Updated November 1, 2023
Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
Since 2005, the United States has imposed sanctions on
Venezuela has failed demonstrably to adhere to its
Venezuelan individuals and entities that have engaged in
obligations under international narcotics control
criminal, antidemocratic, and/or corrupt actions. The Trump
agreements. President Biden made the determination for
Administration expanded the scope of U.S. sanctions,
FY2024 in September 2023 but waived foreign aid
moving beyond individually targeted sanctions to include
restrictions.
broader financial sanctions, sectoral sanctions, and
sanctions on the government of Nicolás Maduro. Despite
Treasury has imposed sanctions on at least 22 individuals
those sanctions, which were associated with an economic
and 27 companies with connections to Venezuela by
collapse that has led 7.7 million Venezuelans to flee the
designating them as Specially Designated Narcotics
country, Maduro consolidated power. The failure of
Traffickers pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
international pressure to dislodge Maduro has led
Designation Act (P.L. 106-120, Title VIII; 21 U.S.C. 1901
Venezuela’s Unity Platform of opposition parties to shift
et seq.). Designees include current and former officials.
strategies and compete in presidential elections due by
October 2024.
Targeted Sanctions Related to Antidemocratic
Actions, Human Rights Violations, and Corruption
The Biden Administration has sought to leverage sanctions
In response to increasing repression in Venezuela, Congress
relief to incentivize Maduro to negotiate a path toward
enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil
freer, fairer elections. After the October 17, 2023, signing
Society Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
of a partial electoral roadmap between Maduro and the
Among its provisions, the law required the President to
Unity Platform, the Biden Administration issued licenses
impose sanctions against those whom the President
easing some sanctions on Venezuela through April 2024.
identified as responsible for significant acts of violence,
U.S. officials warned, however, that if the Maduro
serious human rights abuses, or antidemocratic actions.
government does not define an expedited process that
Congress extended this act through 2023 in P.L. 116-94.
allows all candidates to run for president and begin to
release political prisoners and wrongfully detained U.S.
President Obama issued E.O. 13692 to implement P.L. 113-
citizens by late November 2023, the licenses can be
278 in March 2015, and Treasury issued regulations in July
revoked. Maria Corina Machado won the October 2022
2015 (31 C.F.R. Part 591). The E.O. targets (for asset
opposition primary with 93% of the vote but is barred from
blocking and visa restrictions) those involved in actions or
running in the 2024 contest.
policies undermining democratic processes or institutions;
serious human rights abuses; prohibiting, limiting, or
Congress has helped shape U.S. sanctions policy toward
penalizing freedom of expression or peaceful assembly; and
Venezuela. Some in Congress oppose any easing of
public corruption. It includes any person who is a current or
sanctions, whereas others are supportive only if the Maduro
former leader of any entity engaged in any of those
government complies with the electoral agreement. U.S.
activities, as well as current or former government officials.
sanctions on Venezuela are described below.
As of November 1, 2023, Treasury had imposed SDN
Terrorism-Related Sanctions
sanctions on more than 110 Venezuelans and at least eight
Since 2006, the Secretary of State has made an annual
entities pursuant to E.O. 13692. The targeted individuals
determination that Venezuela is not “cooperating fully with
include President Maduro, his wife, and his son; Vice
United States anti-terrorism efforts” pursuant to Section
President Delcy Rodríguez; Defense Minister Vladimir
40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2781). The
Padrino Lopez; supreme court judges; and governors.
most recent determination was made in May 2023. The
United States has prohibited all U.S. commercial arms sales
Additional Financial Sanctions
and retransfers to Venezuela since 2006. In 2008, pursuant
President Trump imposed additional financial sanctions on
to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, the U.S. Treasury
Venezuela because of the government’s human rights
Department (Treasury) designated two individuals and two
abuses and antidemocratic actions. In August 2017,
travel agencies in Venezuela as Specially Designated
President Trump issued E.O. 13808, which prohibited
Nationals (SDNs) subject to asset blocking sanctions for
access to U.S. financial markets by the Venezuelan
financially supporting Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated Foreign
government, including state energy company Petróleos de
Terrorist Organization.
Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), with certain exceptions intended
to minimize the impact on the Venezuelan people and U.S.
Drug Trafficking-Related Sanctions
interests. In March 2018, President Trump issued E.O.
Since 2005, pursuant to procedures in the Foreign Relations
13827 to prohibit transactions involving the Venezuelan
Authorization Act, FY2003 (P.L. 107-228, §706; 22 U.S.C.
government’s issuance of digital currency, coin, or token.
2291j), the President has made an annual determination that
In May 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13835, which
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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions
prohibited transactions related to purchasing Venezuelan
Biden Administration: Licenses
debt and any debt owed to Venezuela pledged as collateral.
In May 2022, OFAC allowed Chevron to discuss future
operations with PdVSA. In November 2022, OFAC issued
Broader Sectoral Sanctions
a license allowing Chevron to resume production, import,
On November 1, 2018, President Trump issued E.O. 13850.
and export of petroleum products at its existing joint
This E.O. set forth a framework to block the assets of, and
ventures in Venezuela. Chevron has recouped some of the
prohibit certain transactions with, any person determined by
billions in debt PdVSA owes the company. In January
the Secretary of the Treasury to operate in designated
2023, OFAC gave Trinidad and Tobago a two-year license
sectors of the Venezuelan economy or to engage in corrupt
to engage with PdVSA on developing an offshore natural
transactions with the Maduro government.
gas field. In October 2023, OFAC amended the license to
allow cash payments for the gas.
On January 28, 2019, pursuant to E.O. 13850, Treasury
designated PdVSA as operating in the oil sector of the
On October 18, 2023, the Treasury Department
Venezuelan economy and the Secretary of the Treasury
determined the company was subject to U.S. sanctions. The
• issued a six-month general license temporarily
E.O freezes all property and interests in property of PdVSA
authorizing transactions involving the oil and gas sector
subject to U.S. jurisdiction and prohibits U.S. persons
in Venezuela;
(companies or individuals) from engaging in transactions
with the company. Treasury also sanctioned Venezuela’s
• issued another general license authorizing transactions
Central Bank, National Development Bank, and state-
with Minerven, in part to reduce illicit gold trading; and
owned gold company, Minerven. Through January 2021,
Treasury sanctioned individuals, as well as oil and shipping
• amended licenses to remove bans on the secondary
companies, for helping PdVSA evade sanctions. The Biden
trading of certain Venezuelan bonds and PdVSA debt
Administration has not issued similar secondary sanctions.
and equity.
The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets
Should the Maduro government not comply with the terms
Control (OFAC) has issued general licenses to allow certain
of the election agreement, the State Department said that
transactions related to PdVSA and its U.S. subsidiaries,
the United States will “reverse steps we have taken.”
some of which have expired. OFAC authorized transactions
with U.S.-based PdVSA subsidiaries PDV Holding Inc.
Resuming oil trade with Venezuela and allowing
(PDVH) and CITGO Holding Inc. through February 2021.
Venezuelan gas to be developed and exported to European
OFAC authorized PDVH, CITGO, and other U.S.
allies could advance U.S. economic and security interests.
companies to import petroleum from PdVSA through April
Easing sanctions also may improve the Venezuelan
2019, but payments went to a blocked U.S. account. OFAC
economy and reduce emigration from the country, another
permitted U.S. companies (including Chevron) working in
U.S. policy goal. It remains to be seen whether U.S.
Venezuela with PdVSA to operate through July 2019. An
concerns about hastening a return to democracy in
amended license subsequently allowed only transactions
Venezuela will outweigh these other concerns, particularly
necessary for the “safety or the preservation of assets.”
if the Maduro government does not allow Machado to run.
OFAC extended that license through mid-November 2023.
Policy Considerations
Since 2019, OFAC has continuously renewed, most
Congress has maintained broad support for a negotiated
recently through January 2024, a license blocking certain
solution to the crisis in Venezuela that would pave the way
creditors from seizing CITGO assets. OFAC may change
for free and fair elections. In December 2019, Congress
course on this policy in compliance with ongoing litigation.
enacted P.L. 116-94, which included provisions from the
Venezuela Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and
Sanctions on the Maduro Government
Development (VERDAD) Act (S. 1025). The law extended
In August 2019, President Trump issued E.O. 13884,
targeted sanctions regarding corruption and undemocratic
freezing the assets of the Maduro government in the United
actions through 2023. With those authorizations scheduled
States and within the control of U.S. persons. The order
to expire in December, Congress could enact legislation to
prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with
codify current executive orders or to create new
the Maduro government unless authorized by OFAC. E.O.
sanctionable offenses (e.g., H.R. 5670, S. 995).
13884 also authorized financial sanctions and visa
restrictions on non-U.S. persons who assist the Maduro
Some in Congress have supported sanctions relief, arguing
government. To allow assistance to the Venezuelan people,
that broad sanctions have not achieved their aims and have
OFAC issued licenses authorizing transactions involving
hurt the Venezuelan people. Others have opposed sanctions
the delivery of food, agricultural commodities, and
relief, introducing legislation that would prohibit U.S.
medicine; remittances; international organizations; and
imports of Venezuelan oil (S. 3053). Others have urged the
communications services. A 2021 Government
Biden Administration to revoke the licenses granted in
Accountability Office report found that, despite those
October 2023 since the Maduro-aligned supreme court has
licenses, overcompliance with U.S. sanctions had limited
suspended the results of the opposition primary and barred
some humanitarian assistance to Venezuelans.
Machado’s candidacy. For more information, see OFAC’s
page on “Venezuela-Related Sanctions.”
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Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions

Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Affairs
IF10715


Disclaimer
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10715 · VERSION 43 · UPDATED

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