Updated December 14, 2023
Defense Primer: Operations in the Information Environment
Information as a Joint Function
Strategy for Operations in the
In 2017, Joint Publication (JP) 1 Doctrine of the Armed
Information Environment
Forces of the United States was updated to establish
The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) places these
information as the seventh joint function of the military,
activities in the context of the “gray zone,” coercive actions
along with command and control, intelligence, fires,
below the threshold of a military response and across USG
movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. This
areas of responsibility. With an eye toward the NDS, the
designation has necessitated clarification and revisions in
2023 Strategy for Operations in the Information
some Department of Defense (DOD) doctrine.
Environment aims to improve the DOD’s ability to plan,
resource, and apply informational power to enable
Information Warfare
integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring
While there is currently no official United States
advantages. The NDS describes use of the electromagnetic
government (USG) definition of information warfare (IW),
spectrum across all domains, as well as integration with
DOD doctrine may use the term information warfare to
whole-of-government informational advantages to achieve
describe “the mobilizing of information to attain a
these strategic goals.
competitive advantage and achieve United States (US)
policy goals.” Some DOD doctrine defines IW not as a
History of OIE
strategy but as a subset of OIE conducted during both
In 2018, DOD issued a Joint Concept for Operations in the
competition below armed conflict and during warfighting in
Information Environment. According to this document, the
order to dominate the IE at a specific place and time. The
IE comprises and aggregates numerous social, cultural,
U.S. military contributes to information warfare by
cognitive, technical, and physical attributes that act upon
deliberately leveraging the inherent informational aspects of
and affect knowledge, understanding, beliefs, world views,
activities and by conducting operations in the information
and, ultimately, actions of an individual, group, system,
environment.
community, or organization. Corresponding DOD policy
defined OIE as actions taken to generate, preserve, and
Operations in the Information Environment
apply informational power against a relevant actor in order
According to the 2022 JP 3-04 Information in Joint
to increase or protect competitive advantage or combat
Operations, Operations in the Information Environment
power potential within all domains of the operating
(OIE) involve the integrated employment of multiple
environment. OIE span the competition continuum
information forces to affect drivers of behavior by
(cooperation, competition short of armed conflict, and
informing audiences; influencing foreign relevant actors;
warfighting). This definition of the continuum aligned with
attacking and exploiting relevant actor information,
the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which emphasized
information networks, and information systems; and
information warfare as competition short of open warfare.
protecting friendly information, information networks, and
information systems. OIE activities take place within the
Information Operations
information environment (IE), defined as “the aggregate of
Past definitions within DOD have conceptualized IO as a
social, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical, and
purely military activity involving a set of tactics or
physical factors that affect how humans and automated
capabilities. In earlier iterations of DOD JP 3-13, IO
systems derive meaning from, act upon, and are impacted
consisted of five pillars: computer network operations
by information, including the individuals, organizations,
(CNO), which include computer network attack, computer
and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or use
network defense, and computer network exploitation;
information.” Strategic communication, public diplomacy
psychological operations (PSYOP); electronic warfare
and public and civil affairs, and cyberspace operations may
(EW); operations security (OPSEC); and military deception
be integrated and employed by information forces. These
(MILDEC). With the advent of U.S. Cyber Command,
efforts may take place in and throughout each of the global
CNO became cyberspace operations, offensive and
domains of air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace, and in
defensive with its own doctrine in JP 3-12. In 2010, PSYOP
various forms unrelated to cyberspace, such as dropping
became military information support operations (MISO), to
pamphlets, cultural exchanges, jamming or broadcasting
reflect a broader range of activities and the existing Military
targeted communications, and foreign aid programs.
Information Support Teams consisting of PSYOP personnel
deployed at U.S. embassies overseas. JP 3-13.2 replaced the
All instruments of national power—diplomatic,
term PSYOP with MISO to “more accurately reflect and
informational, military, and economic (DIME)—can be
convey the nature of planned peacetime or combat
projected and employed in the information environment,
operations activities.” The name change reportedly caused
and by nonmilitary elements of the federal government.
administrative confusion, and some services reverted to the
PSYOP label.
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Defense Primer: Operations in the Information Environment
The Secretary of Defense later characterized IO in JP 3-13
by cyberspace presents an ideal battlespace to conduct
as “the integrated employment, during military operations,
covert operations.
of information-related capabilities in concert with other
lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp
In JP 3-12, DOD defines cyberspace as “the global domain
the decision making of adversaries and potential
within the information environment consisting of the
adversaries while protecting our own.” This definition
interdependent network of information technology
shifted the focus from a set of tactics toward the desired
infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
effects and how to achieve them. JP 3-13 defined
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and
information-related capability (IRC) as a tool, technique, or
embedded processors and controllers.” Some have
activity employed within a dimension of the information
criticized this as lacking the cognitive, human element that
environment that can be used to create effects and
the internet represents, which in turn could adversely affect
operationally desirable conditions. JP 3-04 supersedes JP
how the military organizes, trains, and equips for IO in
3-13, and legacy terms such as IO and IRC are to be
cyberspace. Additionally, there are concerns that the split
removed from the Dictionary of Military and Associated
between IO and cyberspace operations in doctrine and
Terms.
organization created a stovepipe effect that hinders
coordination of these closely related forces. As such, some
Types of Information in OIE
services such as the Army and Air Force are reorganizing
In common parlance, the term disinformation campaign is
assets from Cyber Commands into Information Warfare
often used interchangeably with information operations
Commands. The Marine Corps created a Deputy
and/or psychological operations. However, disinformation
Commandant for Information in order to oversee
or deception is only one of the informational tools that
Operations in the Information Environment, to include
comprise an IW strategy; factual information can also be
cyberspace operations.
used to achieve strategic goals and in some cases more
effectively than deceptive means. Different categories of
Who Is Responsible for the “I” in DIME?
information that may be used in OIE include the following:
Within the USG, much of the current information doctrine
and capability resides with the military. Many consider
Propaganda. The propagation of an idea or narrative that is
DOD to be relatively well funded, leading some to posit
intended to influence, similar to psychological or influence
that the epicenter for all IW activities should be the
operations. It can be misleading but true, and may include
Pentagon. Some fear that military leadership of the IW
stolen information. A government communicating its intent,
sphere represents the militarization of cyberspace, or the
policies, and values through speeches, press releases, and
weaponization of information. In addition, the military may
other public affairs can be considered propaganda.
not possess the best tools to successfully lead information
efforts across the USG. Title 10 U.S.C. 2241 prohibits
Misinformation. The spreading of unintentionally false
DOD from domestic “publicity or propaganda,” although
information. Examples include internet trolls who spread
the terms are undefined. It is unclear how OIE relate to this
unfounded conspiracy theories or web hoaxes through
so-called military propaganda ban. P.L. 115-232 tasked the
social media, believing them to be true.
State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC) to
“direct, lead, synchronize, integrate, and coordinate efforts
Disinformation. Unlike misinformation, disinformation is
of the Federal Government to recognize, understand,
intentionally false. Examples include planting false news
expose, and counter foreign state and foreign non-state
stories in the media and tampering with private and/or
propaganda and disinformation efforts.” P.L. 116-92
classified communications before their widespread release.
created a Principal Information Operations Advisor within
DOD to coordinate and deconflict its operations with the
Cyberspace and OIE
GEC.
Cyberspace presents a force multiplier for IW activities.
Social media and botnets can amplify a message or
OIE as an Act of War?
narrative, using all three elements of information to foment
Some have questioned whether tampering with, interfering
discord and confusion in a target audience. Much of today’s
with, or otherwise influencing a sovereign nation’s
IW is conducted in cyberspace, leading to associations with
democratic processes in an IW campaign is an act of war
cybersecurity. Cyberspace operations can be used to
that could trigger a military response, and not necessarily in
achieve strategic IW goals; an offensive cyberattack, for
cyberspace. U.S. policy suggests that these types of
example, may be used to create psychological effects in a
operations fall below the threshold of armed conflict.
target population. A foreign country may likewise use
cyberattacks to influence decisionmaking and change
CRS Reports
behaviors. Cyberspace operations may be conducted for IW
purposes, such as to disable or deny access to an
CRS Report R45142, Information Warfare: Issues for Congress,
adversary’s lines of communication or to demonstrate
by Catherine A. Theohary.
ability as a deterrent. These operations may be overt, such
as a government’s production and dissemination of
materials intended to convey democratic values. In this
Catherine A. Theohary, Specialist in National Security
case, the government sponsorship of such activity is known.
Policy, Cyber and Information Operations
Covert operations are those in which government
sponsorship is denied if exposed. The anonymity afforded
IF10771
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Defense Primer: Operations in the Information Environment
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