INSIGHTi

Iraq: Attacks and U.S. Strikes Reopen
Discussion of U.S. Military Presence
Updated February 16, 2024
Iran-backed armed groups attacked U.S. personnel in Iraq more than 60 times between the October 2023
onset of the Israel-Hamas war and February 4, 2024. In response President Joe Biden has ordered U.S. air
strikes in Iraq and in neighboring Syria. Iraq’s government, citing risks to Iraq’s security from the attacks
and counter-strikes, says it seeks to end the presence in Iraq of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat the
Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) and to engage in bilateral discussions about the future of the U.S.
military presence. U.S.-Iraq talks announced by Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin have begun on the
“evolution” of the coalition mission and to “enable the transition to an enduring bilateral security
partnership.” After Iraq-coalition talks on February 11, an Iraqi military spokesman said, “a timetable will
be formulated for a deliberate and gradual reduction, leading to the end of the mission of the international
coalition forces... and the transition to a bilateral relationship, as long as peace is not disturbed.”
In December 2023, President Biden cited the Iraqi government’s invitation for U.S. forces and the
coalition to remain in Iraq in his semi-annual comprehensive war powers report to Congress. That same
month, U.S. Central Command reported that approximately 2,400 U.S. military personnel were deployed
in Iraq and 800 in Syria. The U.S. military presence in Iraq and U.S. military access to Iraq’s airspace and
land border with Syria facilitate U.S. military operations in Syria, where IS insurgents are more active
than in Iraq and U.S. partner forces secure prisons holding thousands of IS fighters.
In December 2023, Congress authorized U.S. counter-IS partnership programs in Iraq and Syria through
December 2024. Members of Congress may consider how potential changes to the U.S. and/or coalition
presence in Iraq may affect U.S. interests in the region; whether changes should be made to patterns of
U.S. assistance to Iraqi and Syrian partners; whether additional consultation with the executive branch or
oversight is warranted; and how attacks on U.S. personnel and U.S. strikes comport with the War Powers
Resolution and the 2001 and 2002 legislative authorizations for the use of military force.
Escalating Attacks and U.S. Strikes Follow Hamas-led Attacks on Israel
and Onset of Gaza War
Following the U.S. killing in Iraq of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-Qods Force
commander Qasem Soleimani and an Iraqi security official (both U.S.-designated terrorists) in January
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
IN12309
CRS INSIGHT
Prepared for Members and
Committees of Congress

---

Congressional Research Service
2
2020, Iraq’s parliament voted to direct the Iraqi government to expel foreign forces and deny foreign
access to Iraqi airspace, territory, and waters. Iraq’s then-caretaker government did not do so, and its
successors engaged U.S. counterparts in talks that led in December 2021 to an announced end to U.S.
combat operations and a transition to training and advisory support. Intermittent attacks on U.S. forces in
Syria and Iraq continued through early 2023, with some attributed to Iran-backed Iraqi armed groups.
Observers noted changes in the pattern of such attacks in relation to developments in Iraq, Syria, and the
wider region. President Biden directed strikes following some attacks on U.S. personnel in Syria and Iraq,
and the Administration has stated its intent to defend U.S. personnel with “proportional” responses.
Figure 1. Attacks on U.S. Personnel and U.S. Strikes in Iraq and Syria
Since October 17, 2023, and as of February 15, 2024

Source: CRS, using U.S. Department of Defense announcements and media reports. On October 24, 2023, the
Department of Defense acknowledged 13 attacks on U.S. forces since October 17, 2023.
Notes: KH = Kata’ib Hezbol ah. HN = Harakat Hezbol ah al Nujaba. CRS cannot validate attack and strike details.
Since October 2023, observers have documented more than 150 claimed attacks by the “Islamic
Resistance in Iraq” on U.S. and other targets in Iraq, Syria, Israel, and Jordan, including the January 28
attack in Jordan that killed and injured U.S. servicemembers. Some attacks in Syria and Iraq have resulted
in injuries to U.S. and Iraqi personnel. Reportedly, U.S. response strikes have destroyed facilities of the
IRGC and of an Iran-backed Iraqi group in Syria and Iraq, and have killed some members of the Iraqi
groups inside Iraq. Iraq’s government has described attacks on U.S. forces as acts hostile to Iraq while
saying U.S. strikes on Iraqi territory violate Iraqi sovereignty. A January 4, 2024, U.S. strike in Baghdad
killed a leader of an Iran-backed U.S.-designated terrorist group who also served as a commander in
Iraq’s state-affiliated Popular Mobilization Forces. Dozens of U.S. strikes on February 2 targeted militia
groups in Iraq, prompting Iraq’s government to summon the U.S. chargé-d’affaires and submit a letter of
protest over what it described as “a new act of aggression.” A U.S. strike on February 7 killed a leader of
the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization Kata’ib Hezbollah. An Iraqi military spokesman said
the coalition had deviated from the reasons for its presence in Iraq and that the current “trajectory
compels the Iraqi government more than ever to terminate the mission of this coalition.”
On February 10, some members of Iraq’s parliament convened a session to call for the expulsion of U.S.
forces, but they were denied a quorum by other members refusing to attend. Iraq’s parliament could play a
role in ratifying any bilateral U.S.-Iraq agreements that result from planned talks.
Possible Considerations for Congress
Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has said U.S. forces remain “focused on the mission of defeating
Daesh [IS/ISIS/ISIL], and we are here for no other purpose” and in January 2024 he reiterated U.S.

---

Congressional Research Service
3
“commitment to deepen our security cooperation to advance stability within Iraq and the region.” In
August 2023, a U.S.-Iraq Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue agreed “to consult on a future process ...
inclusive of the Coalition, to determine how the Coalition’s military mission will evolve on a timeline
according to the following factors: the threat from ISIS, operational and environmental requirements, and
[Iraqi] capability levels.” As part of those discussions, the Iraqi government “reaffirmed its commitment
to protect U.S. and Global Coalition personnel and advisors, convoys, and diplomatic facilities.”
Ongoing meetings of the U.S.-Iraq Higher Military Commission (HMC) and other working groups could
result in substantial, partial, or no changes to the U.S. military presence. A Pentagon spokesperson has
said “The HMC meeting is not a negotiation about the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.” In
considering possible outcomes, executive branch requests for regular and supplemental funding, and
defense authorization provisions in 2024, Congress may consider the following questions:
• How essential is the U.S. and coalition military presence in Iraq? How does the U.S.
military presence in Iraq relate to U.S. efforts to counter and deter Iran? How does it
affect risks of wider conflict?
• How might changes to the U.S. and/or coalition presence in Iraq affect
• U.S. operations in Syria? U.S. embassy security? the NATO mission in Iraq?
• Iraq’s security and regional security?
• relationships between Iraqi groups and the Iraqi government, including the Kurdistan
Regional Government and U.S.-supported peshmerga forces?
• How might abrupt changes affect perceptions of the United States?
• How if at all should U.S. defense and foreign assistance funding and authorities evolve?

Author Information

Christopher M. Blanchard

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs




Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United
States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However,
as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the
permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

IN12309 · VERSION 6 · UPDATED

---