
Updated January 2, 2024
U.S.-European Relations in the 118th Congress
An Evolving Relationship
challenges—from promoting stability in various regions
Since the end of World War II, the United States and
(including the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Africa) to
Europe have forged a close, wide-ranging partnership.
countering terrorism and cybercrime to addressing Russia’s
Often termed the transatlantic relationship, the U.S.-
first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Historically, U.S.-EU
European partnership encompasses the 31-member North
cooperation was a driving force in liberalizing world trade.
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), relations with the
Additionally, the well-honed habits of U.S.-European
27-member European Union (EU), and extensive bilateral
political, military, and intelligence cooperation are unique
political and economic ties. Despite periodic tensions over
and cannot be easily replicated with other international
the past 70-plus years, U.S. and European policymakers
actors. U.S. engagement in Europe also helps limit Russian,
generally have valued NATO, the EU, and the broader
Chinese, or other possible malign influences.
transatlantic partnership as serving their respective
At the same time, U.S. concerns exist about aspects of the
geostrategic and economic interests. During the Trump
transatlantic relationship. Despite ongoing overall U.S.
Administration, U.S.-European relations were strained by
President Trump’s
support for NATO (including in Congress), previous U.S.
strident criticism of NATO, the EU, and
Administrations and some Members have repeatedly argued
key European countries, as well as by policy divisions on a
for more European defense spending and burden sharing.
range of issues, including relations with China and Iran,
U.S. officials have long regarded certain EU regulatory
tariffs and other trade issues, climate change, and managing
approaches and other policies as barriers to trade. President
the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.
Trump was particularly forceful in calling for greater
European officials welcomed Biden Administration efforts
European defense spending and in criticizing EU trade
to decrease tensions. The launch of Russia’s war against
practices as unfair and damaging to U.S. interests.
Ukraine in 2022 bolstered U.S.-European ties, but some
challenges have arisen and other foreign policy and trade
Biden Administration Policies and War in Ukraine
differences persist. The second session of the 118th
Upon entering office in 2021, President Biden expressed
Congress may evaluate current U.S. interests in Europe,
strong U.S. support for NATO and its Article 5 mutual
implications of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, and
defense commitment and pledged to work with the EU and
prospects for future U.S.-European cooperation.
European governments on common global concerns. Biden
Administration officials viewed cooperation with European
Transatlantic Relations and U.S. Interests
democracies as key to countering challenges posed by
U.S. policymakers for decades have regarded both NATO
China, Russia, and other authoritarian governments.
and the EU as crucial to maintaining peace and stability in
European leaders welcomed the renewed U.S. commitment
Europe and stymieing big-power competition that cost over
to multilateralism exemplified by President Biden’s
500,000 American lives in two world wars. The United
decisions to reverse certain Trump Administration policies
States spearheaded NATO’s creation in 1949 and
and rejoin the World Health Organization and the Paris
encouraged the European integration project from its
Agreement on combating climate change. At the same time,
inception in the 1950s. During the Cold War, NATO and
some tensions remained and new controversies emerged,
the European project were considered essential to deterring
including in relation to the U.S. troop withdrawal from
the Soviet threat. With strong U.S. support, NATO and the
Afghanistan in August 2021 and the Australia-UK-U.S.
EU have enlarged since the 1990s, extending security and
security pact for the Indo-Pacific (known as AUKUS)
prosperity across the European continent.
announced in September 2021.
The U.S. and European economies are deeply intertwined.
Since 2022, Russia’s war against Ukraine has dominated
According to U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data, the
the transatlantic agenda. The Biden Administration, NATO,
transatlantic economy—the 27 EU member states plus the
the EU, and nearly all European governments strongly
non-EU countries of the United Kingdom (UK), Norway,
condemn Russia’s actions, steadfastly support Ukraine’s
and Switzerland—typically generates around $6 trillion per
territorial integrity, and have been providing military and
year in foreign affiliate sales and directly employs up to 10
economic aid to Ukraine. U.S. and European officials are
million workers annually. The United States and the EU are
coordinating security assistance to Ukraine. The United
each other’s largest overall trade and investment partners.
States and many NATO allies have increased military
deployments to Central and Eastern Europe to deter further
Officials and experts on both sides of the Atlantic assess
Russian aggression and reinforce the alliance’s defense
that U.S. leadership of NATO and cooperation with the EU
posture. The Biden Administration and House and Senate
has helped foster democratic and prosperous European
majorities also welcomed decisions by Finland and Sweden
allies that, in turn, have bolstered U.S. foreign and security
to seek NATO membership. (Finland acceded to NATO in
policies and the multilateral trading system. U.S. and
April 2023; to date, all NATO allies except Hungary and
European officials have worked together on many common
Turkey have given final approval to Sweden’s accession.)
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U.S.-European Relations in the 118th Congress
The United States, the EU, the UK, and other allies have
European concerns also exist about ongoing U.S. political
cooperated extensively on imposing sanctions on Russia.
polarization and whether the United States will remain a
The Biden Administration supports EU efforts to end its
reliable international partner. Some European policymakers
dependency on Russian energy imports and has worked to
argue that Europe must be better prepared to address future
help boost liquefied natural gas shipments to the EU.
challenges in Europe and beyond, and to do so on its own if
Transatlantic unity on Ukraine is under pressure, however,
necessary. For other Europeans, Russia’s war against
amid strains on EU solidarity (related in part to a dispute
Ukraine has reinforced the importance of the transatlantic
over Ukrainian grain imports), delays in new EU and U.S.
partnership and its combined political and economic clout.
funding, and U.S. “donor fatigue” and political divisions.
U.S.-European differences also could arise as policymakers
Issues for Congress
begin to consider requirements for future peace negotiations
Potential areas in transatlantic relations for deliberation in
or how to manage relations with Russia in the longer term.
the 118th Congress include the following:
•
Revitalizing U.S.-EU economic ties has been another Biden
Russia’s War Against Ukraine. Congress may assess
Administration priority. In 2021, the United States and the
U.S.-European cooperation on Ukraine, including
EU reached interim agreements to address disputes over
assistance to Ukraine and the degree of U.S.-European
civil aircraft subsidies and on U.S. steel and aluminum
burden sharing. Congress also may be interested in
tariffs imposed on the EU. U.S. and EU negotiators are
examining the conflict’s implications for transatlantic
seeking to overcome divisions on a deal to discourage trade
security and defense relations, energy policies, and
in high-carbon steel and aluminum, address global
Ukraine’s aspirations to join both NATO and the EU.
overcapacity, and enable a permanent solution on the
• NATO. NATO’s 2023 Vilnius Summit and 2022
tariffs. Also in 2021, the United States and the EU launched
strategic concept identified Russia as the most
a new Trade and Technology Council (TTC), which focuses
significant threat to allied security; emphasized NATO’s
on issues such as emerging technologies, supply chain
collective defense role; and addressed other challenges
security, and digital governance. The Biden Administration
facing the alliance, including China, disruptive
views the TTC, in part, as a vehicle to work with the EU on
technologies, terrorism, and climate change. Congress
issues posed by China and other nonmarket economies;
may examine these issues as well as future U.S. goals
TTC meetings also have discussed U.S.-EU export controls
for NATO, the U.S. force posture in Europe, and
and other sanctions on Russia. Additionally, the Biden
ongoing allied efforts to increase defense spending.
Administration concluded a new commercial data transfer
•
arrangement with the EU to replace the Privacy Shield
U.S.-EU Agenda. In addition to U.S.-EU efforts on
framework (which the EU’s top court invalidated in 2020
Ukraine and Russia, Congress may assess Biden
for not meeting EU data protection standards).
Administration efforts to negotiate a CMA and to work
with the EU on clean energy, digital and technology
U.S. tax credits for the purchase of electric vehicles and
policies, and trade issues through the TTC and other
other clean energy subsidies in P.L. 117-169 (commonly
initiatives. Congress also may consider how issues
known as the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, or IRA)
facing the EU—including upcoming elections, future
sparked new trade frictions. The EU contended that some
EU reforms, and EU foreign policy and defense
IRA measures could discriminate against EU firms and
ambitions—could affect the U.S.-EU partnership.
breach multilateral trade rules. Since March 2023, U.S. and
•
EU officials have been negotiating a new critical minerals
UK Relations. Congress may review the implications of
agreement (CMA) to facilitate EU access to certain IRA tax
Brexit—the UK’s 2020 withdrawal as an EU member—
credits for electric vehicles. U.S.-UK CMA negotiations
for U.S. relations and for the Northern Ireland peace
also have been ongoing since June 2023. Some in Congress
accord. Some in Congress support a future U.S.-UK free
question the Administration’s pursuit of CMAs as executive
trade agreement (FTA); the Biden Administration is
agreements without formal congressional approval. Some
engaged with the UK in CMA talks and on other trade
U.S. stakeholders and Members also voice concern that new
issues but has not resumed comprehensive U.S.-UK
EU digital rules could unfairly target U.S. technology firms.
FTA negotiations begun by the Trump Administration.
•
Managing relations with China and addressing the Israel-
China. The Biden Administration has restarted a U.S.-
Hamas conflict may test U.S.-EU relations as well. EU
EU dialogue on China (initiated by the Trump
views on China in recent years have come to mirror more
Administration), launched U.S.-EU consultations on the
closely U.S. concerns about China’s political and economic
Indo-Pacific, sought to address economic and other
influence. At the same time, some EU officials and national
concerns about China through the TTC, and urged
governments appear wary about U.S.-China tensions and
NATO to address the implications of China’s rise for
reluctant to antagonize a major economic partner. As for
transatlantic security. Congress may consider the
Hamas’s October 2023 attacks on Israel and the ensuing
possibilities for U.S.-European policy coordination
conflict in the Gaza Strip, the Biden Administration and the
toward China and potential obstacles.
EU have affirmed Israel’s right to defend itself “in line with
Also see CRS Report RS21372, The European Union:
international law,” but divisions among EU officials and
Questions and Answers, and CRS In Focus IF10931, U.S.-
member states exist on aspects of the conflict—including
EU Trade and Economic Relations.
on the timing of a potential cease fire—and could
complicate U.S.-EU policy coordination.
Kristin Archick, Specialist in European Affairs
IF12302
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U.S.-European Relations in the 118th Congress
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12302 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED