January 26, 2024
U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council: Background and Issues
The U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) is a
In addition to the TTC, the United States and EU currently
high-level forum between the United States and European
are engaged in: negotiations on steel and aluminum global
Union (EU) that aims to: enhance cooperation on global
overcapacity and carbon issues and a long-term solution to
technology, economic, and trade issues; promote shared
U.S. Section 232 tariffs; negotiations on a targeted critical
prosperity and competitiveness; and support democratic,
minerals agreement (CMA) to ensure that EU electric
market-oriented values. The partners cast the TTC as “the
vehicles (EVs) can qualify for certain tax credit benefits in
key forum for our cooperation on trade and technology
P.L. 117-169 (the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, IRA);
matters.” The Biden Administration has not pursued
and various issues in the World Trade Organization (WTO)
negotiations for a comprehensive free trade agreement
and other multilateral fora.
(FTA) with the EU that would include the removal or
Table 1. TTC Working Group Numbers and Agendas
reduction of tariffs and nontariff barriers. Congress has
1.
lacked a formal role in approving TTC outcomes, as with a
Technology standards
2. Climate and clean technology
host of other economic initiatives with other U.S. trading
3.
partners. Given the TTC’s prominence in U.S.-EU trade
Secure supply chains
4.
relations, Congress may have an interest in oversight of the
Information and communications technology and services
(ICTS) security and competitiveness
TTC and potential legislative action to shape its outcomes.
5. Data governance and technology platform regulation
TTC Origins and Context
6. Misuse of technology threatening security and human rights
Upon entering into office, President Biden pledged “to
7. Cooperation on export controls of dual use items
repair and revitalize the U.S.-EU partnership,” after what
8. Investment screening cooperation
some commentators assess as especially fraught U.S.-EU
9. Promoting small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME)
trade relations during the Trump Administration. The
access to and use of digital technologies
United States and EU announced the TTC at their June
10. Global trade challenges
2021 summit. That same year, they also reached interim
Source: CRS, based on U.S. Department of State, TTC webpage.
resolutions on some bilateral trade irritants (e.g., tariffs).
TTC Developments and Select Issues
The TTC is led on the U.S. side by the U.S. Trade
Since its launch, the TTC has risen in prominence on both
Representative (USTR) and Secretaries of Commerce and
bilateral trade issues and shared economic and geopolitical
State; and on the EU side by the Commissioners for Trade
concerns. In particular, in 2022, the TTC emerged as a key
and Competition of the European Commission (the EU’s
tool for U.S.-EU coordination on export controls in
executive body). At a ministerial level, the TTC has met
response to Russia’s war on Ukraine. The TTC also may
four times (September 2021, May 2022, December 2022,
address shared concerns regarding China’s trade practices.
and May 2023), at alternating U.S. and EU venues. The
fifth ministerial, initially slated for end-2023, is now
Through the TTC, the partners largely have avoided
scheduled for January 30, 2024. The ministerial meetings
rehashing longstanding differences, opting instead to work
have yielded Joint Statements on issue-specific cooperation.
to “update the rules of the road for the 21st century” (e.g.,
regulatory cooperation on new technologies). On some
The TTC is structured as ten working groups oriented on
issues (e.g., China’s global influence), the United States and
topics such as technology, supply chains, and trade and
EU share concerns but may vary in some approaches,
investment (Table 1). Working groups are chaired by
potentially limiting TTC responses to these issues.
relevant U.S. government agencies and European
Commission departments (e.g., working group 10 on global
At the May 2023 fourth ministerial, the parties reiterated
trade challenges is led by USTR and the Commission’s
the TTC’s “central role” in the “broader transatlantic
Directorate-General for Trade). Cooperative activities
partnership” and coordination on responses to the Russia-
include issue-specific coordination, information-sharing,
Ukraine war. Outcomes focused on areas such as artificial
and dialogue. The TTC also has avenues for input from
intelligence (AI), supply chains, digital connectivity and
industry, labor, and other stakeholders.
infrastructure, sustainability, and human rights. Reflecting
U.S. and EU industrial policies (e.g., in clean energy), the
The TTC’s creation follows U.S.-EU dialogues on trade and
partners stated interest in ensuring that their regulatory
economic matters and unsuccessful efforts to conclude a
approaches are “mutually reinforcing” and their policies
comprehensive FTA. For example, Transatlantic Trade and
avoid a subsidy “race to the bottom.” They also reiterated
Investment Partnership (T-TIP) negotiations during the
their ongoing cooperation on export controls and sanctions-
Obama Administration stalled amid differences on issues
related restrictions, investment screening for national
such as agricultural market access, government
security, outbound investment controls on sensitive
procurement, and digital trade.
technologies, and addressing economic coercion.
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U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council: Background and Issues
Supply Chains. The United States’ and EU’s initial focus
Congress also could consider whether to establish a
on supply chain cooperation in the TTC has been on
parliamentary component to the TTC for select Members to
identifying and addressing shared vulnerabilities, including
hold bilateral sessions with European Parliament (EP)
diversification efforts and R&D priorities, in areas such as
counterparts. It could alternatively use ongoing
semiconductors, solar energy, critical minerals, and
parliamentary engagement in the Transatlantic Legislators’
pharmaceuticals. In May 2023, the parties announced the
Dialogue (between U.S. House Members and the EP) to
completion of an early warning and monitoring mechanism
shape the TTC. Such moves could boost the durability of
for the semiconductors value chain. The mechanism aims to
TTC outcomes and structure.
anticipate shortages and alleviate bottlenecks, and it
Focus Areas. Congress may assess how the TTC aligns
outlines operational steps to respond to disruptions. The
with congressional priorities. It may weigh in on the TTC’s
partners also have sought to promote sustainable and
prioritization of some geopolitical issues (e.g., responses to
responsible supply chains with strong protection for labor
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine), compared to other bilateral
rights. The Trade and Labor Dialogue (TALD), established
trade and technology issues.
at the second ministerial, has convened stakeholders to
discuss ways to detect, address, and mitigate the risk of
Digital economy issues may be of particular congressional
forced labor in supply chains.
interest. Some Members have called for the TTC to address
Digital Policy and Emerging Technologies.
key U.S. concerns on the EU’s digital policies. Congress
At the
also could consider whether TTC cooperation may affect
fourth ministerial, the United States and EU agreed on AI-
U.S. efforts to regulate the digital economy, given USTR’s
related outcomes, including on: the implementation of a
reversal of support for digital trade talks in IPEF and some
Joint Roadmap to encourage a risk-based approach to
digital trade goals at the WTO in 2023, citing the need for
advance trustworthy and responsible AI and develop
space to legislate domestically on the digital economy.
common terminology, and generative AI’s unique
opportunities and risks. They also agreed to advance
Congress also could explore options for modifying the
collaboration in 6G wireless communication systems,
TTC, such as by adding more working groups on other
digital identities, standards for 3D printing, EV charging,
bilateral issues. Additionally, it could legislate explicitly on
and quantum technologies, among other issues. Differences
the TTC or on TTC-related issues (e.g., H.R. 6571 directs
U.S. consultations with allies or partners on supply chains).
on issues not explicitly covered in the TTC, such as the
implementation of the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Effectiveness. Congress may examine whether the TTC is
and Digital Services Act (DSA), may continue to pose
suited to serve as the “key forum” for U.S.-EU trade
challenges in U.S.-EU relations. Some U.S. technology
cooperation and to advance U.S. competitiveness in EU
companies have voiced concern that these regulations
markets. Some Members and stakeholders welcomed the
unfairly discriminate against U.S. companies.
TTC’s creation. Some also have urged for more concrete
deliverables, potentially wary of more “talk” rather than
Sustainability. TTC sustainability initiatives aim to
“action” on difficult issues. Others see the TTC dialogue
support transitions to low-carbon economies and the digital
process as important for relationship-building and assert
economy. The United States and EU have sought
that meaningful progress may take time, potentially across
stakeholder input through the TALD on these issues. They
several ministerial meetings. Regular high-level meetings
launched a Transatlantic Initiative on Sustainable Trade
may ensure political focus on the TTC, yet if too frequent,
(TIST) in May 2023, with workstreams to support a
they may not give working groups enough time for
transatlantic “green” marketplace that benefits businesses,
technical cooperation to contribute to substantive outcomes.
workers, and consumers. Cooperation also focuses on clean
energy technology development and critical minerals.
Congress may examine other ways to advance U.S. trade
Broader U.S. and EU climate policy frameworks, varying
policy interests, such as through comprehensive U.S.-EU
approaches, and other considerations (e.g., energy security)
FTA negotiations. Political support, however, may be
could complicate cooperation on sustainability issues.
limited. In the Biden Administration’s view, executive
Issues for Congress
economic initiatives are better suited to address “21st
century” issues and advance “worker-centered” policies
Select key issues posed by the TTC for Congress include:
than comprehensive FTAs. The EU also has voiced
Congressional Role. As an executive initiative, the TTC
reluctance in repeating the T-TIP experience. On prospects
could raise issues about the role of Congress in shaping the
for a future FTA, Congress also may assess the impact of
TTC’s structure, priorities, and outcomes. Such issues could
greater trade liberalization on the U.S. economy; the role of
heighten if the TTC results in binding trade commitments,
any negotiated U.S.-EU trade outcomes on global rules-
compared to more cooperative policy outcomes. Other
setting; and what role the TTC might play in the laying the
issues could include whether the TTC’s executive-led
groundwork for comprehensive FTA talks.
approach limits the durability and enforceability of
outcomes not enacted into U.S. law. Congress may consider
Shayerah I. Akhtar, Coordinator, Specialist in
whether to seek a more formal role in the approval of, or
International Trade and Finance
consultation on, TTC outcomes (e.g., P.L. 118-31, §6706,
Andres B. Schwarzenberg, Specialist in International
sets a sense of Congress on consultations by the
Trade and Finance
Department of State). Issues about the role of Congress also
Danielle M. Trachtenberg, Analyst in International Trade
have arisen in the context of the Indo-Pacific Economic
and Finance
Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).
IF12575
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U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council: Background and Issues


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