Updated June 3, 2024
Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
The UAF’s need for immediate reinforcements creates
February 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have
pressure to deploy troops with only basic training.
been increasingly challenged to defend against Russian
However, the UAF also needs to train personnel to conduct
advances, given ongoing disadvantages in personnel and a
complex operations and operate advanced weaponry in
less developed defense industry. The UAF has
order to sustain combat operations.
demonstrated flexibility over the course of the conflict to
date, as well as an ability to integrate Western security
Currently, the UAF is also experiencing recruiting
assistance into its military campaigns. Nevertheless, the
challenges. The reported average age of Ukrainian soldiers
UAF continues to face obstacles to sustaining momentum
is around 40 years old, and media reports document an
against Russian forces, including personnel and equipment
apparently increasing resistance among younger Ukrainians
losses. In March 2024 testimony before the Senate Select
to join the UAF. Ukraine passed legislation in April 2024 to
Committee on Intelligence, Director of National
address some recruitment and rotation issues (including
Intelligence Avril Haines assessed, “Ukraine’s retreat from
allowing some prisoners to serve in exchange for a reduced
Avdiivka and their struggle to stave off further territorial
sentence), but Ukrainian officials have yet to implement
losses in the past few weeks have exposed the erosion of
elements of the legislation, including ordering new
Ukraine’s military capabilities.”
conscription or mobilization.
Since early 2022, the Biden Administration and Congress
Additionally, the UAF reportedly struggles to train officers
have supported Ukraine’s defense of its territorial integrity
for staff positions to assist commanders in managing and
against Russia’s invasion. The UAF’s evolving condition
coordinating operations. The lack of trained staff officers
and performance may be of interest to Congress as
has in some cases led to higher-level command staff
Members consider U.S. support for the UAF.
coordinating and managing tactical operations, leading to
centralized and slower decisionmaking.
Personnel
The UAF’s overall performance to date has been bolstered,
Equipment
in part, by high levels of recruitment and motivation. High
The UAF operates a mix of Western and Soviet or early
personnel losses, however, pose a continued challenge to
Russian equipment. This variety of systems complicates
the UAF’s ability to sustain effective operations.
maintenance and standardization. To date, the UAF has
sustained significant equipment losses, apparently leaving
After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the UAF
some UAF units without mechanized or motorized vehicle
gained important combat experience fighting Russian-led
support. The UAF has exhibited resilience in the face of
forces in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk
such losses, in part due to Western security assistance and
(known as the Donbas). In 2022, Ukraine was able to
concerted UAF maintenance efforts.
quickly mobilize these veterans and other volunteers into a
new volunteer Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and
Ukraine has nearly exhausted its supplies of Soviet and
Reserve without the need for lengthy training.
Russian artillery and rocket ammunition, making the UAF
almost entirely reliant on Western assistance for such
Since the beginning of the 2022 war, the UAF has suffered
systems and ammunition. To date, the UAF has
high levels of casualties, lowering force quality. Losses are
demonstrated an ability to use the qualitative advantages
likely higher among regular UAF and Special Forces units,
provided by Western security assistance (e.g., long-range
leading to a greater reliance on TDF and Reserve units.
precision fires) to mitigate Russian quantitative advantages
Many of these TDF and Reserve units also have sustained
in artillery. As of early 2024, however, UAF officials stated
heavy casualties, further increasing the proportion of new
that a shortage of Western artillery ammunition was
recruits needed to regenerate forces.
hampering operations and contributing to Russian advances
(such as capturing the Ukrainian town of Avdiivka).
The UAF faces several challenges in deploying new
personnel. At the time of the invasion, Ukraine did not have
Ukraine’s domestic defense industry produces a wide
a fully developed professional noncommissioned officer
variety of weapons but has been unable to meet the
(NCO) corps, which it previously had been seeking to
country’s full wartime demands. In addition, Russian forces
develop along NATO standards. Due to the high number of
continue to target Ukraine’s domestic defense industry.
trained veterans, many with combat experience, there was
Ukraine’s international partners have begun to take steps to
less of a need for an NCO corps to train new recruits.
help Ukraine strengthen its defense industry capacity
Losses among these veterans have increased the importance
(including through joint production agreements with
of developing a professional NCO corps.
Western defense companies) to help Ukraine meet its long-
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Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
term security needs and reduce its reliance on Western
The UAF command structure appears to be more
security assistance.
centralized than it was earlier in the war. While the UAF
seeks to adopt NATO-style (mission command) principles
Role of U.S. and Western Security
of command, it also exhibits traits of Soviet-style
Assistance
(centralized, top-down) command, particularly among
Since the start of Russia’s 2022 war, the United States has
mobilized officers educated according to Soviet doctrine.
committed more than $51 billion in security assistance to
Additionally, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has
Ukraine. The United States and European allies and
replaced most of the senior UAF leadership and in February
partners also continue to provide training, logistics, and
2024 installed General Oleksandr Syrsky as the new
intelligence support to Ukraine. At the same time, Western
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
officials have repeatedly voiced concerns over potential
Syrsky is reportedly close to President Zelensky, and his
escalation of the conflict, defense industrial production
appointment may indicate a greater alignment of political
capacity challenges, and the availability of funding to
and military decisionmaking.
procure and sustain security assistance.
Russia’s armed forces retain quantitative advantages in
Training
equipment, air support, and electronic warfare. The UAF
The United States and other allies have provided training
has established new units (and reequipped some existing
and advice to the UAF since before Russia’s 2022 invasion.
units) with Western equipment, providing improved
Current training efforts focus on employing and operating
capabilities and survivability.
Western security assistance, basic infantry skills and unit-
level development, and combined arms operations.
Ukrainian officials also note the importance of continued
According to the Department of Defense, since 2022, U.S.
ammunition supplies, especially as fighting remains
and allied nations have trained more than 123,000 UAF
dominated by artillery. In addition, the UAF has identified
soldiers. Training could grow in importance as the UAF
needs in logistics, breaching equipment (such as mine
seeks to replace its losses with mobilized personnel.
clearing), electronic warfare, counter-drone, medical
support, intelligence, and secure communications.
Equipment
In the initial phase of the war, U.S. and European provision
The UAF relies on a core of professional units to conduct
of anti-tank and short-range man-portable air defense
operations and respond to Russian advances. However,
(MANPAD) systems reportedly was crucial for Ukraine’s
losses and exhaustion continue to degrade these units’
resistance to Russia’s invasion. As the war has continued,
capability as they appear increasingly called upon to
Ukraine’s partners have adjusted security assistance to
various positions across the frontline. Some observers
respond to changing conditions and the UAF’s evolving
speculate that overreliance on a few units combined with
needs.
personnel losses may lead to UAF retreats and contribute to
Russian advances.
At the tactical level, the UAF has identified protected
mobility (e.g., armored vehicles and infantry fighting
The UAF has recognized the need to recruit more personnel
vehicles), tanks, and tactical-level fire support (e.g.,
(both to replace losses and to rotate units from the from the
mortars) among its needs. UAF officials express particular
frontline), but Ukraine has yet to implement new
concerns about their reliance on Western supplies of
mobilization or conscription. Training new recruits to
artillery ammunition, and insufficient supplies continue to
replace and expand professional units, as well as officers
force UAF units to ration artillery fire.
for staff positions, could remain a key objective. UAF
officials state they have the capacity and capability to
Ukraine’s air force and air defenses have thus far limited
conduct new recruit training inside Ukraine. The UAF’s
Russian air superiority. Russia retains air superiority in
ability to regenerate forces and maintain force quality
certain regions, however, and continues to target Ukrainian
arguably will be critical to its success.
air defenses. Acquisition of air defense systems remains a
top priority for the UAF, at both the strategic and the
These developments may factor into congressional
tactical levels, to defend against increasing Russian
decisions regarding whether and how to support Ukraine’s
Aerospace Force operations. Ukrainian officials have
defense. Some observers suggest the UAF faces a
emphasized the importance of securing sufficient
deteriorating situation without sustained Western security
ammunition for Ukraine’s air defenses in response to
assistance. Other observers argue that the UAF faces
ongoing Russian strikes against military and civilian
significant hurdles to decisively defeating Russian forces
targets.
regardless of security assistance.
Current Military Performance and
Outlook
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
Affairs
The UAF continues to demonstrate high levels of tactical
flexibility and capability. As fighting shifts into more
IF12150
attritional combat and Russia leverages its advantages in
personnel and artillery, some observers argue the UAF
should focus on sustaining its combat capability and
constructing defensive fortifications.
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Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12150 · VERSION 8 · UPDATED

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