Updated May 7, 2024
Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues
U.S. policy toward Taiwan (which also calls itself the
structure, including the extension of compulsory military
Republic of China or ROC) has long prioritized the
service from four months to one year (implemented
maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
beginning in 2024) and the expansion of reserve, civil
The United States supports Taiwan’s efforts to deter the
defense, and territorial defense capabilities. Taiwan’s
People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) from using
defense relationship with the United States also confers
force to gain control of the archipelago, which the PRC
political and military advantages.
claims as its territory. The U.S. government has also sought
Taiwan faces an increasingly asymmetric power balance
to strengthen its own ability to deter PRC military
across the Strait. The Communist Party of China’s military,
aggression in the Pacific. The PRC, for its part, claims the
United States uses Taiwan as a “pawn” to undermine and
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has undergone a
decades-long modernization program focused primarily on
contain China. Congress and the President have enacted
developing the capabilities needed to annex Taiwan. Some
legislation aimed at strengthening U.S.-Taiwan defense ties.
observers assess that the PLA is, or soon will be, able to
A key challenge for U.S. policymakers is supporting
Taiwan’s defense
execute a range of military campaigns against Taiwan. The
without triggering the conflict that U.S.
PLA trains for operations such as missile strikes, seizures of
policy seeks to prevent. For more information, see CRS
Taiwan’s small outlying islands, blockades, and—the
Report, Taiwan Defense Issues for Congress.
riskiest and most challenging campaign for the PLA—an
Figure 1. Taiwan
amphibious landing and takeover of Taiwan’s main island.
Taiwan also faces defense challenges at home. Civil-
military relations are strained for historical, political, and
bureaucratic reasons. The archipelago’s energy, food,
water, internet, and other critical infrastructure systems are
vulnerable to external disruption. According to some
observers, Taiwan’s civil defense preparedness is
insufficient, and its military struggles to recruit, retain, and
train personnel. At a societal level, it is not clear what
costs—in terms of economic security, physical safety and
security, and lives—Taiwan’s people would be willing or
able to bear in the face of possible PRC armed aggression.
Biden Administration officials state that a PRC invasion of
Taiwan is “neither imminent nor inevitable.” In 2023, U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency Director William J. Burns said
PRC leader Xi Jinping had instructed the PLA “to be ready

by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion. Now that does
Source: Graphic by CRS.
not mean that he’s decided to conduct an invasion in 2027
or any other year. But it’s a reminder of the seriousness of
Taiwan’s Security Situation
his focus and his ambition.”
Taiwan’s leaders have tasked Taiwan’s technologically
advanced military with deterring—and if necessary,
PRC Gray Zone Pressure Against Taiwan
defeating—PRC military aggression. Taiwan enjoys
The PLA engages in persistent non-combat operations that
strategic advantages, including geography and climate. The
some analysts say are eroding Taiwan’s military advantages
Taiwan Strait is some 70 nautical miles (nm) wide at its
and readiness. Such “gray zone” actions include:
narrowest point, and some 220 nm wide at its widest.
• large and increasingly complex exercises near Taiwan;
Weather conditions make the Strait perilous to navigate at
•
certain times of the year. Taiwan’s mountainous terrain and
near-daily air operations in the vicinity of Taiwan,
densely populated coast are largely unsuitable for
including frequent sorties across the so-called “median
amphibious landing and invasion operations. Taiwan’s
line,” an informal

north-south line bisecting the Strait that
leaders since 2017 have grown the defense budget; from
PLA aircraft rarely crossed prior to 2022;
2019 to 2023, spending increased by an average of nearly
• routine naval patrols across the median line, some as
5% per year, and as a percentage of GDP increased from
close as 24 nm from Taiwan’s main island;
2% to 2.5%. Defense spending is set to increase again in
• unmanned combat aerial vehicle flights near and
2024, albeit at a slower rate. In 2022, Taiwan’s president
encircling Taiwan; and
announced a “realignment” of Taiwan’s military force
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Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues
• stepped-up air and maritime activities near Kinmen—an
standing policy encourages restraint by Beijing and Taipei
outlying island administered by Taiwan near the PRC
and incentivizes Taipei to invest more in its own defense.
coast—including reported flights of unmanned aerial
Successive U.S. administrations have encouraged Taiwan to
vehicles in the airspace over Kinmen in 2022 and an
pursue an “asymmetric” strategy to make it prohibitively
increase in coast guard patrols around Kinmen “to
strengthen law enforcement inspections” since a February
costly for the PRC to annex Taiwan by force. This approach
envisions Taiwan investing in capabilities intended to
2024 clash between Taiwan’s coast guard and a PRC
cripple an amphibious invasion through a combination of
vessel that left two PRC citizens dead.
anti-ship missiles, naval mines, and other similarly small,
The PRC government often ramps up such activities
distributable, and relatively inexpensive weapons systems.
following high-profile engagements between senior U.S.
Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party government has
policymakers and Taiwan leaders.
adopted this approach to some extent, but some (including
many stakeholders in Taiwan’s defense establishment)
The normalization of PLA operations ever closer to
argue that Taiwan must continue to invest in conventional
Taiwan’s islands in peacetime could undermine Taipei’s
capabilities (e.g., fighter jets and large warships) to deter
ability to assess whether the PLA is using “routine”
PRC gray zone coercion short of an invasion. Uncertainty
operations or exercises to obscure preparations for an
as to whether, how, and for how long Washington might aid
attack. PLA use of such operations as cover for an attack
Taiwan in the event of an attack informs these debates.
could significantly shorten the time Taiwan has to respond.
Gray zone activities also provide the PLA with training and
Arms Transfers
intelligence-gathering opportunities. They strain Taiwan’s
Over the past seven decades, Taiwan has consistently been
forces, which face growing operational and maintenance
one of the largest purchasers of U.S. defense equipment
costs associated with responding to PLA activities. Some
through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. Some
observers assess Beijing uses these coercive but nonviolent
observers argue Taiwan’s military is insufficiently equipped
operations to sow doubt in Taiwan’s people about Taiwan’s
to defeat a PRC armed attack. Further, some observers
military capabilities and to create political pressure for
argue the war in Ukraine has revealed problems with the
Taipei to acquiesce to Beijing’s insistence on unification.
U.S. defense industrial base, raising concerns about defense
U.S. Support for Taiwan’s Defense
suppliers’ ability to produce and deliver weapons to Taiwan
in a timely fashion. In part as a response to these concerns,
The United States has maintained unofficial defense ties
Congress recently took steps to increase and expedite arms
with Taiwan since 1980, when President Carter terminated
transfers to Taiwan, including but not limited to:
a 1954 U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty. (The United States
terminated diplomatic relations with Taiwan and withdrew
• Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The Taiwan
its military personnel in 1979.) The robust defense
Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA; Title LV, Subtitle A
relationship includes arms transfers; routine bilateral
of the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization
defense dialogues and planning; and training activities in
Act for FY2023, P.L. 117-263) for the first time
both the United States and Taiwan, including, since 2023,
authorized the provision of FMF (essentially, loans or
using International Military Education and Training (IMET)
grants a foreign government may use to purchase U.S.
funds. Experts assess that U.S.-Taiwan defense relations
arms) for Taiwan, although Congress did not
have substantially contributed to Taiwan’s ability to deter
appropriate the authorized grants. The State Department
PRC military aggression.
in 2023 notified Congress of its intent to obligate $135
million for FMF for Taiwan using other authorities. The
U.S. Strategy and Policy
Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L.
The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C.
118-47) makes available not less than $300 million in
§3301 et seq.) was the first law to provide a legal basis for
FMF for Taiwan. Emergency supplemental
U.S. support for Taiwan’s defense following the
appropriations for FY2024 (P.L. 118-50) include an
termination of diplomatic relations. Among other things,
additional $2 billion for FMF for the Indo-Pacific;
the TRA states that it is U.S. policy to “make available to
Taiwan could be a recipient.
Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such
quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain
Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA). TERA
a sufficient self-defense capability” and “to maintain the
amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or
§2318(a)(3)) to make PDA available to Taiwan for the first
other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security,
time, authorizing the provision to Taiwan of up to $1 billion
or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” annually in defense articles, services, and education and
from U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) stocks. In July
The TRA does not require the United States to defend
2023, the Biden Administration notified Congress of its
Taiwan, but by stating it is U.S. policy to maintain the
intent to exercise this authority to transfer $345 million of
capacity to do so, the TRA creates “strategic ambiguity”
defense equipment to Taiwan. P.L. 118-50 appropriated
about potential U.S. actions in the event of a PRC attack.
$1.9 billion for the replacement of DOD stocks transferred
Some observers, including some Members of Congress,
to Taiwan via PDA and for reimbursement of DOD defense
advocate making a formal commitment to defend Taiwan.
services and military education and training provided to
Supporters of a shift to “strategic clarity” argue such clarity
Taiwan or to countries that “provided support to Taiwan at
is necessary to deter an increasingly capable and assertive
the request of the United States.”
PRC. Supporters of strategic ambiguity argue the long-
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Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues

IF12481
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs


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