Updated March 1, 2024
Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues
U.S. policy toward Taiwan (which officially calls itself the
with the United States also confers political and military
Republic of China or ROC, Taiwan) has long prioritized the
advantages.
maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan faces an increasingly asymmetric power balance
The United States supports Taiwan’s efforts to deter the
People’s Republic of China (
across the Strait, however. The Communist Party of China’s
PRC or China) from using
military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has
force to gain control of the archipelago, which the PRC
undergone a decades-long modernization program focused
claims as its territory. Increasingly, the U.S. government
primarily on developing the capabilities needed to annex
has sought to strengthen its own ability to deter PRC
Taiwan. Some observers assess that the PLA is, or soon will
military aggression in Asia. Congress has passed several
be, able to execute a range of military campaigns against
laws aimed at strengthening U.S.-Taiwan defense ties. A
Taiwan. The PLA trains for operations such as missile
key challenge for U.S. policymakers is supporting Taiwan’s
strikes, seizures of Taiwan’s small outlying islands,
defense without triggering the conflict that U.S. policy
blockades, and—the riskiest and most challenging
seeks to prevent. For additional background, see CRS In
campaign for the PLA—an amphibious landing and
Focus IF10275, Taiwan: Background and U.S. Relations.
takeover of Taiwan’s main island.
Figure 1. Taiwan
Taiwan also faces defense challenges at home. Civil-
military relations are strained for historical, political, and
bureaucratic reasons. The archipelago’s energy, food,
water, internet, and other critical infrastructure systems are
vulnerable to external disruption. According to some
observers, Taiwan’s civil defense preparedness is
insufficient, and its military struggles to recruit, retain, and
train personnel. At a societal level, it is not clear what
costs—in terms of economic security, physical safety and
security, and lives—Taiwan’s people would be willing or
able to bear in the face of possible PRC armed aggression.
U.S. officials have said a PRC invasion of Taiwan is
“neither imminent nor inevitable.” In 2023, U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency Director William J. Burns said PRC
leader Xi Jinping had instructed the PLA “to be ready by
2027 to conduct a successful invasion. Now that does not

mean that he’s decided to conduct an invasion in 2027 or
Source: Graphic by CRS.
any other year. But it’s a reminder of the seriousness of his
focus and his ambition.” Previously, some U.S. officials
Taiwan’s Security Situation
had cited specific years in the mid-2020s as possible target
Taiwan’s technologically-advanced military is tasked with
dates for an attack, renewing U.S. debates about how to
deterring—and if necessary, defeating—PRC military
allocate limited resources to shore up Taiwan’s resilience.
aggression. Taiwan enjoys strategic advantages, including
geography and climate. The Taiwan Strait is 70 nautical
PRC Gray Zone Pressure Against Taiwan
miles (nm) wide at its narrowest point, and 220 nm wide at
The PLA engages in persistent non-combat operations that
its widest. Weather conditions make the Strait perilous to
some analysts say are eroding Taiwan’s military advantages
navigate at certain times of the year. Taiwan’s mountainous
and readiness. Such “gray zone” actions include:
terrain and densely populated coast are largely unsuitable
for amphibious landing and invasion operations. Taiwan’s
• large and increasingly complex exercises near Taiwan;
leaders since 2017 have grown the defense budget; from
• near-daily air operations in the vicinity of Taiwan,
2019 to 2023, spending increased by an average of nearly
including frequent sorties across the so-called “median
5% per year, and as a percentage of GDP increased from
line,” an informal north-south line bisecting the Strait that
2% to 2.5%. Defense spending is set to increase again in
PLA aircraft rarely crossed prior to 2022;
2024, albeit at a slower rate. To increase readiness,
Taiwan’s leaders announced plans to extend compulsory
• routine naval patrols across the median line, some as
military service from four months to a year and to expand
close as 24 nm from Taiwan’s main island; and
civil defense capabilities. Taiwan’s defense relationship
• unmanned combat aerial vehicle flights near and
encircling Taiwan, and reported flights of unmanned
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Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues
aerial vehicles in the airspace of Kinmen, an outlying
cripple an amphibious invasion through a combination of
island administered by Taiwan near the PRC coast.
anti-ship missiles, naval mines, and other similarly small,
distributable, and relatively inexpensive weapons systems.
The PRC government often ramps up such activities
Taiwan’s government has adopted this approach to some
following high-profile engagements between senior U.S.
extent, but some (including many stakeholders in Taiwan’s
policymakers (including Members of Congress) and Taiwan
defense establishment) argue that Taiwan must continue to
leaders. The PRC claims that the United States uses Taiwan
as a “pawn”
invest in conventional capabilities (e.g., fighter jets and
to undermine and contain China.
large warships) to deter PRC gray zone coercion short of an
The normalization of PLA operations ever closer to
invasion. Uncertainty as to whether, how, and for how long
Taiwan’s islands in peacetime could undermine Taipei’s
Washington might aid Taiwan in the event of an attack
ability to assess whether the PLA is using “routine”
informs these debates.
operations or exercises to obscure preparations for an
attack. PLA use of such operations as cover for an attack
Arms Transfers
could significantly shorten the time Taiwan has to respond.
Over the past seven decades, Taiwan has consistently been
one of the largest purchasers of U.S. defense equipment
Gray zone activities also provide the PLA with training and
through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process. For the
intelligence gathering opportunities. They strain Taiwan’s
period FY2020-FY2022, Taiwan was the largest purchaser
forces, which face growing operational and maintenance
of U.S. defense equipment through FMS.
costs associated with responding to PLA activities. Beijing
also could be using coercive but nonviolent operations to
Some observers argue Taiwan’s military is insufficiently
sow doubt in Taiwan’s people about Taiwan’s military
equipped to defeat a PRC armed attack. Further, some
capabilities and to create political pressure for Taipei to
observers argue the war in Ukraine has revealed problems
acquiesce to Beijing’s insistence on unification.
with the U.S. defense industrial base, raising concerns
about defense suppliers’ ability to produce and deliver
U.S. Support for Taiwan’s Defense
weapons to Taiwan in a timely fashion. In part as a
The United States has maintained unofficial defense ties
response to these concerns, Congress recently took steps to
with Taiwan since 1980, when President Carter terminated
increase and expedite arms transfers to Taiwan, including:
a 1954 U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty. (The United States
agreed to withdraw its military personnel from Taiwan the
• The Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA; Title LV,
year before). The robust defense relationship includes arms
Subtitle A of the James M. Inhofe National Defense
transfers; routine bilateral defense dialogues and planning;
Authorization Act [NDAA] for Fiscal Year 2023, P.L.
and training activities in both the United States and Taiwan.
117-263) for the first time authorized the provision of
Experts assess that U.S.-Taiwan defense relations have
Foreign Military Financing (FMF; essentially, loans or
substantially contributed to Taiwan’s ability to deter PRC
grants a foreign government may use to purchase U.S.
military aggression.
arms) for Taiwan: up to $2 billion a year in direct loans
and loan guarantees and up to $2 billion a year in grant
U.S. Strategy and Policy
assistance through FY2027. Although the Consolidated
The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C.
Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328) did not
§3301 et seq.) was the first law to provide a legal basis for
appropriate funds for the grant assistance (and Taiwan
U.S. support for Taiwan’s defense following the
declined the loan), the State Department in 2023 notified
termination of diplomatic relations. Among other things,
Congress of its intent to obligate $135 million for FMF
the TRA states that it is U.S. policy to “make available to
programs for Taiwan from other authorizations.
Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such
quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain
• TERA amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
a sufficient self-defense capability” and “to maintain the
U.S.C. §2318(a)(3)) to make Presidential Drawdown
capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or
Authority available to Taiwan, authorizing the
other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security,
provision to Taiwan of up to $1 billion annually in
or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
defense articles, services, and education and from U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) stocks. In July 2023, the
The TRA does not require the United States to defend
Biden Administration notified Congress of its intent to
Taiwan, but by stating it is U.S. policy to maintain the
capacity to do so, the TRA creates “strategic ambiguity”
exercise this authority to transfer $345 million of
defense equipment to Taiwan.
about potential U.S. actions in the event of a PRC attack.
Some observers, including some Members of Congress,
• The FY2024 NDAA (Sec. 1242) authorized temporary
advocate making a formal commitment to defend Taiwan.
acquisition flexibilities to streamline DOD’s and the
Supporters of a shift to “strategic clarity” argue such clarity
defense industrial base’s procurement and replenishment
is necessary to deter an increasingly capable and assertive
of certain munitions bound for Taiwan.
PRC. Supporters of strategic ambiguity argue the long-
Senate-passed H.R. 815 and House-introduced H.R. 7372
standing policy encourages restraint by Beijing and Taipei
would appropriate $1.9 billion for the replacement of DOD
and incentivizes Taipei to invest more in its own defense.
stocks and reimbursement of DOD military education and
Successive U.S. administrations have encouraged Taiwan to
training provided to Taiwan or to countries that “provided
pursue an “asymmetric” strategy to make it prohibitively
support to Taiwan at the request of the United States.”
costly for the PRC to annex Taiwan by force. This approach
envisions Taiwan investing in capabilities intended to
Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs
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Taiwan: Defense and Military Issues

IF12481


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12481 · VERSION 8 · UPDATED

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