

 
 Legal Sidebari 
 
Regulating Gender in School Sports: An 
Overview of Legal Challenges to State Laws 
Updated October 4, 2023 
Public debate over the participation of transgender women in women’s sports has proliferated in recent 
years, raising questions of fairness in contexts ranging from the Olympics to elementary school sports 
teams. School districts and athletics associations typically regulate who can participate in their sports 
leagues, and many have implemented policies that allow students to participate on teams that align with 
their gender identity at some levels of competition. In the past few years, however, many states have 
passed laws preventing transgender women and girls from participating in women’s interscholastic sports. 
These laws, which often state their purpose as protecting women’s sports, function by limiting 
participation on sports teams “based on the biological sex at birth of team members.” Proponents of this 
legislation argue that male physiology confers inherent physical benefits and that “biological females” 
have a competitive disadvantage if “biological males” are allowed to play with or against them on 
women’s teams. Transgender student-athletes and their parents have contested these laws and the 
underlying theories of fairness in a growing number of lawsuits across the country. Generally, these 
lawsuits claim that such laws violate Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (Title IX) and 
the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
This Legal Sidebar begins by explaining the constitutional and statutory bases for the legal challenges to 
policies and laws regulating gender in school sports. It then summarizes the approaches federal district 
and appellate courts have taken to these lawsuits across the country and describes the potential for 
Supreme Court involvement. The Sidebar concludes by identifying several considerations for Congress. 
Legal Context 
Equal Protection Clause Claims for Sex Discrimination 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause provides that “no state shall . . . deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” To withstand scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause, a law may treat similarly situated persons differently only if there is a sufficient 
governmental reason to do so. Whether a governmental classification survives an equal protection 
challenge depends on the basis for the classification (i.e., who the law treats differently) and the 
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government’s rationale for the classification. Courts apply one of three tiers of scrutiny depending on the 
type of classification at issue. The first tier, known as strict scrutiny, applies to classifications on 
categories such as race, religion, alienage, and national origin, which the Court has described as “suspect” 
classifications. To withstand strict scrutiny, a law that involves a suspect classification must be “narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.” Under the second tier, called intermediate scrutiny, 
a so-called “quasi-suspect” classification, including sex-based distinctions, must be supported by an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” that the classification is “substantially related” to “an important 
governmental interest.” Laws that discriminate based on non-suspect classifications are subject to the 
third tier, rational-basis scrutiny, under which the government must show only that the discriminatory 
law is “rationally related” to a “legitimate government interest.” In general, the more suspect the 
classification at issue discriminated against, the stronger the government’s justification for that 
discrimination must be. 
Title IX Claims for Sex Discrimination 
Title IX bans sex discrimination in educational institutions that receive federal funding. Sex 
discrimination arises under Title IX when the following elements are met: (1) an individual must be 
excluded from, denied benefits of, or discriminated against under an educational program due to sex; 
(2) the educational program must receive federal funding at the time of the exclusion; and (3) the 
individual must be harmed by the treatment. 
The Supreme Court has consistently compared Title IX to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 
VII), which prohibits making employment decisions on the basis of sex, among other things. The Court’s 
Title IX jurisprudence has at times imported Title VII analysis, whereas at other times it has emphasized 
the differences between the two statutes. For this reason, developments in the Title VII landscape can be 
of significant importance to Title IX litigation. Notably, the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Bostock v. 
Clayton County held that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination in employment includes 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. Because of the frequent overlap 
between Title VII and Title IX, some federal courts have read Bostock to apply to Title IX. The Supreme 
Court has not clarified this issue. 
Legal Challenges to State Laws and School Policies 
Permissive Policies 
Some lawsuits challenge policies that permit transgender women to compete on sports teams that align 
with their gender identity. These lawsuits argue that such policies violate Title IX by reducing the odds of 
a cisgender woman’s success in athletic competition. The argument in these claims is typically that 
biological males have inherent physical advantages over biological females and that transgender women 
retain those characteristics regardless of gender-affirming treatments. 
Soule v. Connecticut Association of Schools, Inc. 
The Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference allows students to participate on sports teams 
consistent with their gender identity, regardless of the gender listed on their birth certificates. In Soule v. 
Connecticut Association of Schools, Inc., four cisgender girl student athletes on their high school’s track 
team challenged the policy under Title IX, arguing that the policy limited the ability of students who were 
“born female” to succeed in athletics or obtain the benefits that come from excellent athletic ability, like 
scholarships. The student-plaintiffs sought to remove records set by transgender girls who had 
participated in the conference. In an opinion released on December 16, 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
  
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for the Second Circuit rejected the claim, holding that the conference had reason to believe that allowing 
transgender girls to participate on girls sports teams was consistent with, rather than in violation of, 
federal law. Citing guidance from the Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Bostock, and a number of circuit court opinions, the court held that there was ample 
evidence for the conference to reasonably conclude that “discrimination based on transgender status is 
generally prohibited under federal law.” The court concluded that there was no evidence that the 
conference’s “facially neutral policy” was discriminatory or otherwise in violation of Title IX. On 
February 13, 2023, the Second Circuit announced that it would rehear Soule en banc. As of this writing, 
the rehearing has not been scheduled.  
Restrictive Policies 
A second, more common type of lawsuit involves challenges to policies that restrict transgender women 
from participating on women’s sports teams. The facts in these lawsuits tend to follow a consistent 
formula: a transgender woman plays on or plans to play on a women’s sports team but is prevented from 
doing so because of an intervening state law requiring women’s sports participants to be “biologically 
female.” Unlike lawsuits addressing permissive policies, lawsuits addressing restrictive policies tend to 
include claims for violations of both the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. The additional Equal 
Protection Clause claim typically alleges that these policies wrongfully treat transgender students 
differently from their cisgender peers, requiring an analysis as to the government’s motivation for treating 
the two groups differently under the law.  
Hecox v. Little 
On August 17, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho granted a preliminary injunction 
against Idaho’s Fairness in Women’s Sports Act, which (1) categorically bans transgender women from 
participation in women’s sports; (2) requires physical examinations in the event of a dispute as to an 
athlete’s sex; and (3) creates a private cause of action against a school for any student who suffers any 
harm due to the participation of a transgender woman on their team. Hecox v. Little involves a challenge 
to this law brought by two students: a transgender woman who intended to try out for her university’s 
track and cross country teams but was unable to due to her gender identity and a cisgender woman who 
played on her high school soccer team but was concerned that competitors may question her sex due to 
her “masculine” appearance. The students sought a preliminary injunction on the grounds that the act 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. The district court agreed, 
holding that both plaintiffs had a strong likelihood of success under intermediate scrutiny on the merits of 
their Equal Protection claims. 
The court rejected the state’s argument that the justification of promoting equality in women’s sports was 
“exceedingly persuasive” because transgender women make up less than one percent of the population 
and are therefore very unlikely to displace any cisgender women from sports participation. Furthermore, 
because the act specifically requires that testosterone levels absent medication be equal to those of a 
cisgender woman, the court found that the state’s purpose was less likely to be leveling the playing field 
for women than it was purely discriminatory: if the state’s true concern was the athletic advantage of 
higher testosterone levels, the court reasoned that the law would regulate an athlete’s current testosterone 
levels, rather than what they might have been in the past. The court also held that the act likely 
discriminates against cisgender women, as it singled out any “masculine” looking athletes on a women’s 
sports team for a potentially invasive physical or genetic test. The court explained that “it appears that the 
Act hinders those benefits [that flow from success in athletic endeavors] by subjecting women and girls to 
unequal treatment, excluding some from participating in sports at all, incentivizing harassment and 
exclusionary behavior, and authorizing invasive bodily examinations.” The court did not address the Title 
IX claim, as it was not included in the original petition for initial relief.  
  
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After granting the preliminary injunction, the district court determined that the case did not become moot 
when one of the plaintiffs withdrew from her university before returning and planning to try out for the 
track and cross country teams again in fall 2023. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision on 
the mootness issue on January 30, 2023. On August 17, 2023, the Ninth Circuit also upheld the district 
court’s grant of a preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of 
their equal protection claims. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, based on the pleadings, the state had 
categorically banned transgender girls and women from participating in school sports without evidence 
that the ban was substantially related to the state’s interests in equal opportunity in women’s sports. A trial 
on the merits remains pending. 
D.N. v. DeSantis 
D.N. v. DeSantis is a case in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida challenging 
Florida’s “Fairness in Women’s Sports Act,” which limits participation on public secondary and post-
secondary women’s sports teams to cisgender women and creates a cause of action against a school for 
students who “suffer direct or indirect harm” as a result of a violation of the act. D.N., a transgender girl, 
filed claims against the State of Florida under the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX, alleging that the 
act discriminated against her on the basis of transgender status and would prevent her from playing soccer 
with the teams she has been playing with for years. 
The district court stayed this case pending the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Adams v. School Board of St. 
Johns County. Adams, which involved a school policy that banned transgender students from using the 
bathroom matching their gender identity, held that the policy does not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
or Title IX.  On the Equal Protection question, the Eleventh Circuit held that the bathroom policy 
withstood intermediate scrutiny because it is related to an important privacy interest of students using the 
bathroom only with their same “biological sex” and is “clearly related” to that interest. On the Title IX 
question, the court did not find discrimination on the basis of sex because the court saw Title IX as 
banning discrimination on the basis of “biological sex,” rather than gender identity. Thus, the court ruled 
that Title IX allowed for bathrooms to be segregated on the basis of gender identity. The Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Adams may be determinative for the district court’s decision in D.N. No decision has 
been made in this case. 
A.M. v. Indianapolis Public Schools  
In July 2022, the Indiana state legislature passed a bill that banned students who were determined to be 
male at birth from participating on sports teams designated for girls or women. The Southern District of 
Indiana addressed a Title IX claim brought by A.M., a ten-year-old transgender girl, who was told that the 
new law barred her from playing on her school’s girls softball team. Applying the Supreme Court’s Title 
VII analysis in Bostock v. Clayton County to Title IX in line with the Seventh Circuit’s 2017 decision in 
Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District, the court held that laws treating students differently on the 
basis of transgender status are illegal under Title IX. While A.M. also raised an Equal Protection claim, 
the court did not address this claim in granting the preliminary injunction reserving that issue for 
discussion on the merits. The Seventh Circuit declined to hear an appeal brought by the school district. 
The district court has not yet resolved the merits of the case.  
B.P.J. v. West Virginia Board of Education 
B.P.J. v. West Virginia Board of Education is a challenge to the West Virginia “Save Women’s Sports Act.” 
The act, which became law on April 28, 2021, provides that only “biological females” can participate in 
women’s sports in all public interscholastic, intercollegiate, intramural, or club sports teams at the 
secondary or post-secondary level, categorically barring transgender women. Like the other restrictive 
  
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policies discussed above, the act also creates a cause of action for any student who “suffers any direct or 
indirect harm as a result of a violation” of the act.  
The case was brought by a transgender girl about to enter middle school who wanted to participate on her 
middle school’s girls cross country and track teams but was barred from participation by the act. The 
plaintiff alleged that the act violated the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX because it unlawfully 
discriminated based upon sex. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia decision, 
by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin, initially agreed and granted a preliminary injunction on July 21, 2021. On 
the constitutional issue, Judge Goodwin applied intermediate scrutiny and found that, as applied to B.P.J., 
the law “is not substantially related to providing equal athletic opportunity for girls.” Because B.P.J. was 
on puberty blockers and was participating in a non-contact sport, Judge Goodwin did not find the 
government’s alleged interest in keeping transgender girls out of sports to be valid. Judge Goodwin’s 
analysis of the Title IX claim also found B.P.J. likely to win on the merits because she was clearly 
discriminated against due to her biological sex and harmed in that she would not be able to participate on 
a sports teams that aligns with how she presents herself to and experiences the world. 
That same court’s decision on the merits, which it announced on January 5, 2023, reversed course and 
held that the West Virginia law did not violate either the Equal Protection Clause or Title IX. On the Equal 
Protection issue, Judge Goodwin applied intermediate scrutiny to the West Virginia law and held that the 
athletic advantage that testosterone gives biological males is substantially related to the state’s important 
interest in promoting fair women’s sports. Judge Goodwin also held that “Title IX used ‘sex’ in the 
biological sense because its purpose was to promote sex equality,” and therefore West Virginia’s law did 
not violate Title IX. On February 7, 2023, Judge Goodwin denied a stay pending appeal, meaning that 
West Virginia could enforce the law against B.P.J. while the case awaited a hearing before the Fourth 
Circuit. The Fourth Circuit overturned the district court’s denial of a stay pending appeal on February 22, 
and the Supreme Court denied an application for review of that decision on April 6, leaving the Fourth 
Circuit’s ruling in place.  
Potential Supreme Court Involvement 
The Supreme Court has not expressly held whether transgender status is a quasi-suspect classification 
subject to intermediate scrutiny or whether transgender status is protected under Title IX. In June 2021, 
the Court declined to hear an appeal of Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board, a Fourth Circuit case 
holding that Title IX protects against discrimination on the basis of gender identity in the context of 
access to bathrooms and other gender-segregated facilities. The Court indicated that Justices Thomas and 
Alito would have granted the petition for certiorari, but neither Justice wrote a dissent. The decision not to 
hear Grimm aligned with the Court’s denial of a petition for certiorari in Parents for Privacy v. Barr, a 
Ninth Circuit case addressing a similar issue, in December 2020.  
Most recently, the Court’s April 2023 denial in B.P.J. of a stay pending appeal drew a dissent from Justice 
Alito, joined by Justice Thomas. While the dissent was on procedural grounds, it suggests that there might 
be at least two future votes in favor of deciding whether Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause protect 
students against discrimination on the basis of gender identity.  
Congressional Considerations 
The statutory and legal landscape of regulating gender in sports is in flux. The various challenges to these 
state laws and policies have resulted in conflicting court decisions, and many of the cases remain pending 
decisions on the merits. The courts will likely have a role in determining which laws regulating sports 
participation based on gender identity are permissible, and the Department of Education has already 
proposed amending Title IX regulations to address this topic. Congress also has several options if it
  
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wishes to shape this debate. The House’s recent passage of H.R. 734, which amends Title IX to require 
athletes on sports teams designated for females to be “biologically female,” represents one way federal 
legislation might address this issue. If H.R. 734 or another bill restricting sports participation on the basis 
of “biological sex” ultimately passes, it may be impacted by future Supreme Court decisions, as courts 
have not definitively addressed which level of scrutiny should apply when reviewing classifications based 
on gender identity. A future Supreme Court decision imposing intermediate scrutiny on such 
classifications would likely make it more difficult for H.R. 734 or like bills to survive an Equal Protection 
challenge. Alternatively, if Congress wishes to insulate transgender girls and women from state legislation 
like that discussed above, it could amend Title IX to explicitly require recipients to allow students to 
participate on the teams that match their gender identities. Such permissive legislation is less likely to 
face challenges under the Equal Protection Clause, though it could face other legal challenges. Congress 
could also let these issues proceed in the courts without taking legislative action, which may lead to a 
patchwork of permissive and restrictive policies across the country.  
 
Author Information 
 
Madeline W. Donley 
   
Legislative Attorney 
 
 
 
 
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