INSIGHTi

Election Worker Safety and Privacy
Updated January 5, 2024
Concerns about election workers’ safety and privacy have been reported since the 2020 election in
surveys, news articles, and testimony before congressional committees. Those concerns, along with a
perceived increase in politically motivated job scrutiny, have led some to leave, or consider leaving, their
roles.
This Insight provides a brief overview of federal activity on election worker safety and privacy since
2020. For more information, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10781, Overview of Federal Criminal Laws
Prohibiting Threats and Harassment of Election Workers
, by
Jimmy Balser.
Background
Federal law prohibits certain types of intimidation of or interference with election workers, including
intimidation to discourage serving as a poll watcher or election official or in response to such service;
interference by members of the Armed Forces with election officials’ exercise of their duties; and
intimidation for helping voters register or cast a vote. Many states have laws that address other threats to
election workers, such as through privacy protections for election commissioners. More general laws,
such as prohibitions against voter intimidation or harassing or threatening interstate communications,
might also apply to some conduct.
Some state and local officials have responded to recent reports of threats to election workers with
administrative action or legislative proposals. Election officials have included local law enforcement in
poll worker trainings, for example, and implemented new security measures in their offices. State
legislators have enacted new prohibitions or protections, such as a New Hampshire law that prohibits
intimidating election officials to interfere with their work and an Oregon law that extends existing privacy
protections to election workers.
Federal Activity
The executive branch has taken some action on election worker safety and privacy since the 2020
election. In July 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the creation of an Election
Threats Task Force “to address the rise in threats against election workers, administrators, officials, and
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others associated with the electoral process.” DOJ reported charging 14 cases and securing nine
convictions related to the task force as of August 2023.
In addition to enforcement efforts, federal agencies have provided resources or support for election
workers. For example, DOJ, two U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies, and the U.S.
Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
administer certain grant funds that might be used to address
threats to election workers. DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency also offers
publications and services to help election officials respond to physical and online threats; the EAC hosted
a panel discussion on election official security and released a related web page and video series; and the
EAC’s Board of Advisors adopted a resolution condemning threats against election workers and calling
for additional agency resources to help protect them.
There has also been activity on the issue in Congress. Election administrators and other witnesses have
addressed threats to election workers in testimony to several congressional committees, including in
2021: July 28 and October 26;
2022: May 19, June 21, June 22, July 20, July 27, August 3 (Senate Judiciary), August 3
(Senate Rules), and August 11; and
2023: March 10, March 23, March 28, April 27, June 7 (House), June 7 (Senate), June
14, and November 1.
In the 117th Congress, the majority staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform released a
report about the effects of election misinformation and disinformation, including threats to election
workers, that drew on responses from election officials to letters from the then-chairs of the committee
and the Committee on House Administration.
Some Senators have also sent letters to federal agencies
requesting updates or action on threats to election workers, such as a DHS- and Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)-issued public service announcement to local law enforcement.

Some bills introduced in the 117th or 118th Congress have aimed to address election worker security
directly, including through proposals to
• prohibit intimidation of election workers with intent to interfere with or retaliate for
performance of official duties (117th: H.R. 777, H.R. 4064/S. 2155, H.R. 5746, S. 2093,
S. 2747, S. 4920; 118th: H.R. 11/S. 1/S. 2344, S. 1318);
• prohibit intimidation for or interference with helping voters register, vote, or both (117th:
H.R. 1/S. 1/S. 2093, H.R. 1245, H.R. 1366, H.R. 2358/S. 954, H.R. 5746, S. 1840, S.
2747;
118th: H.R. 11/S. 1/S. 2344, H.R. 1583);
• prohibit physically damaging election infrastructure (117th: H.R. 5746, H.R. 6872/S.
3142, S. 4, S. 2928);
• extend an existing prohibition to intimidation for processing ballots or tabulating,
canvassing, or certifying votes (117th: H.R. 5053/S. 2626, H.R. 5746, S. 2747, S. 4920;
118th: H.R. 11/S. 1/S. 2344, S. 1318, H.R. 3130/S. 1487);
• prohibit, or extend an existing prohibition to, intimidation involving violence or threats of
harm and involving election agents, vendors, and contractors (117th: S. 4, S. 2928, H.R.
5746,
H.R. 6872/S. 3142);
• prohibit removal or suspension of local election administrators except for specified
reasons, such as neglect of duty or malfeasance in office (117th: H.R. 4064/S. 2155, H.R.
5746,
S. 2747; 118th: H.R. 11/S. 1 /S. 2344, H.R. 5046/S. 2575);
• create privacy protections for, or extend existing privacy protections to, election workers
and their families (117th: H.R. 4064/S. 2155, H.R. 5314, H.R. 5746, S. 2093, S. 2747, S.
4920;
118th: H.R. 11/S. 1 /S. 2344, S. 1318);


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• increase the penalty for violating an existing prohibition on intimidating poll watchers
and election officials (117th: S. 4574);
• establish in statute a DOJ-led election officials security task force (117th: H.R. 5314);
• prohibit possession of unauthorized firearms at federal election sites (118th: H.R. 2471);
or
• direct DOJ to provide law enforcement and federal attorneys with training and resources
for addressing threats to election workers and assign a special agent to each FBI field
office to investigate such threats (117th: S. 4920; 118th: S. 1318).
Legislation has also been introduced to authorize funding states might use to address threats to election
workers. For example, Members have proposed funding for recruiting, training, retaining, or protecting
election workers (117th: H.R. 1/S. 1/S. 2093, H.R. 2358/S. 954, H.R. 5746, H.R. 7992/S. 4239, S. 2747, S.
4920;
118th: H.R. 11/S. 1 /S. 2344, H.R. 5292/S. 630, S. 1318); supplementing election worker pay (117th:
H.R. 8015; 118th: H.R. 3436/S. 1609); providing election workers with physical security services and
social media threat monitoring (117th: S. 4920; 118th: S. 1318); and preventing disclosure of election
workers’ personal information (117th: S. 4920; 118th: S. 1318).

Author Information

Sarah J. Eckman
Karen L. Shanton
Analyst in American National Government
Analyst in American National Government


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.
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