INSIGHTi

Key Bridge Collapse: Critical Infrastructure
Security and Resilience Considerations
April 5, 2024
On March 26, 2024, the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore collapsed due to a cargo ship colliding
with a bridge support tower. The collapse caused loss of life and disrupted numerous critical distribution
functions associated with the Port of Baltimore, and severed a major highway artery. Media reports
suggested that factors contributing to the collapse included absence of adequate protection for bridge
supports from shipping collision impacts and the bridge design, which made the entire structure
vulnerable to the loss of a single support.
The national critical infrastructure security and resilience (CISR) enterprise prioritizes mitigating threats
and hazards such as terrorist bombings, the effects of aging, extreme weather events, and cyberattacks.
Catastrophic accidents are more commonly regarded as matters of industrial or environmental safety,
rather than infrastructure security. However, the collapse of the Key Bridge suggests that safety risks may
also affect infrastructure security and continuity of national critical functions—i.e., the ramming of the
bridge by a large ship had the same effects regardless of intent of the crew. This Insight examines how
major incidents (apparently) not involving malicious intent, such as the Key Bridge collapse, may
evidence broader systemic risks to infrastructure security and resilience that may not be fully considered
within the existing framework of public-private CISR partnerships at the federal and state levels.
Although the risks of catastrophic accidents to critical infrastructure might seem apparent in hindsight, the
federal infrastructure risk management plan for transportation systems (including ports, bridges, and
vessels) did not consider them in depth. Federal and Maryland authorities invested heavily in anti-
terrorism measures in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal
agencies, but regarded a potential accidental collision as being largely hypothetical and cost-prohibitive to
guard against.
A media account published in the wake of the Key Bridge incident detailed years-long risk management
efforts focused on maritime anti-terrorism patrols and structural inspections. A former senior Maryland
Transportation Authority (MDTA) official quoted in the account said, “It never occurred to anybody” that
a ship traversing the narrow channel might lose control and strike a critical support structure. MDTA is an
independent, self-funding state agency that owns and operates certain toll bridges and roads in Maryland,
including the Key Bridge.
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN12344
CRS INSIGHT
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At the federal level, DHS and the Department of Transportation (DOT) jointly manage risk management
partnerships for the Transportation Systems (TS) Sector, which includes roadways, bridges, and ports.
These activities focus on information sharing on security threats and best practices for mitigation, but also
include substantial investments in direct security assistance from DHS and grant funding for state and
local security programs. Federal law mandates certain physical security and cybersecurity requirements
for maritime facilities (enforced by the U.S. Coast Guard), focusing on intentional acts. In February 2024,
the Biden Administration announced an Executive Order “On Safeguarding of Vessels, Harbors, Ports and
Waterfront Facilities of the United States,” which expanded U.S. Coast Guard authorities under 33 C.F.R.
§6. Under the order, the Coast Guard may take direct control of vessels within a designated security zone
“that present a known or suspected cyber threat to U.S. maritime infrastructure,” among other provisions.
In 2023, DHS awarded $1.9 million in grants to Maryland port authorities and facility operators under the
Port Security Grant Program “to implement Area Maritime Transportation Security Plans … and
strengthen security at Maryland ports, including the Port of Baltimore.” The grant program offers $100
million for “state, local and private-sector partners” annually, “to help protect critical port infrastructure
from terrorism, enhance maritime domain awareness, improve port-wide maritime security risk
management, and maintain or reestablish maritime security mitigation protocols that support port
recovery and resiliency capabilities.” Some funds went to MDTA, which has its own police force that it
uses to secure MDTA-operated bridges, highways, and public transport. The police force has an annual
operating budget for FY2024 of nearly $125 million, with $2.3 million of that amount budgeted for Key
Bridge patrols. (Public officials credited MDTA officers for saving lives by blocking vehicle traffic to the
bridge before the ship struck it, and pulling a survivor from the water.)
Ship collision hazards, by contrast, appear to have been a matter of largely local concern to state
transportation authorities. In January 2023, the Delaware River & Bay Authority, which operates the
Delaware Memorial Bridge, announced plans to spend $93 million to build a ship collision protection
system, with $22.5 million of the total provided by a DOT grant. The MDTA Fiscal Year (FY) 2024
Traffic and Toll Revenue Forecast Update briefly listed a three-year construction project—due to begin in
2029—that would have added a fiberglass jacket protection system at the water pier columns of the Key
Bridge. Costs and design details were not provided, and it was not clear whether this system—or any
feasible alternative—would have been sufficient to absorb the impact of the cargo ship.
Although ship and barge collisions with bridges are often reported as rare events arising from unique
circumstances, they are relatively commonplace occurrences. A 2000 study listed 30 major bridge
collapses due to collisions worldwide between 1960 and 1998, costing hundreds of lives in some cases.
Hundreds of other recorded collisions caused partial damage or fatalities. In 1981, a ship collision with
the Sunshine Skyway Bridge in Tampa Bay led to partial collapse of the structure and numerous fatalities.
The incident led to design improvements and development of more rigorous collision safety standards for
new bridges. However, these did not apply to the Key Bridge, which opened in 1977.
Areas for congressional action may include legislation governing implementation of ship collision safety
standards, funding of collision safety improvements, and guidance to federal agencies on infrastructure
risk assessments.

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Author Information

Brian E. Humphreys

Analyst in Science and Technology Policy




Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
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IN12344 · VERSION 2 · NEW

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