Updated May 16, 2024
Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
The U.S. President has sole authority to authorize the use of
systems provide “unambiguous, reliable, accurate, timely,
U.S. nuclear weapons. This authority is inherent in his
survivable, and enduring” warning about attacks on the
constitutional role as Commander in Chief. The President
United States, its allies, and its forces overseas. If these
can seek counsel from his military advisors; those advisors
capabilities identified an attack or an anomalous event, the
are then required to transmit and implement the orders
President would participate in an emergency
authorizing nuclear use. But, as General John Hyten, then
communications conference with the Secretary of Defense,
the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other military
(STRATCOM), noted, his job is to give advice, while the
advisors. They would offer the President details and an
authority to order a launch lies with the President.
assessment of the possible incoming attack, while the
STRATCOM commander would explain the President’s
General Mark Milley, then the Commander of the Joint
options for a retaliatory attack.
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), made a similar point in a memo he
provided to Congress in September 2021. He noted that he
The President would then evaluate and respond to this
is a part of the “chain of communication,” in his role as the
information and decide whether to authorize the use of U.S.
President’s primary military advisor, but he is not in the
nuclear weapons. He would communicate his choices and
“chain of command” for authorizing a nuclear launch. He
provide this authorization through a communications device
also noted that, if the President ordered a launch, the CJCS
known as the nuclear “football”—a suitcase carried by a
would participate in a “decision conference” to authenticate
military aid who is always near the President. The suitcase
the presidential orders and to ensure that the President was
is equipped with communication tools and a book with
“fully informed” about the implications of the launch.
prepared war plans for certain targets. The President could
choose from these prepared plans or, time permitting, ask
The President, however, does not need the concurrence of
STRATCOM to prepare an alternative.
either his military advisors or the U.S. Congress to order the
launch of nuclear weapons. Neither the military nor
If the President did choose to respond with a nuclear attack,
Congress can overrule these orders. As former
he would identify himself to military officials at the
STRATCOM Commander General Robert Kehler has
Pentagon with codes unique to him. These codes are
noted, members of the military are bound by the Uniform
recorded on an ID card, known as the “biscuit,” that the
Code of Military Justice “to follow orders provided they are
President carries at all times. Once identified, he would
legal and have come from competent authority.” But
transmit the launch order to the Pentagon and
questions about the legality of the order—whether it is
STRATCOM. The Secretary of Defense would possibly
consistent with the requirements, under the laws of armed
contribute to the process by confirming that the order came
conflict (LOAC), for necessity, proportionality, and
from the President, but this role could also be filled by an
distinction—are more likely to lead to consultations and
officer in the National Military Command Center at the
changes in the President’s order than to a refusal by the
Pentagon. STRATCOM would implement the order by
military to execute the order.
preparing to launch the weapons needed for the selected
option. According to Bruce Blair, an expert on U.S.
The Nuclear Command and Control
command and control, once the order is “transmitted to the
System (NCCS)
war room, they would execute it in a minute or so.” If an
According to the Department of Defense’s Nuclear Matters
immediate response was selected, “the (land-based)
Handbook, the elements of the nuclear command and
Minuteman missiles will fire in two minutes. The
control system (NCCS) “support the President, through his
submarines will fire in 15 minutes.” Blair also noted that
military commanders, in exercising presidential authority
there is no way to reverse the order.
over U.S. nuclear weapons operations.” The system relies
on “a collection of activities, processes, and procedures
Options for Nuclear Use
performed by appropriate military commanders and support
Because this system was designed during the Cold war, it
personnel that, through the chain of command, allow for
was, as former director of the CIA General Michael Hayden
senior-level decisions on nuclear weapons employment.”
noted, “designed for speed and decisiveness. It’s not
Specifically, the NCCS provides the President “with the
designed to debate the decision.” Long-range missiles
means to authorize the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis
attacking the United States from Russian territory could
and to prevent unauthorized or accidental use.”
reach U.S. territory in around 30 minutes; sea-based
systems deployed closer to U.S. shores might arrive in half
The NCCS collects information on threats to the United
that time. If the United States wanted to retaliate before
States, communicates that information to the President,
U.S. weapons, or, more importantly, the U.S. command and
advises the President on response options, communicates
the President’s chosen response to the forces in the field,
control system, were degraded by an attack, then the entire
process of identifying, assessing, communicating, deciding,
and controls the targeting and application of those forces.
and launching would have to take place in less than that
Within this system, radars, satellites, and processing
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Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces
amount of time. Given that some time would be needed for
Congress before launching nuclear weapons in less extreme
mechanical or administrative steps, analysts estimate that
circumstances.
the President would have less than 10 minutes to absorb the
Some analysts outside the U.S. government have also
information, review his options, and make his decision.
questioned whether the United States should retain the
During the Cold War, U.S. doctrine argued that, to deter a
option to launch nuclear weapons promptly because, they
Soviet attack, the United States would need to be able to
argue, the time pressures could lead to the accidental or
retaliate even if the Soviet Union launched a massive attack
inadvertent start of a nuclear war. They note that the United
with little warning. Hence, the United States planned for
States received false warning of nuclear attack several times
scenarios where the Soviet Union deployed thousands of
during the Cold War, and if the President had responded to
nuclear warheads that could reach the United States. The
that warning within the 30-minute time line of a nuclear
short time lines and preplanned responses provided the
attack, it would have triggered global nuclear war. If the
President with the option to launch U.S. weapons before
President could not launch the weapons in such haste, he
most of the attacking warheads detonated on U.S. soil.
would necessarily have the time to wait for more accurate
or less ambiguous information.
But, even during the Cold War, an attack or anomalous
event was not the only possible scenario for the start of a
Others, however, argue that there is nothing inherently
nuclear war, and a massive U.S. response launched in under
destabilizing or dangerous in the prompt launch options.
30 minutes was not the only option available to the
The President has options to delay a response and await
President. If the nuclear war escalated out of a conflict in
additional information. In addition, even in the current
Europe, or if the Soviet Union launched a more measured
security environment, a President and his advisors would be
attack, the President might have more time to assess the
unlikely to interpret ambiguous warning information as
threat and determine his response. Moreover, because U.S.
evidence of an all-out attack from Russia or another nation.
bombers could fly away from their bases earlier in a crisis
Instead, they note that the presence of both prompt and
or conflict and U.S. submarine-based missiles might
delayed options bolsters deterrence by providing the
survive an attack on U.S. territory, the President could
President with the flexibility to choose the appropriate
decide to delay the U.S. response. Nevertheless, some
response to an attack on the United States or its allies.
analysts have speculated that a launch under attack was the
dominant option during the Cold War, and that the
Legislation
command and control system was designed to permit such a
H.R. 669 and S. 1186, Restricting First Use of Nuclear
prompt launch of U.S. nuclear weapons.
Weapons Act of 2023.
The United States has reviewed and revised its nuclear
H.R. 669 and S. 1148, Restricting First Use of Nuclear
employment plans several times since the end of the Cold
Weapons Act of 2021.
War. According to unclassified reports, these reviews have
H.R. 2603 and S. 1219, To Establish the Policy of the United
added options to the plans available to the President. While
States Regarding the No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons.
some options probably still provide responses to an attack
from a nation, like Russia, with a large nuclear force, others
H.R. 8902, To Direct the Secretary of Defense to Notify
might provide for more measured and discriminate attacks.
Congress Before Carrying Out an Order to Use a Nuclear
In addition, even though the plans likely include options for
Weapon Without a Declaration of War by Congress.
a prompt response in the face of an unexpected attack, they

also likely have options for delayed responses. As a result,
although the prompt launch options may have dominated
CRS Products
U.S. planning during the Cold War, they may no longer
CRS Report RL33640, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background,
dominate U.S. nuclear war plans.
Developments, and Issues, by Amy F. Woolf.
Another scenario could see the United States choose to use
nuclear weapons prior to a nuclear attack against the United

States or its allies, on a time line that did not reflect an
Other Resources
imminent nuclear attack against the United States. The
DOD, Nuclear Matters Handbook, April 2020, chapter 2.
United States has never declared a “no first use” policy, and
the President could order the first use of nuclear weapons.
Jeffrey Lewis, “U.S. presidents are currently given a four-
As noted above, his military advisors may seek to adjust his
minute window to decide whether or not to initiate an
orders to meet the laws of armed conflict, but there is,
irreversible apocalypse,” Foreign Policy, August 5, 2016.
otherwise, no legal barrier to first use.
Peter Huessy, “The Prompt Launch Scare,” Real Clear Defense,
November 9, 2016.
In recent years, some Members of Congress and analysts
outside government have questioned whether the
Commander-in-Chief should have the sole authority to
This In Focus was originally authored by Amy F. Woolf,
launch a nuclear attack in all circumstances. They agree that
Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy.
the President would not have the time to consult with
Congress or seek approval from other officials if the United
Anya L. Fink, Analyst in U.S. Defense Policy
States were under attack with nuclear weapons. But, in an
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
environment where the threat of a massive nuclear attack
IF10521
seems more remote than during the Cold War, they argue
that the President could take the time to consult with
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Defense Primer: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10521 · VERSION 13 · UPDATED

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