Updated March 14, 2024
Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
develop along NATO standards. Due to the high number of
February 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have
trained veterans, many with combat experience, there was
successfully defended against Russian offensives, despite
less of a need for an NCO corps to train new recruits.
several apparent disadvantages, including fewer personnel
Losses among these veterans have increased the importance
and a smaller domestic defense industry. The UAF has
of developing a professional NCO corps.
demonstrated flexibility over the course of the conflict to
date, as well as an ability to integrate Western security
The UAF’s need for immediate reinforcements creates
assistance into its military campaigns. Nevertheless, the
pressure to deploy troops with only basic training.
UAF continues to face obstacles to sustaining momentum
However, the UAF also needs to train personnel to conduct
against Russian forces, including personnel and equipment
complex operations and operate advanced weaponry in
losses. In March 2023 testimony before the Senate Select
order to sustain combat operations.
Committee on Intelligence, Director of National
Intelligence Avril Haines assessed,
Currently, the UAF is also experiencing growing recruiting
challenges. The reported average age of Ukrainian soldiers
Ukraine’s retreat from Avdiivka and their struggle
is around 40 years old. Ukrainian officials have stated they
to stave off further territorial losses in the past few
intend to implement modified mobilization plans (such as
weeks have exposed the erosion of Ukraine’s
changes in conscription) in the near future. UAF officials
military capabilities with the declining availability
also have announced a personnel review, alleging that too
of external military aid.
many personnel are performing support missions.
Since early 2022, the Biden Administration and Congress
Additionally, the UAF struggles to train officers for staff
have supported Ukraine’s defense of its territorial integrity
positions to assist commanders in managing and
against Russia’s invasion. The UAF’s evolving condition
coordinating operations. The lack of trained staff officers
and performance may be of interest to Congress as
has in some cases led to higher-level command staff
Members evaluate whether to appropriate additional funds
coordinating and managing tactical operations, leading to
to support Ukraine and conduct oversight of U.S. policies
centralized and slower decisionmaking.
and assistance.
Equipment
Personnel
The UAF operates a mix of Western and Soviet or Russian
Some observers assert that the UAF’s overall performance
equipment. This variety of systems reportedly contributes to
to date has been bolstered, in part, by high levels of
diverse capabilities across units but complicates
recruitment and motivation. High personnel losses,
maintenance and standardization. To date, the UAF has
however, pose a continued challenge to the UAF’s ability to
sustained significant equipment losses, apparently leaving
sustain effective operations.
some UAF units without mechanized or motorized vehicle
support. The UAF has proven resilient in the face of such
After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the UAF
losses, in part due to Western security assistance and
gained important combat experience fighting Russian-led
concerted UAF maintenance efforts.
forces in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk
(known as the Donbas). In 2022, Ukraine was able to
Ukraine has nearly exhausted its supplies of Soviet and
quickly mobilize these veterans and other volunteers into a
Russian artillery and rocket ammunition, making the UAF
new volunteer Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and
almost entirely reliant on Western assistance for such
Reserve without the need for lengthy training.
systems and ammunition. To date, the UAF has
demonstrated an ability to use the qualitative advantages
Since the beginning of the 2022 war, the UAF reportedly
provided by Western security assistance (e.g., long-range
has suffered high levels of casualties, lowering force
precision fires) to mitigate Russian quantitative advantages
quality. Losses are likely higher among regular UAF and
in artillery. As of early 2024, however, UAF officials state
Special Forces units, leading to a greater reliance on TDF
that a shortage of Western artillery ammunition is
and Reserve units. Many of these TDF and Reserve units
hampering operations and contributing to Russian advances
also have sustained heavy casualties, further increasing the
(such as capturing the Ukrainian town of Avdiivka).
proportion of new recruits needed to regenerate forces.
Ukraine’s domestic defense industry produces a wide
The UAF faces several challenges in deploying new
variety of weapons but has been unable to meet the
personnel. At the time of the invasion, Ukraine did not have
country’s full wartime demands. In addition, Russian forces
a fully developed professional noncommissioned officer
continue to target Ukraine’s domestic defense industry.
(NCO) corps, which it previously had been seeking to
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Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
Some observers assert that Ukraine’s international partners
Current Military Performance and
should seek to strengthen Ukraine’s defense industry
Outlook
capacity (including through joint production agreements
The UAF continues to demonstrate high levels of
with Western defense companies) to help Ukraine meet its
operational flexibility, motivation, and capability. As
long-term security needs and reduce its reliance on Western
fighting shifts into more attritional combat and Russia
security assistance.
leverages its advantages in personnel and artillery, some
observers argue the UAF should focus on sustaining its
Role of U.S. and Western Security
combat capability and constructing defensive fortifications.
Assistance
Since the start of Russia’s 2022 war, the United States has
The UAF command structure appears to be more
committed more than $44.2 billion in security assistance to
centralized than it was earlier in the war. While the UAF
Ukraine. The United States and European allies and
seeks to adopt NATO-style (mission command) principles
partners also continue to contribute training, logistics, and
of command, it still exhibits traits of Soviet-style
intelligence support to Ukraine. At the same time, Western
(centralized, top-down) command, particularly among
officials have repeatedly voiced concerns over potential
mobilized officers educated according to Soviet doctrine.
escalation of the conflict, defense industrial production
Additionally, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has
capacity challenges, and the availability of funding to
replaced most of the senior UAF leadership and installed
procure and sustain security assistance.
General Oleksandr Syrsky as the new Commander in Chief.
Syrsky is reportedly close to President Zelensky, and his
Training
appointment may indicate a greater alignment of political
The United States and other allies have provided training
and military decisionmaking.
and advice to the UAF since before Russia’s 2022 invasion.
Current training efforts focus on employing and operating
Russia’s armed forces retain some advantages in equipment
Western security assistance, basic infantry skills and unit-
(specifically artillery and armored vehicles), air support,
level development, and combined arms operations.
and electronic warfare. The UAF has established new units
Observers have noted the challenge of simultaneously
(and reequipped some existing units) with Western
training personnel to operate and maintain weapons
equipment, providing improved capabilities and
systems.
survivability. Ukrainian officials state that their most urgent
needs include air defense, armored mobility, artillery, and
Although the UAF still faces pressure to deploy troops in
long-range fire support. In particular, armored mobility is
the field with minimum training, it has increased efforts to
required to equip new and existing units.
prioritize advanced training to support long-term
development. Training will likely grow in importance as the
Ukrainian officials also note the importance of continued
UAF seeks to replace its losses with mobilized personnel.
ammunition supplies, especially as fighting remains
dominated by artillery. In addition, the UAF has identified
Equipment
needs in logistics, breaching equipment (such as mine
In the initial phase of the war, U.S. and European provision
clearing and bridging capabilities), medical support,
of anti-tank and short-range man-portable air defense
intelligence, and secure communications.
(MANPAD) systems reportedly was crucial for Ukraine’s
resistance to Russia’s invasion. As the war has continued,
The UAF still relies on a core of professional units to
Ukraine’s partners have adjusted security assistance to
conduct combined arms operations and spearhead
respond to changing conditions and the UAF’s evolving
operations. Casualties, exhaustion, and the need to rotate
needs.
units remain ongoing challenges. The UAF has recognized
the need to recruit more personnel (both to replace losses
At the tactical level, the UAF has identified protected
and to rotate units from the from the frontline), but Ukraine
mobility (e.g., armored vehicles and infantry fighting
has yet to implement a new mobilization call up. Training
vehicles), tanks (including Leopard, Challenger, and
new recruits to replace and expand professional units, as
Abrams), and tactical-level fire support (e.g., mortars)
well as officers for staff positions, likely will remain a key
among its top security assistance needs. UAF officials
objective. The UAF’s ability to regenerate forces and
express particular concerns about their reliance on Western
maintain force quality likely will be critical to its success.
supplies of artillery ammunition and assert that a lack of
supplies has forced UAF units to ration artillery fire.
These developments may factor into congressional
decisions regarding whether and how to support Ukraine’s
Ukraine’s air force and air defenses have proven effective
defense. Some observers suggest the UAF faces a
thus far in limiting Russian air superiority. Russia retains
deteriorating situation without further Western security
air superiority in certain regions, however, and continues to
assistance. Other observers argue that the UAF faces
target Ukrainian air defenses. Provision of air defense
significant hurdles to decisively defeating Russian forces
systems remains a top priority for the UAF, at both the
regardless of security assistance.
strategic and the tactical levels, to defend against increasing
Russian Aerospace Force operations. Ukrainian officials
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
have emphasized the importance of securing sufficient
Affairs
ammunition for Ukraine’s air defenses in anticipation of
resumed Russian attacks on civilian infrastructure.
IF12150
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Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
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