Updated September 28, 2023
Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
Overview
According to Saudi officials, the kingdom intends to
The 118th Congress may engage the Biden Administration
develop the capacity to produce nuclear fuel using domestic
with regard to U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia’s National
resources. In 2019, Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abd al
Project for Atomic Energy and the potential for future U.S.-
Aziz bin Salman Al Saud said, “even if we scale up [nuclear
Saudi nuclear energy cooperation. In May 2022, Saudi
power] ... we want to go to the full cycle, to producing the
Arabia invited technical bids related to the planned
uranium, enriching the uranium.” The minister further stated
construction of two nuclear reactors, and, in January 2023, a
in January 2023 that Saudi Arabia intends to use its
Saudi minister restated the kingdom’s intention to use its
substantial domestic uranium resources for producing LEU.
domestic uranium resources for producing low-enriched
Saudi Arabia is a state party to the nuclear Nonproliferation
uranium (LEU) as nuclear fuel.
Treaty (NPT), which requires the government to accept
Congress and successive Administrations have sought the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on
kingdom’s commitment to forgo the most proliferation-
all nuclear facilities. Such comprehensive safeguards
sensitive nuclear facilities—those for enriching uranium or
agreements (CSA) impede the development of nuclear
reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to obtain plutonium—and
weapons. Saudi Arabia has not concluded an additional
Saudi Arabia’s acceptance of enhanced international
protocol to its CSA. Such a protocol would improve the
safeguards on its nuclear program. Previous Administrations IAEA’s ability to investigate undeclared nuclear facilities
linked prospects for a U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation
and activities. Saudi Arabia’s CSA does include a small
agreement to these conditions, and Congress has limited the
quantities protocol (SQP) which, according to the IAEA,
use of certain funds to support possible U.S. nuclear exports
“holds in abeyance” most comprehensive safeguards
to Saudi Arabia unless the kingdom makes such
agreement procedures if the government neither possesses
commitments. Depending on its nature and extent, possible
more than a specified amount of nuclear material nor has
future U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation may require
introduced nuclear material into a facility. In September
Department of Energy (DOE) authorizations and/or
2023, Saudi officials told the IAEA they intend to rescind
congressional approval of U.S.-Saudi agreements.
the SQP and “implement the full” CSA. Other international
Saudi Nuclear Plans and Policy
mechanisms are designed to restrict the spread of sensitive
nuclear technology, including enrichment technology.
In July 2017, Saudi Arabia approved a National Project for
In 2020, Saudi authorities denied press reports citing
Atomic Energy, including plans to build large and small
unnamed Western officials claiming that Saudi Arabia, with
nuclear reactors for electricity production and water
China’s help, built a facility for milling uranium oxide ore.
desalination. The project is part of a broader Saudi
Saudi Arabia’s IAEA safeguards agreement requires the
government effort to diversify the kingdom’s economy and
government to declare such a facility to the agency. Other
expand the use of non-fossil-fuel-based energy. Saudi
Arabia holds 16% of the world’s proven reserves of
press reports discussed another possible undeclared site.
crude
oil, has the world’s fourth-largest reserves of natural gas,
Saudi state policy maintains that Saudi nuclear energy
and consumes the second most energy in the Middle East.
pursuits are limited to peaceful purposes. Crown Prince
Oil and natural gas generate roughly 39% and 60% of the
Mohammed bin Salman bin Abd al Aziz Al Saud said in
kingdom’s electricity, respectively.
September 2023 stated that if Iran were to obtain a
Saudi authorities have worked to develop required legal and
nuclear weapon, the kingdom will have to follow suit.
regulatory frameworks with the support of the IAEA.
Agency officials completed a nuclear infrastructure review
Threats to the security of critical Saudi infrastructure may
in Saudi Arabia in 2018 and issued a final report in January
raise concerns about the security of Saudi nuclear facilities.
2019. The kingdom established a Nuclear and Radiological
The U.S. government notes security threats in Saudi Arabia
Regulatory Commission in March 2018, and, in March
from terrorist groups and hostile regional actors, including
2022, created the Saudi Nuclear Energy Holding Company
missile and rocket attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure and
(SNEHC) to develop and operate planned nuclear facilities.
government facilities that U.S. officials attribute to Iran or
In 2017, the Saudi government solicited marketing
Iran-backed groups. Ongoing U.S.-Saudi security
information from potential international partner companies
cooperation seeks to mitigate these threats and others.
for reactor construction, but did not meet its original
U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Cooperation
timeline for initiating a formal bidding process. In May
2022, Saudi officials invited technical bids from companies
In 2008, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed a
in Russia, China, and South Korea related to the planned
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) stating bilateral
construction of two 1.4 giga-watt electric (GWe) reactors at
intent to cooperate on nuclear activities in the fields of
Khor Duweihin, a coastal area between the kingdom’s
medicine, industry, and electricity production. The
borders with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
nonbinding MOU stated Saudi Arabia’s intent “to rely on
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Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
existing international markets for nuclear fuel services as an
licensing for commercial, medical, and industrial purposes;
alternative to the pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing.”
the export of reactors and critical reactor components; and
other commodities under Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The Obama and Trump Administrations engaged the
export licensing authority. Foreign entities’ nuclear exports
kingdom on the prospects for reaching a bilateral civil
to Saudi Arabia containing U.S.-origin technology might
nuclear energy agreement, including through formal
require U.S. consent.
negotiations over the text of a proposed “123 agreement”
(see below) in 2012 and 2018. The Government
So-called “123 agreements,” must include the terms,
Accountability Office (GAO) reported in 2020 that the
conditions, duration, nature, and scope of cooperation, as
governments had “not made significant progress toward a
well as meet several nonproliferation criteria. The President
nuclear cooperation agreement because of persistent
must make a written determination “that the performance of
differences ... over nonproliferation conditions, including
the proposed agreement will promote, and will not constitute
U.S. insistence that Saudi Arabia conclude an Additional
an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security.”
Protocol with the IAEA and that Saudi Arabia agree to
The AEA requires Congress to review a 123 agreement for
restrictions on enrichment and reprocessing.” The State
two time periods totaling 90 days of continuous session. If
Department said in August 2020 that the United States
the President has not exempted the agreement from any
would seek an agreement “with strong nonproliferation
requirements of Section 123(a), it becomes effective at the
protections that will enable Saudi and U.S. nuclear
end of the second period, unless, during that time, Congress
industries to cooperate.”
adopts a joint resolution disapproving the agreement and the
resolution becomes law. Section 57(b)(2) of the AEA allows
National Nuclear Security Administration Administrator Jill
for limited cooperation related to the “development or
Hruby and Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm have
production of any special nuclear material outside of the
talked to Saudi leaders about the government’s nuclear
United States.” A 123 agreement is not necessary for such
program, Hruby told the Senate Armed Services Committee
cooperation, which mostly involves transfers of unclassified
in April 2023, adding that the Administration is “asking the
nuclear technology and services pursuant to “Part 810
Saudis to be consistent with nonproliferation standards that
authorizations”
we have for every other country that we work with.”
that are not subject to congressional review.
Section 123 agreements do not require recipient
In June 2023, the Saudi Foreign Minister said the kingdom
would “
governments to forgo enrichment or reprocessing. Still,
very much prefer to be able to have the U.S. as one
some 123 agreements contain provisions designed to
of the bidders” for its program, noting “there are others that
discourage enrichment and reprocessing programs in the
are bidding, and obviously we would like to build our
Middle East. The 2009 U.S.-UAE 123 agreement provides
program with the best technology in the world, and that will
the United States the right to terminate nuclear cooperation
require a certain agreement to be in place.”
with that country if the UAE “possesses sensitive nuclear
From 2017 to 2019, DOE granted seven “Part 810”
facilities within its territory or otherwise engages in
authorizations (per 10 C.F.R. §810) for U.S. companies to
activities within its territory relating to enrichment of
engage in civil nuclear discussions, including marketing,
uranium or reprocessing of nuclear fuel.” An Agreed Minute
with Saudi Arabia in response to the kingdom’s 2017
to that agreement states that its terms “shall be no less
request for marketing information. In 2022, U.S. and Saudi
favorable in scope and effect than those which may be
officials signed an MOU on the exchange of technical
accorded” to other countries in the Middle East. The minute
information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters.
also explains that, if the U.S. government concludes a more-
favorable 123 agreement with another regional government,
According to unnamed U.S. and Israeli officials cited in a
the United States will, at the UAE’s request, consult with the
September 2023 press report, the United States is
government “regarding the possibility of amending” the 123
considering a U.S.-run uranium enrichment operation in
agreement with equally favorable terms.
Saudi Arabia in conjunction with proposals to encourage
Saudi Arabia to normalize relations with Israel.
Congress and U.S. Policy
Since FY2020, Congress annually has prohibited the use of
Both highly enriched uranium and plutonium can be
appropriated funds for Export-Import Bank support for
used as fuel in some types of nuclear reactors but also
nuclear exports to Saudi Arabia until the kingdom has a 123
are used as fissile material in nuclear weapons.
agreement “in effect”; “has committed to renounce uranium
Consequently, ostensibly peaceful enrichment and
enrichment and reprocessing on its territory under that
reprocessing facilities frequently generate concern that
agreement”; and has “signed and implemented” an
a government’s facilities may aid nuclear weapons
Additional Protocol with the IAEA [most recently for
programs. Conversely, a nuclear program without such
FY2023 in Section 7041(i), Division K, P.L. 117-328].
facilities generally poses little proliferation risk, but
Since 2018, some Members have introduced bills that would
may pose security and/or environmental risks.
have required a congressional joint resolution of approval
U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Requirements
before a 123 agreement with Saudi Arabia could take effect.
Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
Christopher M. Blanchard, Specialist in Middle Eastern
(AEA, 22 U.S.C. §§2011 et seq.), requires nuclear
Affairs
cooperation agreements for significant nuclear cooperation
Paul K. Kerr, Specialist in Nonproliferation
with foreign governments. Such cooperation includes the
transfer of certain U.S.-origin nuclear material subject to
IF10799
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Prospects for U.S.-Saudi Nuclear Energy Cooperation
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https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF10799 · VERSION 21 · UPDATED