities and External Support
Hamas’s pragmatism. In 2017, the group publicly released a
statement that Hamas’s conflict is with the “Zionist project”
Hamas’s military capabilities and tactics have steadily
rather than with Jews in general. It also expressed
advanced in sophistication from the rudimentary guerrilla
willingness to accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank
and suicide attacks it initially employed. The group uses a
and Gaza if it results from “national consensus,” but said
range of domestically produced and smuggled weaponry:
Hamas would not recognize Israel’s legitimacy.
rockets and mortars, drones, anti-tank guided missiles, man-
portable air defense systems, and a variety of small arms.
Hamas’s formal leadership structure consists of a 15-
Most of its rockets—the main impetus for Israel’s Iron
member politburo as the group’s primary decision-making
Dome anti-rocket system—are only capable of targeting
entity and a Shura Council that elects the politburo—with
southern Israel, but some can strike Israel’s main
similar structures for the West Bank, Gaza, prisoners in
population centers farther north. Hamas has constructed an
Israel, and the diaspora. Ismail Haniyeh, a former PA
extensive system of tunnels within Gaza that it uses to
prime minister based in Qatar, is chairman of the politburo.
protect and transport personnel and weapons—significantly
Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s leader in Gaza since 2017, and
increasing targeting difficulties for Israeli forces. Since
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Hamas: Background, Current Status, and U.S. Policy
October 7, Israel’s military has degraded Hamas’s
Gaza’s infrastructure. After each round, economic recovery
organized fighting capability, with U.S. estimates of
and reconstruction was minimal—perhaps partly because
reported Hamas manpower dropping from 20,000-25,000 to
some international actors were unsure about the durability
9,000-12,000, but sources suggest Hamas has maintained
of reconstruction and/or wanted to avoid bolstering Hamas.
some resilience by shifting to hit-and-run tactics with
President Joe Biden has surmised that one objective of
smaller groups.
Hamas’s October 7 assault may have been to disrupt
According to the State Department, “Hamas has received
Israel’s improvement of relations with Saudi Arabia. Hamas
funding, weapons, and training from Iran and raises funds
might have sought to reemphasize the importance of Arab
in Persian Gulf countries,” and Iran provides up to $100
popular support for the Palestinian cause to Arab states
million annually in combined support to Palestinian
considering closer relations with Israel. Hamas leaders and
militants. U.S. officials have said that “Iranian leaders did
some observers have suggested other possible objectives for
not orchestrate nor had foreknowledge of” the October 7
the attack, such as bolstering Hamas’s domestic popularity
attacks. In November 2024, the Economist estimated
amid speculation over who might succeed PA President
Hamas’s annual revenue to be more than $1 billion, with
Abbas, securing prisoner releases, and capitalizing on
around $360 million in “taxes” on goods brought into Gaza,
Israeli domestic discord. In cease-fire talks to date, Hamas
and about $750 million from foreign sources. According to
has insisted on a permanent end to conflict, perhaps seeking
the Treasury Department and a U.S.-based expert, these
to maintain influence in Gaza either directly or by
sources include Iran’s government and cryptocurrency
pressuring whatever governing entity may emerge.
exchanges, plus private entities in other regional countries,
It is unclear how the ongoing conflict may affect Hamas’s
including Algeria, Sudan, Qatar, Turkey, and the United
future in Gaza or elsewhere, and whether Hamas or Israel
Arab Emirates. To the extent Israeli military operations
can realize its objectives. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
reduce Hamas’s control over Gaza and its borders, some
Netanyahu has declared Israel’s intent to destroy Hamas
revenue sources could decrease considerably.
military and governing capabilities and recover hostages.
Political Ambition, Control of Gaza, and Popularity
Domestic and international pressures could influence
Israel’s military operations and post
Hamas apparently seeks to play a leading role in the
-conflict plans in Gaza.
Palestinian national movement. In 2006, it won a surprise
U.S. Policy and Options for Congress
victory over Fatah in PA legislative elections, giving it
Major questions for U.S. policymakers include: How can
nominal control over several key PA government ministries
U.S. efforts to counter Hamas and the Iran-led “axis of
as it vied with PA President Mahmoud Abbas (who also
resistance” bolster Israel, the PA, and other U.S. regional
heads Fatah) for power. A Middle East “Quartet” (the
partners while minimizing suffering for Palestinian
United States, European Union, Russia, and U.N. Secretary-
civilians? How should the United States engage with allies
General) urged Hamas to recognize Israel, renounce
or partners—such as Qatar and Turkey—that may host or
violence, and accept previous Israeli-Palestinian
support Hamas and seek to mediate its conflicts? How can
agreements. Hamas refused. After a Saudi-brokered PA
various actors assist Palestinians in Gaza and reestablish
unity government collapsed in 2007, Hamas forcibly seized
post-conflict governance there without empowering Hamas
Gaza, and has since presided over worsening economic and
or its ideology and tactics? Since 2006, Congress and the
humanitarian conditions there as the de facto authoritarian
executive branch appear to have structured certain types of
ruler. Since taking power, Hamas and other groups like
U.S. economic and security assistance partly to help the PA
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have used Gaza to launch
counter Hamas. Congress also has placed conditions and
attacks on Israel, prompting tightened access restrictions
restrictions on U.S. funding to any PA government that
from Israel and Egypt. The PA has countered Hamas’s
Hamas controls, joins, or “unduly influences” (for example,
presence in the West Bank with Israeli and U.S. support.
in P.L. 109-446 and Section 7040(f) of P.L. 118-47).
Media reports since 2022 suggest that Hamas and PIJ, with
Iranian backing, have aided increased militant action in the
The Biden Administration publicly supports an end to
West Bank (where actions by Israeli forces and settlers may
Hamas rule in Gaza, while pressing Israel and other actors
endanger Palestinian civilians) to target Israelis and
to plan for “the day after.” U.S. and Israeli officials also
undermine the PA.
seek the release of hostages. The Treasury Department has
designated many actors for sanctions as Hamas supporters,
The extent of Hamas’s domestic popularity is uncertain.
but may have difficulty limiting fundraising activities
Hamas portrays itself as defending Palestinian national
abroad that bypass the U.S. financial system.
aspirations and Jerusalem’s Muslim holy sites, and is the
preferred faction of at least 20% of Palestinians (in the
In April 2024, Congress enacted the Hamas and Other
West Bank and Gaza, or WBG) in most polls. WBG polls
Palestinian Terrorist Groups International Financing
from late 2023 suggested that the conflict had boosted
Prevention Act (Division M of P.L. 118-50), which requires
Palestinian approval for Hamas; March 2024 polling
the executive branch to impose sanctions on foreign states
showed some drop in popular support.
or persons that provide certain types of support to Hamas,
PIJ, some other groups, or their affiliates. Humanitarian
Armed Conflict with Israel
funding in FY2024 regular and supplemental appropriations
Hamas has pointed to purported Israeli provocations to
is subject to “Gaza oversight” provisions aimed at
justify escalations of violence. During the four rounds of
preventing any diversion, misuse, or destruction of aid.
major conflict before October 2023, Hamas and other
militants launched rockets toward Israeli population
Jim Zanotti, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
centers, and Israeli military strikes largely decimated
IF12549
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Hamas: Background, Current Status, and U.S. Policy


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12549 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED

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