

 
 INSIGHTi 
 
Election Worker Safety and Privacy 
Updated January 5, 2024 
Concerns about election workers’ safety and privacy have been reported since the 2020 election in 
surveys, news articles, and testimony before congressional committees. Those concerns, along with a 
perceived increase in politically motivated job scrutiny, have led some to leave, or consider leaving, their 
roles. 
This Insight provides a brief overview of federal activity on election worker safety and privacy since 
2020. For more information, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10781, Overview of Federal Criminal Laws 
Prohibiting Threats and Harassment of Election Workers, by Jimmy Balser. 
Background 
Federal law prohibits certain types of intimidation of or interference with election workers, including 
intimidation to discourage serving as a poll watcher or election official or in response to such service; 
interference by members of the Armed Forces with election officials’ exercise of their duties; and 
intimidation for helping voters register or cast a vote. Many states have laws that address other threats to 
election workers, such as through privacy protections for election commissioners. More general laws, 
such as prohibitions against voter intimidation or harassing or threatening interstate communications, 
might also apply to some conduct. 
Some state and local officials have responded to recent reports of threats to election workers with 
administrative action or legislative proposals. Election officials have included local law enforcement in 
poll worker trainings, for example, and implemented new security measures in their offices. State 
legislators have enacted new prohibitions or protections, such as a New Hampshire law that prohibits 
intimidating election officials to interfere with their work and an Oregon law that extends existing privacy 
protections to election workers. 
Federal Activity 
The executive branch has taken some action on election worker safety and privacy since the 2020 
election. In July 2021, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) announced the creation of an Election 
Threats Task Force “to address the rise in threats against election workers, administrators, officials, and 
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others associated with the electoral process.” DOJ reported charging 14 cases and securing nine 
convictions related to the task force as of August 2023. 
In addition to enforcement efforts, federal agencies have provided resources or support for election 
workers. For example, DOJ, two U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies, and the U.S. 
Election Assistance Commission (EAC) administer certain grant funds that might be used to address 
threats to election workers. DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency also offers 
publications and services to help election officials respond to physical and online threats; the EAC hosted 
a panel discussion on election official security and released a related web page and video series; and the 
EAC’s Board of Advisors adopted a resolution condemning threats against election workers and calling 
for additional agency resources to help protect them. 
There has also been activity on the issue in Congress. Election administrators and other witnesses have 
addressed threats to election workers in testimony to several congressional committees, including in 
•  2021: July 28 and October 26; 
•  2022: May 19, June 21, June 22, July 20, July 27, August 3 (Senate Judiciary), August 3 
(Senate Rules), and August 11; and 
•  2023: March 10, March 23, March 28, April 27, June 7 (House), June 7 (Senate), June 
14, and November 1. 
In the 117th Congress, the majority staff of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform released a 
report about the effects of election misinformation and disinformation, including threats to election 
workers, that drew on responses from election officials to letters from the then-chairs of the committee 
and the Committee on House Administration. Some Senators have also sent letters to federal agencies 
requesting updates or action on threats to election workers, such as a DHS- and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI)-issued public service announcement to local law enforcement. 
Some bills introduced in the 117th or 118th Congress have aimed to address election worker security 
directly, including through proposals to 
•  prohibit intimidation of election workers with intent to interfere with or retaliate for 
performance of official duties (117th: H.R. 777, H.R. 4064/S. 2155, H.R. 5746, S. 2093, 
S. 2747, S. 4920; 118th: H.R. 11/S. 1/S. 2344, S. 1318); 
•  prohibit intimidation for or interference with helping voters register, vote, or both (117th: 
H.R. 1/S. 1/S. 2093, H.R. 1245, H.R. 1366, H.R. 2358/S. 954, H.R. 5746, S. 1840, S. 
2747; 118th: H.R. 11/S. 1/S. 2344, H.R. 1583); 
•  prohibit physically damaging election infrastructure (117th: H.R. 5746, H.R. 6872/S. 
3142, S. 4, S. 2928); 
•  extend an existing prohibition to intimidation for processing ballots or tabulating, 
canvassing, or certifying votes (117th: H.R. 5053/S. 2626, H.R. 5746, S. 2747, S. 4920; 
118th: H.R. 11/S. 1/S. 2344, S. 1318, H.R. 3130/S. 1487); 
•  prohibit, or extend an existing prohibition to, intimidation involving violence or threats of 
harm and involving election agents, vendors, and contractors (117th: S. 4, S. 2928, H.R. 
5746, H.R. 6872/S. 3142); 
•  prohibit removal or suspension of local election administrators except for specified 
reasons, such as neglect of duty or malfeasance in office (117th: H.R. 4064/S. 2155, H.R. 
5746, S. 2747; 118th: H.R. 11/S. 1 /S. 2344, H.R. 5046/S. 2575); 
•  create privacy protections for, or extend existing privacy protections to, election workers 
and their families (117th: H.R. 4064/S. 2155, H.R. 5314, H.R. 5746, S. 2093, S. 2747, S. 
4920; 118th: H.R. 11/S. 1 /S. 2344, S. 1318);
  
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•  increase the penalty for violating an existing prohibition on intimidating poll watchers 
and election officials (117th: S. 4574); 
•  establish in statute a DOJ-led election officials security task force (117th: H.R. 5314);  
•  prohibit possession of unauthorized firearms at federal election sites (118th: H.R. 2471); 
or 
•  direct DOJ to provide law enforcement and federal attorneys with training and resources 
for addressing threats to election workers and assign a special agent to each FBI field 
office to investigate such threats (117th: S. 4920; 118th: S. 1318). 
Legislation has also been introduced to authorize funding states might use to address threats to election 
workers. For example, Members have proposed funding for recruiting, training, retaining, or protecting 
election workers (117th: H.R. 1/S. 1/S. 2093, H.R. 2358/S. 954, H.R. 5746, H.R. 7992/S. 4239, S. 2747, S. 
4920; 118th: H.R. 11/S. 1 /S. 2344, H.R. 5292/S. 630, S. 1318); supplementing election worker pay (117th: 
H.R. 8015; 118th: H.R. 3436/S. 1609); providing election workers with physical security services and 
social media threat monitoring (117th: S. 4920; 118th: S. 1318); and preventing disclosure of election 
workers’ personal information (117th: S. 4920; 118th: S. 1318). 
 
Author Information 
 
Sarah J. Eckman 
  Karen L. Shanton 
Analyst in American National Government 
Analyst in American National Government 
 
 
Disclaimer 
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff 
to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of 
Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of 
information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. 
CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United 
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