April 1, 2024
Congressional Commission on the U.S. Strategic Posture
Congress plays an important role in U.S. nuclear weapons
“opportunistic or simultaneous” Russian and/or PRC
policy through funding and oversight of U.S. strategic
military aggression in Europe and Asia. The report stresses
military capabilities and related programs carried out by the
the importance of U.S. relations with allies and potential
Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of
allied “contributions” to the “broader strategic posture.”
Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
The Senate also considers providing advice and consent to
Nuclear strategy and posture
ratification of arms control treaties negotiated by the
The SPC report endorses a U.S. nuclear strategy “based on
executive branch.
six fundamental tenets—assured second strike, flexible
response, tailored deterrence, extended deterrence and
Congress has periodically created high-level panels to
assurance, calculated ambiguity in declaratory policy, [and]
examine relevant issues. Most recently, Section 1687 of the
hedge against risk.” The report argues that U.S. nuclear
FY2022 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 117-81)
employment planning should be “consistent with the Law
established a 12-member bipartisan commission to
of Armed Conflict,” which prohibits targeting of civilian
“conduct a review of the [U.S.] strategic posture …
populations, and notes that U.S. nuclear weapons should
including a strategic threat assessment and a detailed review
continue to target what U.S. adversaries “value most.”
of nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and force structure and
factors affecting the strategic stability of [U.S.] near-peer
Echoing multiple U.S. Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPRs),
competitors”; assess “benefits and risks” of current U.S.
which is a periodic congressionally mandated executive
nuclear policies and strategic posture; and “make
branch document outlining U.S. nuclear strategy, the SPC
recommendations to the President and Congress” on the
report stresses “the traditional role of nuclear weapons,”
U.S. “long-term strategic posture.”
which includes “deterrence of adversaries, assurance of
[a]llies, achieving U.S. objectives should deterrence fail,
Chaired by former NNSA principal deputy administrator
and hedging against adverse events.” The report argues that
Madelyn Creedon and former Senator Jon Kyl, the
the triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with submarine-
United States (Strategic Posture Commission or SPC) met
launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers,
between July 2022 and August 2023. The SPC’s October
as well as modernized nuclear command and control (NC3),
2023 consensus report outlines the evolving nuclear
is the U.S. strategic posture “foundation for … the
postures from Russia and the People’s Republic of China
foreseeable future.”
(PRC or China) during the 2017-2035 time period and
proposes over 80 recommendations for U.S. defense policy,
The SPC report calls for “fully and urgently executing” the
nuclear and conventional weapons capabilities, the U.S.
current nuclear delivery system and warheads
nuclear weapons complex, and nuclear arms control.
modernization program of record (POR) and highlights the
growing risks to the program’s costs and schedule. The
Findings and Recommendations
report also argues that the current POR is “necessary but
The SPC report argues that the “U.S.-led international
not sufficient” because it does not account for evolving
order” is threatened by “Chinese and Russian authoritarian
Russian and PRC nuclear arsenals. The report offers the
regimes.” This “high-stakes challenge,” the report states,
following “modifications” to the POR:
requires “urgent action” by the executive branch and
• “Prepare to upload [mount on delivery vehicles] some or
Congress to ensure “U.S. vital interests and international
all” of the additional nuclear warheads the United States
stability.”
currently holds in reserve as a “hedge” against
technological or geopolitical risks.
The SPC report posits the emergence of a “two-nuclear-
peer” environment. It describes the evolution of Russian
• Increase the planned procurement of the long-range
and PRC nuclear weapons, as well as their conventional
standoff weapon (LRSO) nuclear-armed air-launched
(nonnuclear), space and counterspace, cyber, electronic
cruise missile, B-21 bombers and related tankers, and
warfare, chemical, and biological capabilities. The report
Columbia class SSBN with Trident SLBM.
also describes regional threats from North Korea and Iran,
•
the challenges of emerging technologies and proliferation,
Plan to deploy the Sentinel ICBM with multiple nuclear
threats to the U.S. homeland from adversarial capabilities
warheads and “pursue the feasibility of fielding” some
and terrorism, and the possibility of strategic surprise.
of these new ICBMs “in a road mobile configuration.”
• Initiate plans for continuous B-21 bomber patrols and
The SPC report argues that an effective U.S. strategic
“accelerate” the development of “advanced
posture needs to account for the possibility of
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Congressional Commission on the U.S. Strategic Posture
countermeasures” to adversary integrated air and missile
“limit all nuclear weapon types” and also pursue “nuclear
defenses (IAMD).
risk reduction measures to increase predictability and
reduce uncertainty.”
To mitigate the risks of modernization delays contributing
to “militarily significant shortfalls in [U.S.] deployed
Reception of Recommendations
nuclear capability,” the SPC report also recommends the
The SPC report received mixed reactions from
United States “exercise upload of ICBM and SLBM
nongovernmental analysts. Some observers have argued
warheads” on current systems, “develop plans and
that the SPC provides a greater “recognition of the
procedures” to reverse the conversion of SLBM launchers
contemporary threat context” than the 2022 NPR. Others
and B-52 bombers implemented in order to meet U.S.-
have asserted that the SPC understates adversaries’ nuclear
Russian strategic nuclear arms control commitments, and
capabilities and called on the United States to suspend
ensure the service life extensions of NC3 and the Ohio class
compliance with New START to enable the upload of
SSBN. The report does not offer cost estimates for any of
additional nuclear warheads.
its proposals.
Some critics have charged that the report does not prioritize
The SPC report also advocates providing the President with
among the potentially competing requirements for
“a range of militarily effective” flexible options to “deter or
conventional and nuclear weapons capabilities. Others have
counter” Russian or PRC “limited nuclear use in theater,”
argued that some SPC recommendations, like mobile
as well as assure U.S. allies. The report argues for theater
ICBMs, are impractical and challenged the SPC’s finding
nuclear capabilities that are prompt and “forward deployed
that current U.S. theater nuclear options provide insufficient
or deployable”; “survivable against preemptive attack
flexibility. Still others have criticized the SPC report for
without force generation day-to-day,” possessing “a range
omitting potential changes to nuclear targeting and weapons
of explosive yield options, including low yield”; and able to
employment guidance. Finally, critics have asserted that the
penetrate adversary IAMD. In congressional testimony,
report not only prioritizes increasing U.S. nuclear weapons
Chairwoman Creedon stated that the SPC sought to avoid
capabilities over diplomacy, but also proposes actions that
endorsing specific systems, though vice-chair Kyl has noted
are inconsistent with U.S. international disarmament
that the proposed nuclear sea-launched cruise missile would
obligations.
meet the requirements.
Issues for Congress
Conventional (nonnuclear) capabilities
The SPC presented its findings to the Senate and House
The SPC report notes the need for a variety of conventional
Armed Services Committees in late 2023. In open hearings,
capabilities to “effectively deter and defeat” a
Members of Congress were generally receptive to SPC
“simultaneous” PRC and Russian act of “aggression in Asia
report findings but sought clarification on
and Europe using conventional forces.” These capabilities
recommendations. Some Members raised concerns about
include long-range, nonnuclear precision strike systems, a
the possible costs of implementing all SPC
“more resilient space architecture,” and an integrated
recommendations; others noted challenges of prioritizing
IAMD to deter and defend against “coercive attacks” on
between investments in conventional and nuclear weapons.
U.S. critical infrastructure. The SPC report argues that
Still other Members emphasized human capital and other
“without these necessary enhancements to the conventional
capacity challenges across the DOD industrial base and
force, an increased [U.S.] reliance on the nuclear deterrent
NNSA complex, particularly the availability of skilled-trade
is likely.”
workers. Some Members also noted the SPC report’s
recommendation for timely congressional funding.
Nuclear weapons industrial base and complex
The SPC report argues for an expansion and “overhaul” of
Members of Congress and committees of jurisdiction
the DOD nuclear weapons defense industrial base and the
covering DOD, NNSA, and the State Department could
NNSA nuclear weapons complex to meet current POR
evaluate some of the SPC report’s recommendations during
needs and address proposed POR modifications, as well as
strategic posture, authorization, appropriation, and
offer flexibility and serve as a hedge against technological
oversight hearings for FY2025 and beyond. SPC report
and geopolitical risks. Among over 20 proposals, the SPC
proposals for potential consideration could include those
report recommends that Congress “forge and sustain
related to nuclear and conventional military capabilities,
bipartisan consensus and year-to-year funding stability” and
and the defense industrial base and nuclear weapons
support programs to support an adequate future workforce.
complex, as well as recommendations concerning arms
control and nonproliferation, such as the implementation of
Risk reduction and arms control
related international treaties and development of monitoring
The SPC report contends that arms control and
and verification technologies. Through intelligence
nonproliferation can “enhance” the “effectiveness” of U.S.
community briefings, Congress could also continue to track
deterrence strategy and notes the “paramount importance”
the evolution of Russian and PRC nuclear and other
of U.S. leadership in efforts “to reduce strategic risks.”
capabilities and intentions to determine possible U.S.
However, the report posits that arms control must follow
responses. Congress may also examine options related to
the U.S. government’s development of a strategy and force
risk reduction engagements with adversaries and initiatives
requirements to address the “two-nuclear-peer threat.” Until
to bolster deterrence with allies.
a “change in the geopolitical environment,” the report adds,
the U.S. government must pursue research on verification to
Anya L. Fink, Analyst in U.S. Defense Policy
https://crsreports.congress.gov

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Congressional Commission on the U.S. Strategic Posture

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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12621 · VERSION 3 · NEW

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