Updated January 26, 2024
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy
Since 2005, the United States has imposed targeted
privately revoked the visas of Venezuelans, including those
sanctions on Venezuelan individuals and entities that have
of current Venezuelan officials and their families.
engaged in criminal, antidemocratic, or corrupt actions. In
response to increasing human rights abuses and corruption
Terrorism-Related Sanctions
by the government of Nicolás Maduro, in power since
Since 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual
2013, the Trump Administration expanded U.S. sanctions to
determination (most recently in May 2023) that Venezuela
include financial sanctions, sectoral sanctions, and
is not “cooperating fully with United States anti-terrorism
sanctions on the government. Those sanctions and other
efforts” pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export
international pressure failed to dislodge Maduro and
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781). The United States has
exacerbated an ongoing economic and humanitarian crisis
prohibited all U.S. commercial arms sales and retransfers to
caused by government mismanagement and corruption that
Venezuela. U.S. Department of Commerce export controls
has prompted 7.7 million Venezuelans to flee.
related to Venezuela affect dual-use technology, including
expanded restrictions since mid-2020 on sales to military
The Biden Administration has sought to leverage sanctions
end users. In 2008, pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.)
relief to incentivize Maduro to allow presidential elections
13224, the U.S. Treasury Department designated two
in 2024 to be as free and fair as possible. Maduro officials
individuals and two travel agencies in Venezuela as
have thus far continued to bar opposition primary winner
Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) subject to asset
Maria Corina Machado from running and have increasingly
blocking sanctions for financially supporting Hezbollah, a
cracked down on dissent.
U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization.
Recent Developments
Drug Trafficking-Related Sanctions
On October 18, 2023, the Biden Administration issued
Treasury has imposed asset blocking sanctions on 11
licenses easing energy sanctions on Venezuela through
individuals and 25 companies with connections to
April 2024 after Maduro and the opposition signed the
Venezuela by designating them as Specially Designated
Barbados Accord, which included a roadmap toward
Narcotics Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics
holding competitive elections. U.S. officials warned that the
Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120, Title VIII, as
licenses could be revoked if the Maduro government did
amended; 21 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.).
not create a process to allow all barred candidates to run
and release wrongfully detained Americans and Venezuelan
Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic
political prisoners.
Actions, Human Rights Violations, and Corruption
In response to increasing repression in Venezuela, Congress
In late November 2023, the Maduro government announced
enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil
that candidates barred from office could appeal to the
Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
supreme court. Machado appealed; the court’s decision is
Among its provisions, the law required the President to
pending. In December, the Maduro government released 20
impose sanctions on those the President identified as
political prisoners, 10 imprisoned Americans, and Leonard
responsible for significant acts of violence, serious human
Francis, an American fugitive indicted in a naval bribery
rights abuses, or antidemocratic actions. Congress extended
scandal. In addition to sanctions relief, the United States
these sanctions authorizations through 2023 in P.L. 116-94.
released Alex Saab, a U.S.-sanctioned ally of Maduro
indicted on U.S. money laundering charges.
President Obama issued E.O. 13692 to implement P.L. 113-
278 in March 2015, and Treasury issued regulations in July
The 118th Congress is closely monitoring the degree to
2015 (31 C.F.R. Part 591). The E.O. targets (for asset
which the Maduro government complies with the Barbados
blocking and visa restrictions) those involved in actions or
Accord linked to U.S. sanctions relief and could seek to
policies undermining democratic processes or institutions;
modify U.S. sanctions policy. Unless otherwise noted,
serious human rights abuses; prohibiting, limiting, or
information in this product is drawn from the Treasury
penalizing freedom of expression or peaceful assembly; and
Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
public corruption. It includes any person who is a current or
The product does not discuss foreign aid restrictions.
former leader of any entity engaged in any of those
activities, as well as current or former government officials.
Visa Restrictions
Even though the sanctions authorities in P.L. 116-94
Since FY2018, the State Department has imposed visa
expired in December 2023, the President still has the
restrictions related to corruption or human rights abuses
authority to impose them under E.O. 13692.
pursuant to Section 7031(c) of annual Department of State,
Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations
Treasury has imposed SDN sanctions on more than 110
acts on 15 Venezuelans. The State Department also has
Venezuelans and at least eight entities pursuant to E.O.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy
13692. Those individuals include President Maduro, his
licenses, overcompliance with U.S. sanctions had limited
wife, and his son; Vice President Delcy Rodríguez; Defense
some humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans.
Minister Vladimir Padrino Lopez; supreme court judges;
and governors. The Biden Administration has not
Biden Administration: Licenses
designated any new individuals or entities to date.
Since 2019, OFAC has issued and amended licenses to
allow certain transactions. The Biden Administration has
Additional Financial Sanctions
issued licenses to encourage the Maduro government to
President Trump imposed additional financial sanctions on
negotiate a path to free and fair elections. In May 2022,
Venezuela in response to the government’s human rights
OFAC allowed Chevron, the only major U.S. energy
abuses and antidemocratic actions. In August 2017,
company still in Venezuela, to discuss future operations
President Trump issued E.O. 13808, which prohibited
with PdVSA. In November 2022, after negotiations
access to U.S. financial markets by the Venezuelan
restarted, OFAC issued a license allowing Chevron to
government, including state energy company Petróleos de
resume production, import, and export of petroleum
Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), with certain exceptions intended
products at its existing joint ventures in Venezuela. On
to minimize the impact on the Venezuelan people and U.S.
October 18, 2023, Treasury
interests. In March 2018, President Trump issued E.O.
13827 to prohibit transactions involving the Venezuelan
• issued a six-month general license temporarily
government’s issuance of digital currency, coin, or token.
authorizing transactions involving the oil and gas sector
In May 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13835, which
in Venezuela;
prohibited transactions related to purchasing Venezuelan
debt and any debt owed to Venezuela pledged as collateral.
• issued another general license authorizing transactions
with Minerven, in part to reduce illicit gold trading; and
Broader Sectoral Sanctions
On November 1, 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13850.
• removed bans on the secondary trading of certain
This E.O. set forth a framework to block the assets of, and
Venezuelan bonds and PdVSA debt and equity.
prohibit certain transactions with, any person determined by
the Secretary of the Treasury to operate in designated
Resuming oil trade with Venezuela and allowing
sectors of the Venezuelan economy or to engage in corrupt
Venezuelan gas to be developed and exported to European
transactions with the Maduro government.
allies could advance U.S. energy and security interests.
These licenses also may bolster Venezuela’s economy and
On January 28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, Treasury
reduce emigration, another U.S. policy goal. It remains to
designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector of the
be seen whether the Biden Administration will extend these
Venezuelan economy and the Secretary of the Treasury
licenses beyond April 2024, however, as few observers
determined the company was subject to U.S. sanctions. The
predict that Maduro officials will allow even a minimally
E.O froze all property and interests in property of PdVSA
competitive election to occur.
subject to U.S. jurisdiction and prohibited U.S. persons
(companies or individuals) from engaging in transactions
Congressional Considerations
with the company. Treasury also sanctioned Venezuela’s
Congress has maintained broad support for a negotiated
Central Bank, National Development Bank, and state-
solution to the crisis in Venezuela leading to free and fair
owned gold company, Minerven. Treasury has imposed
elections. In 2019, Congress enacted P.L. 116-94, which
sanctions pursuant to E.O. 13850 on 22 individuals, 91
included the Venezuela Emergency Relief, Democracy
entities, and 47 vessels, none of which were designated
Assistance, and Development (VERDAD) Act (S. 1025).
under the Biden Administration.
The law extended targeted sanctions regarding corruption
and undemocratic actions through 2023. Legislation to
Sanctions on the Maduro Government
reauthorize sanctions authorities in the VERDAD Act has
In August 2019, President Trump issued E.O. 13884,
been introduced but not considered (H.R. 6831/S. 3363).
freezing the assets of the Maduro government in the United
Other introduced legislation would create new sanctionable
States and within the control of U.S. persons. The order
offenses (H.R. 5670), impose visa restrictions on
prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with
individuals who support Venezuela (S. 1129), and codify
the Maduro government unless authorized by OFAC. E.O.
selected executive orders and create U.S. foreign aid
13884 also authorized financial sanctions and visa
restrictions on countries that militarily support Venezuela
restrictions on non-U.S. persons who assist the Maduro
(S. 995).
government. There are five individuals and one entity
designated under this executive order, none of which were
Some in Congress have supported sanctions relief, arguing
designated by the Biden Administration.
that broad sanctions have not achieved their aims and have
hurt the Venezuelan people. In contrast, other Members of
To allow assistance to the Venezuelan people, OFAC
Congress have opposed sanctions relief and have
issued licenses authorizing transactions involving the
introduced legislation that would prohibit U.S. imports of
delivery of food, agricultural commodities, and medicine;
Venezuelan oil (S. 3053). They have urged the Biden
remittances; international organizations; and
Administration to revoke the licenses granted in October
communications services. A 2021 Government
2023, arguing the Maduro-aligned supreme court is unlikely
Accountability Office report found that, despite those
to allow Machado’s candidacy. See CRS In Focus IF10230,
Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy.
https://crsreports.congress.gov
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions Policy
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs
IF10715
Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10715 · VERSION 45 · UPDATED