Updated November 15, 2023
AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation
On December 1, 2021, President Joseph Biden submitted to
The agreement, which entered into force on February 8,
Congress an “Agreement among Australia, the United
2022, is to remain in force until December 31, 2023, when
Kingdom, and the United States for the Exchange of Naval
it will “automatically extend for four additional periods of
Nuclear Propulsion Information.” This In Focus explains
six months each.” Any party may terminate its participation
the agreement’s substance, as well as provisions of the
in the agreement with six months written notice. Should any
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended (P.L. 83-
party abrogate or materially violate the agreement, the other
703; 42 U.S.C. §§2153 et seq.), concerning the content and
parties may “require the return or destruction” of any
congressional review of such agreements.
transferred data.
An accompanying message to Congress explains that the
The agreement includes provisions to protect transferred
agreement would permit the three governments to
data. For example, no party may communicate any
“communicate and exchange Naval Nuclear Propulsion
information governed by the agreement to any
Information and would provide authorization to share
“unauthorized persons or beyond” the party’s “jurisdiction
certain Restricted Data as may be needed during trilateral
or control.” In addition, a recipient party communicating
discussions” concerning a project to develop Australian
such information to nationals of a third AUKUS
nuclear-powered submarines. This project is part of an
government must obtain permission from the originating
“enhanced trilateral security partnership” named AUKUS,
party. The agreement includes an appendix detailing
which the three governments announced on September 15,
“security arrangements” to protect transferred information.
2021. The United States has a similar nuclear naval
propulsion arrangement only with the United Kingdom
Related Nuclear Cooperation
pursuant to the bilateral 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement.
Agreements
The AEA authorizes and contains requirements for nuclear
The partnership’s first initiative, according to a September
cooperation agreements governing both civil and military
15 Joint Statement, is an 18-month study “to seek an
applications. The United States has nuclear cooperation
optimal pathway to deliver” this submarine capability to
agreements with both Australia and the United Kingdom
Australia. This study is to include “building on” the U.S.
that are relevant to the AUKUS agreement. The United
and UK nuclear-powered submarine programs “to bring an
Kingdom is a nuclear-weapon state under the nuclear
Australian capability into service at the earliest achievable
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); Australia is not a nuclear-
date.” The study is “in the early stages,” according to a
weapon state.
November 2021 non-paper from Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, which adds that “[m]any
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
of the program specifics have yet to be determined.”
The United States and Australia first concluded a civil
nuclear cooperation agreement in 1957. Those governments
On March 13, 2023, Australian Prime Minister Anthony N.
updated that agreement in 1979 and renewed it in 2010.
Albanese, U.S. President Joe Biden, and British Prime
Australia sells around 36% of its $1 billion in uranium
Minister Rishi Sunak announced a “phased approach” for
exports to the United States. The United States is also a
Australian acquisition of a nuclear-powered submarine,
major processor of Australian uranium sold to other
called SSN-AUKUS, which is to be based on a “next-
countries. Australia does not currently possess any nuclear
generation” British design and incorporate “cutting edge
power plants, but it operates one research reactor. This
U.S. submarine technologies.” SSN-AUKUS “will be built
agreement “specifically prohibits the transfer of restricted
and deployed by both Australia and the United Kingdom,”
data under it,” as well as “sensitive nuclear technology,
according to the leaders’ statement.
sensitive nuclear facilities and major critical components.”
Agreement Details
As a nonnuclear-weapon state under the NPT, Australia has
The agreement, which the governments signed on
a comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency
November 22, 2021, permits each party to exchange “naval
(IAEA) safeguards agreement. Such agreements, according
nuclear propulsion information as is determined to be
to the agency, are designed “to provide credible assurance
necessary to research, develop, design, manufacture,
to the international community that nuclear material and
operate, regulate, and dispose of military reactors.” As
other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear
noted, this information includes restricted data; the AEA
uses.”
defines such data to include “all data concerning ... the use
of special nuclear material in the production of energy.”
The 1958 U.S. nuclear cooperation agreement with the
The AEA and 10 C.F.R. Part 810.3 define special nuclear
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), renewed
material as plutonium, uranium-233, or enriched uranium.
in 1995, provided the legal framework for civilian nuclear
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AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation
cooperation between the United States and United
Section 123
Kingdom. In anticipation of the latter’s withdrawal from the
AEA section 123 contains provisions governing nuclear
European Union (EU), and its legal association with
cooperation agreements’ content, as well as associated
Euratom, the two governments concluded a bilateral nuclear
congressional review procedures. Section 123 a. states that
cooperation agreement in 2018. Following the required
the proposed agreement is to include the terms, conditions,
congressional review period, the new agreement entered
duration, nature, and scope of cooperation and lists
into force on December 31, 2020, after the UK withdrawal
mandatory criteria for the agreement. This section mandates
from the EU. The agreement is to remain in force for 30
that nuclear cooperation agreements pursuant to AEA
years.
section 144 c. (2) contain
US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement
• a guarantee that safeguards on transferred nuclear
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-585) restricted the
material and equipment continue in perpetuity;
sharing of nuclear weapons information with foreign
• a provision requiring the application of comprehensive
governments, including the United Kingdom. However, an
IAEA safeguards to be applied in nonnuclear-weapon
October 1957 Declaration of Common Purpose issued by
states;
President Dwight Eisenhower and UK Prime Minister
Harold MacMillan stipulated that Eisenhower would
• a prohibition on the retransfer of material or restricted
request Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act “as may
data without U.S. consent;
be necessary and desirable to permit” bilateral nuclear
•
cooperation. (For more information, see CRS Insight
a requirement that the recipient state maintain physical
IN11762, New Developments in the United States’ Strategic
security on transferred nuclear material;
and Defense Ties with Australia, by Bruce Vaughn.)
• a prohibition on the recipient state’s use of transferred
Congress adopted an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act
items or technology for any nuclear explosive device or
in 1958 (P.L. 85-479) authorizing U.S. government transfer
for any other military purpose; and
to foreign governments of information, as well as certain
•
components, related to nuclear weapons. This amendment
a provision specifying the U.S. right to demand the
also authorizes the export of nuclear reactors and related
return of transferred nuclear materials and equipment, as
information for naval propulsion.
well as any special nuclear material produced through
their use, if the cooperating state detonates a nuclear
In 1958, the United States and United Kingdom concluded
explosive device or terminates or abrogates an IAEA
the U.S.–UK Mutual Defense Agreement (MDA). The
safeguards agreement.
United States subsequently transferred a nuclear plant and
associated reactor fuel to the United Kingdom for use in a
Section 123 d. specifies the procedure for congressional
submarine. The agreement, which the two parties amended
approval of agreements such as the AUKUS agreement.
in 2014, “provides the necessary requirements for the
control and transmission of submarine nuclear propulsion
Congress has the opportunity to review a nuclear
technology, atomic information and material between the
cooperation agreement for 60 days of continuous session.
UK and US, and the transfer of non-nuclear components to
The President must submit the text of the proposed
the UK.” The 2014 amendment extended the MDA until
agreement, along with required supporting documents, to
2024.
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, and the House and Senate Armed
Atomic Energy Act Requirements
Services Committees. The agreement may enter into force
The AEA includes requirements for the content of nuclear
after the end of the 60-day period unless, during that time,
cooperation agreements, related presidential determinations
Congress adopts a joint resolution disapproving the
and other supporting information for submission to
agreement and the resolution becomes law.
Congress, conditions affecting the implementation of an
agreement, and procedures for Congress to consider and
At the beginning of this 60-day period, joint resolutions of
approve the agreement. (For more information, see CRS
approval or disapproval, as appropriate, are to be
Report RS22937, Nuclear Cooperation with Other
automatically introduced in each house. During this period,
Countries: A Primer, by Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth D.
the committees are to hold hearings on the proposed
Nikitin.)
agreement and “submit a report to their respective bodies
recommending whether it should be approved or
Section 144 c. (2): Military Nuclear Reactor Data
disapproved.” If no committee has reported the requisite
This section permits the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
joint resolution of approval or disapproval by the end of 45
and Department of Defense, with presidential authorization,
days, it is automatically discharged from further
“to communicate or exchange with that nation Restricted
consideration of the measure. After the joint resolution is
Data concerning research, development, or design, of
reported or discharged, Congress is to consider it under
military reactors.” The President must determine that “the
expedited procedures, as established by Section 130 i. of
proposed cooperation” and data communication “will
the AEA.
promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the
common defense and security.”
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation
IF11999
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AUKUS Nuclear Cooperation


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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11999 · VERSION 3 · UPDATED

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