Updated October 9, 2023
U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From the Mérida Initiative
to the Bicentennial Framework
Record drug overdose deaths in the United States and rising
The Four-Pillars: FY2011-FY2017
homicides in Mexico, most of which never lead to
In 2011, the U.S. and Mexican governments broadened the
convictions, have led some in Congress to question the
scope of bilateral efforts under four pillars.
efficacy of U.S.-Mexican security cooperation. The
homicide rate in Mexico tripled from 2007 to 2021,
1. Combating transnational criminal
reaching 28 per 100,000 people. Over the same period, U.S.
organizations (TCOs)
drug overdose deaths rose from 27,700 in 2007 to 107,000
2. Strengthening criminal justice sector
in 2021. Some 66% of U.S. overdoses in 2021 were linked
institutions while protecting human rights
to fentanyl. Since 2019, Mexico has replaced China as the
United States’
3. Creating a 21st-century U.S.-Mexican border
primary source of fentanyl (with precursor
while improving immigration enforcement in
chemicals coming mostly from China), despite bilateral
Mexico
efforts under the Mérida Initiative that were supported by
$3.5 billion in appropriations from FY2008 to FY2021.
4. Building strong and resilient communities
through pilot projects aimed at violence
Congress may evaluate lessons learned from the Mérida
prevention and drug demand reduction
Initiative to inform funding and oversight of the U.S.-
Some observers initially praised the initiative’s breadth but
Mexico Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public
later concluded that the governments adopted too many
Health, and Safe Communities, adopted in 2021.
priorities without allocating adequate funding for them,
particularly on the Mexican side. For example, pillar two
Origins of the Mérida Initiative
received significant U.S. funding for courtroom
Prior to FY2008, Mexico did not receive large amounts of
infrastructure, training, and equipment to support Mexico’s
U.S. security assistance, partially due to Mexican sensitivity
2008-2016 transition to an accusatorial justice system at the
about U.S. involvement in the country’s internal affairs. In
federal and state levels. According to the World Justice
March 2007, then-Mexican President Felipe Calderón asked
Project, however, the new criminal justice system is
for more U.S. cooperation to fight criminal organizations
unlikely to succeed without improvements in the
and their cross-border trafficking operations. In response,
investigative capacities of Mexican police and prosecutors.
the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S. antidrug and rule-
of-law assistance to Mexico, began. As part of the Mérida
Final Phase and Demise: FY2018-FY2021
Initiative’s emphasis on shared responsibility, the Mexican
In January 2018, President Trump issued two executive
government pledged to tackle corruption. The U.S.
orders on combatting TCOs (E.O. 13773) and enhancing
government pledged to address drug demand and the illicit
border security (E.O. 13767) that refocused the Mérida
trafficking of firearms and bulk currency to Mexico. Both
Initiative. Controlling irregular migration became a central
governments have struggled to fulfill those commitments.
U.S. goal, along with reducing synthetic drug production,
improving border interdiction, and conducting anti-money
Initial Phase: FY2008-FY2010
laundering efforts. Analysts asserted that promoting human
Congress appropriated $1.5 billion for the Mérida Initiative
rights and institutionalizing the new criminal justice system
from FY2008 to FY2010, including $420.7 million in
were deemphasized.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which enabled the
purchase of equipment, including aircraft and helicopters,
Since taking office in December 2018, Mexican President
to support Mexico’s federal security forces (military and
Andrés Manuel López Obrador has criticized the Mérida
police). Congress required the State Department to withhold
Initiative and reduced federal security cooperation with the
15% of certain U.S. aid for the Mexican military and police
United States, with the exception of migration enforcement.
until the agency submitted an annual report stating that
In 2019, the López Obrador administration disbanded the
Mexico was taking steps to meet human rights
federal police, which had received significant U.S.
requirements. U.S. assistance focused on counternarcotics,
equipment and training. It created a National Guard,
border security, and counterterrorism; public security; and
primarily composed of retired military officers, that has
institution building. U.S. intelligence supported Mexico’s
limited investigative capacity and lacks civilian control
strategy of arresting (and extraditing) kingpins from each of
over its operations. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic
the major drug trafficking organizations, which
hindered bilateral cooperation. In October 2020, the United
inadvertently contributed to intra-cartel violence.
States arrested former Defense Minister Salvador
Cienfuegos on drug charges; the move angered the Mexican
government, which further limited cooperation. Mexico’s
Congress enacted a law requiring foreign law enforcement
https://crsreports.congress.gov

---

U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From the Mérida Initiative to the Bicentennial Framework
officials to share information they gather with designated
Congressional Action
Mexican federal authorities and requiring Mexican state
Congress could influence the Bicentennial Framework
and local officials to report contacts with foreign officials.
through appropriations and conditions on those
Bilateral cooperation further diminished as the Mexican
appropriations, other legislation, and oversight. The Biden
government stopped approving many Mérida programs.
Administration’s FY2023 foreign assistance budget request
included $141.6 million for Mexico. The Consolidated
Bicentennial Framework (2021-Present)
Appropriations Act, 2023 (P.L. 117-328), did not specify an
The Biden Administration has sought to reduce tensions
appropriations level for Mexico, though the explanatory
and rebuild the U.S. security relationship with Mexico. In
statement noted that the act included aid “commensurate
October 2021, Mexico hosted the first High-Level Security
with prior fiscal years.” Mexico received $127.1 million in
Dialogue (HLSD) since 2016. After the dialogue, the
FY2022 (including $64 million in International Narcotics
governments announced a new Bicentennial Framework for
and Law Enforcement [INCLE] funds and $32 million in
Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities (the
Economic Support Funds [ESF] to support the
Framework) with three pillars:
Framework). Other ESF money supported climate programs
and other goals. The explanatory statement also instructed
1) Protect people by investing in public
agencies to comply with directives in H.Rept. 117-401,
health solutions to drug use, supporting
which prohibited foreign military financing (FMF) aid for
safe communities, and reducing
Mexico and directed that no other funds appropriated be
homicides and other high-impact crimes
used to support military involvement in law enforcement.
2) Prevent transborder crime by securing
H.Rept. 117-401 also required the State Department to
modes of travel and commerce, reducing
produce a report assessing the impact of aid provided
arms trafficking, targeting illicit supply
through the Framework, as well as a report on human rights
chains, and reducing human trafficking
in Mexico, among other topics.
and smuggling
Congress has not completed action on the Biden
3) Pursue criminal networks by disrupting
Administration’s $111.4 million FY2024 request for
illicit financiers, strengthening justice
foreign assistance to Mexico. Most programs continue to be
sector actors to prosecute organized
funded at the FY2023 level under a continuing resolution
crime, addressing cyber threats, and
(P.L. 118-15) that expires on November 17, 2023. The
cooperating on extraditions
House-passed version of the State, Foreign Operations, and
Many observers credit the 2021 HLSD and the Framework
Related Programs Appropriations bill (H.R. 4665) would
with restarting bilateral security cooperation. The
not specify a total appropriations level for Mexico and
Framework envisions a more coordinated, “whole of
would prohibit the provision of ESF to Mexico. It also
government” approach to combating shared security
would require the State Department to withhold 15% of all
challenges. In March 2023, U.S. and Mexican officials
international security aid for Mexico (including INCLE and
announced “phase two” of the Framework, focused on
other funds) until the Secretary certifies that the Mexican
combatting fentanyl production, arms trafficking, and
government has taken steps to combat fentanyl trafficking
TCOs. Mexico has enacted a new law to detect and punish
and TCOs. H.Rept. 118-146, accompanying H.R. 4665,
illicit synthetic drug production; dedicated federal
would direct the State Department and other U.S. agencies
prosecutors to work on fentanyl cases; and extradited
to focus on strengthening the capacity of Mexican judicial
Ovidio Guzmán, a major fentanyl trafficker. At the 2023
and security institutions to combat crime, especially crime
HLSD, U.S. officials highlighted increased interdictions,
associated with fentanyl and other narcotics trafficking.
arrests, and indictments for arms and fentanyl trafficking.
Sanctions have become a key tool to combat both crimes
The Senate Appropriations Committee’s reported foreign
and those who finance TCOs.
aid appropriations bill, S. 2438, would prohibit the
obligation of INCLE assistance for the Mexican
Key questions remain, however, about the Framework,
government until the Secretary of State submits a report to
including the extent to which it should include migration
the Appropriations Committees assessing the Mexican
control as a major focus, as discussed at the 2023 HLSD.
government’s antidrug efforts over the past two years.
Some observers have argued that the Framework provides
S.Rept. 118-71, accompanying the bill, would require the
insufficient U.S. support for corruption efforts and
Secretary to submit a second report prior to the obligation
institutional strengthening in Mexico. Others have urged
of INCLE funds, assessing the extent to which the Mexican
U.S. agencies to push for transparency and human rights
government is addressing certain human rights issues and
safeguards as Mexico has increased reliance on the military
how U.S. assistance has supported those objectives. In
to perform public security, customs, and other traditionally
addition to any assistance provided for Mexico, S. 2438
civilian functions. Human rights groups assert that the
would provide “not less than” $125.0 million for programs
Framework does not prioritize addressing impunity for past
to counter the flow of fentanyl and other synthetic drugs
and ongoing grave human rights abuses committed by
and their precursors from the People’s Republic of China to
Mexican security forces. A September 2023 Government
the United States, including through other countries and
Accountability Office report questioned how the
across the United States-Mexico border.
Framework’s efficacy would be evaluated.
See CRS In Focus IF10400, Trends in Mexican Opioid
Trafficking and Implications for U.S.-Mexico Security
https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10578 · VERSION 28 · UPDATED

---

U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From the Mérida Initiative to the Bicentennial Framework
Cooperation; CRS Report R41576, Mexico: Organized
Clare Ribando Seelke, Specialist in Latin American
Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations; CRS In Focus
Affairs
IF10215, Mexico’s Immigration Control Efforts.
IF10578


Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to
congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress.
Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has
been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the
United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be
reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include
copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you
wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.

https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10578 · VERSION 28 · UPDATED

---