Updated December 1, 2023
Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
The UAF faces several challenges in deploying new
February 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have
personnel. First, at the time of the invasion, Ukraine did not
successfully defended against and pushed back Russian
have a fully developed professional noncommissioned
forces in many regions, despite several apparent
officer (NCO) corps, which it previously had been seeking
disadvantages. The UAF has demonstrated flexibility over
to develop along NATO standards. As described above, a
the course of the conflict to date, as well as an ability to
high number of trained veterans, many with combat
integrate Western security assistance into its military
experience, mitigated to some degree the need for an
campaigns. The UAF continues to face obstacles to
established NCO corps to train and command new recruits.
sustaining momentum—including losses in personnel and
Losses among these veterans have increased the importance
equipment—against Russian forces, however, as some
of developing a professional NCO corps and affected unit-
Ukrainian officials candidly admit.
level capability.
Since early 2022, the Biden Administration and Congress
Second, the UAF’s need for immediate reinforcements
have supported Ukraine’s defense of its territorial integrity
creates pressure to deploy troops with only basic training.
against Russia’s invasion. The UAF’s evolving condition
To sustain combat operations in the current conflict,
may be of interest to Congress as Members evaluate
however, the UAF continues to balance training personnel
whether to appropriate additional funds to support Ukraine
to conduct complex operations and operate advanced
and how to conduct oversight of U.S. policies and
weaponry with ensuring sufficient personnel are deployed
assistance.
at the front line.
Personnel
Finally, the UAF struggles to train officers for staff
Some observers note that the UAF’s overall performance to
positions to assist commanders in managing and
date has been in part due to high levels of recruitment and
coordinating operations. The lack of trained staff officers
motivation. High losses, however, pose a continued
has in some cases led to tactical operations being
challenge to the UAF’s ability to sustain effective
coordinated and managed by higher-level command staff,
operations.
leading to centralized and slower decisionmaking.
After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the UAF
Equipment
gained important combat experience fighting Russian-led
The UAF operates a mix of Western and Soviet or Russian
forces in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk
equipment. This variety of systems results in diverse
(known as the Donbas). This experience led to a large
capabilities across units and complicates maintenance and
proportion of trained veterans among Ukraine’s population.
standardization. To date, the UAF has sustained significant
In 2022, these veterans and other volunteers (including
equipment losses. Some UAF units appear to be operating
foreign recruits) were quickly mobilized into Ukraine’s new
without mechanized or motorized vehicle support, likely
volunteer Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and Reserve
due to losses and limited replacements. Despite losses,
without the need for lengthy training. These units have been
Western security assistance and UAF resilience in repairing
crucial in supporting regular UAF units, enabling the
and maintaining equipment has been crucial to UAF
regular units to spearhead operations and counteroffensives.
successes.
Since the beginning of the 2022 war, the UAF reportedly
Ukraine has nearly exhausted its supplies of Soviet and
has suffered high levels of casualties, lowering force
Russian artillery and rocket ammunition, making the UAF
quality. Losses are likely higher among regular UAF and
almost totally reliant on Western assistance for artillery and
Special Forces units, leading to a greater reliance on TDF
rocket artillery systems and ammunition. Ukrainian
and Reserve units. Many of these TDF and Reserve units
officials have emphasized a need for long-range rocket and
also have sustained heavy casualties, further increasing the
artillery systems to counter Russia’s quantitative
proportion of new recruits needed to regenerate forces.
advantages in long-range fire. The UAF has demonstrated
Unlike in the initial period of the war, when most recruits
an ability to use qualitative advantages provided by
were veterans, at present most new recruits have little
Western security assistance (e.g., long-range precision
military experience and, as a result, take longer to train.
fires) to mitigate Russian quantitative advantages in
Currently, the UAF is also experiencing growing recruiting
artillery.
challenges; Ukrainian officials have stated they intend to
implement further mobilization plans (such as changes in
Ukraine’s domestic defense industry produces a wide
conscription) in the near future.
variety of weapons but has been unable to meet the
country’s full wartime demands. In addition, Russian forces
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Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook
have targeted Ukraine’s domestic defense industry,
Current Military Performance and
affecting its ability to produce and maintain equipment.
Outlook
Some observers highlight the importance of supporting and
The UAF continues to demonstrate high levels of
improving Ukraine’s defense industry to fill Ukraine’s
operational flexibility, motivation, and capability. The UAF
long-term security needs and reduce its reliance on Western
appears committed to capitalizing on Russian military
security assistance.
shortfalls and demonstrating to foreign audiences its ability
to retake territory. However, as fighting shifts into more
Role of U.S. and Western Security
positional and attritional combat, some observers argue the
Assistance
UAF should transition to sustaining combat capability.
Since the start of Russia’s 2022 war, the United States has
committed more than $44.2 billion in security assistance to
The UAF command structure appears to be more
Ukraine. The United States and European allies and
centralized than it was earlier in the war. While the UAF
partners also continue to contribute training, logistics, and
seeks to adopt NATO-style principles of command, it still
intelligence. Western officials continue to have concerns
exhibits traits of Soviet-style command, particularly among
over escalation, available stockpiles, defense industrial
mobilized officers educated according to Soviet doctrine.
production capacity, and funding to procure and sustain
Nevertheless, the UAF has demonstrated flexibility and a
security assistance.
willingness to adjust operations due to changing
circumstances, particularly at the unit and junior levels.
Training
Prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion, the United States and other
Russia’s armed forces retain some advantages in equipment
allies contributed training and advice to the UAF. Current
(specifically artillery and armored vehicles, including
training efforts focus on employing and operating Western
tanks), air support, and electronic warfare. The UAF has
security assistance; basic infantry skills and unit-level
established new units (and re-equipped some existing units)
development; and, increasingly, combined arms operations.
with Western equipment, providing improved capabilities
Observers also note the challenge of simultaneously
and survivability. Ukrainian officials state that their most
training personnel on operating weapons systems and on
urgent needs include air defense, armored mobility
maintenance and sustainment strategies that are crucial to
(armored and infantry fighting vehicles), artillery (such as
operating systems over the long term.
M777 howitzers), and long-range fires. In particular,
armored mobility is required to upgrade and equip new and
The UAF still faces pressure to deploy troops in the field
existing units.
with minimum training to replace losses but has increased
efforts to prioritize advanced training to support long-term
Ukrainian officials also note the importance of continued
development and the creation of new units. Training will
ammunition supplies, especially as fighting remains
likely grow in importance as the UAF seeks to replace its
dominated by artillery support. In addition, the UAF has
losses with mobilized personnel.
identified needs in logistics (including training and
improving processes), breaching equipment (such as mine
Equipment
clearing and bridging capabilities), medical evacuation and
In the initial phase of the war, U.S. and European provision
care, intelligence, and secure communications.
of anti-tank and short-range man-portable air defense
(MANPAD) systems was crucial for Ukraine’s resistance to
The UAF still relies on a core of professional units to
Russia’s invasion. As the war has evolved, Western security
conduct combined arms operations and spearhead
assistance has adjusted to the conditions and the UAF’s
operations, supported by TDF and Reserve units.
needs.
Recruitment and motivation remain high, but losses,
exhaustion, and the need to rotate units likely will remain
At the tactical level, the UAF has identified protected
ongoing challenges. Training new recruits to replace and
mobility (e.g., armored vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles),
expand these professional units, as well as officers for staff
tanks (including Leopard, Challenger, and Abrams), and
positions, will likely remain key objectives. The UAF’s
tactical-level fire support (e.g., mortars) among its needs to
ability to regenerate forces and maintain force quality likely
exploit advances, protect withdrawal, and support
will be critical to its success
operations.
These developments may factor into congressional
Ukraine’s air force and air defenses thus far have proven
decisionmaking regarding whether and how to support
effective in limiting Russian air superiority. Russia retains
Ukraine’s defense. Some observers suggest that UAF
air superiority in certain regions, however, and continues to
capabilities will continue to increase with continued U.S.
target Ukrainian air defenses. Air defense systems remain a
and Western security assistance, especially in key areas,
top priority for security assistance, at both the strategic and
such as air defenses and artillery. Other observers argue that
the tactical levels, including mobile air defense systems to
the UAF faces significant hurdles to decisively defeating
protect units as they advance and support offensive
Russian forces regardless of security assistance.
operations. Ukrainian officials say that securing enough
ammunition for Ukraine’s air defenses is critical in
Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European
anticipation of Russian targeting of civilian infrastructure
Affairs
this winter.
IF12150
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Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF12150 · VERSION 5 · UPDATED

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