May 21, 2024
Russia’s Nuclear Weapons
Russia presents an “acute threat” to the United States and
weapons. Russia has rejected U.S. efforts to negotiate limits
its allies, according to the 2022 National Defense Strategy.
on Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons, describing these
The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, a Biden Administration
weapons as an offset to U.S. and NATO conventional
review of U.S. nuclear policy, states:
superiority. The State Department estimated in 2024 that
the Russian military has between 1,000 to 2,000 nuclear
Russia remains the U.S. rival with the most capable
warheads for nonstrategic weapons; nongovernmental
and diverse nuclear forces. Today it is unique in the
organizations attribute 1,558 warheads to these systems.
combination of strategic and non-strategic nuclear
forces it fields that enables nuclear employment
Russian officials have expressed concerns about the
ranging from large-scale attacks on the [U.S.]
survivability of Russian strategic nuclear forces, given
homeland to limited strikes in support of a regional
advances in U.S. long-range conventional strike and missile
military campaign [in the Euro-Atlantic region].
defenses. In 2018, President Putin announced that Russia
Since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russian
was developing new delivery vehicles, including an ICBM-
mounted hypersonic glide vehicle, a nuclear-powered cruise
President Vladimir Putin has threatened to use nuclear
weapons against the West, stated that Russia has deployed
missile, and a nuclear-capable autonomous underwater
nonstrategic nuclear weapons to its ally Belarus, and
system. According to 2024 testimony of NORTHCOM
Commander General Gregory Guillot, “Russia intends for
declared the suspension of certain Russian obligations
under the New START Treaty that limit U.S. and Russian
these systems to challenge U.S. defenses and guarantee
Russia’s ability to retaliate after a first strike.”
strategic nuclear forces. Congress may choose to examine
U.S. deterrence and risk reduction policy toward Russia.
Doctrine and Employment Plans
Force Structure
According to a 2020 Russian doctrinal document, Russian
nuclear deterrence policy seeks to maintain nuclear forces
According to a recent nongovernmental estimate, Russia
has around 1,710 deployed nuclear warheads based on a
at a “sufficient” level, “guarantees protection of national
triad of strategic delivery vehicles roughly consisting of 326
sovereignty and territorial integrity,” deters aggression, and
enables escalation management, as well as the
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 12 ballistic-
“
missile submarines (SSBNs) with 192 submarine-launched
termination” of adversary “military actions” on conditions
“acceptable” to Russia.
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and 58 strategic bombers.
The document adds that the
Russian President could authorize nuclear weapons
Russia has not exchanged official data with the United
States about the structure of its strategic nuclear forces
employment in scenarios that include “the arrival of reliable
since 2023. Russian officials have stated, however, that
data” about a ballistic missile attack against Russian or
allied territory, the use by an adversary of “nuclear and
Russia continues to abide by New START limits, thus
other weapons of mass destruction”
maintaining rough parity with U.S. strategic nuclear forces.
against Russia or an
According to one nongovernmental estimate, the United
ally, “adversary actions” on “government or military”
States has around 1,770 deployed nuclear warheads.
targets that could affect Russia’s ability to retaliate with
nuclear weapons, and “aggression against [Russia] with the
Russia is concluding a modernization of its strategic nuclear
use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the
state is in jeopardy.”
forces that focuses in particular on the development of the
SS-X-29 (Sarmat) heavy ICBM, the SS-27 Mod 2 (Yars)
ICBM, and the Dolgorukiy (Borei) class SSBN, according
Russian political and military leaders have articulated a
“strategic deterrence” concept that combines nonmilitary
to a 2024 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessment.
Russia deploys the majority of its strategic nuclear
means, nonnuclear capabilities, and nuclear weapons into a
warheads on ICBMs. A separate Russian military service,
spectrum of continuous actions aimed at deterrence,
escalation management, and warfighting. (See CRS In
the Strategic Rocket Forces, commands these silo-based
and mobile ICBMs. Russia can field most of its ICBMs and
Focus IF11625, Russian Armed Forces: Military Doctrine
all of its SLBMs with multiple warheads on each missile,
and Strategy.) According to the U.S. intelligence
community’s
according to a nongovernmental source.
2024 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA),
“Russia is expanding and modernizing” its dual-capable
systems “because Moscow believes [they] offer
Russia also has a variety of dual-capable systems (which
options to
deter adversaries, control the escalation of potential
are able to use conventional or nuclear warheads), including
precision strike missiles, of various ranges and modes of
hostilities, and counter U.S. and Allied conventional
forces.”
launch, that are not limited by any arms control agreements.
Western studies of authoritative Russian military
writings depict several different variants of “ladders”
The Russian military could deploy these systems with
nuclear warheads, enabling their use as nonstrategic nuclear
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Russia’s Nuclear Weapons
involving steps with dual-capable systems the Russian
President Biden has raised concerns that President Putin
military could take to deter or manage escalation.
may use nuclear weapons. In addition, the 2024 ATA states,
“Russia’s inability to achieve quick and decisive battlefield
The Russian military plans for the use of military force
wins, coupled with Ukrainian strikes within Russia,
through a system of “strategic operations.” According to
continues to drive concerns that Putin might use nuclear
nongovernmental sources, some of these operations may
weapons.” The 2024 DIA assessment also notes that “an
foresee large-scale as well as limited use of nuclear
existential threat to the Russian state is cited in Russian
weapons. Other strategic operations may provide Russia
doctrine … as justification for nuclear use, and the West
with flexible coercive options below the nuclear threshold.
cannot completely discount the possibility of Russia using
According to General Guillot’s 2024 testimony, Russia
nuclear weapons in Ukraine.”
could employ nonnuclear precision missiles and cyber
capabilities “to strike Western economic and military
The war in Ukraine will have implications for Russia’s
infrastructure in an attempt to degrade our political will and
doctrine. The attrition of Russia’s ground forces during the
compel negotiations to terminate an escalating conflict.”
war in Ukraine raises the prospect that “Moscow will be
more reliant on nuclear and counterspace capabilities for its
Russian Coercive Signaling Since 2022
strategic deterrence,” according to the 2024 ATA. In 2024,
Since February 2022, President Putin has invoked Russia’s
U.S. officials also expressed concern about Russia’s plans
nuclear weapons in an apparent attempt to deter Western
to launch a nuclear-armed satellite into space.
military intervention against Russia in Ukraine. According
to the 2024 ATA, “Russia almost certainly does not want a
Arms Control and Strategic Stability
direct military conflict with U.S. and NATO forces.”
In February 2023, President Putin announced that Russia
Russian nuclear signaling also has included announcements
would suspend its participation in the 2010 New START
of increased nuclear readiness, exercises, and missile tests.
Treaty, an arms control agreement that limits U.S. and
Some experts in Russia have called for limited nuclear
Russian strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 800 and
strikes and changes to doctrine, arguing that Russian
warheads actively deployed on these delivery vehicles to
nuclear threats have not deterred Western military aid to
1,550 each. Russian officials have said Russia would
Ukraine. According to a 2024 DIA assessment,
maintain treaty limits but discontinue on-site inspections
and data exchanges. (See CRS Report RL33865, Arms
Following a period of heightened nuclear rhetoric
Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and
from senior Russian leaders in late-2022, Putin has
Agreements.) In a 2024 report to Congress, the State
downplayed the possibility of a nuclear conflict in
Department stated that, while the United States “cannot
subsequent speeches and noted he saw no need to
certify” that Russia is compliant with New START, the
change Russia’s nuclear doctrine.
department “does not determine” at present that “Russia’s
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated in April
noncompliance” “threatens national security interests.”
2024 that Russia deployed “several dozen” nuclear
As a result of Russia’s war in
weapons to Belarus. Media reports suggest that Russia
Ukraine, the United States
stationed nuclear-capable SS-26 (Iskander) short-range
and Russia have not met in a Strategic Stability Dialogue
ballistic missiles to Belarus and trained Belarusian pilots on
aimed at discussing future arms control since January 2022.
aircraft certified for carrying nuclear weapons. The DIA
Biden Administration officials have said since 2023 that the
assessed in 2024 that Russia has “expanded its nonstrategic
United States is willing to return to talks with Russia
“without preconditions.” However, President Putin stated in
nuclear weapons posture” in Belarus. The DIA report
further stated that “Putin claims warheads were delivered to
February 2024 that Russia would not discuss arms control
while the United States seeks to inflict “strategic defeat” on
Belarus in June” 2023, but noted that “the new location
does not extend the range of Russia’s ability to deploy
Russia by providing military aid to Ukraine.
nonstrategic nuclear weapons.”
President Putin may choose to completely withdraw from
Russia may continue its nuclear signaling to the West as the
New START or build up Russian nuclear forces after New
war in Ukraine progresses. In May 2024, Russian officials
START expires in February 2026. One nongovernmental
announced exercises involving nonstrategic nuclear
estimate suggests that Russia holds 1,112 strategic nuclear
weapons, noting separate statements by French and U.K.
warheads in reserve. Russia could mount some of these
leaders about, respectively, the possibility of Western
warheads onto its ICBMs or SLBMs. The United States
troops in Ukraine and the use of Western systems in
holds 1,938 warheads in reserve, according to a
Ukrainian strikes on targets in Russia.
nongovernmental estimate. The Congressional Commission
on the U.S. Strategic Posture proposed in its 2023 report
that the United States “p
Russia also may choose to signal to the West through
repare to upload some or all” of its
threats or demonstrations of nuclear testing. President Putin
reserve warheads in response to the emerging “two-nuclear-
peer” threat from Russia and China.
noted the possibility of nuclear tests in February 2023, and
Congress may consider
Russia withdrew its ratification of the Comprehensive Test
some of the commission’s other recommendations for U.S.
Ban Treaty (CTBT) in November 2023. Russia maintains a
nuclear and conventional deterrence capabilities,
nuclear testing capability at its Novaya Zemlya test site in
cooperation with allies, and risk reduction with adversaries.
the Arctic.
(See CRS In Focus IF12621, Congressional Commission on
the U.S. Strategic Posture.)
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Russia’s Nuclear Weapons

IF12672
Anya L. Fink, Analyst in U.S. Defense Policy


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