

Updated May 22, 2024

U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine

The United States has been a leading provider of security assistance to Ukraine, particularly since Russia launched its expanded invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Since then, the United States has committed more than \$52 billion in security assistance to support “Ukraine’s efforts to defend itself against Russia’s aggression, secure its borders, and improve interoperability with NATO,” according to the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense (DOD) (see **Table 1**).

FY2022 and FY2023 security assistance packages have been mostly funded via \$48.7 billion in supplemental appropriations. This amount includes \$25.93 billion to replenish DOD equipment stocks sent to Ukraine via Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA; 22 U.S.C. §2318); \$18 billion for DOD’s Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI; P.L. 114-92, §1250); and \$4.73 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF; 22 U.S.C. §2763) for Ukraine and “countries impacted by the situation in Ukraine.” Another \$300 million per year has been provided for USAI in regular FY2022 and FY2023 appropriations, as well as in FY2024 continuing appropriations.

FY2024 security assistance packages are being funded mostly via \$28.8 billion in supplemental appropriations. Division B of P.L. 118-50 includes at least \$13.41 billion to replenish DOD stocks sent to Ukraine via PDA, \$13.77 billion for USAI, and \$1.6 billion in FMF for Ukraine and other affected countries. P.L. 118-50 also established an FY2024 PDA cap of \$7.8 billion.

Like prior Ukraine supplemental appropriations, FY2024 supplemental appropriations also include funds for U.S. European Command operations and related support for the U.S. military. See CRS Insight IN12107, *Department of Defense Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: A Summary*.

Security Assistance Programs

The United States has used security assistance programs and authorities to help build the defensive capacity of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) through train, equip, and advise efforts across multiple spending accounts.

Since August 2021, the United States has been providing defense items to Ukraine via PDA, by which the President can authorize the immediate transfer of articles and services from U.S. stocks, up to a funding cap established in law, in response to an “unforeseen emergency” (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)). Since August 2021, the Biden Administration has authorized 57 PDA drawdowns valued at about \$24 billion (**Table 2**). Since August 2023 most PDA packages have been transferred under previous authorizations, after a DOD review of PDA overvaluations restored up to \$6.2 billion in FY2022 and FY2023 authority.

USAI and FMF procurement packages have included equipment, training, and advisory efforts to strengthen Ukraine’s defensive capabilities (see **Table 3**).

Ukraine also has received assistance pursuant to DOD’s security cooperation authorities, notably Building Partner Capacity (10 U.S.C. §333) and Defense Institution Building (10 U.S.C. §332), as well as International Military Education and Training. Other State Department- and DOD-funded security assistance has supported conventional weapons destruction, border security, law enforcement training, and counter-weapons of mass destruction capabilities.

Table 1. Selected U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, FY2022-FY2024

(in millions of dollars)

	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	Total
Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA)	9,225.0	14,628.0 + previously authorized PDA	400.0 + previously authorized PDA	24,253.0
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative	6,300.0	12,300.0	6,300.0	24,900.0
Foreign Military Financing	1,542.6	77.8	2,000.0	3,620.4
Total	17,067.6	27,005.8	8,700.0	52,773.4

Source: Compiled by CRS, on the basis of ForeignAssistance.gov and Department of State and Department of Defense press releases through May 22, 2024.

Note: For FY2024, the table includes assistance that the Biden Administration has announced as of May 22, 2024, not total appropriated funding (for which, see **Table 3**) or total available PDA (\$7.8 billion).

Table 2. Presidential Drawdowns for Ukraine, FY2021-FY2024

(in millions of dollars)

Fiscal Year	PDA #	Announced Value
2021	1	60.0
2022	2-21	9,225.0
2023	22-47	14,628.0 [822.0]
2024	48-57	400.0 [2,500.0]

Source: Compiled by CRS, on the basis of Department of State and Department of Defense press releases through May 22, 2024.

Note: PDA totals in brackets are the value of announced packages utilizing previously authorized Presidential Drawdown Authority.

Table 3. Selected U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine, FY2016-FY2024

(in millions of dollars)

	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY19	FY20	FY21	FY22	FY23	FY24
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) ^a	80.3	99.0	95.0	70.4	247.9	120.0	1,542.6	77.8	2,000.0
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) ^b	226.5	148.6	195.5	214.8	256.7	275.7	6,300.0	12,300.0	14,072.0

Sources: ForeignAssistance.gov and Department of Defense budget estimates. Table data valid through May 22, 2024.

a. FY2016-FY2023, as obligated; FY2024, as announced by the Department of State.

b. FY2016-FY2021, actuals as reported by the Department of Defense; FY2022-FY2024, as appropriated.

Through the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine, the U.S. Army and National Guard, together with military trainers from U.S. allies, provided training, mentoring, and doctrinal assistance to the UAF before 2022. This training mission was suspended at the outset of Russia's expanded invasion. Subsequently, DOD and U.S. allies resumed training Ukrainian personnel, outside Ukraine, both to operate weapon systems and at the collective unit level.

Provision of Defense Equipment

After Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, the Obama Administration provided Ukraine nonlethal security assistance. In 2017, the Trump Administration announced U.S. readiness to provide lethal assistance to Ukraine.

According to DOD, USAI packages prior to FY2022 provided sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, counter-artillery radars, Mark VI patrol boats, electronic warfare detection and secure communications, satellite imagery and analysis capability, counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS), air surveillance systems, night vision devices, and equipment to support military medical treatment and combat evacuation procedures. Ukraine also has used FMF, as well as some of its national funds, to procure U.S. defense equipment.

According to DOD, U.S. security assistance committed to Ukraine since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion through May 10, 2024, has included the following:

- 40+ High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and ammunition;
- 12 National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS); 1 Patriot air defense battery; other air defense systems; and 21 air surveillance radars;
- 31 Abrams tanks, 45 T-72B tanks and 300+ Bradley infantry fighting vehicles;
- 400 M113 and 189 Stryker Armored Personnel Carriers;
- 2,000+ Stinger anti-aircraft missiles;
- 10,000+ Javelin and 90,000+ other anti-armor systems;
- Phoenix Ghost, Switchblade, and other UAS;
- 198 155 mm and 72 105 mm Howitzers and artillery;
- 227 mortar systems;
- Remote Anti-Armor Mine (RAAM) Systems;
- 9,000+ Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles;
- High-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs) and laser-guided rocket systems;
- 40,000+ grenade launchers and small arms;
- communications, radar, and intelligence equipment; and
- training, maintenance, and sustainment.

The Administration has approved third-party transfers of U.S.-origin defense articles and equipment from several NATO and EU members to Ukraine. Since 2022, NATO

and EU members and other allies have made available at least \$50 billion in security assistance to Ukraine.

Related Legislation

Prior to and immediately following Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine, Congress authorized or proposed increased funding levels for existing security assistance authorities. Congress increased the PDA funding cap (22 U.S.C. §2318(a)(1)) from \$100 million up to \$11 billion for FY2022 via P.L. 117-128, up to \$14.5 billion for FY2023 via P.L. 117-328, and up to \$7.8 billion for FY2024 via P.L. 118-50.

P.L. 118-50 continued provisions from P.L. 117-328 that require the Secretaries of State and Defense to report to Congress on measures taken to account for the end-use of U.S. weapons transferred to Ukraine. The act also continued a requirement for monthly descriptions of U.S. security assistance provided to Ukraine since February 24, 2022. In addition, P.L. 118-50 appropriated \$8 million for the DOD Inspector General, including the Special Inspector General for Operation Atlantic Resolve, to carry out reviews of DOD activities to execute appropriated funds.

Discussion on Future Assistance

U.S. policy increasingly has recognized the UAF's ability to employ and operate advanced weaponry. Much of U.S. assistance has been focused on providing capabilities that Ukraine's domestic defense industry cannot produce, as well as those that can be immediately deployed on the battlefield to increase the UAF's resilience and ability to sustain combat operations. One key focus at present is securing and backfilling ammunition (both artillery and air defense). In addition, the UAF says it continues to need advanced rocket and missile systems, protected mobility assets (such as armored vehicles), communication, and intelligence support. Ukrainian officials have sought to acquire other advanced systems, including more Western battle tanks, fighter aircraft, long-range missiles, and additional air defense capabilities.

Increasingly, the provision of security assistance to Ukraine has focused on improving the UAF's medium- to long-term capabilities, including sustainment, transitioning to NATO standard weaponry, and the development of Ukraine's domestic defense industry. Debate continues about U.S. assistance to Ukraine, Ukraine's warfighting prospects amid renewed Russian offensives, potential for escalation, and the ability of the U.S. defense industrial base to supply growing demands.

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