Updated April 24, 2024
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy
Since 2005, the United States has imposed targeted
Drug Trafficking-Related Sanctions
sanctions on Venezuelan individuals and entities that have
Treasury has imposed asset blocking sanctions on 11
engaged in criminal, antidemocratic, or corrupt actions. In
individuals and 25 companies with connections to
response to increasing human rights abuses and corruption
Venezuela by designating them as Specially Designated
by the government of Nicolás Maduro, in power since
Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics
2013, the Trump Administration expanded U.S. sanctions to
Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120, Title VIII, as
include financial sanctions, sectoral sanctions, and
amended; 21 U.S.C. §§1901 et seq.).
sanctions on the government. Those sanctions and other
international pressure failed to dislodge Maduro and
Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic
exacerbated an ongoing economic and humanitarian crisis
Actions, Human Rights Violations, and Corruption
caused by government mismanagement and corruption that
In response to increasing repression in Venezuela, Congress
has prompted 7.7 million Venezuelans to flee the country.
enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil
Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. §1701 note).
After the Venezuelan opposition united to run against
Among its provisions, the law required the President to
Maduro in elections due in 2024, the Biden Administration
impose sanctions on those the President identified as
offered sanctions relief to incentivize the Maduro
responsible for significant acts of violence, serious human
government to enable a free and fair electoral process. By
rights abuses, or antidemocratic actions. Congress extended
April 2024, however, the Administration had rolled back
these sanctions authorizations through 2023 in P.L. 116-94.
most sectoral sanctions relief due to Maduro officials’
antidemocratic actions that violated an October 2023
President Obama issued E.O. 13692 to implement P.L. 113-
Maduro-opposition electoral agreement. The 118th Congress
278 in March 2015, and Treasury issued regulations in July
is closely monitoring the electoral process in Venezuela, as
2015 (31 C.F.R. Part 591). The E.O. targets (for asset
well as U.S. policy responses, and could seek to modify
blocking and visa restrictions) those involved in actions or
U.S. sanctions policy.
policies undermining democratic processes or institutions;
serious human rights abuses; prohibiting, limiting, or
Unless otherwise noted, information in this product is from
penalizing freedom of expression or peaceful assembly; and
the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets
public corruption. It includes any person who is a current or
Control (OFAC). The product does not discuss foreign aid
former leader of any entity engaged in any of those
restrictions.
activities, as well as current or former government officials.
Although the sanctions authorities in P.L. 116-94 expired in
Visa Restrictions
December 2023, the President still has the authority to
Since FY2018, the State Department has imposed visa
impose them under E.O. 13692.
restrictions related to corruption or human rights abuses
pursuant to Section 7031(c) of annual Department of State,
Treasury has imposed SDN sanctions on roughly 115
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations
Venezuelans and at least eight entities pursuant to E.O.
acts on 15 Venezuelans. The State Department also has
13692. Those individuals include President Maduro, his
privately revoked the visas of Venezuelans, including those
wife, and his son; Vice President Delcy Rodríguez; Defense
of current Venezuelan officials and their families.
Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez; supreme court judges;
and governors. The Biden Administration has not
Terrorism-Related Sanctions
designated any new individuals or entities to date.
Since 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual
determination (most recently in May 2023) that Venezuela
Additional Financial Sanctions
is not “cooperating fully with United States anti-terrorism
President Trump imposed additional financial sanctions on
efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export
Venezuela in response to the government’s human rights
Control Act (22 U.S.C. §2781). The United States has
abuses and antidemocratic actions. In August 2017,
prohibited all U.S. commercial arms sales and retransfers to
President Trump issued E.O. 13808, which prohibited
Venezuela. U.S. Department of Commerce export controls
access to U.S. financial markets by the Venezuelan
related to Venezuela affect dual-use technology, including
government, including state energy company Petróleos de
expanded restrictions since mid-2020 on sales to military
Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), with certain exceptions intended
end users. In 2008, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.)
to minimize the impact on the Venezuelan people and U.S.
13224, the U.S. Department of the Treasury designated two
interests. In March 2018, President Trump issued E.O.
individuals and two travel agencies in Venezuela as
13827 to prohibit transactions involving the Venezuelan
Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) subject to asset
government’s issuance of digital currency, coin, or token.
blocking sanctions for financially supporting Hezbollah, a
In May 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13835, which
U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization.
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy
prohibited transactions related to purchasing Venezuelan
• issued a six-month general license (G.L. 44) temporarily
debt and any debt owed to Venezuela pledged as collateral.
authorizing transactions involving the oil and gas sector
in Venezuela; and
Broader Sectoral Sanctions
• removed bans on the secondary trading of certain
On November 1, 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13850.
Venezuelan bonds and PdVSA debt and equity.
This E.O. set forth a framework to block the assets of, and
prohibit certain transactions with, any person determined by
U.S. officials warned that the licenses could be revoked if
the Secretary of the Treasury to operate in designated
the Maduro government did not create a process to allow all
sectors of the Venezuelan economy or to engage in corrupt
candidates to run and release wrongfully detained
transactions with the Maduro government.
Americans and Venezuelan political prisoners. By mid-
December, the Maduro government had minimally satisfied
On January 28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, Treasury
those conditions. Nevertheless, in January 2024, OFAC
designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector of the
revoked G.L. 43 after Venezuela’s supreme court upheld a
Venezuelan economy and the Secretary of the Treasury
ban on the candidacy of the opposition’s chosen nominee,
determined the company was subject to U.S. sanctions. The
María Corina Machado. U.S. officials repeatedly warned
E.O. froze all property and interests in property of PdVSA
that G.L. 44 would not be renewed if electoral conditions
subject to U.S. jurisdiction and prohibited U.S. persons
did not improve.
(companies or individuals) from engaging in transactions
with the company. Treasury also sanctioned Venezuela’s
On April 18, the Administration did not renew the oil sector
Central Bank, National Development Bank, and state-
license, citing the Maduro government’s continued
owned gold company, Minerven. Treasury has imposed
“disqualification of candidates” and “harassment and
sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13850 on 22 individuals, 91
repression” of the opposition and civil society as violations
entities, and 47 vessels. The Biden Administration has not
of the Barbados Agreement. Instead, OFAC issued a new
added any individuals, entities, or vessels to this list.
license giving companies 45 days to wind down operations
Sanctions on the Maduro Government
that were authorized by G.L 44. OFAC stated that U.S.
companies may seek specific licenses to work in Venezuela
In August 2019, President Trump issued E.O. 13884,
and that projects underway before G.L. 44 took effect may
freezing the assets of the Maduro government in the United
continue (such as a project to develop natural gas fields
States and within the control of U.S. persons. The order
near Trinidad). In the assessment of some analysts, this
prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with
policy retains U.S. influence over which companies are able
the Maduro government unless authorized by OFAC. E.O.
to participate in Venezuela’s oil and gas sector while
13884 also authorized financial sanctions and visa
providing opportunities for Western companies to recoup
restrictions on non-U.S. persons who assist the Maduro
debts owed by PdVSA through oil-for-debt swaps.
government. There are five individuals and one entity
designated under this executive order, none of which were
Congressional Considerations
designated by the Biden Administration.
Congress has supported U.S. policy aims to support free
and fair elections leading to a return to democracy in
To allow assistance to the Venezuelan people, OFAC
Venezuela. There continues to be broad support for the use
issued licenses authorizing transactions involving the
of targeted sanctions. Bills to reauthorize such sanctions on
delivery of food, agricultural commodities, and medicine;
individuals who engage in corruption, human rights abuses,
remittances; international organizations; and
and/or antidemocratic actions under the Venezuela
communications services. A 2021 Government
Emergency Relief, Democracy, Assistance, and
Accountability Office report found that, despite those
Development (VERDAD) Act (P.L. 116-94, Division J),
licenses, overcompliance with U.S. sanctions had limited
which expired in December 2023, have been reported in the
some humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans.
House (H.R. 6831) and introduced in the Senate (S. 3363).
Biden Administration: Licenses Issued and Revoked
Other introduced legislation would create new election-
related sanctionable offenses (H.R. 5670) and require the
Since 2019, OFAC has issued and amended licenses to
imposition of visa restrictions on current and former
allow certain transactions. The Biden Administration has
Maduro government officials (S. 1129).
issued licenses to encourage the Maduro government to
negotiate a path to free and fair elections. In May 2022,
Members have disagreed on the best way to induce Maduro
OFAC allowed Chevron, the only major U.S. energy
to cede power through elections. Some welcomed the Biden
company still in Venezuela, to discuss future operations
Administration’s decision to ease sanctions in response to
with PdVSA. In November 2022, after negotiations
the Barbados Agreement despite recent setbacks. Others
restarted, OFAC issued a license allowing Chevron to
dismissed sanctions relief for Maduro as concessions to a
resume production and the import and export of petroleum
criminal regime. Some of those critics have introduced
products at its existing joint ventures in Venezuela. On
legislation (e.g., S. 995) that would codify some executive
October 18, 2023, after Maduro and the opposition signed
orders against the Maduro government or any successor
the Barbados Agreement, which included a roadmap toward
government that includes former Maduro officials.
holding competitive elections, Treasury
• issued General License 43 (G.L. 43) authorizing
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
transactions with Minerven, in part to reduce illicit gold
Affairs
trading;
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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy

IF10715


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10715 · VERSION 47 · UPDATED

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