Updated April 4, 2024
Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
Cuba remains a one-party authoritarian state with a
out in Havana and throughout the country, with thousands
government that has sharply restricted freedoms of
of Cubans protesting economic conditions (including food
expression, association, assembly, and other basic human
and medicine shortages and blackouts) and the lack of
rights since shortly after the 1959 Cuban Revolution. Over
political freedoms. The government responded with harsh
the past six decades, U.S. policy has generally sought to
measures, including widespread detentions of protesters,
isolate the Cuban government to promote change on the
civil society activists, and bystanders. Hundreds of the July
island and limit Cuba’s ability to engage in malign
2021 protesters have been tried and convicted, and many
activities abroad. Congress has played an active role in
others reportedly have been forced into exile. In response to
shaping U.S. policy toward Cuba, including by enacting
renewed protests in March 2024, the Cuban government
legislation related to U.S. sanctions and appropriating
reportedly took some steps to address food shortages and
funding to support access to information and promote
power outages while implementing short-term internet
democracy and human rights in Cuba.
shutdowns and arbitrarily detaining some protesters. The
human rights group Prisoners Defenders reported that there
Political and Economic Developments
were 1,067 political prisoners at the end of February 2024
Miguel Díaz-Canel succeeded Raúl Castro as president in
(up from 152 on July 1, 2021).
2018 and as head of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) at
its eighth party congress in 2021. Cuba’s National
Increased Cooperation with China and Russia
Assembly elected Díaz-Canel to a second and final five-
Amid Cuba’s domestic challenges, the country has sought
year presidential term in April 2023. The departure of
to increase ties with China and Russia. The Biden
Castro and other older leaders from the PCC’s Politburo
Administration asserts that China has had an intelligence
reflects the generational change in Cuban leadership that
collection facility in Cuba since at least 2019. Some press
began in the early 2000s. While in power from 2006 to
reports suggest that Cuba and China have discussed
2018, Raúl Castro (who succeeded his brother, longtime
additional security cooperation. Cuba also has strengthened
leader Fidel Castro) relaxed restrictions on private
its diplomatic and commercial ties with Russia. Among
economic activities, but his government’s slow, gradualist
other reported agreements, Russia has pledged to deliver
approach did not produce major economic improvements.
32,000 barrels of oil and oil products per day to Cuba and
Cuba adopted a new constitution in 2019 that introduced
Cuba has offered to provide 30-year land concessions to
some reforms but maintained the state’s dominance over the
Russian firms in Cuba.
economy and the PCC’s predominant political role.
U.S. Policy
Socioeconomic Conditions
Since the early 1960s, when the United States imposed a
The Cuban economy has yet to fully recover from the
trade embargo on Cuba, the centerpiece of U.S. policy
economic shutdown associated with the COVID-19
toward the country has consisted of economic sanctions
pandemic. Cuba reported that the economy contracted by
aimed at isolating the Cuban government. The Obama
10.9% in 2020 and grew by 1.3% and 2% in 2021 and
Administration initiated a policy shift away from sanctions
2022, respectively. The Cuban government estimated a
and toward engagement and the normalization of relations.
contraction of 1%-2% in 2023. According to the Economist
Policy changes included the rescission of Cuba’s
Intelligence Unit (EIU), Cuba’s economic output will not
designation as a state sponsor of international terrorism
return to its pre-pandemic level until after 2025. Recovery
(May 2015); the restoration of diplomatic relations (July
reportedly has been slowed by fuel oil shortages due to
2015); and eased restrictions on travel, remittances, trade,
reduced imports from Venezuela, a slower-than-expected
telecommunications, and banking and financial services
return of hard currency-wielding foreign tourists, hurricane
(2015-2016). The Trump Administration reversed course,
damage, continuing distortions and inefficiencies in the
introducing new sanctions in 2017, including restrictions on
centrally planned economy, and the effects of U.S.
transactions with companies controlled by the Cuban
sanctions. A major importer of food, Cuba has struggled
military. By 2019, the Trump Administration had largely
with declining agricultural production and rising global
abandoned engagement and significantly increased
food prices, resulting in shortages and concerns about food
sanctions, particularly on travel and remittances.
insecurity. In late 2023, Cuba made an urgent request to the
In its initial months, the Biden Administration announced it
United Nations for additional food aid for children.
was conducting a review of policy toward Cuba, with
Increased Repression
human rights as a core pillar. In the aftermath of the Cuban
government’s harsh response to the July 2021 protests, the
Beginning in November 2020, the Cuban government
Biden Administration criticized Cuba’s repression and
cracked down on the San Isidro Movement (MSI), a civil
imposed targeted sanctions on those involved, including
society group opposed to restrictions on artistic expression.
financial sanctions on three Cuban security entities and
On July 11, 2021, anti-government demonstrations broke
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview
eight officials, and visa restrictions against 50 individuals
Guard reporting 6,182 interdictions in FY2022 and at least
involved in repressing protesters.
6,897 in FY2023. Repatriation flights of Cubans ordered
removed from the United States, which had largely been
In May 2022, the Biden Administration announced several
suspended by Cuba since 2020, resumed in April 2023.
policy changes aimed at increasing support for the Cuban
people. It expanded immigrant visa processing at the U.S.
As part of its broader efforts to stem irregular migration, the
Embassy in Havana and eased travel restrictions by
Biden Administration has sought to increase legal pathways
reauthorizing scheduled and charter flights to cities beyond
for migrants to enter the United States. In January 2023, for
Havana and reinstating group people-to-people travel (e.g.,
example, the Department of Homeland Security launched a
for educational purposes). It also eased restrictions on
new humanitarian parole program allowing up to 30,000
sending cash remittances by eliminating the dollar and
individuals per month from Cuba and other selected
frequency limits for family remittances and reauthorizing
countries to enter and remain in the United States for two
donative (i.e., non-family) remittances to Cuban nationals.
years with work authorization, subject to sponsorship and
Additionally, the Administration announced plans to
vetting requirements. As of November 2023, nearly 60,000
increase support for Cuban entrepreneurs, including by
Cubans had arrived in the United States under the program.
authorizing access to expanded cloud technology,
application programming interfaces, and e-commerce
118th Congress: Selected Actions on Cuba
platforms and working to expand access to microfinance;
The 118th Congress has continued to shape U.S. policy
many of these changes have yet to be implemented.
toward Cuba through oversight, appropriations, and other
legislation. The explanatory statement accompanying the
U.S. and Cuban officials also have resumed meetings on
Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related
selected issues of bilateral concern that were suspended
Programs Appropriations Act, 2024 (P.L. 118-47, Division
during the Trump Administration. These include the U.S.-
F), designates $25 million for the Office of Cuba
Cuba Law Enforcement Dialogue and semiannual talks to
Broadcasting (OCB) and $25 million for Cuba democracy
review implementation of bilateral migration accords.
programs. The act stipulates that the democracy funding
may not be used to support business promotion, economic
Selected U.S. Sanctions
reform, or entrepreneurship in Cuba. The act also directs
The Biden Administration thus far has opted to maintain
the Secretary of State to report on countries and
several other policies implemented during the Trump
international organizations that are paying the government
Administration, including the following measures.
of Cuba for “coerced and trafficked labor of Cuban medical
professionals” and to impose sanctions on officials from
Transactions with the Cuban Military. In 2017, the State
such countries and organizations, with certain exceptions.
Department published a list of entities controlled by the
Cuban military, intelligence, or security services “with
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
which direct financial transactions would disproportionately
2024 (P.L. 118-31; NDAA) extends through FY2024 a
benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the
prohibition on the use of funds to close or relinquish control
Cuban people or private enterprise.” This “Cuba restricted
of U.S. Naval Station, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The NDAA
list” includes 231 entities (ministries, hotels, businesses).
also requires the Secretary of Defense to report on the
activities of the Russian and Chinese militaries in Cuba,
Travel and Remittances. Since 2019, U.S. restrictions
their potential impact on U.S. national security, and U.S.
have prohibited travel to Cuba by cruise ships and by
policy response options.
private and corporate aircraft. Since 2020, most U.S.
travelers have been prohibited from staying at over 400
Congress has begun to consider the Biden Administration’s
hotels and private residences identified as owned or
FY2025 budget request, which includes nearly $16 million
controlled by the Cuban government.
for OCB and $20 million for democracy programs in Cuba.
Terrorism Designations. On January 11, 2021, pursuant to
Congress also could consider various other legislative
several laws, the Secretary of State redesignated Cuba as a
initiatives related to Cuba that have been introduced in the
state sponsor of international terrorism, citing its harboring
118th Congress. These include bills to ease (e.g., S. 653) or
of several U.S. fugitives and members of Colombia’s
tighten (e.g., S. 504/H.R. 1120) sanctions, codify the state
National Liberation Army. The Secretary of State also has
sponsor of terrorism designation (e.g., H.R. 314/S. 538),
included Cuba on an annual list of countries certified as not
and counter alleged military and intelligence cooperation
cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts, pursuant
between Cuba and China (e.g., S. 3225). Among bills that
to the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. § 2781), since
have advanced, S. 376, passed by the Senate in June 2023,
2020.
would rename the street in front of the Cuban Embassy in
Washington, DC, after Cuban democracy activist Oswaldo
Irregular Migration
Payá, and H.R. 1505, passed by the House in November
Driven by Cuba’s difficult economic conditions and
2023, would modify the bar against U.S. courts enforcing or
political repression, irregular Cuban migration to the United
validating trademarks that were confiscated by the Cuban
States has surged over the past three years. U.S. Customs
government.
and Border Protection encountered more than 200,000
Cuban migrants annually in FY2022 and FY2023, a
Peter J. Meyer, Specialist in Latin American and Canadian
fivefold increase over FY2021. Most of those encounters
Affairs
occurred at the Southwest land border. U.S. maritime
Joshua Klein, Analyst in Foreign Affairs
interdictions of Cubans also have increased, with the Coast
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

Cuba: U.S. Policy Overview

IF10045


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10045 · VERSION 103 · UPDATED

---